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## HANNIBAL'S COVENANT.

On a summer day, in the fourth year of Hannibal's war (215 B. C.), the Roman squadron which patrolled the waters off the Calabrian coast noticed a suspect ship sailing from Cape Lacinium (near Croton). Cutters sent by the Roman admiral P. Valerius Flaccus, captured the vessel. Among the prisoners were Xenocrates, the Macedonian envoy, returning from a mission to Hannibal's headquarters in Campania, and three Punic emissaries, Gisgo, Bostar, and Mago, sailing with him from Philip V of Macedonia. The diplomats carried a letter from Hannibal to the Macedonian king and an exemplar of the treaty.

NOTE: The following abbreviations are used in this paper: Gsell = S. Gsell, *Histoire ancienne de l'Afrique du Nord*, I-IV (Paris, 1916-20); Holleaux = M. Holleaux, *Rome, la Grèce et les monarchies hellénistiques* (Paris, 1923); Korošec = V. Korošec, *Hethitische Staatsverträge (Leipziger rechtswissenschaftliche Studien*, LX [Leipzig, 1931]); Langdon = S. Langdon and A. H. Gardiner, "The treaty of alliance between Hattusili . . . and . . . Rameses II," *J. E. A.*, VI (1920), pp. 179-205; Luckenbill = D. D. Luckenbill, "Hittite Treaties and Letters," *Amer. Journ. of Semitic Lang.*, XXXVII (1920-1), pp. 161-211; Meissner = B. Meissner, "Die Beziehungen Ägyptens," etc., *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländisch. Gesellsch.*, LXXII (1918), pp. 32-65; Michel = Michel, *Recueil d'inscriptions grecques* (Paris, 1903-); R. I. D. A. = *Revue Internationale des Droits de l'Antiquité*; Tod, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions* (Oxford, 1900); Täubler = E. Täubler, *Imperium Romanum* (Berlin, 1902); Walbank = F. W. Walbank, *Philip V* (Cambridge, 1940); *Politische Dokumente aus Kleinasien* (Berlin, 1907); *Ancient Near Eastern Texts*, ed. J. B. Pritchard (Princeton, 1955).

between both powers. Prisoners and papers were sent to the Senate.<sup>1</sup>

Two generations later, Polybius was allowed to make copies of these documents in the Roman archives. He included a transcript of the treaty (and perhaps of Hannibal's letter) in the seventh book of his Histories. The book is lost, but a Byzantine compiler, among other excerpts from Polybius' work, has also preserved the text of the oath sworn by Hannibal to Philip V.<sup>2</sup>

But this Greek text, as philological examination has shown, is a translation of the Phoenician original (often awkwardly literal). Hannibal spoke his oath in his own language. Polybius has reproduced verbatim the official version of this Punic oath, which was given to the Macedonian ambassador by Hannibal. This philological situation makes the interpretation of Hannibal's Oath particularly difficult. The Greek legal language used in this instrument more often conceals than expresses Punic legal terminology. Add that we have no direct, and only a few indirect, parallels to help us in explaining the meaning of a Punic document.

Our ignorance of Carthaginian institutions prevents us from fully understanding Hannibal's Oath. Many data, which would be precious, are still meaningless for us. Yet, the knowledge that the Oath is a Punic instrument enables us, if I am not mistaken, to grasp the form and the essence of this unique record.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Liv., XXIII, 33-34; cf. G. de Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani*, III, 2 (Turin, 1917), p. 407. On chronology cf. Holleaux, p. 181; Walbank, pp. 70 and 299. As Livy's narrative shows, Hannibal was at this time at Capua (Liv., XXIII, 33, 5), in the beginning of the summer (cf. XXIII, 39, 4).

<sup>2</sup> Pol., VII, 9. Cf., generally, my paper "An Oath of Hannibal," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXV (1944), pp. 87-102. The latest paper on the subject, so far as I know, is E. Manni's "L'alleanza punico-macedone del 215 A. C.," *Memoria della R. Accademia di Bologna*, Classe di Scienze filosofali, Ser. IV, III (1941), which gives bibliography; cf. also Walbank, pp. 68 ff.; particularly Holleaux, pp. 179-83; Walbank, pp. 68 ff.; de Sanctis, p. 407. Hannibal's Oath is quoted here according to my mentioned article.

<sup>3</sup> I have prepared a detailed commentary on the Oath, but it has not yet been published. It will throw light upon the difficult passages. For the present, I add some addenda to my previous paper. On the protocol of the oath, see now A. Aymard, "Le protocol royal grec,"

## I.

The understanding of every document must begin with the explanation of its structure. The Punic record is an oath, the "oath which Hannibal has sworn," as the first line of the document announces. Now, the oath was (and is) essentially a self-imprecation in the case of perjury. "Every oath ends in a curse on the perjurer."<sup>4</sup> International agreements, in the Orient as well as in Greece, were guaranteed by imprecatory oaths. For instance, Ba'alu of Tyre called down upon himself a dozen calamities, such as to fall into the paws of a hungry lion, if ever he should violate the treaty concluded with Esarhaddon of Assyria. The treaties between Rome and Carthage were also validated by conditional curses. A Roman annalist pictured Hannibal pronouncing an oath to his soldiers and calling upon gods to destroy him should he break faith. Hannibal's vow of eternal enmity to Rome, taken with his hand laid on the entrails of a sacrifice, was, as his gesture shows, a self-imprecation.<sup>5</sup> Yet Hannibal's oath tendered to Philip of Macedonia contains no curse. What is the meaning of this deviation?

The oath serves to guarantee an assertion by a supernatural

*R. E. A.*, L (1948), pp. 232-63 and "Basileus Makedonon," *R. I. D.* IV (1950), pp. 61-97. The Oath distinguishes between the king and the Macedonians. Cf. Walbank, pp. 264-6. In the treaty of 264, Hieron is likewise distinguished from the Syracusans. *Pol.*, I, 62, 8. Cf. *I. G.*, XIV, 7; A. Wilhelm, *J. O. A. I.*, III (1900), p. 168; W. Hüttl, *Verfassungsgeschichte von Syrakus* (Reichenberg, 1929), p. 136. On the Punic gods invoked by Hannibal cf. R. Dussaud, "Astarté, Pontos et Ba'al," *C. R. A. I.*, 1947, pp. 201-25 and *idem*, *Syria*, XXV (1946-8), pp. 205-30. Hannibal distinguishes between the full citizens of Carthage and the "plebs" (see *Oath*, 97). The same distinction in New Carthage (*Pol.*, X, 17, 6-7): *πολιτικοί* and *χειρότεροι*. Cf. also the co-existence of *astoi* and *Alexandreis* in Alexandria. Cf. *Rev. Phil.*, LIII (1927), p. 162 and now V. Arangio-Ruiz, *R. I. D. A.*, IV (1950), pp. 1-20.

<sup>4</sup> Plut., *Q. Rom.*, 44. On the oath as conditional curse cf. R. Hirzel, *Der Eid* (Leipzig, 1902), pp. 137-41; J. Pederson, *Der Eid bei den Semiten* (Strassburg, 1914), pp. 108-19.

<sup>5</sup> Ba'alu treaty: E. F. Weidner, "Ein Staatsvertrag der Phönizier," *Orientforschung*, VIII (1931-2), pp. 31-4. Eng. trans. Luckenbill, *Ancient Records of Assyria* (Chicago, 1922), p. 10. Hannibal's oaths: Liv., XXI, 45, 8; *Pol.*, II, 10, 10. The curse in Esnum-Eshmun'azar inscription: G. A. Smith, *Semitic Inscriptions* (Oxford, 1903), p. 10.

power.<sup>6</sup> (*Est enim ius iurandum adfirmatio religiosa*, Cic., *De Off.*, III, 104.) Whether the oath-taker invokes the Almighty as witness or speaks standing on the hide of a tiger, he brings a third partner into the agreement between himself and the opposite party. The proper function of the oath is precisely that: to transform the bipartite relation of the contracting parties into a triangular bond in which the sacral force has a share. Thus, every oath must necessarily have these two parts: a) the assertion, and b) its supernatural confirmation. The self-imprecation furnishes the third component of the oath. Without the curse, the supernatural guarantor may not strike down the faithless partner. Thus, his word would remain unconfirmed and, ultimately, valueless. The oath without adjuration would be like a law without sanction, a *lex imperfecta*.

Yet, the opposite party is more interested in the fulfillment of a promise than in punishment of the broken faith. The sacred force, invoked by the oath, may also be brought in, not to punish the perjurer, but to prevent the perjury. This affirming oath, without curse, is particularly fitting to establish a lasting brotherhood. Saxo Grammaticus, a Danish author of the thirteenth century, tells that the ancient Danes, in choosing a king, stood on stones "in order to foreshadow from the steadfastness of the stones that the deed would be lasting."

The rites of the artificial brotherhood, which occur all the world over, are of the same type. There is no curse. But in sucking one another's blood, or sharing the same meal, or smoking the calumet together, and so on, men by these ritual acts confirm their will to establish a mutual bond. The Hebrew *berit* ("covenant" of the English Bible) was also a stabilizing oath, without curse, in which God was invoked to make the promise stand firm. Lacking the imprecation, all these oaths were bipartite. They contained the assertion of the swearer and the invocation of divinity. In describing the conclusion of a blood-covenant between two Oriental princes, Tacitus (*Ann.*, XII, 47), Tacitus' interest and skill, sharply distinguishes this rite from the oath of the Danes. The covenant was guaranteed (not by a

<sup>6</sup> For the history of the oath see my paper "Couper une alliance," *Archiv für Völkerkunde*, V (1951), pp. 133-56.

curse, but) by the bond of blood. *Id foedus arcum habetur quasi mutuo cruce sacratum.*<sup>7</sup>

The "covenanted" form of the oath was not peculiar to the Hebrews among the North-West Semitic peoples. It was also used by the Arabs and other neighbors of Israel. Biblical authors speak of *berit* between Edom and its confederates, between Solomon and Hiram of Tyre. Moreover, the existence of a god called Baal-*berit* at Shechem offers an incontrovertible proof that Canaanites, i. e., the Phoenicians, also used the "covenanted" pledge. A recently discovered Canaanite (Phoenician) incantation speaks of an "everlasting bond" (*'alat*) made by the god Assur with the bearer of the amulet. It seems that this bond was again a covenant like *berit*. Thus *'alat* may have been the Phoenician term for covenant.<sup>8</sup>

The Carthaginians brought not only their religion but also their diplomatic style from Phoenicia. A rather obscure clause in the first treaty between Rome and Carthage became meaningful when the same provision was discovered in the agreement between Esarhaddon of Assyria and a king of Tyre. The men of Rivers, Lakes, and Springs among the gods witnessing Hannibal's oath, exceptional in Greece, was a standing formula in the Near Eastern treaties. Besides his own gods, Hannibal also invoked "all the gods who possess Macedonia and the rest of Greece." This reference to gods of the other party is so alien to Greek and Roman (and modern) practice that commentators regard the passage as interpolated. Yet, the formula again belongs to the diplomatic style of the ancient East. The king of Tyre mentioned before called down upon himself the conditional curse not only of Phoenician gods but of "the gods of Assyria and Accad" as well. A thousand male and female deities of Khatti land, together with the same number of deities

<sup>7</sup> Saxo quoted in J. G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough*, I (3rd ed., London, 1907), p. 160. On *berit* cf. J. Pederson, *Israel* (Oxford Univ. Press, 1926), I-II, pp. 278-308; W. Robertson Smith, *Lectures on the Religion of the Semites* (3rd ed., New York, 1927), Introd.; H. G. Begrich, "Berit," *Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft* (1944), pp. 1-10.

<sup>8</sup> Obad. 7; I Reg. 5, 26; 15, 19. Baal-Berit, see Th. H. Gaster, "A Canaanite Magical Text," *Journal of Semitic Studies* (1937), pp. 39-79. Further cf. W. F. Albright, "The Amulet Inscriptions of King Mesha," *American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures* (1951), pp. 21-3.

of Egypt, were invoked by both partners in the treaty between Ramses II and Hattushil.<sup>9</sup>

The form of Hannibal's Oath is equally antique. Toward the end of the sophisticated third century B. C., in the age of Archimedes and Chrysippus, in dealing with a Hellenic king, the Punic captain had recourse to the ancient rite of friendship, which long ago bound together Hiram of Tyre and King Solomon. As the quoted parallels show, the bipartite Oath of Hannibal, lacking imprecation, is a *berit*, the covenant without execration of the perjurer. Hannibal's Oath is the sole "covenanted" treaty which has come down to us. Elsewhere, the international *berit* is only referred to.

II

A covenant could be inaugurated by a solemn ceremony, for instance, by a common meal. But the compact could be constituted as well by pronouncing the sacramental words in the presence of gods. That made them parties to the covenant. King Jalah "stood by the pillar and made a *berit* before the Lord, to walk after the Lord and to keep His commandments" (II Reg. 23, 3). Hannibal "deposes" his oath "in the presence of all the gods who are in the expedition and who preside over this oath." Greek words here veil some Punic expression and a Phoenician thought.<sup>10</sup> Does Hannibal think of the gods who "watch over" the oath or has he in mind the deities who are

<sup>9</sup> Cf. R. Laqueur, "Symbola," *Hermes*, LXXI (1936), pp. 469-72. On the worship of living waters cf. Smith (above, n. 7), pp. 169 and 588; R. Mouterde, *Mélanges de l'université St. Joseph*, XXV (1942), p. 58; Langdon, p. 195, Korošec, p. 96. For Greek practice cf. L. Robert, *Études épigraphiques* (Paris, 1938), p. 367. On the inclusion of gods of the other party in the oath cf. Gsell, IV, p. 223, n. 1; Korošec, p. 95. Different is the oath by common deities of two States, as e.g. in *S.I.G.*<sup>3</sup>, 6; *I.G.*, IX, 1, 98.

*Oρκος δν ἔθετο Ἀννίβας . . . ἐπαντίον Αιός.* The expression is a solecism, one can deposit pledges, documents, etc. (cf. e.g. Pol., III, 67, *Enteuteais*, 22) but not an oath, except in a *Agam.*, 1570). *Anth. Pal.*, V, 133: *ὅρκος εἰς πλέων τοις οὐρανοῖς πάρεστι* "rowing to winds." In Hannibal's Oath the formula. Cf. LXX, II Reg. 23, 5: *διαθήκην* v. 29, 24: *ἔαν δὲ ὅρκον προτεθέντος* (there

present here?<sup>11</sup> In any case, he has his *dii castrenses*, probably represented by emblems on the standards, before him while he pronounces the words of the oath.<sup>12</sup> Otherwise, the deities may not catch the utterance. He speaks not for himself alone, but accompanied by co-jurors who probably repeated his words. Joshua entering into the covenant with the Gibeonites was also supported by the chiefs of Israel, who swore with him. Hannibal's co-jurors were probably members of his *concilium*, that is, the higher officers, responsible for the conduct of operations. After the capture of Saguntum, the Romans demanded the extradition of the "general Hannibal and his councillors." The names of two or three of these co-jurors have been preserved; the other names are lost in a lacuna of the Greek manuscript.<sup>13</sup> Besides the co-jurors, mentioned by name, "all Carthaginian senators" in the camp and all Carthaginians in the campaign with Hannibal are swearers of the oath. The mention of senators again is paralleled in the treaty between Esarhaddon and Ba'al<sup>u</sup>, the king of Tyre. In a passage (unfortunately damaged), the "Elders" figure besides the Phoenician ruler. On the other hand, the citizen army, as in every ancient city, is qualified to represent the whole city. There are Punic coins, minted in Sicily, bearing the legend: "the people of the Camp."<sup>14</sup>

<sup>11</sup> It is difficult to say whether the Greek word ἐφεστήκασιν corresponded to *paqad* or to *qum* in the original. Cf. R. Helbing, *Die Kasussyntax der Verba bei den Septuaginta* (Göttingen, 1928), p. 287. In the Bar-g'yh treaty (n. 20), the pact is concluded "before" (*qedem*) the gods who are asked to "open the eyes."

<sup>12</sup> Altar and *ιερὰ σκηνὴ* in Punic camp: Diod., XX, 65. For standards cf. R. Labat, *Le caractère religieux de la royauté assyro-babylonienne* (Paris, 1939), pp. 259-65; J. Faulkner, *J. E. A.*, XXVII (1941), pp. 12-18; K. Galli, *Biblisches Reallexikon* (Tübingen, 1937), pp. 160-3. On the national gods of troops cf. F. Zucker, "Die Doppelinschrift," etc., *Abh. Preuss. Akad.*, 1937, no. 6, p. 23.

<sup>13</sup> Joshua 9, 15; cf. e. g. I Macc. 6, 61; Tod, II, 158, etc. On co-jurors cf. E. Seidl, *Der Eid im ptolemäischen Recht* (Diss. jur., Munich, 1909), p. 55; A. Heuss, "Abschluss und Beurkundung," *Klio*, XXVII (1905), p. 17. Hannibal's council: Pol., III, 20, 8; 30, 10; 31, 10. Cf. Gsell, II, p. 220.

<sup>14</sup> W. F. Albright kindly referred me to the inscription of the Bar-g'yh treaty (see above, n. 5). Punic coins: B. V. Head, *A History of the Punic Wars* (Oxford, 1911), p. 877: the legend: *aq̄l b̄l*. In the Bar-g'yh treaty (n. 20) the "citizens" (*ba'ali*) of Tyre are mentioned as witnesses to the pact after and beside the kings.

## III.

Hannibal "lays down" the oath of friendship. The Greek words he uses to describe this conception are strange and ungrammatically assembled: *τὸν δρκον τοῦτον θέσθαι· περὶ φιλίας καὶ εὐνοίας καλῆς, φίλους καὶ οἰκείους καὶ ἀδελφοὺς, ἐφ' ὃτ' εἶναι . . .* The Greek words here obviously cover a Punic idiom which is unknown to us. But an Oriental parallel helps us to grasp the meaning of the clause. In the Accadian text of the treaty between Hattushil of Hatti and Ramses II of Egypt, the latter says: "Behold, now I give good brotherhood and good peace between us forever, in order to give good peace and good brotherhood . . . for ever." The same idea that amity is concluded now in order to have it permanent is then expressed in other sections of the instrument. In modern treaties a similar statement of the objects of the treaty is usually given in the preamble.<sup>15</sup>

The surprising adjective *καλός* in the quoted passage of Hannibal's oath corresponds to the adjective *damqa* (that is, good, gracious, pious, etc., according to the lexicon) in the Ramses-Hattushil treaty. In Phoenician the adjective was probably *na'im*. In the same manner, Greek scribes rendered the Latin formula *bona fide* by *καλῇ πίστει*. On the other hand, *φιλία* as a term of international law corresponds to *šalama* ("peace") in the Accadian passage quoted and to *šalom* in Phoenician, while *εὐνοία* expresses some term for "goodwill." In the treaty between Ramses and Hattushil, the kings speak of "brotherhood, friendship (or peace) and goodwill (or favor)" between them.<sup>16</sup>

By entering into the covenant, the parties become "friends, kinsmen and brothers." That again reproduces the traditional terminology of Oriental diplomacy. Naptera, wife of Ramses II,

<sup>15</sup> Cf. e.g. the treaty of Ghent (1814): Great Britain and the United States, "desirous of . . . restoring peace, friendship and good understanding . . . agreed . . . there shall be a firm and universal peace,"

terms are: *abu-ut-ta-ni sa-la-ma-a-ni u da-miķ-ta* (Langdon's also the expression *te-ma dam-ka* *damqa* in a translated and translated in Meissner, p. 43. *Φιλία καλής*, as § 12 shows. H. L. Ginsberg suggests that the Phoenician original of *εὐνοίας καλῆς* and A. Goetze, *A. N. E. T.*, p. 202, renders "brotherhood (and) good peace."

writes to the queen of Hatti after the conclusion of the Hattushil-Ramses treaty: "I am in peace and brotherhood with the great queen my sister," while "brotherhood and kinship" are terms used by Hattushil to describe his relations with the Babylonian king.<sup>17</sup>

Hannibal adds that the oath is made "in order that" or "under the conditions that." This signifies that the amity between the partners is conditioned by the fulfillment of the stipulated obligations. The same formula was used in the first agreement between Rome and Carthage: there is to be friendship between the Romans and the Carthaginians "on the following conditions" (*ἐπὶ τοῖσδε*).<sup>18</sup>

The condition of the amity is that the Carthaginians should be "preserved and guarded" by the Macedonians, and vice versa. The Greek verbs here correspond to the Punic idiom of the same meaning (*nṣr wsmr*) which has been found on some amulets. And again, the same terminology was used in the second millennium B. C. in the Near East. The first duty of a vassal of Hatti is to "preserve" (*našaru*) the overlord and his empire. As is said in the treaty between Mursil, king of Hatti, and an Asiatic prince: "As the Sun (that is, the king of Hatti) guards his own head and his land, so may he also guard the head and land of Shumashshura," who likewise takes the same obligation with respect to Mursil.<sup>19</sup>

So far, the structure and terminology of Hannibal's Oath roughly correspond to the language and composition of the Near

<sup>17</sup> These letters are transliterated in Meissner, pp. 59-60; English translation in Luckenbill, pp. 194 and 202.

<sup>18</sup> Pol., III, 22, 4: *ἐπὶ τοῖσδε φίλιαν εἶναι Πωμαῖος... καὶ Καρχηδόνιος.* Cf. Pol., I, 62, 8; III, 22, 4; 23, 2. Cf. E. Täubler, p. 263; A. Heuss, *Die völkerrechtlichen Grundlagen der römischen Aussenpolitik* (Leipzig, 1933), p. 17. Greek parallels are rare: Roman treaty with Antiochus III: Pol., XXI, 43, 1; Michel, 19 (Smyrna and Magnesia): *ἐπὶ τοῖσδε συνέθεντο τὴν φιλίαν.* Cf. also Michel, 26.

<sup>19</sup> The amulets: M. Lidzbarski, *Ephemeris für Semitische Epigraphie* (Giessen, 1903), I, p. 172. Cf. the wish formula in Ugaritic: *týrk tšlmk* (C. H. Gordon, *Ugaritic Handbook* [Roma, 1936]), p. 10, that is "guard and keep whole" (H. L. Ginsberg, *Ugaritic Texts*, p. 11). The terms referring to the duty of mutual protection are identical. Murshil's document is transliterated in Weidner, p. 181; Luckenbill, p. 181.

Eastern treaties of the second millennium B. C. Bearing in mind that a thousand years separated Hannibal from Ramses II and the Hattite kings, and that the Oriental treaties we have quoted belonged to Babylonian and not to Phoenician civilization, we must acknowledge that the similarity is astonishing. Yet, inasmuch as *berit* is a peculiar juristical institution, the dissimilarity is no less striking.

#### IV.

In the ancient world, in the Near East as well as in Greece or Italy, a treaty became binding only through its ratification by oath. The difference between the agreed stipulations (*leges foederis*, *συνθῆκαι*) and their sworn acceptance (*foedus*, *ὅρκοι*) was fundamental in the ancient law of nations. The oath was not only the best security for the observance of good faith but was equivalent to ratification in modern international law. When Ramses II wished to explain that he was bound by the treaty with the land of Hatti, he wrote as follows: "Behold, the writing of the oath, which I swore for . . . the king of Hatti, . . . is placed under the feet of Teshub, before the great gods. They are the witnesses of these words. And behold, the writing of the oath, which . . . the king of Hatti swore for me, is placed under the feet of Ra, before the great gods. They are the witnesses of these words." In this case, since both parties were obligated, the oaths were exchanged. But in one-sided engagements, while one party stipulated conditions, the other accepted the agreement by oath. Thus, in the conventions between the king of Hatti and his vassals, the former stated the terms, while the latter took oath to observe these conditions. On the other hand, when the city of Theangela capitulated on certain conditions, only Eupolemus, the conqueror, was bound by oath, since the city after surrender was in any case at the discretion of the victor. A passage in Ezekiel, which seems to puzzle commentators, refers to the same use. The Babylonian king made *berit* with Zedekiah—that is, the conclusion of the agreement, and "brought him under a curse"—that is, compelled him to take a unilateral oath to observe these conditions.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Heuss, "Die Vertragsschreibung im alten Orient," pp. 14-35 and 65-79. For Greece cf. Heuss (n. 18), pp.

"Korinthischen Bunde," *J.O.A.I.*, XXVI (1931-2),

"fair agreements and oaths" *l'dh wlzqrh* in the

"Cf. H. Bauer, "Ein Aramaischer Staats-

Accordingly, the oath-taker could invoke divine punishment on the violator of the agreement: such is the formula in the Ramses-Hattushil treaty. Or, he could enumerate his obligations and promise their fulfillment: such is the usual formula in the ancient world. Sometimes a cautious oath-taker made the promise on the explicit condition that the other party should also keep good faith.<sup>21</sup> But the swearer obviously could not include the obligations of the opposite party in the formula of his oath. He could not call down a curse on himself in the event that the other partner should be faithless. The oaths which validated the treaties in the ancient Near East, of course, did not refer to the obligations of the other party. These duties were, however, enumerated in the treaty itself. Each party mentioned its own obligations first in its copy of the pact. Yet, Hannibal in his oath states the obligations of both parties, beginning with the Macedonians. The explication of these anomalies is that *berit* is no "oath." Since the *berit* contains no curse but only presents a solemn declaration made before the Deity, it necessarily enumerates the conditions of the covenant. The *sefer-ha-berit* in Exodus (24, 7) offers a parallel. Here (Ex. 21-3) God enumerates His *mishpatim*, His conditions of the covenant, that is, the obligations of Israel toward the Lord. Then, the Lord promises to be the foe of Israel's foes and adversary of Israel's adversaries and to give the promised land to the chosen people. As a matter of fact, the *berit* (as well as the rite of artificial kinship elsewhere) was often, and perhaps originally, the unilateral act by which a man of power granted the covenant to a client. Under such conditions, the formula of the compact, spoken by the future patron, naturally mentioned the duties of the client as well.<sup>22</sup>

vertrag," *Archiv für Orientforschung*, VIII (1932-3), pp. 1-17. J. N. Epstein in *Qedem*, I (1942), pp. 78-83; cf. A. Dupont-Sommer, *Les Araméens* (Paris, 1949), pp. 56-60. Eupolemus: L. Robert, *Collection Froehner* (Paris, 1936), p. 56. M. Rostovtzeff, *R. E. A.*, XXXIII (1937), p. 8. Ramses' letter: Meissner, p. 58 (Engl. transl.: Luckenbill). Ezek. 17, 13 ('*alah* = "curse").

<sup>21</sup> See e. g. the oath of the Carians, Tod, II, 142.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Korošec, p. 25. For Roman-Punic treaties for treaties between Rome and Greek states cf. additional *berit*: I Sam. 11, 2; II Sam. 3, 12; I Kings 11, 12; 1 Macc. 1, 11. Cf. also as grant cf. Begrich (above n. 7), p. 2. Cf. e. g.

The essence of *berit* is mutual protection. Hannibal's Oath, as we have seen (p. 9), is explicitly made to hinge on this provision. But the *berit* establishes a state of peace and mutual affection permanently. *Berit* is synonymous with *shalom*, "peace," in the full sense of this word. Men or peoples bound by a covenant are brothers. They cannot do evil one to another, they are bound to help each other. This implicit meaning of the covenant explains two significant lacunae in the Oath. In the first place, there is no reference to the length of its contemplated validity. The Oath does not even contain an assurance of eternal duration of friendship which is repeatedly given in the Ramses-Hattushil treaty. On the other hand, there is no non-aggression clause which was necessarily the first and fundamental provision in ancient agreements of peace and amity. "The Hittites shall do no evil to the Mitannies and the Mitannies shall do no evil to the Hittites."<sup>23</sup>

Positively, mutual security meant a defensive alliance, which, as always in the Orient and sometimes also in Greece, refers not only to foreign foes but also to internal enemies of the contracting powers.<sup>24</sup> In the oath the parties agree that they shall not plot against one another. The stipulation appears in Greek oaths of allegiance. In the mouth of Hannibal it means the promise not to aid and abet plots against Philip, and vice versa. It would be interesting to know whether this clause was part of the style of Phoenician treaties or corresponded to a wish of the Macedonian king who had many enemies in his dominions.

The Oath, then, establishes a military alliance between the contracting parties. Without any subterfuge, the Macedonians should be "foes of the Carthaginians' foes," and vice versa. As Hattushil writes, referring to his alliance with Ramses: "We are brothers . . . with an enemy who is our common foe, verily

(Paris, 1932), p. 497: the blood-covenant is only used to accept a foreigner into a clan or to make the head of a clan a vassal of a more powerful ruler.

<sup>24</sup> Between Shubbiluliuma and Mattiuaza. Transliteration:

<sup>25</sup> f. translation: Luckenbill, p. 167. On this clause cf.

<sup>26</sup> 68. For Greek international law cf. my observations

<sup>27</sup> 103.

<sup>28</sup> al aid against the disturbers of internal quiet:

<sup>29</sup> 76. In Greek law see e.g. the Athenian

<sup>30</sup> 361: Tod, nos. 144 and 147.

we shall be hostile and with our common friend verily we shall be at peace." This promise of mutual assistance is essentially different from the duty imposed on a vassal to follow the suzerain: "with my friend he shall be at peace, with my enemy he shall be at enmity."<sup>25</sup> Yet, this provision in Hannibal's Oath is not identical with the Greek clause of defensive alliance. In the latter the only *casus foederis* was the invasion of the territory of the other partner. Likewise, in the treaty of Ramses-Hattushil, the contracting powers, and in Hittite treaties of vassalage, the suzerain, had to assist the other partner only if the latter's territory was invaded. Accordingly, in the Greek law of nations it was permissible for an ally to give military assistance to an enemy of his partner as long as the territory of the latter remained unviolated. But the *berit* established a perfect union. Hosea reproaches Israel that, having entered into covenant with Assyria, she delivers oil to Egypt, a foe of Assyria. That shows, incidentally, that the oracle was uttered in the time of king Hoshea who (in 727) intrigued with Egypt against Assyria. It also brings to mind the prohibition of giving a tribute to Egypt, "which thy fathers paid," imposed on the king of Amurru (North Syria) by Mursil II of Hatti. The obligation to be the enemy of his ally's enemy in Hannibal's Oath expressly excluded the usual Greek limitations of reciprocal obligations of the allied powers.<sup>26</sup>

A new alliance necessarily raises the question of its compatibility with the other engagements of the parties. Hannibal's war originated in a dispute about the question of whether the

<sup>25</sup> Hattushil's letter; transliterated Meissner, p. 60; translations: Luckenbill, p. 202. I reproduce Langdon's translation, p. 202. The military duties of the vassal: Korošec, pp. 72-3 and 69, 1 (the formula quoted in the text).

<sup>26</sup> On the Greek principle of limited assistance cf. *R. E. G.*, LVI (1943), pp. 291-4. The Persian wars originated in this law of *epimachia*, exercised by the Athenians in favor of Miletus but against Persia. Cf. Herod., V, 99. The *casus foederis* in the Hittite treaties of vassalage: Korošec, p. 90. On *berit* with Assyria: Hos. 12, 2. Cf. II R. Amurru treaty: E. Forrer, "Staatsverträge" (*Mittelasiatische dcrasialischcn-Aegyptischcn Gesellschaft*, XXXI [1926]), A. N. E. T., p. 204. Cf. generally Korošec, p. 46. Cf. Athens and Regium (433-2 B. C.): [οὐκ] ὀφελήσονται Πηγίων (Tod, I, p. 58).

term "allies" in the Roman-Punic peace of 241, included only those who were such at the time of making this treaty or also those who became allies afterwards. The Carthaginians interpreted the clause in the former meaning. Accordingly, Hannibal expressly states that the term "allies" in his oath is restricted to the present confederates of each party, with the specific inclusion of his future allies in Italy. On the other hand, Hannibal stipulates that military aid does not need to be furnished against allies of one's own who became enemies of the other partner. In other words, according to the general principle of legal interpretation, the earlier treaty must stand against a later. Ben Hadad of Damascus entered into covenant with Baasha of Israel. When the latter attacked Judah, Asa of Judah asked Ben Hadad for help, referring to the *berit* already made by their fathers. Ben Hadad broke his covenant with Baasha and sent his army against Israel. Hannibal expressly refuses to be placed in such an awkward position. If one of his allies attacks Philip of Macedonia, he is not obliged to espouse the latter's cause.<sup>27</sup>

Such limitations made it particularly necessary to state emphatically that the Macedonians should assist Hannibal in the present war against Rome until victory. The natural obligation not to desert an ally was often expressly confirmed in Greek

<sup>27</sup> Pol., III, 21 and 29; I Reg. 15, 17. In some Greek treaties there is a clause prohibiting engagements incompatible with the present instrument. See e.g. the alliance between Antigonus Doson (?) and Eleutherna: τὰς Ἐλευθεραιούς [ποιεῖν τὸν] πόλεμον πρὸς οὓς ἀν βασιλεὺς Ἀντίγονος πολεμήῃ· μὴ ἔχεινα δὲ ἐτέραν συμμαχίαν τίθεσθαι ἑναντίαν πρὸς Ἀντίγονον καὶ Μακεδόνας; cf. M. Guarducci, *Inscr. Creticae*, II (Rome, 1939), ch. XII, no. 21. It follows a clause of the same meaning with reference to the obligations of Antigonus. In the treaty between Rhodes and Hierapytna aid is promised against an aggression by some ally of Hierapytna: Michel, 17 = S. I. G.<sup>3</sup>, 581 = Guarducci, III, p. 32: εἰ δέ κα συστὰ πόλεμος Ὄρδοις ποτί τινα τῶν ἐν συμμαχίαι ἕόντων Ἱεραπύτνοις εἰ μέν κα πολεμῶντ<sup>λ</sup>ας· Ὄρδοις, ἀποστελλόντων τὰν συμμαχίαν Ὄρδοις Ἱεραπύτνησι, εἰ δέ κα πολεμῶνται κατάρχαντες πολέμουν, μὴ ἐπάναγκες ἔστω Ὄρδοις ἀποστέλλειν συμμαχίαν Ὄρδοις. Sometimes, there is an example of the advantage of a third party: the treaty between Miletus and Rhodes establishes a complete alliance between both cities, but of Rhodes (S. I. G.<sup>3</sup>, 633): μηθὲν ὑπεναντίον πρασ- πρὸς Ὄρδοις συμμαχίαν. Cf. also Diod., XX, 99, 3;

treaties.<sup>28</sup> But in the latter it was also usual to stipulate that the assistance must be given "in the most effective manner." To Hannibal, however, the aid was to be furnished "according to the need and to the future understanding."<sup>29</sup> Hannibal, thus, paradoxically stipulated a general alliance for the future, but only a limited help for the present war. Yet, this paradox is only apparent. The general obligation of mutual security was a part of a *berit*. But the conqueror of Italy did not wish to have a Macedonian as a principal power beside him in the war against Rome. The law of nations, ancient as well as modern, distinguished between the principal ally, who carried on the war with all his forces, and the associated powers, who merely furnished the former with a number of troops. The auxiliary had no right to any share in conquests, and the principal alone made peace, in which the associates were only included. Thus, in the peace between Magnesia and Miletus, it was agreed that "the same peace shall be also for Priene, which assisted Magnesia, and for Heracleia, which assisted Miletus."<sup>30</sup> This device to extend the benefits of peace to the States which were auxiliaries (or simply had some interest or other in the new political relationship) allowed the principal contracting powers to negotiate among themselves without taking into account the wishes and whims of their associates.

Hannibal reserved for himself the sole right of making peace with Rome provided that Philip should be comprehended in it.

<sup>28</sup> See e.g. Thuc., V, 23; V, 47; VIII, 58; *Griech. Dialekt. Inschr.*, III, 5041, etc.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. the alliance of 420 B.C. in Thuc., V, 47: *τρόπῳ δύοις ἀνδρῶνται λοχυροτάτῳ*. Cf. also e.g. the Chremonidean alliance (*S.I.G.*<sup>3</sup>, 434-5), that between Miletus and Heracleia (*ib.*, 633); Michel, 17; Michel, 21, etc.

<sup>30</sup> *S.I.G.*<sup>3</sup>, 538 = *Milet*, III, 148: *εἶναι δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν εἰρήνην καὶ Πριηνεῦσιν τοῖς συμμαχήσασι Μάγγησιν καὶ Ἡρακλεώταις τοῖς συμμαχήσασι Μιλήσιοις*. On powers that are comprehended in a treaty of peace cf. my article in *Rev. Phil.*, LXI (1935). I add that the Aetolian-Roman alliance of 212 also stipulated that either party making a separate peace with Philip should include the ally in it. *Liv.*, XXVI, 29: *si Aetoli pacem cum Philippo facerent, foederi adscriberent fore pacem si Philippus arma ab Romanis . . . abstulerit*. The condition is neither the prohibition of a separate peace (Täufel, 193, 194), nor the beginning of Roman protection of the Aetolians (*ib.*, VII, p. 125).

Hannibal promised 1) that the effects of peace should be extended to Macedonia, 2) that Rome should abandon her possessions on the other side of the Adriatic Sea and 3) should return hostages to Demetrius of Pharos, an Illyrian ruler and auxiliary of Philip. But not wishing to give the status of a principal belligerent to Philip, Hannibal obviously could not demand more than limited help. Inasmuch as auxiliary troops were paid by the assisted party, Hannibal, whose financial situation was bad in 215, reserved the decision about the assistance he might need and require.<sup>31</sup> Again, it was usual that the principal power furnished ships to carry the auxiliary force offered by the overseas ally.<sup>32</sup> Yet, Hannibal had no fleet, and Roman naval superiority was obvious and uncontested.

The treaty, further, stipulated that Philip's assistance should be given "according to the need," that is, only if Hannibal requested it. Unbidden reinforcements were not wanted. For instance, in 169 the Romans refused the contingent offered by the Achaeans for the war against Perseus of Macedonia.<sup>33</sup> Both points of the clause (aid to be given when needed and on the conditions to be fixed later) were in no manner exceptional. The first one was already usual in Oriental agreements of the second millennium B. C.<sup>34</sup> Yet, although natural in a defensive alliance against a future and indefinite aggressor,<sup>35</sup> the clause is odd in an offensive agreement concluded during the war against the foe explicitly named.

After the peace with Rome, the offensive alliance against this power will become a defensive one. Both signatories will help

<sup>31</sup> Liv., XXII, 61, 2 (in 216): *Hannibalem maxime huiusce rei (sc. pecuniae) egentem*. In 216 Hannibal requested financial assistance from Carthage (Liv., XXIII, 12, 4) but, as it seems, did not obtain it (Liv., XXVIII, 12, 5 and XXX, 2, 2). Cf. Pol., IX, 25, 6. Cf. E. Groag, *Hannibal als Politiker*, p. 105.

<sup>32</sup> Holleaux, p. 186.

<sup>33</sup> Pol., XXXVIII, 13, 5. Cf. Thuc., V, 61, 1. Particular and future agreements on the number and character of auxiliary forces and their payment are, for instance, referred to in the alliances of 418 between Sparta and Argos (Thuc., V, 79).

Ramses-Hattushil treaty, § 9, Korošec, p. 73. For the earlier provisions cf. Täubler, p. 57.

<sup>34</sup> Ramses-Hattushil treaty, § 9, Korošec, p. 73. For the earlier provisions cf. Täubler, p. 57. Cf. also Herod., I, 146, 3 (Aetolians and Attalus in 200 B. C.); Liv., XXXIX, 16, 3 (Aetolians and Attalus in 212).

one another against future Roman aggression. In a kind of afterthought, the redactor of the instrument then extended the same mutual guarantee with reference to any future aggressor. A clause allowing changes and amendments in the treaty, with the agreement of both parties, ends the instrument. Such provision was usual in Greek treaties.<sup>36</sup>

## V.

Our examination of Hannibal's Oath has produced two conclusions, one juristical, the other historical, but has also raised many problems which the present writer is unable to solve.

In the first place, Hannibal's Oath offers the sole existing document of international *berit*. The instrument shows a remarkable mixture of traditional clauses, which were already used a millennium before Hannibal, with provisions current in Hellenistic documents. It is as if in Oriental diplomacy, Abraham suddenly should become a contemporary of Polybius. This combining of new and of antique elements shows that the old-fashioned form of the "covenant" was adapted in Hellenistic Carthage to the needs of a new time.<sup>37</sup>

The comparison with the three Punic treaties, concluded with Rome, is instructive.<sup>38</sup> Although known only through Polybius' resumés of their Latin versions, these instruments clearly show the standard form of international agreements, the type which was normal in Greece as well as in the Ancient East. These treaties are bilateral "agreements" ("there is to be friendship . . . on the following conditions") which are confirmed by the oath of each party. In the "covenant," as we have seen, the pledge may be unilateral, given conditionally or without condition. Hannibal's Oath was a unilateral declaration. Did he expect a "symmetric" declaration of Philip V? We do not know.

Further, the treaties between Rome and Carthage were con-

<sup>36</sup> Cf. e.g. Thuc., V, 23; V, 47, etc.

<sup>37</sup> Arist., *Pol.*, III, 9, 11 (1280 a 35) says that Carthaginians (and Etruscans) contracted commercial treaties, written agreements, military secours and σύμβολα περὶ τοῦ μὴ δῦκειν. The "engagement not to do wrong" would be a perfect interpretation of *berit*.

<sup>38</sup> *Pol.*, III, 22-28. Cf. Täubler, p. 264; A. Piganiol, *Les traités de l'empire romain* (Paris, 1939), p. 68; M. David, "The Treaties Between Rome and Carthage," *Symbolae Van Oyen* (Leiden, 1946), p. 11.

cluded by the respective governments. Hannibal was, of course, qualified to enter into military conventions in his campaign. Polybius and Livy refer to alliances concluded between the Punic general and cities and peoples in Italy. For instance, the treaty with the Locrians stipulated that the latter had to help the Carthaginians in peace and war, and that the Carthaginians reciprocally should help the Locrians. Yet, in the same summer of 215, having concluded the preliminary negotiations with Hieronymus of Syracuse, Hannibal referred him to the Carthaginian government for the conclusion of a definitive treaty of alliance. Consequently, he had no unlimited treaty-making power.<sup>39</sup>

It is permissible to surmise that in Hellenistic Carthage the "covenant" form was used when the engager, let us say a general in the field, was not deputed by the Senate for the conclusion of this treaty. Having no power to convey rights belonging to the central government, the general, however, could engage himself and his army, by means of a *berit*. Hannibal's covenant with Philip V is not concluded in the name of the Carthaginians (as the Roman-Punic treaties). The contracting party is Hannibal himself together with the troops under his command. They swear, but this oath contains no curse on the perjurer. Whatever may happen, gods will be unable to destroy the army of Carthage if this elusive assurance is violated.

These observations throw light on the much discussed treaty of Hasdrubal. This governor-general of Punic Spain gave pledge to the Romans that the Carthaginians should not cross the Ebro for conquest. Modern critics are at a loss to understand this unilateral pledge.<sup>40</sup> If, however, we suppose that Hasdrubal entered into a covenant with Rome, this unique clause of an agreement becomes intellegible. We have only to remember how Laban set up a pillar to delimit his and Jacob's boundaries.

<sup>39</sup> Liv., XXIV, 1, 13 (treaty with the Locrians). Cf. Pol., III, 84-5; III, 23 (27); IX, 26, 7; Liv., XXIII, 7; 43, 14; XXIV, 1; XXV, 8, 8; Plut., *De Mul. Virt.*, 6 (246 c) = Polyaen., VII, 50. Negotiations with Syracuse: Pol., VII, 2; Liv., XXIV, 6.

<sup>40</sup> Pol., III, 27, 9. Cf. Piganiol (above, n. 38), p. 108; H. H. Scullard, *The Roman World* (London, 1935), pp. 197-9; G. de Sanctis, *Storia di storia antica* (Bari, 1932), pp. 161-8 and works of other authors.

Neither should pass over this mark "for harm." "And Jacob swore by the *Pachad* of his father Isaac."<sup>41</sup> Since in Hasdrubal's time there was no danger of a Roman army arriving at the Ebro (the Romans had still to cross the Po at this date), it is quite natural that Hasdrubal's engagement was not only unilateral but also made without conditions.

If the suggested interpretation is exact, the covenant with Philip V was an expedient for Hannibal. The agreement did not bind the government at home. In 218, the Carthaginian Senate with regard to Hasdrubal's treaty emphatically stated that pledges given by Punic generals are not binding for Carthage as being made without the consent of the constituted authorities.<sup>42</sup> Thus, Hannibal's covenant was no entangling alliance which could impair the relations between Carthage and Egypt and other Hellenistic powers. The pledge engaged the Punic commander-in-chief alone and was valid in the theatre of war: Italy (that is the land south of the Po), the Celtic Land (Gallia Cisalpina), Liguria. Altogether that meant the Italian peninsula. Note that Sicily was not covered by this guarantee.

The draft of the treaty throws some light on Hannibal's political aims. He, naturally, expected to remain the Carthaginian captain-general in Italy after the definitive victory and peace. Thus, he promises to assist Philip in case of a later attack by the Romans or any other power (*sc.* in Italy) not exempt by former treaty with Carthage. The stipulation shows that the most implacable foe of Rome did not plan the destruction of the City of the Seven Hills. He rather admitted that even after the conclusion of peace, Rome would remain a military power free to declare and able to conduct a new war against Macedonia or Carthage. Hannibal was brought up in the polite traditions of Hellenism. The idea of *Carthago delenda* could originate only in the mind of barbarians.

Hannibal viewed the Carthaginian dominion in Italy as a confederation, members of which retained the right to make war. That is again a Greek conception. It is no less remarkable that Hannibal gave back the right of minting to his Italian allies.

<sup>41</sup> Gen. 31, 53. On the term *pachad* cf. W. F. Albright, *From the Stone Age to Christianity* (2nd ed., Baltimore, 1946), p. 17.

<sup>42</sup> Pol., III, 21.

while Carthage did not allow Utica to strike coins, and Hellenistic kings equally monopolized the coinage. If it could be proved that Hannibal imposed the Phoenician standard in Italy, that would show, however, that he planned an economic annexation of Italy by Carthage.<sup>43</sup>

But why did Philip offer aid to the Punic general in the summer of 215 B. C.? Why did he send his plenipotentiary to Hannibal and not to Carthage? The envoy had to reach Hannibal across the Roman lines; according to the annalistic version he was even captured on the way by Roman troops; he surely became a prisoner on the way back. To understand Philip's action we have first to put out of our minds the knowledge of the surprising events which were to follow Hannibal's triumph but which still lay hidden in the unknown future at the time when the Macedonian envoy crossed the Adriatic Sea.

On hearing the results of the battle of Trasimene (September 217), Philip hastened to make peace with the Aetolians in order to regain liberty of action.<sup>44</sup> According to Polybius, he planned to intervene in Italy. The vision of Italy pursued him even in his sleep, and the conquest of Italy was to be the first step to world domination.<sup>45</sup> It is probable that this interpretation of Philip's dreams is a hostile invention of Achaeans informants. The possession of a harbor on the seaboard of Italy would be necessary in order to bring troops to that country. So far as we know, Philip made no effort to solicit Tarentum or let us say Thurii. The Roman fleet controlled the sea lanes.<sup>46</sup>

As a matter of fact, the king rather undertook to lay hands on

<sup>43</sup> Cf. W. Giesecke, *Italia Numismatica* (Leipzig, 1928), pp. 150-70; P. Wuilleumier, *Tarente* (Paris, 1939), p. 144; J. Heurgon, *Recherches sur l'histoire . . . de Capoue* (Paris, 1942), p. 218. Yet, according to this author Capua under Hannibal used the Roman standard. The Punic coinage (of Attic weight), with the name of Carthaginian towns in Sicily (e.g. Motya) on the coins, falls between ca. 410 and 310 B. C. Thus it virtually precedes the coins struck at Carthage itself in the Hellenistic period. These coins follow the Phoenician (Ptolemaic) standard. Cf. C. Seltman, *Greek Coins* (London, 1933), pp. 249-50.

<sup>44</sup> For the following cf. Holleaux, *C. A. H.*, VII, ch. V.; Walbank, pp.

101. Cf. Manni (n. 2), p. 8.

Syracuse sent an envoy to Philip; Liv., XXV, 23, 8. Cf. *H. A. H.*, III, 2, p. 410.

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Roman possessions in Illyria. It is doubtful whether these seaports (Oricum, Apollonia, Epidamnus, Pharos in the north) and the Illyrian tribes under Roman protectorate were of any military or political importance for Macedonia. Mountain chains separate Macedonia from Albania. The latter is open toward the West but closed toward the East. Greek colonists or traders reached Illyria by sea and not by land. The kings of Macedonia had no interests in the Adriatic, except that they sometimes engaged Dalmatian pirates against Aetolian privateers. On the other hand, the Romans established no colonies or garrisons in Illyria; they did not even have permanent agents in the Dalmatian protectorate. The kings of Macedonia, who tolerated Egyptian stations on the Thracian coast, had nothing to fear from Rome's nominal domination of and intermittent interventions in Albania. Polybius again suggests that the occupation of Illyria was essential for Philip's future crossing to Italy. But Philip was already the master of Zacynthus, Cephallenia, and Leucas in the Ionian Sea. Yet, in the early summer of 216, Philip tried to take Apollonia by surprise, a city which later became a Roman gateway to Macedonia but which could hardly be used as a base against Italy.

As a matter of fact, Philip simply followed the rule-of-thumb of Hellenistic statecraft: to grasp at every prize within one's reach. Rome's sudden weakness offered the opportunity, as it seemed, for acquiring new territories in Illyria. The Roman fleet stationed at the western point of Sicily was far away. But when Philip's flotilla, after sailing round the Peloponnese, at last reached the bay of Aulon, the king learned that a Roman squadron was approaching. Philip abandoned the expedition and returned to Macedonia.

In the meantime, Hannibal triumphed at Cannae. That changed the whole situation, and Xenophanes was hastily sent to the Punic camp. The Roman annalists later imagined that both foes of Rome intended to divide the world between them and that Philip was invited by Hannibal to come to Italy with all his host and to participate in the war against Rome ~~on land and on sea~~<sup>and on land</sup>.<sup>47</sup> All that is invented anachronistically, without knowledge of subsequent events. In the spring of 215,

<sup>47</sup> Liv., XXXIII, 33; App., *Mac.*, 1; Zonar., IX, 4, 2.

would hardly have welcomed a new Pyrrhus in Italy. But the "second front," small as it was, which Philip prepared to open, was a helpful military diversion for the Punic captain.<sup>48</sup> On the other hand, Philip had no reason now to seek an alliance with Carthage. As the political situation was in the spring of 215, a pact with Carthage would have placed the heir of Alexander on the level of Hieronymus of Syracuse. Carthage was now the greatest military power in the world. Her allies were her vassals. But it was still possible in helping Hannibal to obtain a part of his spoils.

After Cannae, almost all of southern Italy seceded from Rome. Hannibal was now in possession of some seaports where Punic reinforcements could land: some weeks later Bomilcar put ashore at Locri soldiers, elephants, and supplies sent from Carthage, while other aid landed in Bruttium. Should the war go on, Hannibal could hope that his next victory would surpass that of Cannae. But he rather expected a peace. He could promise to the Capuans that their city soon would be the capital of Italy.<sup>49</sup> As we have noted, Hannibal expressly excluded Philip from participation in the coming peace conference with Rome. But if Rome was about to come to terms with the conqueror, was it not to be expected that Illyrian harbors should be ceded to the great commercial city of Africa? It was to the advantage of Philip to preempt the Dalmatian coast before the Carthaginians. His military coup missed, but his diplomacy succeeded. In exchange for future, more or less nebulous, military aid, the invincible Hannibal solemnly pledged to obtain Illyria for Philip. From now on, the wily Punic, ensnared by the superior arts of Greek statecraft, fought not only for his city, but also . . . *pour les beaux yeux du roi de Macédoine*. Whether the victorious peace should be signed this summer, or next winter, or even after the next campaign (you surely do not think that the Romans will stand this beating any more?), the Senate would have to abandon the possessions on the other side of the Adriatic Sea. In the meantime, the king could strengthen his position in Greece, for instance, by establishing his garrison in Messene. This

I, 4, 5; IX, 22, 5.

reinforcements: Liv., XXIII, 41, 10 and 43, 6; Hannibal's

victory: Liv., XXIII, 43, 4; his promise to Capua:

reasoning fitted perfectly in the whole system of Hellenistic politics. If the first rule was to grab at any accessible prize, the second one was to compromise after a crushing defeat. A year before Cannae, defeated in the pitched battle at Raphia, Antiochus III hastened to conclude a negotiated peace with Ptolemy IV. Philip himself acted accordingly in his wars with Rome. War *à outrance* was no longer fashionable. In a letter written in the fall of 215, Philip expressed his admiration for the political wisdom of the Romans with regard to their naturalization of foreigners.<sup>50</sup> How could he in the spring of 215 imagine that the Romans would not behave like every civilized power with respect to the peace with Carthage? Following the same line of reasoning, Napoleon in Moscow daily expected the coming of Russian peace emissaries.

Yet, the Romans did not ask for peace, neither after Cannae, nor in 215, nor in 214. In 214 the tide of victory had still not turned against Hannibal, but the "Fabian" warfare of the Romans deprived him of any chance of bringing the war to a victorious conclusion then. In 214, then in 213, Philip invaded Illyria, not without success. But these successes brought about the Roman-Aetolian alliance of 212 and the First Macedonian War. We do not know whether Hannibal, more and more hard-pressed by the Romans, ever reminded Philip of the promised aid.<sup>51</sup> Philip probably never thought of sending it, and, in any case, never tried to do it.

But all that was still not woven on the spindle of the Parcae when Xenocrates crossed the Adriatic Sea. If Rome had concluded the peace with her conqueror in 215, posterity would have lauded to the skies the diplomatic genius of Philip—provided, of course, that Hannibal, on this occasion, should have kept his part of the bargain. Nothing, indeed, is more fascinating than history that did not happen. But in the spring of 215, nobody, not even the young P. Cornelius Scipio, could see the coming glory of Zama through the night of Time.

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<sup>50</sup> Philip's letter to Larissa: *S. I. G.*, 543.

<sup>51</sup> Livy (XXIV, 13, 5) says that Hannibal occupied Tarentum in 213 with a view to Philip's landing.

SENECA'S *APOCOLOCYNTOSIS* AND *OCTAVIA*:  
A DIPTYCH.

The attribution to Seneca of both the *Apocolocyntosis* and the *Octavia* has been questioned, the form of both is unusual and their significance far from clear. I believe that they are closely related and that the link that connects them strengthens the arguments in favor of Seneca's authorship. I shall, in this paper, attempt to show what his purpose was in writing the former during the first days of Nero's reign and the latter during the last months of his own life, at the time of the Pisonian conspiracy.

Before proceeding with the discussion, a brief summary of the traditional arguments for and against the genuineness of these two works is in order. That Seneca composed an *Apocolocyntosis* of Claudius which satirized the emperor's apotheosis is vouched for by Dio (*συνέθηκε μὲν γὰρ καὶ ὁ Σενέκας σύγγραμμα ἀποκολοκύντωσιν αὐτὸν ὥσπερ τινὰ ἀθανάτιον ὄνομάσας*).<sup>1</sup> The fact that the difficult word *Apocolocyntosis* does not appear in the title given by the best manuscript, *Sangallensis* 569 (saec. 9/10) or by the inferior manuscripts, is sufficiently accounted for by the following hypothesis: The archetype's title *Diui Claudi Apocolocyntosis* was glossed *Apotheosis per saturam*, the word *Apocolocyntosis* dropped out to be replaced by the gloss. The resulting title in *Sangallensis* (*Diui Claudi ΑΙΠΟΘΗΣΙΣ Annaei Senecae per saturam*) is thus inaccurate and tautological but it does introduce the satire mentioned as Seneca's by Dio.<sup>2</sup> The fact that

<sup>1</sup> Bibliography in Schanz-Hosius, *Gesch. der Röm. Lit.*, II (1935), pp. 471 f.; L. Herrmann, "Recherches sur le Texte de la Satire sur l'Apothéose de Claude," *Rev. Belge Philol. et Hist.*, XI (1932), pp. 549-76; C. F. Russo, "Studi sulla Divi Claudi ΑΙΠΟΚΟΛΟΚΥΝΤΩΣΙΣ," *La Parola del Passato*, I (1946), pp. 241 ff., and his edition of the *Apocolocyntosis* (1947).

<sup>2</sup> Another possible solution was suggested by K. Schenkl in *Wien. Zeitungsb.*, hist. Kl. (1863), pp. 3 f.: like many of Varro's satires this book had a double title, one in Greek and one in Latin. See also K. Stöck, "Senecas *Apocolocyntosis*, eine Zweite Ausgabe des Verfassers," *Rh. M.*, XCII (1944), pp. 159-73. His arguments in support of this view are not convincing. Separate editions of the *Apocolocyntosis* by Seneca do not seem to have been published before 1950. See also F. Bornmann, "*Apocolocyntosis*," *La Parola del Passato*, XXVIII (1950), pp. 69 f.

the pun (Apocolocyntosis on the analogy of apotheosis) is confined to the title instead of being carried out in the text is not unique in literature and need not detain us. One more argument, this one psychological, has been adduced against Seneca's authorship. He is known to have composed the *Laudatio funebris* read by Nero at Claudius' funeral. Is it conceivable that he should at the same time have written the ludicrous satire against the dead emperor known as the *Apocolocyntosis*?

It has been suggested that overstress of laudation results in the acutest satire and that Seneca used this device in the funeral oration he composed for Nero to read.<sup>3</sup> The fact that the audience laughed when Claudius' wisdom and foresight were mentioned in this speech may indicate that Seneca wrote it with his tongue in his cheek (Tac., *Ann.*, XIII, 3). At any rate protocol demanded that the traditional eulogy of the departed ruler be recited by his heir. Since Nero could not compose it himself (Tac., *ibid.*) Seneca wrote, according to the conventionally correct formulae of rhetoric, the panegyric demanded by tradition and Agrippina. Neither sincerity nor grief was expected of him. Once his official task was performed he could proceed to attack and satirize the dead man, whatever his motive may have been in writing the *Apocolocyntosis*, without incurring any blame for inconsistency or lack of decorum. In Pliny's terse phrase (*Pan.*, XI, 1): *dicavit caelo . . . Claudiū Nero ut irrideret*. Thus there seems to be no convincing reason either in the manuscript tradition or in the occasion of its composition for doubting the genuineness of the *Apocolocyntosis* or for questioning its identity with the work mentioned by Dio.

If Seneca wrote the *Octavia* he must have done so at the very end of his life since events are mentioned which happened up to the year 65 (the great fire, work begun on the *domus aurea*). The many arguments against its attribution to Seneca were to my mind convincingly disposed of some time ago by Pease<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> A. Momigliano, *L'Opera dell' Imperatore Claudio* (Firenze, 1929), pp. 136-9; W. H. Alexander, "Seneca's ad Polybiūm *De Consolatione*. A Reappraisal," *Trans. Royal Soc. of Canada*, XXXVII (1943), pp. 53; A. Rostagni, *Scenaeac Divi Claudi Apokolokyntosis* (ed. Torino, 1944), pp. 20-2.

<sup>4</sup> A. S. Pease, "Is the *Octavia* a Play of Seneca?" *C.J.*, VI (1920), pp. 388-403. For bibliography see E. C. Chickering, *A*

and have recently been reviewed by S. Pantzerhielm Thomas<sup>5</sup> who concludes in favor of its genuineness. If the E recension of the tragedies, which does not include the *Octavia*, represents an edition published or prepared for publication by Seneca during his lifetime, and the A recension, which does include it, represents an edition published after his death, when the *Octavia* could safely appear,<sup>6</sup> then only one serious argument remains against Seneca's authorship. This is the claim made by many critics that the author knows details of Nero's and Poppaea's deaths. The passage on which their objections are mainly based is an oracular speech of Agrippina's in which her son is threatened with an early death (vv. 614-30). This has seemed to others as it does to me far too vague and general to constitute a *vaticinium ex eventu*. Von Ranke<sup>7</sup> and Siegmund<sup>8</sup> long ago showed that it contains stock literary themes and that both the mythological examples (see *Apocol.*, 14, 4) and Agrippina's other threats are found elsewhere in the poets. Moreover a well-known prophecy was current during Nero's lifetime foretelling that some day he would be deserted (Suet., *Nero*, 40, 2: *praedictum a mathematicis Neroni olim erat fore ut quandoque destitueretur; unde illa vox eius celeberrima Τὸ τέχνιον ἡμᾶς διατρέφει . . .*). Some such utterance announcing a wretched death for the tyrant as well as literary models,<sup>9</sup> as for instance

*to Octavia Praetexta* (N. Y., 1910); K. Münscher, *J. A. W.*, CXCIII (1922), pp. 198 ff.; "Senecas Werke. Untersuchungen zur Abfassungszeit und Echtheit," *Philol.*, Suppl. XVI, 1 (1923), pp. 1-145; Léon Herrmann, *Octavie Tragédie Prétée* (Paris, 1924); Schanz-Hosius, *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 1), Joanna Schmidt in *R.-E.*, V. Ciaffi, "Intorno all' Autore dell' *Octavia*," *Riv. di Filol.*, LXV (1937), pp. 246-65.

<sup>5</sup> S. Pantzerhielm Thomas, "De *Octavia Praetexta*," *Symbolae Osloenses*, XXIV (1945), pp. 48-87.

<sup>6</sup> See Herrmann, *op. cit.*, (*supra*, n. 4), pp. 1-5.

<sup>7</sup> *Sämmtl. Werke*, LI-LII, p. 65.

<sup>8</sup> A. Siegmund, "Zur Kritik der Tragödie *Octavia*," *Progr. Bohm Leipa*, 1909-1910.

<sup>9</sup> Lucretius (II, 978-1023) had given of these punishments an explanation which appealed to Seneca (*Ep.*, 24, 18). Cf. also Vergil, *Ene.*, VI, 595-627. For the sufferings of Sisyphus, Tantalus, Ixion, and Prometheus in Seneca's tragedies see *H. O.*, 942-7, 1069 ff.; *Pha.*, 1229 ff.; *Med.*, 15 ff. (note also 43: *daturus coniugi iugulum suae*); *Th.* 6 ff., etc.

<sup>10</sup> Threatened with death and desertion: *H. O.*, 609 ff.; *Ag.*, 79 ff.; *Med.*, 15 ff., etc. See also *Apoc.*, 14, 4. Doubt has been cast on the

Ovid's *Ibis* (159-80), are sufficient to account for the dark prophecy of Agrippina. The parallel with Suetonius' description of Nero's death (which may contain legendary as well as historical elements) is remote and does not indicate for the *Octavia* a date later than Seneca's death. As for Poppea, her *tristes rogos* are mentioned in the play (vv. 595-8), though we know that she was not cremated (Tac., *Ann.*, XVI, 6: *corpus non igni abolitum, sed regum externorum consuetudine differtum odoribus conditur tumuloque Iuliorum infertur . . . ; gravida ictu calcis adflicta est*), and the brutal manner of her death passed over, whereas it would doubtless have been included in the catalogue of Nero's sins had this been compiled after the event. Pease and Pantzerhielm Thomas have scrutinized the play minutely and shown that it contains no details circumstantial enough to indicate a date later than Seneca's death. No evidence sufficiently strong to disprove the manuscript tradition has been brought forward. But doubt is contagious and the assertion that the play contains inconsistencies and anachronisms has gained plausibility through frequent repetition.

Still, if we accept the traditional attribution to Seneca, we must account for one anomaly: Seneca appears as one of the characters in the *Octavia*. Hosius<sup>10</sup> points out that this never occurs in serious drama. Cratinus had represented himself in the *Pytine*, Herondas in one of his mimes. (*The Dream*). Aristophanes uttered personal comments in the parabases as Terence and others did in their prologues. Adam de la Halle and more recently Molière, Grabbe, and Immermann all appear in their own plays.<sup>11</sup> The effect is apt to be irony or humor. What then was the impression which Seneca intended to produce in thus impersonating himself in the pseudo-drama called the *Octavia*? The Seneca he has sketched is a man he never claimed

reliability of Suetonius' account of the death of Nero by J. Köhm, *Phil. Woch.*, LV (1935), pp. 772-80.

<sup>10</sup> *Gnom.*, XIII (1937), pp. 132-5.

<sup>11</sup> See also Karl Kraus, *Die letzten Tage der Menschheit*. In Varr *Eumenides* and in his *Gloria* the author appears to be speaking in his own name and the phrase *vosque in theatro* might indicate a work in dramatic character. He may also have appeared in person in his *Marcopolis*, *περὶ ἀρχῆς*. We do not know what genre Varr wrote for his *Trikáparos* in which he satirized the first triumvirate.

to be in real life, a man secure in the possession of truth, fearless, serene, invulnerable. He appears as the exponent of Stoicism rather than as a real person, his *sententiae* are delivered in oracular style, his every word is marked with the dignity, super-human calm, and philosophy of the Stoic ideal. In the *De Vita Beata* he had already explained that he never intended to imply that he had attained this ideal: *haec non pro me loquor . . . sed pro illo cui aliquid acti est* (17, 4). When he spoke as a sage he was only the spokesman of his school of philosophy. He knew his own weakness but could show the way to the highest good. Though he realized that the acquisition of wisdom and perfection was far beyond his power, his task was to be the mouthpiece of those who had formulated and, like him, attempted to follow the rules of reason and philosophy. In the *Octavia* he once more used this convenient device of the diatribe and other genres.

I have called the *Octavia* pseudo-drama, in spite of the fact that it is always referred to as the only extant *tragoedia praetexta*.<sup>12</sup> When the fragments of *praetextae* available to us and the information concerning them in ancient sources are compared to the *Octavia* it is clear that Seneca's work belongs to a different genre. It shares with the *praetextae* the framework of a tragedy and the portrayal of native characters of high position. But in the *praetextae* dramatic expression was given to the traditions of the heroic age, or to praise of more recent heroes. They treat of great events connected with the history or the legend of Rome, of national heroes who fought or died nobly. Their style seems to have the solemnity, dignity, and magnificence of epic poetry. They record great victories or great disasters with a kind of magnificence. Patriotism above all, pride, courage, are portrayed directly and dramatically in lofty and resounding words. The *Octavia* contains none of the elements which, with their emphasis on valorous deeds, made the *praetextae* dramas eminently suitable for presentation on the Roman stage. Totally lacking in anything dramatic, the *Octavia* is in fact a diatribe against Nero. It can hardly be said to have a plot but consists rather of a series of monologues and duologues which tell a pathetic story and proceed to moralize it. All is told, nothing acted. The only clash of personalities is a cold and argumentative debate between the

<sup>12</sup> See my article on the subject in K. Ziegler, *R.-E.*, s. v. *Tragoedia*, xxiii.

emperor and his minister. All is static exposition, without progress, growth, or crisis. The *Octavia* is deliberately composed, not as drama, but as the imitation of drama. The author could, had he meant this to be a true *praetexta*, have exploited the conflicts and crises inherent in the situation which appears so dramatic in the pages of the historians. There is no feeling for staging, no regard for an audience, and the scenes which would have stirred the spectators' or the readers' emotions, had this been conceived as a true tragedy, are deliberately omitted. Nero never meets Octavia or Poppaea nor do the two women ever come face to face. The situation itself is moving but it is analyzed, never acted. As there is no tying of the threads, no rising of tension, and no suspense, so there is no untying and no resolution of conflict. The *Octavia* is a versified representation in dialogue of tragic events, apparently meant to produce pity and fear, but it is dramatic in form only, not in the treatment of characters and situations. It is not a true tragedy, any more than Seneca's remaining nine plays are tragedies in the accepted sense of the word.<sup>13</sup> By adapting and combining elements belonging to different genres (tragical history, philosophical and political dialogue, diatribe, satire), he contrived in the *Octavia* a new and not altogether successful type of pseudo-drama. As he had already used the tragic mold to expound his own brand of Stoicism, so now he represented dramatically the philosophical and political implications of the contemporary state of affairs.

We must now consider what Seneca's purpose was in writing a ludicrous and at times coarse satire against Claudius and a pseudo-dramatic piece which could not be published during Nero's lifetime. About both works opinion is sharply divided. Scholars have called the *Apocolocyntosis* a political squib (Sikes),<sup>14</sup> a silly and spiteful attack (Mackail),<sup>15</sup> a venomous political satire (Teuffel).<sup>16</sup> Duff says<sup>17</sup> that Seneca detested

<sup>13</sup> B. M. Marti, "Seneca's Tragedies: A New Interpretation," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXVI (1945), pp. 216-45; "The Prototypes of Seneca's Tragedies," *C. P.*, XLII (1947), pp. 1-16; "Place de L'Hercule sur l'Oeta dans le Corpus des Tragédies de Sénèque," *Rev. Ét. Lat.*, XXVI (1948), pp. 189-210.

<sup>14</sup> *Cambridge Ancient History*, XI, p. 727.

<sup>15</sup> *Latin Literature*, p. 174.

<sup>16</sup> *Gesch. Röm. Lit.* (1910), p. 228, § 289.7.

<sup>17</sup> *Literary History of Rome in the Silver Age*, p. 244. O. W.

Claudius, "he had an old score to wipe out: he probably felt a sincere contempt for his pedantry: and thus a clever and venomous pasquinade was written by a man of flesh and blood, a Spaniard who could let his feelings—especially those of hatred—go." Others read more in it than spiteful revenge. Rostagni<sup>18</sup> believes that it represents Seneca's contempt for the official fiction of deification and that it was mainly responsible for the eventual cancellation of Claudius' apotheosis (Suet., *Claud.*, 45). Nock calls it a clever skit and a parody but warns against taking it as an attack against the institution of imperial deification.<sup>19</sup> For Bickel<sup>20</sup> it represents Seneca's announcement of a new political program (and must have been written late in December 54 or perhaps early in 55). Waltz<sup>21</sup> and Birt<sup>22</sup> see in the satire a political move against Agrippina since it mocks a ceremony organized at her instigation. Münscher<sup>23</sup> also believed that through Claudius it was Agrippina whom Seneca was attacking without ever mentioning her name. For Kurfess<sup>24</sup> on the other hand it represents the official version of the emperor's death (Claudius is shown to have died naturally while watching some comedians). In case this version were not believed, it protects Agrippina from censure by so disparaging Claudius that no one would worry about the possibility of his having been forcibly put out of the way. Viedebannt,<sup>25</sup> for whom this work is a political pamphlet, stresses the fact that Seneca, prime minister and in fact regent for a very young prince, was not in any position to publish a spiteful satire on purely personal grounds.

If we had more of Varro's Menippean satires we might find a

(tr. of the *Apocolocyntosis* [Berlin, 1923]) also considers it as a personal attack against the dead emperor.

<sup>18</sup> *Op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 3).

<sup>19</sup> *Cambridge Ancient History*, X, p. 50.

<sup>20</sup> *Phil. Woch.*, XLIV (1924), pp. 845 ff.

<sup>21</sup> R. Waltz, *Sénèque, L'Apocoloquintose du divin Claude* (ed. Paris, 1934), pp. ii ff.

<sup>22</sup> Th. Birt, *Aus dem Leben der Antike* (Leipzig, 1919), pp. 180 ff.

<sup>23</sup> K. Münscher, *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 4).

<sup>24</sup> *Phil. Woch.*, XLIV (1924), p. 1308; cf. also A. P. Ball, *The Satire Seneca on the Apotheosis of Claudius* (New York, 1902), p. 19.

<sup>25</sup> O. Viedebannt, "Warum hat Seneca die Apokolokyntosis geschrieben?" *Rh. M.*, LXXV (1926), pp. 142-55.

clue as to why this particular form was chosen and what model inspired it. In any case it seems to be far more complex a piece than we are able to judge now, with its omission of Agrippina's name and the many jokes which are meaningless to us and must have been pregnant with political implications and allusions. The most striking passages are the long, solemn panegyric of Nero and his coming rule, and the divine Augustus' savage attack against Claudius. Even if the latter speech contains some parody of Augustus' sayings it seems to have been written in dead earnest. The grotesque elements in the satire, the harsh jests, buffoonery, and humor serve as foil by contrast to the two serious passages. The description of the golden age which is at hand contains reminiscences of the Fourth Eclogue. It breathes not only relief at being at last free of a detestable emperor but the hope in a new deal, in a Utopia in which a virtuous prince will, in Apollo's words, "give to the weary world bright and happy years (*felicia saecula*) and put an end to the silence of the laws." Yet the work is not just a declaration of faith and principles but a deterrent example to point the lesson of crime and punishment. Seneca might have been expected to compose, in these early days of his rule, a treatise for the guidance of his princely pupil. But the young are particularly sensitive to ridicule and derisive laughter. Seneca must have thought that Nero, seventeen at the time of Claudius' death, would profit more by this kind of literary scarecrow than he would from a more solemn treatise on the duties of a prince. This seems to be a hastily written substitute for a *Mirror of Princes*. Under the facetious form of a Menipporean Satire, this, like any Roman satire, is meant to instruct and it does so by exposing the vicious folly of the preceding ruler. Somehow the bitterness of the scathing attacks against Claudius serves to emphasize the glorious hopes raised by the accession of Nero. By judiciously combining flattering praise of the new with denunciation of the dead ruler, serious warning and censure with Rabelaisian mockery, Seneca contrived an original type of political textbook *ad usum Delphini*.

In the *Octavia* the situation represented some ten years later is reversed. Seneca has acknowledged failure both as tutor and as minister. After the murder of Octavia and the great fire he realized that Nero's excesses had become intolerable and that he would not reform. He must have felt the artist's urge to

something which would externalize his sense of disaster and personal tragedy and which would prove his own actions to have been consistent with his philosophy. He must produce a work which would embody his thoughts, present the situation as clearly as a historian would, and perhaps also influence the attitude of others.

Opinion is divided as to whether Seneca took an active part in the Pisonian conspiracy. His age and his fall from grace may have prevented him from joining his nephew and many of his friends in their plot against Nero. But he could not have ignored their efforts and must have sympathized with them. The immediate motive which prompted him to write the *Octavia* may thus have been the feeling of urgency which caused others to plan more violent measures. The very facts mentioned by Tacitus as having caused particular indignation are singled out by him: Nero's divorce from Octavia, the great fire in Rome, the exile and death of prominent men like Plautus and Sulla, the marriage to Poppaea and the projected murder of Octavia, the growing arrogance and tyranny of the emperor. If, as many believe, Seneca was among the conspirators, the *Octavia* may have been circulated *sub rosa* and served useful ends as resistance literature. Tacitus says that in the beginning of the conspiracy the conspirators would gather to talk over Nero's crimes (*Ann.*, XV, 50). This reminds one of Brutus who, when he was organizing his plot against Caesar, would test men and bring them over to his side "by the roundabout method of philosophical discussions" (*Plut., Brutus*, 12). But for Seneca, a practical man as well as an artist, conversations would not be enough, and writing would seem the best way of continuing his lifelong task, self-examination and the teaching of his fellow men.

A historical pamphlet, treating the contemporary situation in the tragic manner, or a diatribe, or a philosophical dialogue similar to those in which Cicero had represented his friends discussing political problems, might have served his purpose. He may even have remembered the dialogue on Caesar's death, the *σύλλογος* which Cicero had long planned to write (*Att.*, XIII, 30, 3 and elsewhere in the letters to Atticus). But he was sensitive to the literary taste of his contemporaries (*Tac.*, *Ann.*, XIII, 3: *... it illi viro ingenium amoenum et temporis eius auribus*

*accommodatum*). Their interest in mime and dramatic recitations may have influenced his choice of a pseudo-dramatic form for the *Octavia*. We know that among the members of the opposition Piso himself had composed *praetextae* and sung tragic pieces (Tac., *Ann.*, XV, 65), that Thrasea Paetus had been concerned with the production of mimes (*ibid.*, XVI, 21), and that Lucan had written a *Medea* (*Vita Vaccae*). Others doubtless shared this interest, as Nero did, a fact which may have added a touch of grim humor to Seneca's choice of medium.

Seneca's immediate purpose may have been to talk out the situation with himself and to impress with the gravity of the crisis the few privileged to read the *Octavia*. But even more, it is his own justification before posterity, after the failure of the high hopes aroused by the events of 54. About this time he represents himself to Lucilius as having withdrawn from men and affairs in order to work for other generations: *secessi non tantum ab hominibus, sed a rebus, et in primis a meis rebus; posterorum negotium ago; illis aliqua, quae possint prodesse conscribo* (*Ep.*, 8, 1-3). He adds that he points out to other men the right way which he has discovered late in life, when already weary with wandering.

As he had written the *De Vita Beata* partly to vindicate himself against accusations of corruption and loose living, so he composed the *Octavia* as his political apology. Having failed as Nero's tutor in spite of all his efforts, he thought that now rebellion offered the only solution. If his friends, or perhaps his associates, did not succeed, he knew that there could be only one outcome for them all. In this more than in any of his earlier works Seneca is haunted by the thought of death. He has placed the evidence before his readers, appealing first to their emotions through fear, pity, and indignation. He has then represented an idealized picture of himself arguing the case of good government with Nero. In this scene both characters are almost impersonal and symbolic. Nero is the wicked, foolish tyrant who obeys his passions and through terror attempts to enslave human beings. Seneca, aloof and coldly rational, expounds that part of the Stoic catechism which deals with a ruler's duties. The philosopher and the tyrant are stock characters out of a text-book rather than real men selected among the actors of

contemporary tragedy. *Sententia* follows *sententia* in a scene more akin to diatribe than to any other genre. Under the bitterness of the present struggle Seneca communicates to his readers his awareness of the eternal quality of this struggle between innocence, justice and tyranny. The particular events are lifted to the level of the universal, the significance of the fight against the tyrant is shown to be part of the never-ending conflict between virtue and evil.

The consequences of Nero's evil choice are briefly sketched but the reader is left with a sense that nothing is solved, nothing completed. There is no catharsis. If Nero has made the wrong choice, others are left to do otherwise. Seneca has indicated the basis of the conflict and championed the side of reason. He has shown an evil which cannot be amended and therefore must be removed because it interferes with the fundamental freedom and dignity of man. It is now up to the reader to commit himself if he so chooses, and it will be the task of posterity to pass judgment. "Virtue is never lost to view; and yet to have been lost to view is no loss. There will come a day which will reveal her, though hidden away or suppressed by the spite of her contemporaries. That man is born merely for a few who thinks only of his own generation. Many thousands of years and many thousands of peoples will come after you; it is to these that you should have regard. Malice may have imposed silence upon the mouths of all who were alive in your day; but there will come men who will judge you without prejudice and without favor. If there is any reward that virtue receives at the hands of fame, not even this can pass away" (*Ep.*, 79, 17, tr. R. Gummere, Loeb Classical Library).

My conclusion is this: As he had used the tragic mold to illustrate his own brand of Stoicism, so now Seneca borrowed the form of the *praetexta* to present the implications of the contemporary crisis. A kind of irony, far more subdued than that of the *Apocolocyntosis*, may be implicit in the form of the Roman national drama which he selected. What should have developed into a Roman *praetexta* with the expected praise of a hero and the usual emphasis on the valor of a Roman leader, turns out to be a satire and a heartbreakingly lament for Octavia. The tyrant himself is utterly lacking in the stature, his crimes in the *adleur*, which might have inspired a writer of tragedy or

of epic. Like the hero of the *Apocolocytosis* this tyrant is mean, stubborn, petulant, and utterly without heroic wickedness. So the *Octavia* too is something of a parody, the opposite of a *praetexta* by the nature of the characters and situations it portrays. I believe that the *Apocolocytosis* was very much in Seneca's mind when he composed the Octavia. The *praetexta* is the reverse of a medal on which he had depicted the new ruler, fair as Apollo. It would be odd indeed if the contemporary readers had not remembered the early explosion of relief and optimism in the *Apocolocytosis* as they now shared Seneca's bitter disappointment. The two texts make a pair and are matched almost like a diptych. The characters involved in both are of the house and stock of Claudius, both dishonor the name of Augustus (*Apoc.*, 10: *sub meo nomine latens*; *Oct.*, 251: *nomen Augustum inquinat*). In the first piece Agrippina, though never mentioned, is nevertheless present, for she is the cause of the outrageous deification of Claudius. In the second she who had murdered her husband has in her turn been murdered by her son and her ghost appears to utter vengeful and prophetic words. In the *Apocolocytosis* the judge of the lower world considers letting off some of the old sinners, Sisyphus, Tantalus, or Ixion, to transfer their sentences to Claudius. In the *Octavia* the classic trio of mythology (to whom is added Tityus) provides the model for the doom with which Nero is threatened. There is bitter irony in the fact that Agrippina's denunciation of Nero plays in the *Octavia* a role similar to Augustus' attack in the *Apocolocytosis*. While in the earlier piece the approach of the Golden Age was heralded, in the later one it has again receded to the distant past. The tyranny which Augustus had so scathingly denounced in Claudius and which was to be absent from the new rule is praised by Nero as the only shrewd and wise policy. A phrase which is a sort of leitmotiv in many of the tragedies seems particularly significant in linking the two works: *petitur hac coelum via* (*Oct.*, 476). The very point of the *Apocolocytosis* had been to show Nero how not to attempt to storm heaven (*Apoc.*, 11: *Hunc nunc deum facere vultis? . . . dum tales deos facitis, nemo vos deos esse credet*). The lesson is drawn in the *Octavia* (472-8).

Pulchrum eminere est inter illustres viros,  
consulere patriae, parcere afflictis, fera  
caede abstinere tempus atque irae dare,  
orbi quietem, saeculo pacem suo.  
haec summa virtus, petitur hac coelum via.  
sic ille patriae primus Augustus parens  
complexus astra est colitur et templis deus.

Here the phrase is meant, not for the tyrant whom Seneca addresses for he has proved that he is past redemption, but for future rulers. To the last Seneca is a teacher, and there may be a touch of the dour optimism of the Stoics in the lack of a definite conclusion. The ways of tyranny have been shown in two monstrous examples, with Nero the object of Seneca's anxious care in the first and the cause of his helpless defeat in the second. They remain for the edification of future generations, for the Stoic is never daunted, even by repeated failure.

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## THUCYDIDES' WORDS FOR "CAUSE."

### I.

Thucydides uses three words specifically denoting cause, *πρόφασις*, *αιτία*, and *αιτιον*, and shows a marked preference for the first two. These two words are used by Thucydides, as by many writers, with great elasticity of meaning. In the case of *αιτία*, the range of meaning is moderate enough to obviate serious misunderstanding. It always, or nearly always, has its root meaning of "responsibility," the thing responsible, "grounds," as *αιτία δέ την ή . . . εὐπραγία* (IV, 65, 4), or, abstractly, either "guilt," "responsibility," e. g. *τὸ πλέον . . . τῆς αἰτίας ἔξομεν* (I, 83, 3), or the imputation of responsibility, "blame," "charge," as in the phrase *ἐν αἰτίᾳ ἔχειν* (II, 59, 2, etc.). Sometimes it is difficult to decide whether concrete grounds or the resultant feeling of blame is the meaning intended. But this embarrassment is trifling in comparison with the confusion occasioned by the word *πρόφασις*.

*Πρόφασις* is used thirty-four times by Thucydides, in a wide variety of meanings. A glance at the article on the word in *LSJ* reminds one that this variety is not at all peculiar to Thucydides, for the word is used by many writers in a number of more or less distinctly different meanings, some of them far removed from the presumably original notion of a "showing forth," or "that which shows forth," i. e. "reason," alleged and presumably true.<sup>1</sup> This meaning remains common in classical writers, but increasingly the meaning of alleged but untrue reason, "pretext," becomes normal. In addition to these, *πρόφασις* can mean "cause" in a quite general, impersonal sense (as distinguished from "reason"), "occasion" or "excuse," and, in the medical writers, it often has the technical meaning

<sup>1</sup> There is no conclusive evidence, so far as I know, to show that "alleged reason" is the original meaning of the word. It is assumed to be, however, in *LSJ*, and the assumption is a reasonable one, especially if the word is related to *προφαίνειν*, as modern lexicographers believe it to be. The order of development of meanings is not of primary importance for this study. In any case, *πρόφασις* as "reason" provides a central meaning from which the others radiate in effect, if not as a historical fact.

of "exciting cause." There are examples of most of these meanings in Thucydides. In the majority of cases the context shows which one is intended, but in a number of passages contextual assistance is inadequate, and three such cases occur in critically important references to the causes of the war.<sup>2</sup>

Although in casual speech it often matters very little whether a cause is termed "reason," "motive," "grounds," or "explanation," there are occasions when distinction among these meanings is essential; to understand as exactly as possible an author's usage of words for cause may be vital to the understanding of his whole approach to his subject. This is eminently true of Thucydides. When he uses *πρόφασις* and *αἰτία* in reference to the causes of the war, it is clearly necessary to know, if we can, whether he means *his own* explanation, or the reasons, motives, etc. of the participants. The question of the precise meaning of the words for cause in these places is not just a lexicographical minutia, but has a bearing on the question of Thucydides' historical method. The present paper is based on a study of the three words *πρόφασις*, *αἰτία*, and *αἴτιον* in Thucydides and in writers who may have influenced, or have been thought to have influenced, the usage of Thucydides. Its purpose is to establish the range of meaning that these words have in Thucydides, and to show that these patterns of meaning are in harmony with the general method of Thucydides' presentation of history.

The nature of the problem and the extent of scholarly disagreement about its solution can be seen from a study of I, 23, 5-6, the celebrated introduction to Thucydides' account of the causes of the war. The passage is the crux of our discussion, and is therefore quoted in full:

διότι δ' ἔλυσαν, τὰς αἰτίας προύγραψα πρῶτον καὶ τὰς διαφοράς, τοῦ μῆτινα ζητήσαί ποτε ἐξ ὅτου τοσοῦτος πόλεμος τοῖς Ἑλλησι κατέστη. τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεστάτην πρόφασιν, ἀφανεστάτην δὲ λόγω, τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἡγοῦμαι μεγάλους γιγνομένους καὶ φόβον παρέχοντας τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀναγκάσαι ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν· αἱ δὲ ἐς τὸ φανερὸν λεγόμεναι αἰτίαι αἵδ' ἥσαν ἐκατέρων, ἀφ' ὧν λύσαντες τὰς σπονδὰς ἐς τὸν πόλεμον κατέστησαν.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> I, 23, 6; 118, 1; 146. These will be discussed below.

<sup>3</sup> A grammatical irregularity in the sentence *τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀληθ. πρόφ. κτλ.* . . . has been supposed by some editors. Krüger (Berlin, 1846), and Boehme-Widman (Leipzig, 1882) explain the sentence as a combina-

It is clear that Thucydides is distinguishing between kinds of cause, and that the *aἰτίαι* (further defined as *διαφοράι*) are more obvious and less basic than the cause expressed by *πρόφασις*. The main difficulty of the passage is to determine the precise meaning of *πρόφασις*. There are three interpretations which have the backing of authoritative scholars. One is that it here means the historian's explanation. This interpretation was proposed by Marchant, and adopted by the Loeb translator, who translates "the truest explanation, although it has been the least often advanced."<sup>4</sup> A second interpretation, implicit in many translations, is explicitly set forth by A. W. Gomme, that the word here means "psychological motive," but that there is no inherent difference of meaning between *πρόφασις* and *aἰτία* when they describe the causes of the war; the same idea could just as well have been expressed by *aἰτία*, and *πρόφασις* is used here merely for the sake of variety.<sup>5</sup> The third interpretation has, in the past thirty years, attained to something like orthodoxy. This is the theory that Thucydides is here imitating a Hippocratic term, *πρόφασις* meaning scientific, real, or basic cause, as opposed to mere *casus belli* (here expressed by *aἰτίαι*). It was first stated, I believe, by Eduard Schwartz, who translates *πρόφασις* as *Ursache* in contrast to *Rechtsgründe* (*aἰτίαι*), and calls it "das Wort . . . mit dem die ionische Physik und Medizin den wissenschaftlichen Kausalitätsbegriff ausdrückt." Apparently independently of Schwartz, C. N. Cochrane, as a part of his thesis that Thucydides was deeply indebted to medical science for his whole view of history and for the plan of his book, declares that *πρόφασις* "means in Thucydides 'exciting cause' . . . The word, as used by the historian, is in the highest degree

tion of two logically independent constructions, *τὴν ἀ. πρόφ. τοὺς 'Α. ἡγοῦμαι μεγάλους γιγνομένους καὶ φόβον παρέχοντας* and *τοὺς 'Α. ἡγοῦμαι ἀναγκάσαι ἐς τὸ πολ.* Most editors, more simply, take the whole construction after *τὴν ἀ. πρόφ.* as an infinitive phrase, object of *ἡγοῦμαι*, and this seems better to me. The central point of the statement is *φόβον παρέχοντας*, while *μεγάλους γιγνομένους* gives the cause of it and *ἀναγκάσαι* the result: "Through their growing power the Athenians inspired the Lacedaemonians with fear and so forced them . . ."

<sup>4</sup> *Thucydides, Book I*, edited by E. C. Marchant (London, 1905), p. 172. Loeb edition, I, p. 43.

<sup>5</sup> A. W. Gomme, *A Commentary on Thucydides*, I (Oxford, 1945), p. 153.

technical." This interpretation of *πρόφασις* has been accepted by Werner Jaeger in *Paideia*: "The conception of cause is borrowed from the language of medicine, as is clear from the word *πρόφασις*, which Thucydides uses; for it was medical science which first made the scientific distinction between the real causes of an illness and its symptoms." J. H. Finley has also adopted this view in his *Thucydides*: "He applies to the causes of the war the same word *πρόφασις*, by which the medical writers commonly denote the cause, or, more literally, the 'explanation' of disease."<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Eduard Schwartz, *Das Geschichtswerk des Thukydides*<sup>a</sup> (Bonn, 1929), p. 250. The first edition appeared in 1919. I do not understand the reference to "Physik"; there is no evidence, so far as I know, for the use of *πρόφασις* in a scientific sense by Ionian scientists other than the medical writers. The index to Diels-Kranz, *Vorsokratiker*, lists two instances of the word, both in fragments of Democritus, both meaning "pretext." It does not seem necessary to argue at length against Schwartz's theory (restated by W. Schmid in Schmid-Stählin, I, 5, 2, 2 [1948], pp. 128-31) that the use of *πρόφασις* here represents a view of the historian about the causes of the war entirely different from that expressed by *alrlai*, and belongs to a different draft of the history. There is not the slightest evidence to support this idea. (Cf. Gomme, *op. cit.*, p. 154.) The present paper does not attempt to deal in any way with the "Thucydidean Question" of composition; some of its conclusions have, however, this much bearing on the matter, that they give further support to what most recent scholarship has agreed on, the essential unity of Book I.

C. N. Cochrane, *Thucydides and the Science of History* (Oxford, 1929), p. 17. Cochrane's views, though it is generally recognized that he exaggerated the influence of the Hippocratics, have been influential, and for the most part deservedly so. But in the important paragraph from which I have quoted there are a number of transparent misstatements, due perhaps to excessive enthusiasm for the theory which they are intended to support. It is asserted that in "Homer, Herodotus, and later writers" *πρόφασις* "unquestionably connotes 'formulated reason' or 'pretext'." Examples of other uses are easily found in Homer, Herodotus, and many later writers. The unqualified assertion that in Thucydides the word means "exciting cause" and is "in the highest degree technical" is quite wrong even on Cochrane's theory, for the word often means "pretext" in Thucydides. In the next sentence Cochrane says that the word "is uniformly used by the Hippocratics in the sense of 'exciting cause'." Examination of some Hippocratic essays will show that there is no such uniformity.

*Paideia*, English translation by Gilbert Highet, I<sup>2</sup> (New York, 1945), p. 393.

J. H. Finley, *Thucydides* (Cambridge, Mass., 1942), p. 68. Although

This third interpretation, in spite of the impressive authority which it has enlisted, is demonstrably baseless. In view of its prevalence, it seems worth while to make the rather long excursus necessary to refute this mistaken opinion.

The fact is that in the Hippocratic corpus *πρόφασις* is not generally used as a special word for "real" or "basic" cause. In the first place, it is altogether misleading to speak as though there were only one Hippocratic use of *πρόφασις*. The meaning of the word is by no means uniform in these writings. In many essays it is used interchangeably with *αἰτίη* and *αἴτιον* and is given all the shades of meaning that these words can have. It is true that there is a special meaning of *πρόφασις* that is, apparently, peculiar to medical writers, but this meaning is not that of basic or real cause. A few examples will illustrate this meaning.<sup>7</sup> In *Epidemics* 3 (III, p. 38), it is said of a patient, *μετὰ...προφάσιος πῦρ ἔλαβε*, "from some exciting cause he was seized with fever" (Jones). What the exciting cause was in this case is not specified. But elsewhere in this work there are numerous examples of what can constitute this kind of *πρόφασις*. In one case (III, p. 56) *πῦρ ἔλαβεν* (the patient) *ἐκ κόπων καὶ πόνων καὶ δρόμων παρὰ τὸ ζῆτος*, in another (III, p. 60) *ἐξ ἀποφθορῆς νηπίου*, and in another (III, p. 142) *ἐκ λύπης*. In section 3 of this essay an epidemic of erysipelas is described as occurring (III, p. 70) *τοῖσι μὲν μετὰ προφάσιος, τοῖσι δὲ οὐ*. There is one "medical" use of the word in Thucydides, and it is exactly parallel to our last example. The passage (II, 49, 1-2) runs as follows: "It was generally agreed that that year was particularly free from other diseases; and if anyone had been suffering from

he adopts this interpretation of *πρόφασις*, Finley observes that the general scientific spirit shared by Thucydides and the medical writers is to be found in other works of the period, and that it is therefore unsafe to ascribe everything to the medical writers (*ibid.*, pp. 69-73).

There have been many other interpretations of *πρόφασις* here, now discarded. Many of the older translators were inclined to protect themselves with ambiguity in translating the word; thus a number of nineteenth century versions have "real occasion." Cornford's insistence, in *Thucydides Mythistoricus* (London, 1907), on translating it by "pretext" has not won any approval.

<sup>7</sup> In citing the Hippocratics I have given references, in parentheses, to volume and page of Littre's edition. I have, however, used the English titles of the Loeb translation of W. H. S. Jones.

any ailment, it invariably ended up as the plague. In the case of others, terrible heat in the head . . . overcame them ἀπὸ οὐδεμιᾶς προφάσεως, suddenly, while they were in good health.” What makes the parallel even closer, and more telling for the present argument, is that in both cases the passages quoted are immediately preceded by descriptions of the general conditions at the onset of the disease. It is in these, presumably, that one would look for the basic cause; yet Thucydides uses for the general word not *πρόφασις*, but *αιρία* (II, 48, 3). No similar comprehensive word is used in the passage in *Epidemics* 3, but in *Airs, Waters, Places*, ch. 4 (II, p. 20), where a similar use of *πρόφασις* occurs, *αἴτιον* is used for basic or original cause: ἔμποι τε πολλοὶ γίνονται ἀπὸ πάσης προφάσιος. τούτου δὲ αἴτιον ἐστι τοῦ σώματος ἡ ἔντασις καὶ ἡ σκληρότης τῆς κοιλίης. Many examples of this meaning of *πρόφασις* can be adduced. In the *Aphorisms* we find ἐκ πάσης προφάσιος, 3, 12 (IV, p. 490); also 2, 41 (IV, p. 482), 5, 45 (IV, p. 548), where *πρόφασις* is again used in explicit distinction from the basic cause, as the immediate exciting cause, and *Prognostic*, ch. 2 (II, p. 114).

In this special use, then, *πρόφασις* does not mean basic cause.<sup>8</sup> It means a physical state which is in some way the forerunner or indicator of the disease or condition under consideration, the “physical antecedent of a physical state,”<sup>9</sup> sometimes even opposed to the basic cause. Transferred into historical matter it would be of the nature of an incident that touches off a war (e. g. the siege of Potidaea) rather than the underlying cause of the war. This use has been imitated very accurately by Thucydides, in the likeliest possible place, the description of the plague (II, 49). Between this use and that of *πρόφασις* in reference to the causes of the war there is no connection at all. It should be noticed, further, that the Hippocratic corpus does not show complete uniformity even in this technical usage, for once in

<sup>8</sup>The suggestion is not intended that this technical use is unimportant. The recognition of the importance of such “preliminary states” in the treatment of disease is obviously one of the great contributions of the Hippocratic school. A sentence from the first chapter of the *Prognostic* (II, p. 110) is typical of the attitude of these writers: “A doctor will be most successful in healing a disease when he knows the future in advance, from the present state.”

<sup>9</sup>So designated by Cochrane, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

the *Aphorisms*, 4, 41 (IV, p. 516), *aἰτίη* is used in exactly the same manner: ἀνευ τινὸς *aἰτίης φανερῆς*. Nevertheless, it can be assumed with a good deal of confidence that in this one passage Thucydides was consciously adopting a medical term.<sup>10</sup>

Apart from this technical sense, *πρόφασις* is used in the Hippocratic corpus quite as other words denoting cause, *aἰτίη*, *aἴτιον*, and the adjective *aἴτιος*. Of twelve essays<sup>11</sup> examined by the present writer, only one, the well known *Sacred Disease*, uses *πρόφασις* exclusively for cause both in the special sense noticed above and for general cause. In the *Prognostic*, only *πρόφασις* is used, but always in its special meaning (II, pp. 114, 160, 180). In *Airs, Waters, Places*, we have seen above that in one passage *πρόφασις* is used with its special meaning, and that *aἴτιον* is used for basic cause. In another place in this essay, *πρόφασις* means basic cause: in ch. 15, the physique of the people who live by the river Phasis is ascribed to the climatic and botanical environment; marshy land, fog, hot and stagnant river water (which they drink), stunted and improperly ripened fruits, etc. The word used to describe these conditions is *πρόφασις* (διὰ ταύτας δὴ τὰς προφάσιας [II, p. 60]).<sup>12</sup> If we turn to *Ancient Medicine*, we find all three words, *aἰτίη*, *aἴτιον*, and *πρόφασις* used for general and basic cause. At one point *aἰτίη* and *aἴτιον* are contrasted, ch. 21 (I, p. 624): τὴν *aἰτίην τούτων τινὶ ἀνατιθέντας καὶ τὸ μὲν *aἴτιον ἀγνοεῖντας*.*

Here *aἰτίη* is the thing held responsible, in distinction from the real cause, *aἴτιον*. Earlier in the essay *aἴτιον* is used in an excellent definition of cause, ch. 19 (I, p. 616): "We must surely consider the causes (*aἴτια*) of each complaint to be those things the presence of which of

<sup>10</sup> I do not know of any authoritative explanation of the development of this meaning. Jones regularly translates "exciting cause," Littré sometimes "cause occasionelle." It is probably cognate with the meaning "occasion" which, as we shall see below, occurs in Thucydides. Possibly the usage found at *Iliad*, XIX, 302 is its forerunner (cf. *infra*, p. 48).

<sup>11</sup> *Ancient Medicine*, *Airs, Waters, Places*, *The Sacred Disease*, *Prognostic*, *Regimen in Acute Diseases*, *Regimen*, *Epidemics* 1 and 3, *Aphorisms*, *The Art, Breaths*, *The Nature of Man*. All are believed to be of the late fifth century.

<sup>12</sup> Hans Diller, "Wanderarzt und Aitiologe," *Philol.*, Suppl. XXVI (1934), p. 41, observes that in this essay *πρόφασις* and *aἴτιον* are used for cause, *aἴτια* for "responsibility."

necessity produces a complaint of a specific kind, which ceases when they change into another combination" (Jones). Yet in the course of the essay *aītīη* is the word most often used for real cause; both *aītīη* and *aītīοv* are commoner than *πρόφασις*. In *The Art*, *aītīοv* is used in the one passage where the notion of general cause is required, ch. 11 (VI, p. 20): *τὸ εἰδέναι τῶν νούσων τὰ aītīa*. In the same chapter, *aītīοs* is twice used as Thucydides uses it, meaning "responsible." In the curious work *Breaths*, which pretends to prove that "breaths" (air in the body) are the cause of all diseases, *πρόφασις* is never used, *aītīοv*, *aītīη*, and *aītīοs* are used indiscriminately and repeatedly for general or basic cause. In the last chapter, for example, we find (VI, p. 114): "All the rest are additional and secondary causes (*συναίτια καὶ μεταίτια*); I have demonstrated that this is the real cause (*aītīοv*, Littré: "cause effective") of diseases."<sup>13</sup> In *The Nature of Man*, general cause is expressed once each by *aītīη*, *aītīοv*, twice by *πρόφασις*, and five times by *aītīοs*. The commonest way of expressing cause is the phrase *γίνεται ἀπό*. *Regimen in Acute Diseases* has one instance of *πρόφασις* meaning "reason," one of *aītīοv* meaning "cause." In *Regimen*, neither *πρόφασις* nor *aītīοv* appears at all, *aītīη* five times, *aītīοs* twice.

This is a sample of Hippocratic usage, not a complete survey. Yet the conclusions necessary for our argument can be drawn with certainty. First, apart from the technical use of *πρόφασις* to mean exciting cause, the various words which denote cause in the general vocabulary of Greek writers are used without distinction. Usage varies from essay to essay, sometimes *aītīη* and *aītīοs* are restricted to what is held responsible, as opposed to real cause, but general Hippocratic usage shows no discrimination in its choice of words to denote general cause. Secondly, there is no one word consistently used to mean basic or real cause. About all that can be said is that our evidence indicates

<sup>13</sup> Jones (II, pp. 224-5) believes that both *The Art* and *Breaths* may be sophistic rather than Hippocratic, but preserved in the library at Cos. This might explain the absence of the technical use of *πρόφασις*. The essays would still be valid as evidence for other medical usage, for there is no reason to suppose that the expressions for cause in a sophistic work on a medical subject would be at variance with medical usage, even if less technical. Littré (VI, p. 88) also believes *Breaths* to be sophistic.

that *πρόφασις* is used less often, for basic cause and for general cause, than either *αἰτίη* or *αἴτιον*. Hence, if we are to suppose that Thucydides modeled his use of *πρόφασις* on that of the medical writers, we ought to suppose, not that he used it with a special significance of basic cause, but, as Gomme believes with regard to references to the causes of the war, that there is no distinction between *πρόφασις* and *αἰτία*, except in the one obvious medical use at II, 49, which has no bearing on the general question. It should be observed, further, that *πρόφασις* in the meaning of general cause is not restricted to the medical writers, and is very unlikely to have originated with them. Herodotus too uses *πρόφασις* to mean general cause, several times. In Herodotus as in most non-technical writers, the word most often means "pretext" or "excuse," but occasionally it is used to mean simply "cause," as in IV, 79, 1: ἐπείτε δὲ ἔδει οἱ κακῶς γενέσθαι, ἐγένετο ἀπὸ προφάσιος τοῦσδε (cf. II, 161, 3).

The upshot of our excursus is that the notion that Thucydides took over from the medical writers a special use of *πρόφασις* in the sense of "basic cause" is without foundation. It has not been proved that Thucydides was not influenced by their usage, but it is clear that their influence would only lead him to use words for general cause without discrimination.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>14</sup> After the present paper was completed there came to my attention a study by K. Deichgräber, "Πρόφασις: Eine terminologische Studie," *Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften und der Medizin*, Bd. III, Hft. 4 (Berlin, 1933), pp. 1-17, a cursory survey of the use of the word from Homer to late antiquity, with special reference to the medical writers. The author's interest in the word is chiefly restricted to the Hippocratics, and his study has little value apart from them. In general, his conclusions are the same as mine with regard to the Hippocratics, and the reader will find in his study further examples of the technical use of *πρόφασις*. I disagree with Deichgräber in two points. First, I see no reason for assuming, as he does (p. 8), that wherever we find a qualifying adjective such as *μικρά*, *βραχεῖα*, *φανερά*, or *ἐμφανῆς* with *πρόφασις* we must suppose that *πρόφασις* itself in these passages has the meaning of general cause. Surely if the context shows that the word is used for "exciting cause," it matters little, for the meaning of the word itself, whether it is called simply "exciting cause" or "obvious exciting cause." Moreover, though *φαν. πρόφ.* is a common phrase, there are no passages contrasting *φαν. πρόφ.* with, e.g., *ἀληθῆς πρόφ.*; on the contrary, *φαν. πρόφ.* is contrasted with *αἴτιον* (e.g. *Aphorisms*, 5, 45 [IV, p. 548]). Secondly, I cannot agree that *πρόφασις*

We can now turn to the second of the three interpretations mentioned above, that though *πρόφασις* here means the motive of the Lacedaemonians, it is only by virtue of the context that we can know this, since *αιτία* and *πρόφασις* are sometimes synonymous in Thucydides. In view of the indiscriminate use we have found in the medical writers, a confusion which can be seen in other writers, Herodotus for example, it would appear a reasonable presumption that in Thucydides also it is idle to look for any consistent difference of meaning in his words for cause. However, though I agree with Gomme that *πρόφασις* means motive here, there is good evidence that *πρόφασις* was not used synonymously with *αιτία* by Thucydides. At III, 13, 1 the two words are used side by side; the Mitylenean envoys at Olympia, after describing why their city had revolted from Athens, sum up with the words *τοιαύτας ἔχοντες προφάσεις καὶ αἰτίας*. If the two words are synonymous, this passage is a mere tautology, for no apparent reason of style, and this is improbable. In one passage which Gomme cites as showing the synonymity of the words (I, 118, 1), it is clear that Thucydides is regarding several *αιτίαι* as constituting one *πρόφασις*, and this is by no means equivalence of meaning between the two terms. An examination of the two words throughout the *History* reveals, as will be demonstrated presently, that each of them has a separate and clearly limited range of meaning. It is true that Thucydides sometimes uses *πρόφασις* where the substitution of *αιτία* would not alter the sense of the passage (e. g. I, 133, 1, quoted *infra*),

"crowds out" (zurückdrängt, p. 8) *αιτίη* (Deichgräber does not mention *αιτίον*) in the meaning of general cause. It is true, as Deichgräber observes, that *πρόφασις* as "Ursache schlechthin" occurs with unusual frequency in the medical writers. But it is equally true, though less striking, that *αιτία* and *αιτίον* also occur unusually often in this same sense; for the medical writers were unusually concerned with cause.

Deichgräber believes, as I do, that Thucydides' use of *πρόφασις* in reference to the causes of the war was not influenced by the Hippocratics (p. 15). But his treatment of Thucydides is too sketchy to be of much value, and is hampered by the notion that in Attic wherever *πρόφασις* means "real cause" there is also somehow implied in it the idea of "pretext." Only by very strained interpretation can this be maintained anywhere in Thucydides; it is quite impossible in such simple uses as those at I, 133, 1 and III, 13, 1, which Deichgräber does not mention. It is just as impossible in Antiphon, whose usage is not dealt with.

and vice versa, just as in English the same circumstances can be designated "reason," "grounds," or "motive." This does not make the three English words synonymous, nor do such cases suggest that the two Greek words were synonymous for Thucydides.

The ingenious suggestion that *πρόφασις* here means the historian's explanation cannot be proved impossible, but is to be rejected, in my opinion, for the following reasons.<sup>15</sup> First, in I, 23, the very form of the sentence demands that *αἰτίαι* and *πρόφασις* have the same point of reference. The contrast *τὴν μὲν γὰρ . . . πρόφασιν . . . αἱ δὲ ἐσ τὸ φανερὸν λεγόμεναι αἰτίαι* has real force only if this is so. If *πρόφασις* means Thucydides' explanation, the parallel that is implied, especially in the word *λεγόμεναι*, is lost. Secondly, in the examination of Thucydides' words for cause to which we now turn, we shall discover that both *πρόφασις* and *αἰτία* have regularly in Thucydides a *subjective* reference, that is, they are concerned with the emotions of, or the influences on, the persons participating in the events, and do not mean the historian's objective analysis of the situation.

## II.

In order to demonstrate the range of meaning of Thucydides' words for cause, it will not, fortunately, be necessary to analyze every instance. The majority are clear and should be beyond dispute. In the following examination, enough examples will be presented to illustrate the different meanings of each word; discussion in detail will be restricted to some few cases in which interpretation has varied, or which are especially important for the present argument. These will be, above all, the references to the causes of the war.

### a. *Πρόφασις.*

It is not the business of this study to deal with the use of

<sup>15</sup> The distinction between "historian's explanation" and "the motive of the Lacedaemonians" is not very important so far as the meaning of the passage is concerned, since in either case it is in the final analysis Thucydides' account with which we are dealing. But from the point of view of the historian's method it is extremely important: it is the difference between objective analysis by the historian and a presentation of the minds of the participants.

*πρόφασις* in other writers except when this is directly relevant to Thucydides' usage, as it is in the case of those authors most likely to have influenced him. These I take to be Homer, Herodotus, and Thucydides' only conspicuous antecedent among Attic prose writers, Antiphon, whose intellect and rhetorical skill Thucydides obviously admired (VIII, 68).

The word occurs only twice in Homer, with two quite distinct meanings. In *Iliad*, XIX, 301-2, we read

"Ως ἔφατο κλαίονσ", ἐπὶ δὲ στενάχοντο γυναικες  
Πάτροκλον πρόφασιν, σφῶν δ' αὐτῶν κῆδε ἐκάστη.

Patroclus' death was the occasion of the grief of the women who joined Briseis in weeping, but the real cause was their own private sorrow. This is not quite "pretext," but it is easy to see how the meaning of pretext would develop from this. This meaning may well be the forerunner also of the "exciting cause" of the medical writers. In the same book, at 261, Agamemnon declares that he has not laid hands on Briseis,

οὐτ' εὖνης πρόφασιν κεχρημένος οὔτε τεν ἄλλου.

Here the meaning is "motive," but this kind of use could underlie the quite general meaning of cause which we have seen in the Hippocratics and in Herodotus. In Herodotus too the word has just two very different meanings; usually it is "pretext," but four times, as in the instance quoted above (p. 45), it means simply "the way it came about," with no special suggestion of either basic or immediate cause.

Antiphon's use of the word is interesting, and in all likelihood more important for Thucydides' than has been recognized. Even if the ancient tradition which makes the historian the pupil of Antiphon is a fiction, the admiration which Thucydides expresses for the slightly older orator and the many affinities between their styles provide a very high probability of influence.<sup>16</sup>

All the instances in Antiphon, eight in number, are based on the notion of one's reason or motive for an act. An example of the word meaning "motive" occurs in the speech *On the Murder of Herodes*, 21: *ἡ μὲν πρόφασις ἐκατέρω τοῦ πλοῦ αὗτη* which follows

<sup>16</sup> For the stylistic similarities between Antiphon and Thucydides see Jebb, *Attic Orators*, I, pp. 23-31.

an account of the motives of Herodes and the accused man for making the voyage in the course of which Herodes disappeared. In 60, the defendant declares that he had no motive (*πρόφασις*) for murdering Herodes. In neither instance is there any emphasis on the idea of *alleged* motive, in fact in 60 the motive which is denied would clearly be an unspoken but real motive. (Other examples of *πρόφασις* meaning motive occur in the same speech, 22 and 59.) Πρόφασις can also mean "plea" or "pretext" in Antiphon. In the speech *On the Choreutes*, 14, we find the phrase *προφάσεως ἔνεκα* meaning "in order to exonerate (myself)," literally "for the sake of a pretext (excuse)," and a similar example occurs in the same speech, 26. All instances of *πρόφασις* in Antiphon have this same subjective application; whether true motive or only pretext, the word expresses the feeling or allegation of the person involved.<sup>17</sup>

The word has the same pattern of meaning in Thucydides as in Antiphon. Apart from the anomalous medical term at II, 49, 1, all instances in Thucydides have the same subjective quality, and all derive from the same basic meaning of alleged and presumably true reason. As in Antiphon, this meaning is modified in two directions: to alleged but *not true* reason, i. e. "pretext," and to true but *not alleged* reason, "motive."

What has been assumed above to be the basic meaning of the word, "reason" alleged and presumably true, is well exemplified by I, 133, 1, "Pausanias came to him and asked τὴν πρόφασιν τῆς ἱκετείας." Nothing in the context suggests that Pausanias meant on what "pretext" the man had come; he merely asks for his motive or reason. There is no emphasis on the notion of expression, nor is there any suggestion of concealment. The example quoted above (p. 46) from III, 13, 1 illustrates the difference between *πρόφασις* and *αἰτία*; this will be discussed below, in our examination of *αἰτία* (pp. 56-7); for the present it is enough to notice that *πρόφασις* here refers to motives or reasons that have been expressed and can be presumed to be genuine. At V, 22, 1, when the Lacedaemonians are trying to get their allies to accept the Peace of Nicias, the Boeotians, the Corinthians, the Megareans, and the Eleans refuse to do so, "for the same reason

<sup>17</sup> *On the Murder of Herodes* is assigned to about 414, *On the Choreutes* to 419/18 in the most recent study of the subject, K. J. Dover, "The Chronology of Antiphon's Speeches," *C. Q.*, XLIV (1950), pp. 44-60.

(τῆς ἀντῆς προφάσει) for which they had in the first place rejected it," namely because the "arrangements did not satisfy them" (V, 17, 2). This is a perfectly candid expression of their reason, and should be so interpreted, not as "pretext," as in the Loeb version.<sup>18</sup>

Of the two different developments from this meaning, one is the commonest meaning in Thucydides, as in most writers, "pretext." Of this meaning little need be said. One example, of many, is VI, 76, 2, where Hermocrates tells the Camarineans that the Athenians have come to Sicily *προφάσει μὲν ἢ πυνθάνεσθε, διάνοιᾳ δὲ ἢν πάντες ὑπονοοῦμεν*. The explicit contrast between *πρόφασις* and *διάνοια*, pretext and intention, puts the meaning beyond doubt. Sometimes *πρόφασις* is simply *πρόσχημα* as at V, 80, 3: ἀγῶνα τινα πρόφασιν γυμνικὸν ποιήσας. Other examples of "pretext" are III, 82, 4; 86, 4; 111, 1; IV, 47, 2; V, 42, 1; VI, 8, 4; 78, 1; 79, 2; VIII, 87, 5.

Intermediate between pretext and reason are several instances where what is alleged is not false, and therefore not merely a pretext, nor yet acceptable as a complete or adequate reason. Such cases are sometimes close to "occasion" (*ansa, ἀφορμή*), sometimes to "excuse." "Occasion" can be exemplified by V, 31, 3, where we are told that the Lepreates, who had been paying tribute to the Eleans, ceased to do so διὰ πρόφασιν τοῦ πολέμου. That is, they made of the war an opportunity or occasion to stop payments. For "excuse," VI, 34, 6 will serve. Hermocrates is urging the Syracusans to forestall invasion by Athens by sending a naval force to meet the enemy off Tarentum; such action, he argues, might cause the Athenians to abandon their undertaking altogether, "especially since their most experienced commander is in command against his will, and would be glad to get an excuse (*πρόφασις*) for abandoning the expedition." Syracusan aggression would not, in Nicias' view, be only a pretext for quitting; it would be a genuine reason, but not his only reason or his basic one, for this would be his lack of sympathy with the whole scheme of conquest. It would be an excuse, neither false nor the whole truth. Other examples are II, 87, 9; III, 9, 2; 39, 7; 40, 6; 75, 4; 82, 1; IV, 80, 2; 126, 5.

<sup>18</sup> Instances at I, 126, 1 and I, 141, 1 may also belong with this group. In Classen's edition, in a note on *πρόφασις* at I, 23, 6, they are listed as examples of "der wirklich vorhandene Grund." It is perhaps better, however, to regard them as meaning "excuse."

Concerning the examples mentioned so far, two observations are important for the present argument. The first is that all of them can easily be derived from the basic meaning of expressed and true reason; the second, that all are concerned with the minds of the participants: they are subjective, and never refer to the objective view of the historian or anyone else.

The final category, of true but unexpressed reason, remains to be considered. Two instances of this meaning obviously stand together, that at I, 23, 6, and what is certainly a repetition of the same meaning, as it is of the phrase, at VI, 6, 1, where, in explanation of the Sicilian expedition, there occur the words ἐφίέμενοι μὲν τῇ ἀληθεστάτῃ προφάσει τῆς πάσης ἄρξαι. Thucydides is simply re-using a memorable phrase. Reasons for preferring the meaning of unexpressed reason, "motive," to "historian's explanation," at I, 23, 6, were given above (p. 47). A further argument can now be added. Since the basic notion of *expressed* reason underlies all cases of *πρόφασις* so far examined, it is natural to presume that the same connotation is present in this case too. When regarded in this light, the phrase is seen to be a very artful one: with the original notion of expression felt, it is, in fact, a paradox, for what is ἀληθεστάτη and would be expected to be "shown forth," is in fact ἀφανεστάτη λόγω.<sup>19</sup> Thucydides must have regarded it as an especially felicitous and forceful phrase; that is why he repeated it at VI, 6, 1. Moreover, "motive" is the *natural* meaning in the context of I, 23, and many interpreters have felt it to be so. It is the meaning that Gomme, for one, extracts on the basis of context alone, even though he does not regard it as proper to *πρόφασις*. What Thucydides is describing here is, quite simply, a subjective motive, that of fear. In VI, 6, 1, the motive is the desire to gain control of Sicily.

Two passages are yet to be examined. These are I, 118, 1 and I, 146. Both refer to the causes of the war, and both certainly mean real cause of some sort. Both can reasonably be taken to mean "occasion," a meaning which we have seen elsewhere in

<sup>19</sup> Thus the passage is analogous with the contrast at VI, 76, 2, προφάσει μὲν... διάνοιᾳ δέ. In each case *πρόφασις* has taken on a meaning which permits it to be contrasted with one aspect of the original sense, λόγος and διάνοια respectively. In both cases the contrast is the more striking because of the implicit paradox.

Thucydides, and this is how they are generally interpreted. I believe, however, that they may better be taken to have the same meaning as *πρόφασις* has in I, 23, "motive."<sup>20</sup> Both I, 118 and I, 146 are chapters in which the historian sums up the causes of the war, as he does in I, 23. There is, then, an initial probability that when, in these summaries, he uses the same words, they will have the same meaning, that I, 118 and I, 146 echo I, 23.

The relationship of these passages can best be shown by a brief outline of the structure of Book I.<sup>21</sup> After the introduction (1-22), and a preliminary reference to the causes of the war, with its mention of *αἰτίαι* and *πρόφασις* (23), two of the grievances (*αἰτίαι*) are described in detail, the incidents of Corcyra (24-55) and Potidaea (56-66). At the end of each description the incident is called, in a concluding sentence, an *αἰτία* (55, 2; 66). Thucydides is thus keeping in touch with his preliminary statement in ch. 23. The first Peloponnesian conference at Sparta is next (67-87), and then the brief statement (88) that "the Lacedaemonians voted that the truce had been broken and that war must be undertaken, not so much because they were persuaded by the arguments of their allies as because they were afraid that the Athenians would acquire even greater power." This is a restatement of the two kinds of cause: the arguments of the allies represent the *αἰτίαι*, the fear of the Spartans the *πρόφασις*, of 23, 5-6. Here and throughout the two conferences, mention of the "breach of the truce" and of the "injustices" of Athens is closely linked with *αἰτία*, not *πρόφασις*.<sup>22</sup> Chapters 89-117 contain the Pentecontaetia, the

<sup>20</sup> In neither case is there the slightest reason to suppose that *πρόφασις* has a scientific meaning.

<sup>21</sup> Some points of the following analysis, as the function of the Pentecontaetia and the close connection between 23 and 88 have been noticed many times. Among recent books, I am indebted to Finley, *op. cit.*, ch. 4, and Harald Patzer, *Das Problem der Geschichtsschreibung des Thukydid und die Thukyidideische Frage* (Berlin, 1937), pp. 109-10.

<sup>22</sup> In ch. 67 the siege of Potidaea is called a breach of the truce and an injustice; the treatment of Aegina and the decrees against Megara are said to be "contrary to the truce." In ch. 86, Sthenelaidas urges the Spartans not to "permit the Athenians to grow greater" (*πρόφασις*), and not to "betray their allies" (*αἰτίαι*). In ch. 88 the implication is that the Spartans voted that the truce had been broken not so much because it *had* been broken (i. e. because they considered the *αἰτίαι*

purpose of which, in the plan of the book, is to illustrate the basis of Sparta's fear of Athens by outlining the growth of Athenian power in the period between the wars, down to the Corcyrean affair. This section, then, is devoted to the *πρόφασις*. But we must not make the mistake of restricting the scope of the *πρόφασις* to the events of this period alone. It is clear from the present participle *γνημένους* (23, 6) and from the clause *μὴ ἐπὶ μεῖζον δυνηθῶσιν* (88) that the Spartan fear is concerned with and arises from present developments as well as the past. After the Pentecontaetia Thucydides again sums up (118): "Not many years later occurred the events described above, the affair of Corcyra and that of Potidaea, and all the incidents ὅσα πρόφασις τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου κατέστη." The Loeb translation has "occasion" for *πρόφασις* here; Gomme,<sup>23</sup> interpreting similarly, maintains that this passage is a proof that *αἰτία* and *πρόφασις* are used interchangeably, since *πρόφασις* means here what *αἰτία* means in ch. 23. But in the present passage several *αἰτίαι* constitute one *πρόφασις*. Real equivalence of meaning would be expressed by something like *ὅσα προφάσεις...ῆσαν*. I believe that *πρόφασις* here means the state of mind that was engendered by the various *αἰτίαι*, and that it can best be translated "motive," as at 23. If, however, it means motive and echoes 23, it ought to include in its scope not only the incidents immediately before the war, but also the earlier events of the Pentecontaetia. Literally, earlier events are excluded in this sentence; nevertheless, the whole context strongly suggests that Thucydides was still thinking in terms of the entire period. The next sentence begins *ταῦτα δὲ ξύμπαντα ὅσα ἔπραξαν...* and then follows a description of the gradual development of Spartan feeling that is altogether reminiscent of 23 and 88: for a long time Sparta did little or nothing to check Athens, "until the power of the Athenians was clearly rising high, and they (the Athenians) were laying hands on their (the Spartans') alliance. Then they could endure no more . . . And so they resolved that the truce was broken and that the Athenians were acting unjustly."<sup>24</sup> The echo of

legitimate) as because of their fear (*πρόφασις*). In ch. 121, when the Corinthians declare that they are being treated unjustly (*ἀδικούμενοι*) they clearly have in mind the *αἰτίαι*.

<sup>23</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 153.

<sup>24</sup> Here again the "breach of the truce" and the "injustices" of Athens are distinguished from the basic feeling of the Spartans.

ch. 88 could not be clearer, and this in turn is generally acknowledged to echo ch. 23. The concentration, in the sentence under consideration, on the incidents immediately prior to the war is probably due to the fact that in Thucydides' opinion it took these *airíai* to precipitate the latent Spartan feeling.

The second conference occupies 119-125, and then the charges of the Lacedaemonians against Athens and the Athenians' counter-charges, with the resultant description of the last days of Pausanias and Themistocles, come in 126-138. Ch. 139 sums up the Spartan demands on Athens, and 140-145 contain Pericles' first speech and the consequent Athenian rejection of the demands.

The final short chapter is, as we should expect, another summing-up. But as it is generally interpreted it is a one-sided summary, mentioning only the *airíai* of the previous summaries.<sup>25</sup> What Thucydides says is "Such were the grievances and the points of dispute on both sides before the war, beginning with the affair of Epidamnus and Corcyra; the opposing sides still were in contact, however, and still visited one another's territory without heralds—not, however, without suspicion. For what was happening constituted a breach of the truce and a *πρόφασις* for war." Here again we should translate *πρόφασις* by "motive"; as in 118, it is often rendered "occasion." Again the passage is a summary, and since we have found that the other summaries echo 23, it is reasonable to believe, in view of the verbal similarity, that this passage does so too. That Thucydides does not say "Such were the grievances and the motive" is not surprising. He never undertook to describe the basic motive, and though he has taken pains to clarify its nature as much as possible, he has not set it forth precisely and in detail as he has some of the grievances. It was pointed out above that the breach of the truce is regularly coupled with the *airíai* and distinguished from the motive, the *πρόφασις*; when the Lacedaemonians decided that the truce had been broken they were in effect honoring the contention of the allies that Athens was in the wrong (*ἀδικεῖν*), in other words that the *airíai* were legitimate grounds for war. The phrase *σπουδῶν ξύγχυσις* then, in this final clause, stands for the *airíai*. What more natural ending to the account of the

<sup>25</sup> Patzer, e.g., says *op. cit.*, p. 110: "Die *ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις* fehlt hier."

causes of the war could there be than a final mention of both *aἰτίαι* and *πρόφασις*? I take the final clause to mean, therefore, that the events that had gone on and were going on (the present participle may be due to the fact that the siege of Potidaea was still in progress) both constituted a realization of the *grievances* and completed the subjective *motive*. Both circumstances were necessary to produce a state of war.

*Πρόφασις* has then in Thucydides several meanings: "reason," expressed and genuine, "pretext" (expressed but untrue), "excuse" or "occasion," and unexpressed but true "motive." These meanings form a comprehensible pattern; all are subjective, having to do with the mental attitudes of the persons who are engaged in the events being described; all can be derived from the basic idea of a "showing forth."<sup>26</sup>

#### b. *Aἰτία*.

This word can be dealt with much more briefly. Its commonest meaning by far is abstract "blame" or "charge." The phrase *ἐν αἰτίᾳ ἔχειν* occurs often, as at II, 59, 2, where the Athenians Περικλέα ἐν αἰτίᾳ εἶχον. (Cf. I, 35, 4; V, 60, 2, 4, 5; 63, 1; 65, 5; VII, 81, 1.) To the same effect are such phrases as *αἰτίαν . . . Ἀρχίδαμος ἔλαβεν* (II, 18, 3), *δι' αἰτίας ἔχετε* (II, 60, 4). (Cf. also I, 39, 3; II, 60, 7; III, 13, 7; 39, 6; 46, 6; 53, 3; IV, 86, 5; 114, 5; V, 71, 1; VI, 14, 1; 46, 5; 60, 1.) In one passage *aἰτία* is distinguished from *κατηγορία*, I, 69, 6: "Blame (*aἰτία*) is levelled against friends who are in error, denunciation (*κατηγορία*) against enemies who have acted unjustly." Nevertheless, in several passages *aἰτία* has a meaning not far removed from that of *κατηγορία* here. Alcibiades, for example, asks not to be sent on the Sicilian expedition "with such a serious charge (*aἰτία*)" (i. e. of guilt in the affair of the Herms) against him (VI, 29, 2); similarly, Nicias fears to return, unsuccessful, to Athens (VII, 48, 4) "to be put to death unjustly and on a disgraceful charge." (Cf. III, 81, 4; V, 75, 3; VI, 76, 3; VIII, 33, 4.)

<sup>26</sup> One instance of *πρόφασις* has been omitted as being too uncertain, in its exact meaning, for any classification. This is VII, 13, 2, *οἱ μὲν ἐπ' αὐτομολίας προφάσει*. It may mean "as occasion for deserting offered" or "motivated by desertion" (literally, "on the motive of desertion") or, less likely, "as professed deserters" (Loeb).

Still in the general class of "blame," but concrete, are such examples as V, 63, 3, where the Spartan king Agis, in bad repute with his subjects for a series of military and diplomatic blunders, promises *ρύσεσθαι τὰς αἰτίας στρατευσάμενος*, "to destroy their grounds for blame by a campaign"; also VI, 105, 2, where we are told that the Athenians, by helping the Argives, "provided the Lacedaemonians with very plausible grounds for blame." (Cf. also II, 60, 1; V, 1, 1; 53, 1.)

Sometimes there is no notion of blame. A clear instance of "responsibility" is I, 83, 3 (quoted in the first paragraph of this paper), where King Archidamus points out to the Lacedaemonians that if they engage in war the greater part of the responsibility for what happens, for good or ill, will be borne by them. The same use is found at VI, 80, 4.

Somewhat commoner is *αἰτία* meaning grounds, thing(s) responsible for an action or a feeling. In IV, 65, 4 (quoted above, first paragraph), in commenting on the enormous optimism of the Athenians, Thucydides says "the cause of it (or the "grounds") was the unbelievable success of most of their undertakings." In I, 99, 1, speaking of the revolt from Athens of Naxos and Lesbos, the historian says "there were other grounds for the revolt, but the main ones were . . ." (*αἰτίαι δὲ ἄλλαι τε . . . καὶ μέγισται*). (Cf. also IV, 85, 1, 6; 87, 4; VII, 86, 5.)

There are five more instances to be considered, of which two are in I, 23, where they describe the causes of the war; a third, in I, 146, clearly echoes I, 23; the fourth, I, 66, refers to the Potidaean affair, one of the *αἰτίαι* of 23, and hence is also closely related. The fifth occurs in a passage already mentioned in our discussion of *πρόφασις* (p. 49); the Mityleneans are giving their reasons for having revolted from Athens. The passage constitutes important evidence for a difference in meaning between *αἰτία* and *πρόφασις*, for there is no reason of art or logic for Thucydides to have the Mityleneans use two words for cause here unless they are meant to express two different kinds of cause. The speech of the Mityleneans shows what the two kinds are. In the course of their explanation of the defection, two aspects of their reasoning emerge: they have certain grievances against the Athenians, namely their transformation of the Delian League from an anti-Persian alliance into an engine for the

subjugation of Greece (III, 10, 3) and their enslavement of most of their allies (10, 4-5); as a result of these activities of Athens, a motive for revolt was formed, the fear of the Mityleneans that they too would suffer enslavement: "What in other alliances is made secure by goodwill was with us maintained by fear, for we were held together as allies by fear rather than by friendship; and whichever of us should first gain courage through security was bound to transgress the alliance in some way" (12, 1). These two aspects of their reasoning are then summed up with the words *airía* and *πρόφασις* in 13, 1. Which word means which kind of reason can only be determined by other uses of the words; we have seen that *πρόφασις* elsewhere means subjective motive and can reasonably suppose that it does so here. The use of *airía* could be either of two meanings we have observed, "charges," or grounds for blame. It is not possible to know which was intended by the historian here.

The other four instances are all related in context, and in all of them the same difficulty arises: does the word mean the incidents that are the source of blame, the grounds, or does it mean the resultant feeling of blame? In I, 66 it refers to the Potidaean affair: "The Athenians and the Peloponnesians, then, had these additional *airíai*." The word can be understood equally well as grounds or as resultant feelings. In I, 23, 5-6, the reference of the word is to the incidents of Corcyra and Potidaea, the decrees against Megara, and the rest of the immediate causes of the war, but there is again the same uncertainty about the precise denotation of the word. The addition of the explanatory word *διαφοράί*, while it makes it clear that *airía* is being used in the sense of "blame," does not help to distinguish between grounds and emotion. In I, 146, since *airíai* is an echo of the use in 23, its meaning will presumably be the same.

It is possible that Thucydides did not mean to make any precise distinction between act and emotion in these passages. Both elements were important in bringing about the war, and both are within the scope of the word's normal meaning. Adequate translation is difficult; the word "grievance," with its ambiguity between grounds and blame, is the best single equivalent.

To sum up, *airía*, like *πρόφασις*, always in Thucydides is closely

connected with a state of mind; where it does not actually denote an emotion it is the incident or factor which causes an emotion. Like *πρόφασις* again, it expresses the feelings of the participants (or the basis for their feelings), not an objective explanation. To this extent both words are subjective; but while *πρόφασις* is the mental state which results from one's own reflections, *airia* is objective in that it expresses a reaction to another's conduct.

### c. *Aἴτιον.*

When Cornford said that "there is in Thucydidean Greek no word which even approaches the meaning and associations of the English 'cause' with its correlative 'effect,'"<sup>27</sup> he must have altogether overlooked the historian's use of *aἴτιον*. Properly, it is the neuter singular of the adjective *aἴτιος*. The adjective is used by Thucydides in keeping with his use of *airia*, with the meaning of "responsible," generally with a sense of blame.<sup>28</sup> As a noun, *aἴτιον* is used quite differently, in the sense of cause with no connotation of emotion, as at III, 89, 5, where the historian states what was in his opinion the cause of a tidal wave on an island off the coast of Locris: *αἴτιον δ' ἔγωγε νομίζω τοῦ τοιούτου*. He goes on to say that the cause was a violent earthquake. (Other examples are I, 11, 1; II, 65, 8; III, 82, 8; 93, 2; IV, 26, 5; VIII, 9, 3.) Generally, there is no possibility of *aἴτιον* meaning grounds or blame; once or twice grounds is a possible interpretation, as at VIII, 9, 3. But in the majority of cases an objective kind of cause is certainly meant, as in the example quoted above: tidal waves do not have subjective reasons. It is possible that this kind of cause is intended in all uses of *aἴτιον*, certain that it is in most. Thus the word is in contrast with the other two: both *πρόφασις* and *airia* refer to the mental attitudes of the persons concerned, *aἴτιον* is objective.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>27</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 59.

<sup>28</sup> *Aἴτιος* is used fourteen times; twelve times it means "guilty," e.g. II, 21, 3 (*Περικλέα*) *αἴτιον ἐνόμιζον*; twice it means "responsible," e.g. VII, 56, 2, *αὐτὸι δέξαντες αὐτῶν αἴτιοι εἶναι*.

<sup>29</sup> Herodotus' use of *aἴτιον* is strikingly similar. With Thucydides, compare Herodotus, III, 108, 4, *τὰ δὲ αἴτιον τούτου τάδε ἔστι*. This kind of phrase is Herodotus' regular use of the word. It seems very likely that his usage influenced that of Thucydides.

#### d. Summary.

If the reader should take the trouble to test the foregoing analysis, he would, in all probability, not agree with every assignment made to the various categories of meaning. He would, however, agree that the ranges of meaning of the three words are as they have been described. The objective, scientific word for cause in Thucydides is *aἴτιον*. *Πρόφασις* means, basically, "reason"; in its Thucydidean range the reason may be true or false, alleged or unspoken. *Aίτια* means responsibility, or what is responsible, or the imputation of responsibility. Both *πρόφασις* and *aίτια* invariably (except, of course, in the description of the plague, which obviously imitates Hippocratic usage and is atypical in Thucydides) are concerned with the feelings of the participants in the scene.

A curious anomaly is thus revealed. Thucydides, the scientific historian, uses his objective word for cause, *aἴτιον*, only seven times. The subjective words, which have to do with the motives, reasons, pretexts, grievances, and charges of the participants, he uses far oftener, and uses these exclusively in his most important discussions of cause, those concerning the causes of the war. An explanation of this apparent renunciation of the scientific approach will form the conclusion of this study.

### III.

Why does Thucydides prefer the less scientific and more subjective terms for cause? It is not possible to return to Cornford's view that Thucydides did not understand cause as such, but only grievances, pretexts, and the like, for the way in which he uses *aἴτιον* contradicts this supposition. If he can explain the smallness of the Trojan expedition (I, 11, 1) objectively, scientifically, even with an obvious awareness of the causative force of economic factors, we cannot suppose him to have been unable to express the causes of the Peloponnesian war in the same spirit, had he chosen to.

On the other hand, *πρόφασις*, as he uses it, does not denote scientific cause. The attempt to attach such a meaning to it when it refers to the causes of the war began (in Cochrane's book, at least) as a reaction against the assault by Cornford on the scientific character of Thucydides' work. The reaction was justified, for any reader feels the presence of a scientific spirit in

Thucydides, painstaking, accurate, and objective. It is not necessary, however, in order to vindicate Thucydides, to impute to him a scientific vocabulary in his description of the causes of the war. Thucydides' words do not reveal any want of objectivity on his part; it is rather that they are more *inclusive* than purely objective words could be. For example, Athens' intervention in the quarrel between Corcyra and Epidamnus was important above all for the additional hatred of Athens with which it inspired the Corinthians. To express this wider concept, with its emotional aspect, Thucydides chose the subjective word stressing the mental state of those involved, rather than the mere *γιγνόμενα*. Therefore he described the incident and its results as an *αἰτία*. The notion of *αἴτιον* is included in *αἰτία*. Similarly, *πρόφασις*, when it is used of the causes of the war, is a broader term than *αἰτία*, as in I, 118, where the *αἰτίαι* which have been described are regarded as collectively constituting the *πρόφασις*. The relationship is quite similar in I, 23, even though here Thucydides is more concerned with distinguishing between *αἰτία* and *πρόφασις*. For the Spartan fear of Athens, the real *πρόφασις* of the war, was unquestionably produced by the various *αἰτίαι* described by the historian, as well as by earlier events.

In using *αἰτία* and *πρόφασις* to describe the causes of the war, then, Thucydides was not the victim of an inability to distinguish between cause and mere complaint, but was deliberately using broad and meaningful terms. If we deny the subjective quality of the words, we are not so much attributing a scientific attitude to him as failing to recognize the breadth of meaning of his words.

To present the causes of the war from the point of view of the participants is in keeping with the whole spirit of Thucydides' art of history. Probably the most impressive feature of his manner is its air of dispassionate recording. The story of the Peloponnesian war tells itself. What is written in the person of the historian is in general purely narrative, it moves rapidly, unencumbered by commentary, concise, sometimes even to the point of sparseness.<sup>30</sup> Not only coloring but analysis and judg-

<sup>30</sup> Thucydides' narrative style is not, however, direct or plain, and in this he is unlike the medical writers. Where these are obscure, it is a result of bad writing, not conscious style, as it often is in Thucydides. The best written Hippocratic essays, such as *Airs, Waters,*

ment as well are restricted chiefly to the speeches. There are memorable exceptions to this general procedure: the brilliant character sketch of Themistocles (I, 138) the account of Athens' fortunes under and after Pericles (II, 65), the famous analysis of *stasis* (III, 82-3), to mention only the most conspicuous. But such passages as these are comparatively rare. For the analysis of men's plans and motives, for statements and criticisms of policy, for most, indeed, of the inner action of the war, we depend on the speeches: the statement of Athenian policy under Pericles is spoken by Pericles (I, 140-4), of Spartan policy in Thrace by Brasidas (IV, 85-87); the best comparison of Athenian and Spartan character is given by the Corinthians (I, 69-71); the finest tribute to Athenian democracy is Pericles' funeral oration (II, 35-46), and the cruelest indictment of Athenian political realism the Melian Dialogue (V, 87-111); information about the tensions and emotions felt in a situation has generally to be derived from such pairs of speeches as those of the Corcyreans and the Corinthians in Book I, Cleon and Diodotus in Book III, Nicias and Alcibiades at Athens, Hermocrates and Athenagoras at Syracuse, and Hermocrates and Euphemus at Camarina, in Book VI.

This direct presentation, where the personality of the historian intrudes as little as possible, and the participants explain themselves and each other, is normal in Thucydides. It is, as any attentive reader senses, a highly dramatic method; it was this quality that Cornford so seriously exaggerated in judging Thucydides as a historian. For there is this basic paradox in Thucydides, that he is at once a scientific historian and yet, stylistically, a dramatist. Where Cornford erred was in extending the dramatic quality from presentation to conception; we fall into the reverse error if we attempt to introduce the scientific nature of the historian's view of history into his vocabulary of cause. The historian's explanations and analyses must be sought, not directly, but through his presentation of the minds and the emotions of the participants.

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*Places*, *The Sacred Disease*, and *Prognostic*, have the characteristic Ionian directness, which they share with Herodotus. In spite of specific similarities (cf. Schmid, *op. cit.*, pp. 181-2), Thucydides' style is essentially far from Ionian.

## POLITICAL MOTIVES IN CICERO'S DEFENSE OF ARCHIAS.

When Cicero accepted the defense of Archias in the year following his consulate, he turned his attention for a time from the exciting political events of the day to prove that a poet, a friend of Lucullus, was a Roman citizen. Archias was not an important person, and no great issue was at stake. The case against him was exceedingly weak, and any lawyer of mediocre ability could have handled it successfully. But Cicero took the case, apparently with relish; and, dispatching the legal arguments in short order, he turned to a larger subject, delivering to his jurymen and his audience a lecture in praise of literature. It is as if poetry, and not a poet, were on trial, and Cicero the man of letters pleads its case before his own generation and all ages to come.

J. Wight Duff and H. J. Rose refer to this speech, or the major part of it, as a charming essay on literature, and J. W. Mackail describes it as a perfect encomium on literature, addressed to "posterity, and the civilized world."<sup>1</sup> I suppose that for most of those who read the *Pro Archia* to enjoy it as a panegyric on humanistic learning that is all they know and all they need to know.

But if we wish to satisfy our curiosity about the motives of Cicero the politician in this case, we can be sure that there is more in it than meets the eye. It is true that he explicitly says in the exordium that gratitude to the man who was his chief adviser in his early literary studies prompts him to defend Archias, and we have no reason for doubting that this was a genuine motive. Another motive is hinted at (28) where Cicero tells us that Archias has begun a poem celebrating the glorious deeds performed by the consul of the preceding year. Cicero could scarcely conceive a nobler theme than this for his poet friend, and when he agreed to defend Archias he surely must

<sup>1</sup> J. Wight Duff, *A Literary History of Rome from the Origins to the Close of the Golden Age* (New York, 1932), p. 360; H. J. Rose, *A Handbook of Latin Literature* (London, 1936), p. 177; J. W. Mackail, *Latin Literature* (New York, 1895), pp. 68-69.

have wanted to encourage the poet in his undertaking. These are personal motives, understandable enough, which may well have been sufficient to move Cicero to accept the defense of Archias.

But it is generally agreed that, just as the attack on Archias was a political manoeuvre, so Cicero's defense was a declaration of his political position. Pompey at this time was in the East, but he had his agents at Rome, one of whom, Metellus Nepos, had tried to secure a dictatorship for Pompey in the Catilinarian crisis and had prevented Cicero from addressing the people at the end of his consulate. Lucullus, Pompey's greatest rival as a military commander, was a leader of the senate;<sup>2</sup> and that body made no effort to conceal its dislike of Pompey.

Since Archias was an intimate friend of Lucullus, whose exploits he had commemorated in a poem, it is usually assumed that the attack on him was in reality an attack on Lucullus, and that the real assailants were men acting on the side of Pompey, of whom Grattius, the accuser, was only a tool. It is even suspected that Caesar had some share in the business,<sup>3</sup> for it is certain that he at this time was trying to win Pompey over to the popular party.<sup>4</sup> These considerations have led scholars to conclude that Cicero in defending Archias took a definite stand and declared himself on the side of the party of Lucullus in the Senate and against the turbulent agents of Pompey as well as against Caesar and his popular party.<sup>5</sup> This accounts not only for the eloquent praise of Lucullus (21) but also for most of the digression in praise of poetry. Cicero was happy to have an opportunity in speaking of poets and poetry to demonstrate that the praise of Lucullus meant the praise of Rome (and at the same time to hint that the glory of his own consulship was Rome's undying glory).

<sup>2</sup> See Dio, XXXVII, 49-50. Cf. Ronald Syme, *The Roman Revolution* (Oxford, 1939), p. 33.

<sup>3</sup> W. E. Heitland, *The Roman Republic* (Cambridge, 1923), III, p. 113.

<sup>4</sup> Caesar had supported Metellus Nepos in his attempt to carry the decree to call Pompey with his army to Rome (*Plut., Cat. Min.*, 27) and had tried to transfer from Catulus to Pompey the honor of rededicating the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus (Dio, XXXVII, 44). See W. W. How and A. C. Clark, *Cicero: Select Letters* (Oxford, 1934), II, p. 40; Ronald Syme, *The Roman Revolution*, p. 32.

<sup>5</sup> See James S. Reid, *Cicronis Pro Archia* (Cambridge, 1877; reprint, 1899), pp. 13-14; W. E. Heitland, *The Roman Republic*, III, p. 113.

But this explanation leaves unexplained the passage (12-14) in which Cicero tells what reading and study have done for him personally. We might, of course, say that this passage serves as a transition from the legal arguments to the larger consideration of Archias' contribution as a poet; and I think this is in a sense true. But it is an unreasonably long transition, the longest I know of in the speeches of Cicero. He tells of the refreshment and inspiration he gets from books and insists that his love of scholarly leisure never keeps him from helping his fellow-men (12). He justifies his hours of reading by a comparison with the habits of pleasure seekers and claims that his studies make him more eloquent and effective in the defense of his friends (13). His best inspirations he has drawn from the great books in which he has learnt to love virtue and to contemn personal danger when his country's welfare is at stake. "How many pictures of great heroes have Greek and Latin writers left us not only for contemplation but also for imitation. These were before me always, when I was at the head of the government, and it was my practice to form my mind and heart by pondering on the example of outstanding men."<sup>6</sup> But were these outstanding men themselves trained in letters? This leads to the distinction between *natura* and *doctrina* and to the assertion that it is the union of the two that produces really great men (15). As examples he mentions Scipio Africanus the Younger, Laelius, Furius, and Cato the Elder, and finally he concludes his long transition (or digression) with the often quoted passage praising the intrinsic worth (as distinct from the practical value) of the delights of literature (16). All this to lead up to the praise of Archias!

This passage, I believe, can be best understood as an echo of the thoughts that were in Cicero's mind when he wrote to Pompey about the same time to acknowledge an official dispatch and a personal letter.<sup>7</sup> Cicero in replying rejoices at the good

<sup>6</sup> Cic., *Arch.* 14: *Quam multas nobis imagines non solum ad intuendum verum etiam ad imitandum fortissimorum virorum expressas scriptores et Graeci et Latini reliquerunt! quas ego mihi semper in administranda re publica proponens animum et mentem meam ipsa cogitatione hominum excellentium conformabam.*

<sup>7</sup> Cic., *Fam.*, V, 7. The first one, so far as I know, to suggest a connection between this letter and *Pro Archia* was Félix Gaffiot in his introduction to the Budé text of the speech, *Cicéron, Discours* (Paris,

news in the official dispatch but he lets Pompey know that he is offended by the coldness of the personal letter. "I have performed deeds which I thought would elicit some joyful acknowledgment in your letter, because of our personal and political ties. I suppose you have omitted any such acknowledgment out of a fear of giving offense to any one."<sup>8</sup> But Cicero goes on to say that his actions have won the approval of all the world, and that when Pompey returns he hopes to show that he has the qualities to make him be to Pompey what Laelius was to Scipio. "You are greater than Africanus, and I am not much inferior to Laelius: and on your return the knowledge of my wisdom and statesmanship will surely unite you to me, as Africanus was to Laelius, in public and private life."<sup>9</sup>

At this time Cicero was beginning to see that his political power was on the decline, that as an upstart knight he was not at all popular with the aristocratic Senate, that the *optimates* backed him during the preceding year only because of their fear of Catiline, that he could not hope now, when that fear was passed, to wield the same power in the curia.<sup>10</sup> And yet he was deeply

1938; reprint, 1947), XII, pp. 11-17. The only comment I have been able to find on M. Gaffiot's theory is a brief notice by a reviewer who dismisses it as unnecessarily subtle (Geoffrey Percival, *C.R.*, LIII [1939], p. 70).

<sup>8</sup> Cic., *Fam.*, V, 7, 3: *Res eas gessi, quarum aliquam in tuis litteris et nostrae necessitudinis et rei p. causa gratulationem exspectavi; quam ego abs te praetermissam esse arbitror, quod verere ne cuius animum offenderes.* Cicero had written to Pompey about the suppression of the Catilinarians (*Hic tu epistulam meam saepe recitas quam ego ad On. Pompeium de meis rebus gestis et de summa re publica misi . . .* [Cic., *Sull.*, 67]). Since it is clear that Pompey hoped the Catilinarian conspiracy would develop sufficiently to make it necessary for the Senate to call him to Rome with his army (J. L. Strachan-Davidson, *Cicero* [New York, 1894], p. 159), it is hard to believe that Cicero seriously looked for hearty congratulations from Pompey.

<sup>9</sup> Cic., *Fam.*, V, 7, 3: *Sed scito ea, quae nos pro salute patriae gessimus, orbis terrae iudicio ac testimonio comprobari; quae, cum veneris, tanto consilio tantaque animi magnitudine a me gesta esse cognosces, ut tibi multo maiori quam Africanus fuit, me non multo minorem quam Lacium facile et in re p. et in amicitia adiunctum esse patiere.*

<sup>10</sup> See Gaston Boissier, *Cicero and His Friends* (New York, 1897), pp. 49-51. In the following year Cicero tells Atticus that he is keeping up his law practice, no longer as a means of getting into office but rather as a means of maintaining his prestige: . . . *in forensi labore, quem*

convinced that the security of his country depended upon a harmony between the aristocracy and the knights. In thinking of this harmony he had in mind not only the knights who happened to be Roman bankers, but also, perhaps especially, the respectable squires from the country districts of Italy, the class from which he himself had come. He frequently speaks of the *concordia ordinum* along with the *consensus Italiae* or *consensus bonorum*,<sup>11</sup> showing that he looked to a union of all the "loyal" elements in Italy to preserve constitutional government.

But he knew that this would be impossible unless he could rally to the cause the support of an outstanding military leader.<sup>12</sup> Pompey seemed to be the best man available.<sup>13</sup> He was a military genius and had the confidence of his soldiers, he was popular with the knights and the plebeians, and if he was rather generally disliked in the Senate, Cicero thought that he could influence a sufficient number to back Pompey in an effort to preserve the constitution.<sup>14</sup> He was convinced that Pompey, in spite of all

*antea propter ambitionem sustinebam, nunc ut dignitatem tueri gratia possim . . . (Att., I, 17, 6).*

<sup>11</sup> See *Att.*, I, 14, 4 and 16, 6. Cf. W. W. How, "Cicero's Ideal in His *De Republica*," *J.R.S.*, XX (1930), pp. 33-34; J. L. Strachan-Davidson, *Cicero*, p. 165.

<sup>12</sup> This thought comes out explicitly in a letter to Atticus the following year (*Att.*, I, 17, 8-10). There Cicero tells of his efforts on behalf of the knights for the sake of *concordia* (*ibid.*, 8-9), but he adds that he is strengthening his position by his friendship with Pompey (*ibid.*, 10).

<sup>13</sup> Cicero's devotion to Pompey dated at least from his praetorship (66 B.C.), when he delivered the *Pro Lege Manilia*, and lasted to the very end. In 54 B.C. he calls Pompey *princeps vir . . . cuiusque ego dignitatis ab adulescentia fautor, in praetura autem et in consulatu adiutor etiam exstissem . . . (Fam., I, 9, 11)*; and in 50 B.C. he says: . . . *mihi σκάφος unum erit quod a Pompeio gubernabitur* (*Att.*, VII, 3, 5). In addition to speaking for Pompey in the *Pro Lege Manilia*, Cicero voted an extraordinary *supplicatio* for him (63 B.C.), defended his interests in the *De Lege Agraria* (63 B.C.), supported the bill (with modifications) designed to provide for Pompey's veterans (60 B.C.), proposed the extraordinary five-year control of the grain supply for Pompey (57 B.C.), and finally joined Pompey's camp in the Civil War (49 B.C.). Numerous references to public utterances made by Cicero in praise of Pompey are gathered by Jérôme Carcopino, *Les secrets de la correspondance de Cicéron* (Paris, 1947), II, pp. 81-84.

<sup>14</sup> The qualities that Cicero admired in Pompey were: *scientia rei*

his ambitions, had no intention of using his might against the laws; and he felt that, whatever power Pompey coveted at Rome, he sought to win it not by armed force but by the consent of his fellow citizens. He realized that Pompey had no talent for statesmanship in the problems that faced the government at Rome; but he knew that he was an incomparable military commander and a born leader of men, and he hoped to be at his side to supply the political wisdom and principles of right government, which his own practical experience as well as his deep knowledge of ethics, political philosophy, history, and law, had given him.

It would be eight years before Cicero would start to work on his *De Re Publica*, but I think that the ideas later expressed in that work had already begun to take shape in his mind.<sup>15</sup> In particular the notion of a *moderator rei publicae*,<sup>16</sup> presented in the fifth book of Cicero's treatise, seems to be haunting him in the year 62 B.C., and I suspect that he fancied during the preceding year that he himself was destined to play the role. But now it is Pompey that he imagines as assuming this leadership and himself at Pompey's side, supplying the counsel that only a scholar and philosopher can give.<sup>17</sup>

*militaris, virtus, auctoritas, felicitas* (*Leg. Man.*, 28-48); or, again, *fortuna, auctoritas, gratia* (*Att.*, I, 20, 4). But he recognized Pompey's faults: . . . *nos, ut ostendit, admodum diligit, amplectitur, amat, aperte laudat: occulte sed ita ut perspicuum sit invidet. Nihil come, nihil simplex, nihil ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς inlustre, nihil honestum, nihil forte, nihil liberum* (*Att.*, I, 13, 4). On Feb. 13, 61 B.C., Cicero wrote that Pompey's first speech on his return from the East pleased nobody (*Att.*, I, 14, 1), and in the following year he complained: . . . *nihil habet amplum, nihil excelsum, nihil non submissum atque populare* (*Att.*, I, 20, 4).

<sup>15</sup> See Martin van den Bruwaene, *Études sur Cicéron* (Bruxelles, 1946), p. 66.

<sup>16</sup> In 49 B.C. Cicero quotes to Atticus from the (now mostly lost) fifth book of the *De Re Publica*: *Ut enim gubernatori cursus secundus, medico salus, imperatori Victoria, sic huic moderatori rei publicae beata civium vita proposita est, ut opibus firma, copiis locuples, gloria ampla, virtute honesta sit. Huius enim operis maximi inter homines atque optimi illum esse perfectorem volo* (*Att.*, VIII, 11, 1).

<sup>17</sup> After quoting from his *De Re Publica* the description of the *moderator rei publicae* (see above, n. 16), Cicero tells Atticus: *Hoc Gracius noster cum antea numquam tum in hac causa minime cogitavit. Dominatio quaesita ab utroque est, non id actum beata et honesta civitas*

These thoughts give point, I think, to the otherwise pointless discourse in *Pro Archia* (12-14) on Cicero's own devotion to study. He does not tell his audience that he hopes to be Pompey's intimate friend and counsellor: that would be out of place in the present circumstances. But he does tell them that now, when his active leadership in political life is over, he does not cease to be deeply concerned about the welfare of his country, and that from his scholarly leisure and hours of reflection he is ready to emerge and offer still the wise counsel that might be otherwise lacking among men of action.

That Scipio and Laelius were in Cicero's thoughts at the time of this speech is clear from the very next paragraph where he cites them as examples of men who attained to preeminence because of a mental culture joined to a superior endowment of nature (16). Moreover, as he proceeds to prove that a poet can confer great glory on his country, he cites a number of examples of famous commanders who were intimately associated with poets (19-27). Among them he mentions Pompey and his connection with Theophanes of Mytilene, the chronicler of Pompey's achievements, and he remarks incidentally that Pompey's success has equalled his natural ability (24). As Cicero proceeds to admit his own love of glory and his hope of immortality of name (28-30), we cannot presume that he has any thought of putting Pompey in the shade. Even in the hour of his triumph a few months previously, when he was delivering the *Fourth Catilinarian*, Cicero had sung the praises of Pompey, declaring him greater than Scipio the Elder, Scipio the Younger, or any of Rome's famous generals, but adding in the same breath that his own glory would find some place amidst these great ones for his statesmanlike wisdom which had saved his country at home while Pompey was securing the empire abroad.<sup>18</sup>

*ut esset* (*Att.*, VIII, 11, 2). From this it seems that Cicero had thought of Pompey as his *moderator*. But W. W. How, *J.R.S.*, XX (1930), pp. 38-39, justly remarks: "Again, the reason that made Cicero finally pronounce Pompey unworthy of the part assigned him as 'moderator rei publicae' is neither his long-known political ineptitude, nor his supposed military incompetence, but the conviction that Pompey as well as Caesar lusted after a power founded on force and unfettered by constitutional shackles, and, in fine, was intent, not on the safety and welfare of the state, but on his own domination."

<sup>18</sup> Cic., *Cat.*, 4, 21: . . . *anteponatur omnibus Pompeius cuius res gestae*

The only plausible objection I can see against this attempt to find the thought of Cicero's letter to Pompey echoed in the speech for Archias is the fact that one of the most eloquent passages in the speech is a eulogy on Lucullus and his exploits in the Mithridatic War (21), a passage which, according to James S. Reid, "seems intentionally to avoid all allusion to the career of Pompeius in the East."<sup>19</sup> But this is no real objection. First of all, Cicero is arguing that Archias by his poetry glorified Rome, and he must logically bring in the exploits of Lucullus, which Archias celebrated in one of his poems. Secondly, there can be no question of intentionally excluding all mention of Pompey in this passage. The passage merely summarizes the events which Archias commemorated in his poem, and it is not likely that Archias would have made any mention of Pompey, since he was never in Pompey's retinue. Finally, there is no reason why Cicero could not intend in one and the same speech to show good will towards both Pompey and Lucullus. He had tried it before in the *Pro Lege Manilia* (20-21), and for some time he would continue to attempt to reconcile the bitterly opposed factions of Pompey and Lucullus in his efforts to establish the harmony of the orders.<sup>20</sup>

By what I have said I do not mean that Cicero intended the *Pro Archia* as a panegyric on Pompey. In fact, it cannot be denied that it contains a very explicit panegyric on Pompey's most pertinacious opponent. But I do think that it contains also a development of the thought that is found in the letter to

*atque virtutes isdem quibus solis cursus regionibus ad terminis continentur: erit projecto inter horum laudes aliquid loci mostrae gloriae, nisi forte maius est patefacere nobis provincias quo exire possimus quam curare ut etiam illi qui absunt habeant quo victores revertantur.*

<sup>19</sup> James S. Reid, *Ciceronis Pro Archia*, p. 17.

<sup>20</sup> Fierce conflicts were waged in the Senate in 61-60 B.C. Pompey was pushing two demands: 1. an agrarian law to settle his veterans on farms; 2. ratification *en bloc* of his acts in the East. The Senate stoutly refused both. Lucullus, who had been treated with contempt by Pompey in Asia (Dio, XXXVII, 49), was especially active in opposing the blanket approval of Pompey's commitments. In this struggle, as well as in the clash brought on by demands made by the knights at this time, Cicero tried to compose differences and consistently worked for a *cordia ordinum*; but in January, 60 B.C., his hope of accomplishing anything began to weaken (*Att.*, I, 18, 3-8). See J. L. Strachan-Davidson, *Cicero*, pp. 180-184.

Pompey. Cicero may not have been very anxious to have Pompey read this speech. But in any case he could not hide the fact that he was on good terms with Lucullus, and he seems to have thought at this time that he might bring Pompey and Lueullus together in the harmony of the orders and the union of all loyal citizens for the preservation of what he considered a just and reasonable political system.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> As late as 45 B.C., when Pompey was dead and Cicero's political ideal was obviously a lost cause, Cicero still liked to believe that from his scholarly retirement he might confer some benefits on his fellow citizens (*Acad. Pr.*, 6):

Etenim, si quodam in libro vere est a nobis philosophia laudata, profecto eius tractatio optimo atque amplissimo quoque dignissima est, nec quicquam aliud videndum est nobis, quos populus Romanus hoc in gradu collocavit, nisi ne quid privatis studiis de opera publica detrahamus. Quod si, cum fungi munere debebamus, non modo operam nostram numquam a populari coetu removimus, sed ne litteram quidem ullam fecimus nisi forensem, quis reprendet nostrum otium, qui in eo non modo nosmet ipsos hebescere et languere nolumus, sed etiam ut plurimis prosimus enitimus?

## ARISTOBULUS THE PHOCIAN.

All that we are told concerning the nationality of Aristobulus, son of Aristobulus, the historian of Alexander and one of Arrian's principal sources in his *Anabasis*, is that he was a "Cassandrian."<sup>1</sup> This does not mean that he was born in Cassandrea, but that he settled there some time after its foundation in 316 B. C.; his birthplace must be sought elsewhere and he must have been a man of mature years in 316, as he took part in Alexander's expedition and was entrusted with the restoration of Cyrus' tomb at Pasargadae.<sup>2</sup> The title "Cassandrian," if properly applied, should mean that he was a citizen of Cassandrea and we might reasonably expect him to become a citizen if he settled in this new city; but for lack of positive evidence, such as an inscription recording civic activity, we cannot be sure of it.

He is not the only historian of Alexander to be associated with more than one city. Onesicritus may be Aeginetan as well as Astypalaean;<sup>3</sup> but a better parallel is furnished by Nearchus and two other Greeks who were trierarchs of Alexander's fleet on the Indus, Laomedon and Androsthenes. All three of them, according to Nearchus, were "Macedonians from Amphipolis," but Arrian tells us that Nearchus was a Cretan originally,<sup>4</sup> and in a Delphic inscription which records honours granted to him he is

<sup>1</sup> Αριστόβουλος δὲ Κασσανδρεύς. See Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*, IIB, no. 139, F. 3—Plut., *Dem.*, 23; F. 6 and 47—Ath., II, 43D, VI, 251A. (F = *Fragmentum*, T = *Testimonium*).

<sup>2</sup> T. 6—Arrian, *Anab.*, proem; F. 51 a and b—Arrian, *Anab.*, VI, 29, 10; Strabo, XV, 3, 7.

<sup>3</sup> Jacoby, *F. Gr. Hist.*, IIB, no. 134, T. 1—Diog. Laert., VI, 84.

<sup>4</sup> Arrian, *Ind.*, 18, lists the trierarchs of the fleet, the Macedonians first, beginning with the group from Pella, ἐκ δὲ Ἀμφιπόλεως ἡγον οἶδε· [ἐκ Κρήτης] Νέαρχος Ἀνδροτίμου, ὃς τὰ ἄμφι τῷ παράπλῳ ἀνέγραψε καὶ Λαομέδων δὲ Λαρίχον καὶ Ἀνδροσθένης Καλλιστράτου. ἐκ Κρήτης is probably an interpolation, and is omitted by many editors, because it is insisted in section 6 that all named so far are Macedonians. Then in section 10 the text gives: ναύαρχος δὲ αὐτοῖσιν ἐπεστάθη Νέαρχος Ἀνδροτίμου· τὸ γένος μὲν Κρῆς δὲ Νέαρχος, φέκι δὲ ἐκ Ἀμφιπόλεως τῇ ἐπὶ Στρυμόνι. This note on Nearchus' origin cannot be expelled from the text so easily; but it is certainly due to Arrian himself, not to Nearchus; Arrian, however, still does not tell us of what state Nearchus was a citizen; he is *Krēs τὸ γένος, οἰκῶν ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει.*

called simply a Cretan.<sup>5</sup> We know that he and Laomedon were both companions of the young Alexander at court before the death of Philip;<sup>6</sup> and subsequently Nearchus was busy in the service of Antigonus "One-Eye" until 314 at least<sup>7</sup> and may have had neither need nor opportunity to establish or re-establish citizenship anywhere. Laomedon, who was made satrap of Syria by Perdiccas, is called a Mytilenian and Androsthenes a Thasian.<sup>8</sup> We do not in fact know whether any of them ever became a citizen of Amphipolis and none of them is ever called Ἀμφιπολίτης. If, however, a writer of Roman times did give one of them this title, we should surely be entitled to argue that he had merely drawn a conclusion from the text of Nearchus; it would not follow that such a writer had independent knowledge; and when Plutarch and Athenaeus call Aristobulus a Cassandraean we need not conclude that they knew more about his civic status than we know about Nearchus; all we can say definitely is that Aristobulus' birthplace is not recorded but that he subsequently took up residence in Cassandraea.

In previous discussions of Aristobulus no notice has been taken of a Delphic inscription, which records honours granted to a certain "Sophocles, son of Aristobulus, a Phocian living in Cassandraea":<sup>9</sup>

- Δελφοὶ ἔδωκαν Σοφοκλεῖ Ἀριστοβούλου Φωκεῖ ἐν Καστροῖσιν  
οἰκοῦντι, Φίλωνι[ . . . . . ] Πελλαῖσι,  
Ἀλεξάνδρῳ Λ[ . . . . . ] ον Ἐδέσσαιώι, Ἀντιγόνῳ Ἀσάνδρου Ἰχναιώι,  
Πολιτάρχῳ [ . . . . . ] Μελιβοεῖ,  
3 Ματριέτῃ Παντέα Περινθίωι, Μελεσικράτει Ἀριστομένει ἐν Ἡραίωι  
τείχει, Διοδώρῳ Μίθρεος Κυζικηνῷ,  
Τέρωνι Ἀπολλοδώρου Καλλατιανῷ, Σωκρίτῳ Κράθωνος Χερσο-  
νασίτῃ, Διονυσίῳ Διονυσίου Βορυσθενίτῃ,  
Νικίᾳ Ἡρακλείδου Βουσπορίτῃ, Γλαύκωνι Σίμου Κυθνίῳ, Ιερο[κλ]εῖ  
Ἀρτεμιδώρῳ Βαργυλίτῃ, Μάχονι  
6 Σαμοθράκι αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐκγόνοις προξενίαν, προμάντειαν, προδικίαν,  
προεδρίαν, ἀσυλίαν, θεαροδοκίαν,

<sup>5</sup> S. I. G.<sup>3</sup>, 266 Νεάρχῳ Ἀνδροτίμῳ Κρητῃ. Cf. Berle, *Das Alexanderreich*, II, p. 269. The inscription cannot be dated accurately.

<sup>6</sup> Arrian, *Anab.*, III, 6, 5.

<sup>7</sup> Diod., XIX, 69, 1.

<sup>8</sup> Diod., XVIII, 3, 1; Strabo, XVI, 3, 2.

<sup>9</sup> *Fouilles de Delphes*, III, 3, 207 (first published by R. Flacelière, "Notes de chronologie delphique," *B. C. H.*, LII [1928], pp. 189-92).

ἀτέλειαν πάντων καὶ τὰλλα ὄσα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις προξένοις καὶ εὐεργέταις. Ἀρχοντος Χαριξένου,  
βουλευόντων Χάρητος, [Τι]μοκράτεος, Καλλιφάνεος.

The name Aristobulus is of course quite common, but there are some reasons for believing that the father of Sophocles is none other than the historian Aristobulus. The inscription belongs to the middle of the third century B.C., though its precise date is doubtful; the most likely date for the archon Charixenus seems to be either 252-1 or else between 263 and 260.<sup>10</sup> A son of the historian Aristobulus, born some time after his father returned from the East in 323, would be of a suitable age about this time to receive these honours at Delphi. Aristobulus himself is supposed not to have started writing his history until he was eighty-four years old—not before 285, then, unless he was already over fifty when Alexander died.<sup>11</sup> But nothing else is known about the later years of his life or his activities in Cassandrea; and nothing whatever is recorded of his earlier life before he joined Alexander's expedition. If nothing is recorded about his place of origin, we are entitled to ask what the reason for this may have been.

If he was a Phocian, the reason is easy to see. Philip was largely responsible for the ruin of Phocis in 346 and it is understandable that a Phocian in the service of a Macedonian king might be reticent about his origin. Indeed, if he was a Phocian, the most likely explanation of his position on Alexander's staff is that his family was opposed to the political leaders of Phocis in the Sacred War and left the country before 346 to seek refuge in Macedonia. When the Phocians recovered their position in the Greek world and were reinstated at Delphi in 278,<sup>12</sup> a son of his who could claim that his family had been driven into exile by the "sacrilegious leaders" was a most likely person to be honoured at Delphi. No signs of any special Phocian outlook can be detected in the fragments of Aristobulus or in Arrian's

<sup>10</sup> G. Daux, *F. D.*, note *ad loc.*, and *Chronologie delphique*, pp. 31-2; Flacelière, *loc. cit.* and *Les Aitoliens à Delphes*, pp. 220-1.

<sup>11</sup> T. 3—[Lucian], *Macrob.*, 22. See introductory note in Jacoby's commentary on Aristobulus; Berne, *Das Alexanderreich*, II, pp. 64-5; Tarn, *Alexander the Great*, II, pp. 42-3.

<sup>12</sup> Paus., X, 8, 3; *S.I.G.*,<sup>8</sup> 399; Flacelière, *Les Aitoliens à Delphes*, pp. 113-14.

*Anabasis*. Arrian does remind us, however, that it was the Theban exiles and the Phocians and the Plataeans and the other Boeotians, not the Macedonians, who were really bitter in their hatred of the ruling party at Thebes when Alexander attacked the city;<sup>13</sup> and we may assume that Arrian learnt this from Aristobulus, not from Ptolemy.

Naturally one cannot prove that this is in fact the history of Aristobulus himself and his family. Cassandra, no doubt, was peopled with settlers from all over the Greek world and it would be absurd to insist that there was only one Aristobulus living there. But at least the historian was important enough to have a son who was honoured at Delphi, and he was also of the right age to be the father of the Sophocles in the inscription. If there is no definite reason for denying their identity, the possibility should certainly be considered that "Aristobulus the Cassandraean" came originally from Phocis.

What does the inscription tell us about Sophocles? The description "a Phocian living in Cassandra" <sup>14</sup> is a curious one, because in the Delphic inscriptions men are styled simply "Phocian" when they represent the *koinon* of Phocis in some official capacity, but otherwise their city is mentioned;<sup>15</sup> and in an honorific inscription it would seem almost like an insult to the city to omit its name. Should we conclude, then, that Sophocles was not a citizen of any particular city in Phocis, but really only Φωκεὺς τὸ γένος, not actually registered anywhere?<sup>16</sup> This indeed would be the position of the son of a Phocian exile, born outside the country; he could call himself a Phocian, but

<sup>13</sup> Arrian, *Anab.*, I, 7, 11; 8, 8.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. *F. D.*, III, 3, 185 Ἀλεξανδρίης Ἡλεῖος ἐν Αἰτωλίᾳ οἰκῶν, who is called simply Ἡλεῖος in 3, 187 (date 272-1 B.C.).

<sup>15</sup> *F. D.*, III, 3, 42 Διλαιεύς, 143 Ἀγρικυρεύς, 294 Δρύμιος. It is the same with Aetolians and Boeotians: 198 Κλεοσθένεις Αἰτωλῷ ἐξ Ἡρακλείας, 199 Βουθήρα Αἰτωλῷ ἐκ Τιτράν, 95, 96, 102 Βοιωτίῳ ἐκ Κορωνείας. Likewise we find Boeotians from Thespiae, Thebes, and Tanagra (81, 82, 94, 100, 101).

<sup>16</sup> For Nearchus see note 4 above. We cannot call Sophocles simply a Phocian citizen, because Phocian federal citizenship was the result, not the basis, of membership of a constituent city. There are a few instances known of honorary federal citizenship (*isopoliteia* with the Phocians) granted to outsiders by the *koinon* of Phocis; but we are hardly justified in assuming this here. See Busolt-Swoboda, *Griech. Staatskunde*, pp. 1452-3; *I. G.*, IX, 1, 97; O. Kern, *Die Inschriften von Magnesia*, no. 34.

could not strictly call any city his own if he was not on the citizen roll. What was his status at Cassandrea? If he was a citizen, we should expect him to be called "Cassandrian" in this inscription; if he was not, it means little to call him a metic unless we know something of the constitution of Cassandrea; we cannot apply Athenian terms to every Hellenistic city; all we know is that he was a person of some importance there; we can only conjecture how he earned the gratitude of Delphi.<sup>17</sup>

Tarn recently tried to prove that Aristobulus came from the island of Cos.<sup>18</sup> He noted that one historian of Alexander, whom Strabo quoted, spoke of "five thousand cities in India between Hydaspes and Hypanis, not one of which was smaller than Meropid Cos."<sup>19</sup> He argued that a writer would not take Cos for his basis of comparison unless it were his own home town and, since the only historian of Alexander whose home town was not known was Aristobulus, that Strabo was quoting Aristobulus here and that Aristobulus came from Cos. The method of argument is excellent; but it has to be remembered that there is another historian of Alexander whom Strabo might be quoting, who certainly came from near Cos, and who might very suitably use this city as a basis of comparison because his own native place was small and obscure: Onesicritus of Astypalaea, whom Strabo quotes in his discussion of India even more frequently than he quotes Aristobulus. Hence the claim of Phocis to be the birthplace of Aristobulus is not seriously shaken by Tarn's argument.

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#### PAGANUS IN B. G. U., 696.

R. O. Fink in his valuable edition of Mommsen's *pridianum*, published in this Journal in 1942, presented a number of new readings. Among the more important of these was the recog-

<sup>17</sup> Flacelière, *B. C. H.*, LII, p. 190, thinks it may be a reward for hospitality shown to Delphic *theoroi*.

<sup>18</sup> *Alexander the Great*, II, p. 32 n.

<sup>19</sup> Strabo, XV, 1, 3; 1, 33.

nition of the centurion sign in Col. i, 20.<sup>1</sup> The entry in which it is found reads as follows:

20 FACTUS EX PAGANO A SEMPRO- (CENTURIO) I  
NIO LIBERALE, PRAEF(ECTO) AEGUPT(I),  
silvano et augurino co(n)s(ulibus),  
sextus sempronius candidus ex v kal(endas)  
maiias.

The consulship in line 22 is the date of Candidus' enlistment (A. D. 156). It is also the year in which this text was written. (*CENTURIO*) *I* (line 20) stands at the right edge of the column, in alignment with similar items above and below. The unit is an auxiliary cohort stationed in Egypt.

Candidus was made centurion *ex pagano*, and the principal question which this entry raises is the meaning of that phrase; or, to be more exact, the meaning of *paganus*, the man's status before his appointment.<sup>2</sup> In view of the fact that Candidus began his service as a centurion, Fink states, ". . . it is obvious that the term as used here means more than simply 'private citizen',"<sup>3</sup> despite Mommsen's opinion to the contrary.<sup>4</sup> Instead, he compares the description of a legionary soldier in *P. Lat. Gen.*, 1 as *pagane cultus* and cites Premerstein's explanation, which is that the soldier on this day went in civilian dress to act as a secret service agent (*Geheimpolizist*).<sup>5</sup> Fink concludes, ". . . one may suppose that the present centurion entered the army from the secret service of the civil police."

There are several objections to this explanation, attractive and well-stated as it is. First, it should be emphasized that

<sup>1</sup> *A.J.P.*, LXIII (1942), pp. 61-71. Mommsen had taken the sign as a mark to separate the numeral *I* from the rest of the line; *Gesammelte Schriften*, VIII (Berlin, 1913), p. 556.

<sup>2</sup> Cf., e.g., *factus dec(urio) ex dupl(icario)* or *sesq(uiplicario)* in *P. Mich.*, 164.

<sup>3</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 65.

<sup>4</sup> " *Pagani* vocabulum opponitur militi in papyro ita ut apud Tacitum et Plinium aliasque auctores passim"; *op. cit.*, p. 563. Mommsen assumed of course that Candidus was an ordinary recruit, not a centurion.

<sup>5</sup> A. von Premerstein, *Klio*, III (1903), p. 41. The section of the papyrus containing this entry is a sort of duty roster. The soldier acted as *pagane cultus* on only one of the nine days covered.

*paganus* in the sense of “civilian” is not only common in writers of all kinds; it is a regular part of the technical language of jurists and others, and is often used precisely where distinctions between “soldiers” and “civilians” are made.<sup>6</sup> It is found, too, where, as in this papyrus, a change in the status of the same person is involved. Cervidius Scaevola, for example, writes in connection with the privileges of soldiers’ wills: *miles si, dum paganus erat, fecerit testamentum. . . .*<sup>7</sup> In a formal military document, one would certainly expect the word to be used with the meaning that is regular in such a context.

Further, one could hardly assume that *paganus* and *pagane cultus* were equivalent in meaning in any context, unless there was good reason to believe so. As often as not, the latter phrase would probably imply, as is true in the only text where it does appear, that the person so described was not actually a *paganus*.

Again, the *pagane cultus*, it will be recalled, was a regularly enrolled legionary. The agents to whom Pliny refers as being in *cultu pagano* were also soldiers (*Ep.*, VII, 25, 6); so too were the others who are similarly described.<sup>8</sup> One may add that apparently the entire imperial secret police was drawn from the army.<sup>9</sup> But the date of Candidus’ enlistment, as Fink saw, shows quite conclusively that he entered military service only when he became centurion.<sup>10</sup> As a civilian, his previous status consequently was quite unlike that of the *pagane cultus*, and there are

<sup>6</sup> For a recent summary, see E. Kornemann, *R.-E.*, XVIII, cols. 2296-7, s. v. “*Paganus*.”

<sup>7</sup> *Dig.*, XXXV, 2, 96; cf. XXIX, 1, 9, 1 (Ulpian): *ut est rescriptum a divo Pio in eo qui, cum esset paganus, fecit testamentum, mox militare coepit*; and XXIX, 1, 38 (Paulus). Many other occurrences of the term will be found in B. Kübler, *Vocabularium Iurisprudentiae Romanae*, III (Berlin, 1937), p. 475.

<sup>8</sup> E.g., Tac., *Hist.*, I, 85: *milites sparsi per domos occulto habitu . . .*; Epictetus, *Diss.*, IV, 13, 5: *στρατώρης ἐν σχήματι ἰδιωτικῷ . . .*

<sup>9</sup> See O. Hirschfeld, “Die Sicherheitspolizei im römischen Kaiserreich,” *Kleine Schriften* (Berlin, 1913), pp. 576-612. For the *frumentarii* see also P. K. Baillie Reynolds, *J. R. S.*, XIII (1923), pp. 180-7.

<sup>10</sup> He was made centurion on April 27. One might argue, if he did not take *paganus* to mean “civilian,” that Candidus had enlisted between January 1 and April 26, and had subsequently been promoted. But as he was not transferred from another unit, April 27, the day both of his accession to the cohort and of his appointment as centurion, must also be the day of his enlistment.

really no grounds at all for believing that he had been a member of any sort of police.<sup>11</sup>

It is, as a matter of fact, the plain if somewhat surprising statement that Candidus was made centurion in this auxiliary cohort directly from civilian status that gives the entry its real interest. Such appointments were apparently quite rare. One may compare, however, the legionary centurions who were appointed directly to the centurionate, often *ex equite Romano*.<sup>12</sup> Unfortunately, there is no evidence for Candidus' claims to preferment, except perhaps his name; the prefect who made him centurion, it will be noted, was also a Sempronius, and it is possible that the two were related or connected in some way.<sup>13</sup> Again, the papyrus itself gives no clue as to what Candidus' future career might have been. But legionary centurions who began their service at that rank, as is well known, often went on to higher responsibilities,<sup>14</sup> and perhaps Candidus too had prospects of advancement to which most centurions who had risen from the ranks could not aspire.

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<sup>11</sup> There were of course civilian police of various kinds, especially in the eastern provinces; see Hirschfeld, *op. cit.*, pp. 599-612, 613-23; U. Wilcken, *Grundzüge und Chrestomathie der Papyruskunde*, I, 1 (Leipzig, 1912), pp. 411-16; D. Magie, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor*, II (Princeton, 1950), pp. 1514-16, nn. 46, 47.

<sup>12</sup> See A. Stein, *Der römische Ritterstand* (Munich, 1927), pp. 136-67, especially 136-8. No auxiliary centurion is included in his list of those appointed directly to the centurionate. Where the type of unit is known, all are legionary centurions. I know of no collection of the evidence for the *auxilia* comparable to that made by Birley (see n. 14) and others for the legions.

<sup>13</sup> The importance of patronage and influence in securing appointments during the Empire requires no comment. For one example involving the centurionate, see Pliny, *Ep.*, VI, 25. Candidus' own qualifications, however, may have been sufficient to obtain this post but not one in a legion.

<sup>14</sup> See Dio, LII, 25, 7; and in addition to Stein's work, also H. M. D. Parker, *The Roman Legions* (Oxford, 1928), pp. 277-83; and E. Birley's important study, "The Origins of Legionary Centurions," *Laureae Aquincenses*, II (Budapest, 1941) = *Dissertationes Pannoniae*, II, no. 11, pp. 47-62, especially pp. 60-2.

## REVIEWS.

GILBERT HIGHET. *The Classical Tradition, Greek and Roman Influences on Western Literature*. New York and London, Oxford University Press, 1949. Pp. xxxviii + 763.

In this substantial, warmly written, and easily read book, Professor Highet conducts us through the centuries of European literature from *Beowulf* to Anouilh and Cocteau, presenting the broad sweep of classical influence, and yet keeping us always or mainly in the presence of concrete literary works and their authors. The volume is primarily a handbook for students, but this basic character is crossed with a strong literary and critical, and propagandist, purpose that gives it a life and an ethos well beyond the nature of a handbook. As a handbook it presents, with conventional periodization, an imposing array of information, generally based (if one reviewer may judge of that) upon the best modern authorities, and set down with a remarkable degree of accuracy. On its important subject no other book exists that is at once so broad in scope and so full of detail; and surely no one can read it without learning much, and learning delightfully. Where Highet's other purposes enter in, in some measure shaping this material, we cannot but have certain reservations; and the book is sometimes too evidently written down to the supposed level of the American undergraduate or college alumnus to whom it seems primarily to be addressed; but the main point is that it unquestionably succeeds in imparting both solid information and legitimate enthusiasm to minds beyond the contracting circle of classical scholars.

The underlying concept is the just and inevitable one that the classical tradition in literature is vital only in works that are vital themselves. With this limiting principle there goes, perhaps not exactly as a deduction, the idea that from the first only works written in the vernacular languages are really alive; classical culture comes home to our business and bosoms only when naturalized in our mother tongue. Accordingly, the whole Latin culture of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance is left out of direct account, and the early Middle Ages are represented only by Old English literature, with mention of the Carolingian revival in a parenthesis, and the later Middle Ages only by the French romances and Dante. That saves space; does it also imply that, before Dante, the heights and depths of the European spirit were fully reflected in the vernacular literatures? The same principle again saves space by allowing Highet to bring Germany into the picture only with the mid-eighteenth century, and to deny that country any earlier Renaissance. "The sixteenth-century Renaissance did not affect Germany," the Table of Contents roundly states (p. xxix); in Germany there came forward no great vernacular writers but "instead, we find nothing except a few [!] humanists writing Latin—the most distinguished being Ulrich von Hutten [?]"—and some poor vernacular writers, the reason being that "the cultural level of the ordinary public was too low" and

"the class-distinctions of German society kept a gulf fixed between the Latin-reading and writing university men and the outside world" (p. 368). Literature is vital in so far as it keeps in touch with the common people, and an excess of classical culture is as injurious as too little. "Classical culture always produces its finest effects in the modern world when it penetrates to the ordinary people and encourages a Rabelais to teach himself Greek, puts Chapman's Homer in the hands of Keats, or makes Shakespeare enthusiastic over Plutarch" (*ibid.*). In this spirit, an entire chapter is given to Shakespeare's knowledge of the Classics, while Milton is parceled out under Pastoral, Epic, and Drama, and seldom treated with much sympathy; and Classical French tragedy, with "baroque" tragedy in general, is "a comparative failure," largely because addressed to a narrow aristocratic audience. A less extreme view is taken in agreement with Du Bellay (p. 232):

Nationalism narrows culture; extreme classicism desiccates it. To enrich a national culture by bringing into it the strength of a continent-wide and centuries-ripe culture to which it belongs is the best way to make it eternally great. This can be proved both positively and negatively in the Renaissance. It was this synthesis of national and classical elements that produced, in England, Shakespeare's tragedies and the epics of Spenser and Milton. It was the same synthesis in France that, after a period of experiment, produced the lyrics of Ronsard, the satires of Boileau, the dramas not only of Racine and Corneille but of Molière. It was the failure to complete such a synthesis that kept the Germans . . . from producing any great works of literature during the sixteenth century.

In this juster view, Milton and the French tragic writers inevitably revert to their natural eminence, or nearly; for surely Milton and Racine, with more complete assimilation of classical culture, produced finer effects than Keats or Rabelais at least. And the association (here significantly due to Du Bellay) of the growth of Renaissance literature with the rise of national consciousness probably is more historical—though less attractive to the present-day reader—than explanations assuming that French society was more democratic than German in the sixteenth century.

The recognition of a synthesis defines the spirit, but not altogether the method, of the book. Himself seeking to interest a more popular class of readers, Hight does not adhere with rigor to this principle nor develop its implications. To define the classical tradition in literature as a synthesis is one thing, to define the terms of the synthesis and to carry the ideas so defined through the long dialectic of European intellectual history as reflected in literature is quite another, and not the author's purpose. Otherwise, for example, it would be necessary to include the Latin culture of the Middle Ages and of the Renaissance as the matrix of the major ideas and intentions carried over into the vernaculars. It would be necessary to follow the successive literary movements, in France for example, and ask what normative value the Classics had for, say, the *rhetoriqueurs*, the school of Marot, the *Pléiade*, and the school of Malherbe. The history of literary theory would have to be taken into account; also the impact of education. It would be necessary, especially for the six-

teenth century, to find a means of measuring the relative value of popular and humanistic elements, and necessary to note which of the Classics were assimilable in different climates of sensibility, and to what extent. Both sides of the synthesis are compounded and variable. The understanding of antiquity and of individual authors shifts, indeed advances, from age to age, and the literary world follows but seldom is abreast of the advance. Ficino's Plato is not the Plato of Schleiermacher, and even the Platonism of Ficino tends to be reduced by the Renaissance poets to "Platonic love" under the pressure of the courtly love of an older tradition—which itself owed something to an older apprehension of Platonism. Indirect influence and a sort of digestive process, in which the whole "republic of letters" is involved, are essential to assimilation. Doubtless the basic studies are lacking for a firm and connected treatment of some of these essential topics, and to raise the abstract content would very likely lower the concrete content of the book. The author's tact envisages a class of readers who will be more content with a long series of interesting facts and of discussions of individual writers, punctuated by broad and rather unverifiable generalizations about successive historical epochs—social, political, moral, even military in character—from which supposedly the literary phenomena are to be immediately deduced. The intermediate realm of operative causes and occasions—of literary aims, discussions, and schools—is generally passed over; we are presented with results rather than processes, and the material influence of ancient literature is more in evidence than the dynamic influence.

Highet writes less as a scientific historian (of whose attitude he is diffident) or a modern literary critic than as a humanist. That is to say, he allows his authors a considerable degree of freedom from historical and psychological necessity and brings into prominence their personal choices; and he is frequently occupied with the moral content of literature. The stirring Conclusion, though several times promising to return to literary matters, is throughout a sermon on life and conduct. The message of antiquity is, What shall it profit a man if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul?—a text which, however, sounds somehow different as paraphrased in Highet's final sentence: "The real duty of man is not to extend his power or multiply his wealth beyond his needs, but to enrich and enjoy his only imperishable possession: his soul." The echo of the Catechism uncomfortably reminds us that neither the Westminster divines nor Plato would have left the real duty of man at that. Nor would Matthew Arnold, "unwilling, pro-pagan Christian" though he be (p. 93)—whose *Hellenism and Hebraism*, as a statement of the "synthesis" upon the moral plane, might well have found mention somewhere in this book. For indeed classical culture has represented a high standard of broad humanity that has guarded religion itself against a narrow and harsh fanaticism, that has fortified the conscience of the West against tyrannies of all kinds, that has upheld the primacy of the intellect and of scientific thought, while providing an antidote to extreme intellectualism by its pervading moral sense; and it has taught literature to rise above the trivialities of the folk-songs and romances of ordinary people to embrace deeper issues in

disciplined forms adequate to the responses of a mature civilization. If Western culture is to retain its values, the Classics can never be just one subject among many or the concern only of specialists—yet that is about where we are. Whatever we may miss in this book in the way of historical nuances, the firm apprehension of this salient point is something to be grateful for.

The limitations of the method, though at the risk of excluding essentials of the subject, enable the author to handle a still enormous material with control and perspicuity. After an Introduction outlining the growth of civilization through the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, the chapter-headings are as follows: The Dark Ages: English Literature; The Middle Ages: French Literature; Dante; Towards the Renaissance: Petrarch, Boccaccio, Chaucer; The Renaissance: Translation;—Drama;—Epic;—Pastoral and Romance; Rabelais and Montaigne; Shakespeare's Classics; The Renaissance and Afterwards: Lyric Poetry; Transition; The Battle of the Books; A Note on Baroque; Baroque Tragedy; Satire; Baroque Prose; The Time of Revolution; Parnassus and Antichrist; A Century of Scholarship; The Symbolist Poets and James Joyce; The Reinterpretation of the Myths; Conclusion. The main lines are: slow growth ending in the "outburst" of the Renaissance; this outburst checked by the Counter-Reformation and various disturbances, leading to the Baroque period, which is marked by a crisis in the attitude to the Classics (the Battle of the Books), but continues to the revolutionary period; the nineteenth century notable for its knowledge of antiquity, but ending in a decline of classical education; twentieth-century use of the classic myths as symbols for twentieth-century problems.

Though the Battle of the Books is treated as a kind of symbol under which to gather up all opposition at any time to the Classics, there is perhaps a loss of perspective in placing it before the chapters on the baroque authors, inasmuch as, in France, the success of the seventeenth-century writers was the occasion for the Battle and a chief strength of the "moderns." One may wonder whether the term "baroque" has not been stretched well beyond usefulness in recent literary history. Here it is carried pretty far and results in some dubious classifications. Perhaps Calderón (1600-81) is a Renaissance dramatist, while Corneille (1606-84) is a baroque dramatist, but apparently Milton wrote Renaissance epic poems and a baroque tragedy, while Titian somehow goes hand in hand with Tiepolo as a typical baroque painter (pp. 178, 291). There is some chronological confusion also in the account of the "conflicts . . . erupting throughout the early Renaissance" (pp. 178-81), where, among witnesses for the early Renaissance, Tasso, Shakespeare, Donne, Galileo, and Cyrano de Bergerac are clearly misplaced. In a book in which choice must be severe, one finds little to complain of in the omission of authors; and very properly Hightet raises his requirements in the most recent period, where he does well to single out "the reinterpretation of the myths" for central attention—especially since with it goes the influence of Greek drama. He keeps close to imaginative literature. Yet one might wish that a little space could have been found for Continental travel-literature after Chateaubriand (Maurice Barrès, *Voyage de Sparte*; Thibaudet,

*Les Heures de l'Acropole*; Hauptmann, *Griechischer Frühling*) as a significant expression of the *rêve grec*. There are unacknowledged, though necessary, geographical limitations; yet Holberg and Ibsen, for example, might have found a small niche somewhere. The Preface promises to show how Greek and Latin influence has "moulded the literature of Western Europe and America," but, not to think of Latin America, very few American authors are considered; absent from the Index are Emerson, Lowell, Bryant, Hawthorne (though Lew Wallace gets in), E. A. Robinson, and Edgar Lee Masters. (Suggestions here might have been found in John Paul Pritchard's *Return to the Fountains*). Such omissions are, however, relatively unimportant or can be justified; our one legitimate complaint on this score is the absence of a discussion of Molière and the modern comedy of manners. The unfavorable view of baroque tragedy in Chapter 16 seems preparatory to a favorable view of comedy, and the last sentences of the chapter announce the subject. Has a section been excised? The amputation, if such it be, leaves a scar; for of all writers, Molière perhaps best represents the author's ideal of a happy balance between classical influences and the native spirit. La Fontaine too should probably have been included.

In a book on the classical tradition the Renaissance naturally demands a central position. Hight makes it the culmination of his introductory sketch, placing there his remarks on the Revival of Learning, and in the body of the book treats it in a series of chapters on authors and literary species. There is little attempt to understand the Renaissance as an epoch in intellectual history; and from the text of the Introduction and from the references it appears that the author knows of nothing on this subject since J. A. Symonds. Even so, among the topics touched on, humanist education and the humanists themselves need not have been omitted. Indeed, if the decline of classical influence is to be accounted for later on in chapters on the Battle of the Books and a Century of Scholarship, the "outburst" of the Renaissance deserves a chapter on, say, a Century of Humanism to introduce it; and if the failure of latter-day humanist education is emphasized, perspective would be gained by some mention of the success of the "new learning" in the schools of the Renaissance. By such omissions half the meaning of the classicizing movement in the vernacular literatures of the sixteenth century is lost. The *questione della lingua* as a historical actuality does not appear (Bembo, for example, is not mentioned), and except by implication we are not made to see Renaissance literature in its process as a *fond* of older "mediaeval" literary directions yielding to or resisting the conscious efforts at "illustration" by a new classical ideal. The penalty of the handbook method is to make the chapters on authors and literary species exclusive and static. Thus there is no place for the literary dialogue, certainly a chief prose-form of Renaissance literature, and Castiglione, for example, finds no mention. No place is found for Renaissance Platonism (not even Spenser's *Faerie Queene* is indexed), and Platoni in a separate topic. The object seems to be to treat literature so far as possible apart from the history of ideas; but this can hardly justify the neglect of Renaissance literary theory,

both Rhetoric and Poetics, which is at the heart of the classical revival. A rapid glance at the Unities (pp. 142-3) is not enough. The neglect is little short of disastrous in the chapter on the Renaissance epic poem—the department in which tension between the popular and the classical tradition came to an open crisis in European letters on the question of the *romanzi*, amid which Tasso's *Gerusalemme* was born, and reborn. Instead of entering into this historical situation, so significant for the classical tradition, the author arranges the material on a scheme of his own, rather in the manner of a college essay; differences among the poems apparently reflect only the impulses of the several poets, and the only difference noted between Ariosto and Tasso, for example, is that Tasso introduces Christian doctrine and the Christian supernatural. Even that point had occupied the critics, and had implications. This is certainly not to say that the details of this chapter lack interest; and the descriptive method itself is legitimate and suits the aims of a handbook; but can historical material even be properly seen and described without adequate historical perspective?

It is time to return to the terms of our first paragraph. Such reservations as we have are almost entirely concerned with matters of historical interpretation in the earlier periods. If Hight has sacrificed a certain depth on the side of historical objectivity, he has gained in what is important for his purpose, namely in personal apprehension. He has read widely indeed, and with sensitivity and discrimination; and the judicious control of so much material is the sign of no ordinary mental energy. There are many excellent observations and many excellent pages. I have marked, among others, the passage on Shakespearean and Senecan pessimism (p. 207); that on classical culture as the common ground of Western culture (p. 292); the interesting association of the "curt" or Tacitean style with unorthodoxy and revolt (p. 326); the suggestion that what Byron and Keats lack as poets is what they might have gained from a better knowledge of the Classics (pp. 414, 417); the speculations on why Mommsen did not finish his *History*—more convincing than the suggestions of Collingwood and Toynbee on this topic; the observation of Sir. G. Greenwood, which was new to me, that the opening of Keats' *Ode to a Nightingale* is a direct echo of Horace, *Epd.*, 14, 1-4 (p. 637); and the pages that invite one to read the poems of Carl Spitteler (pp. 528-31).

Reviewers' gleanings are notably small in a book that, though large, shows an admirable control of detail and is cleanly proof-read. A few points, however, seem to call for comment:

P. 1. Modern medicine and music hardly stand apart from the classical tradition in the same degree as do industry and applied science; cf. p. 180. P. 3 (and pp. 11 and 353). The word "savages" gives a false impression of the barbarian invaders of Italy. P. 6. The division of the Empire no doubt ultimately accounts for the line dividing Poland from Russia, but has lived more directly and as fatally (if at the moment less topically) in the line between Catholic Croatia and Orthodox Serbia. P. 16. Barlaam was no "secret agent" of the Eastern Empire; the phrase may represent a hasty reading of Gibbon's "subtle agent." The paragraph on the

recovery of Greek manuscripts should be replaced; Aurispa and Guarino should be mentioned, and Sabbadini not Gibbon [!] used as authority. P. 17. "Lascaris . . . visited the remote monastery of Mount Athos": read "monasteries." How can one touch even lightly upon the recovery of Greek without mentioning Chrysoloras? Coluccio Salutati rather than de' Salutati (also p. 83). Why give space to Byzantine contractions in Greek typography and make no mention of the far more significant humanist Latin script or of *antiqua* type? P. 21. Admirers of the cathedrals may not agree that in the Middle Ages "the sense of beauty" was "hampered and misdirected," to be recovered only in the Renaissance. P. 89. "The characters of the *Decameron* frequently imply contempt for the Christian church": for "church" read "clergy." P. 113. It is hardly correct to say that "almost as rapidly as unknown classical authors were discovered, they . . . were revealed to the public . . . by vernacular translations"; generally speaking, the time-lag was considerable, and significant. P. 114. "Never blotted a line": read "blotted out line." P. 117. The remarks on Amyot are flat, probably because Sturel's masterwork was not consulted. P. 119. French versions of Plutarch's *Moralia* before Amyot are more numerous and more important than the English versions, which alone are cited; Blignières' old but unsuperseded *Essai sur Amyot et les traducteurs français* should have been looked up. P. 151. As often in Milton, there is more in *P. L.*, II, 3 than immediately meets the eye; God's oath is not merely classical but Biblical also (see M. Y. Hughes' ed. *ad loc.*), and the plural "gods" not merely a simple-minded echo of the classical Olympus. P. 155. The paragraph on the invocation of the Muse by modern poets could be bettered; see now E. R. Curtius, *Europäische Literatur*, pp. 233-50. P. 160. The participial titles of Renaissance epic poems, *Orlando innamorato*, *Paradise Lost*, etc., may be not merely *ab Urbe condita* Latinisms, but borrowed from ancient drama (e.g., *Prometheus Bound*); at least, it is agreed that in continuing the *Innamorato* with *Orlando Furioso* Ariosto took his title from *Hercules Furens*. P. 187. Mlle de Gournay was not literally Montaigne's "adopted daughter." P. 192. The statement that the Theophrastan character-sketch "grew into the modern novel" needs some qualification; cf. p. 340. P. 220. For "My love is like a red red rose / That's sweetly blown in June" read "O, my luv's like a red red rose / That's newly sprung in June." P. 233. The first sentence of the first paragraph needs quotation-marks as a borrowing from Pierre de Nolhac. P. 256. The influence of "the public" requires to be more clearly defined throughout a book that by its intentional limitations constantly raises sociological questions; perhaps Schücking's well-known essay would have been suggestive. If the twentieth-century "public" prefers detective novels to the poetic drama, so, it may be countered, the corresponding "public" in the Renaissance preferred Spanish prose-romances to classicizing tragedies. Pp. 294-5. What is said of Milton's *Samson Agonistes* may be true, but is unsympathetic and onesided; no doubt "there is a subtlety in Sophocles which Milton could scarcely achieve," but the impression is left that Milton lacks subtlety, whereas it is one of his chief qualities. Is there not a subtlety in Milton

that Sophocles could scarcely achieve? P. 395. "Charlotte Corday, before she assassinated Marat, spent the day reading Plutarch." There seems to be no contemporary evidence for this unlikely statement, and the police records are detailed. Certainly the grand-niece of Corneille dramatized herself as a female Brutus, and had read Plutarch, but what she had most in mind, and quotes from in her *Adresse*, was Voltaire's *Mort de César*, then playing to large audiences. P. 397. "In his letter of surrender, Napoleon wrote: 'I throw myself, like Themistocles, upon the mercy of the British people': for Themistocles . . . had . . . thrown himself when exiled upon the mercy of Persia." Napoleon's letter to the Prince Regent was hardly his letter of surrender; he wrote: "Je viens, comme Themistocle, m'asseoir au foyer du peuple britannique"; and this is generally taken to allude to the well-known story (Thuc., I, 136; Plut., *Them.*, 24) of Themistocles as suppliant at the hearth of Admetus king of the Molossians. To compare the British with the Persians would hardly have been tactful—or of good omen for Napoleon himself. P. 400. Virgil, not Vergil, is the name of a village in New York State, and the title of Tennyson's poem (p. 446) is not *To Vergil*. Pp. 489-500. Housman expending intellectual energy upon the text of Juvenal is contrasted unfavorably with Housman on the verge of tears over a poem of Horace. There is doubtless much truth in what is said in these pages about the decline in classical education, and unquestionably more books of an attractive quality, popular in a good sense, should be written on classical subjects; but the whole seems out of focus. Once more, if the rise of humanist education, and its relation to society from the beginning, had been considered, the developments of the last hundred years would have been better understood. It is doubtful if interest in research has been a chief cause of the decline, or if the transplanting to America of Continental methods of scholarship, instead of those of Oxford, has been a bad thing. For a different view of the ogrish Continental professor of p. 495, "whose lectures were unintelligible or repulsive to all but his best students," it would be fair to read Professor Spitzer's recent remarks on Meyer-Lübke in *P. M. L. A.*, LXVI (1951), pp. 39-48. (The missionary zeal of foreign scholars is always interesting, and may be helpful, to Americans.) It should be considered whether, given the intellectual climate of recent times, the decline might not have been more rapid if the Classics had taken their stand merely on the aesthetic and moral grounds that Hight stresses, and had not offered able intellects an area for discoveries, great and small, in the early periods of our culture. The evil influence of the natural sciences upon literary scholarship is an unexamined commonplace and probably much exaggerated; it has hardly "been responsible for the fragmentation of classical study" (p. 499), since classical study has advanced on the feet of limited special dissertations since the time of Poliziano and Budé. "Meanwhile, those looking in from outside see no cathedral arising"—the metaphor is hard to interpret. What is required is, if possible, to re-establish a relationship between the Classics and the basic motivations of our age—a relationship that on the whole existed up to the French Revolution. P. 556. The generous Notes (150 pages) begin

here, and are, save perhaps for Chapter 19, conveniently arranged for ready reference. Why do publishers so seldom solve this easy problem? Possibly the student would be better served if the bibliographical references were somewhat increased, with some curtailment of the use of the Notes as an overflow from the text; one would welcome a note bringing together the principal works on Milton and the Classics as is done for Spenser and for Shakespeare. It is doubtful if the student will grasp much of the "point of view of modern scholarship" on Homer from the books listed for the purpose on p. 669. Two old friends, Egger's *Hellenisme en France* and Zielinski's *Our Debt to Antiquity*, seem nowhere to be mentioned. On the value of Cicero and Tacitus to the French revolutionaries (p. 672), it would be well to go beyond the somewhat sketchy remarks of Zielinski's *Cicero* to Aulard's *Eloquence parlementaire pendant la Rév. fr.* Foscolo's line, *Non son che fui; perì di noi gran parte* (p. 680), evidently echoes Horace, *Carm.* III, 30, 6, as well as IV, 1, 3. G. B. Vico deserves mention in note 6, p. 690; historiography is hardly considered before Bossuet; yet the concept of history distinguishes the heirs of the Greeks from most of the rest of mankind, and until recently historical writing was thought of as literature. Professor M. F. Fisch's Introduction to Vico's *Autobiography* would be suggestive here.

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RENATA VON SCHELIHA. Patroklos. Gedanken über Homers Dichtung und Gestalten. Basel, Benno Schwabe & Co. [1943]. Pp. 418. Bound, Fr. 20.

Scheliha is an enthusiastic admirer of Homer and in her well-written book she has done much to communicate her enthusiasm and admiration to the reader. Her book is primarily concerned with two closely related subjects: determining and describing "das Individuell-Homerische," and identifying and analyzing Homer's own modifications of and additions to traditional material. As the statement on the dust wrapper has it, the author presents Homer "als Dichter der Freundschaft und Erzieher zur Humanität." Her book contains many statements which will be questioned even by Homerists who are in sympathy with her general point of view and must therefore be used with caution, but it is an interesting analysis of Homer as a poet and is to be recommended to all those concerned with the literary side of Homeric studies. As in many books on Homer, its main theses are far from established, but the incidental points made along the way are frequently highly attractive.

Scheliha combines with her Unitarianism a willingness to abandon nearly all the portions of the poems regarded with any suspicion by the Alexandrians, even long sections like the Doloneia and the *Griffessied* (Book XXII, 237 on). Since "a final, the position of the editor is to accept nothing as definitely Homeric, unless he accepts the same poet as author of both poems." Her reading of Homer in the eleventh century is earlier than has been fashionable lately, but is

very close to the date arrived at (by completely different methods) in the latest discussion of the subject, W. F. Albright's "Some Oriental Glosses on the Homeric Problem," *A. J. A.*, LIV (1950), pp. 162-76. Scheliha's reasons for this early date will probably not convince any of those who for reasons she rejects have preferred a later one. Her basic reason is that Homer, she feels, has given such an accurate picture of so much of Mycenaean culture he could not have lived in another cultural epoch. She places much more reliance on the ancient lives of Homer, especially the "Herodotean," than will seem justifiable to many. Although quite often subjective and too uncritical of ancient sources, her discussion of Homer's date is of no little interest.

The account of "Sage und Dichtung zu Homers Zeit" is smoothly written and much of it is sound, but it contains little which is new. Now and then there are flights of fancy: not only are Thamyris, Demodocus, and Phemius conjectured to have been the "Vorbild oder Lehrer" of Homer, but it is suggested that Thamyris was especially significant in the history of pre-Homeric poetry, perhaps introduced a secular content into a poetry hitherto connected with religious cult. The notion that in those passages which Homer introduces by invoking the Muses the content and perhaps even the form go back to older songs has little to recommend it, but it is more than matched by the idea in the footnote that if one assumes Hector and Patroclus are invented characters, this helps to explain *Iliad*, XI, 299 and XVI, 692; in these two passages we have "Selbstbefragung" rather than an invocation of the Muses because Homer is asking about his own inventions and not about traditional material.

With the third and fourth chapters Scheliha really approaches her basic topics; she examines Homer's way of dealing with old saga and with the life around him and then considers the light this examination sheds on his own nature. For evidence on the saga she turns, like many others before her, to the Epic Cycle. She argues that both Homer and the poets of the Cycle got their material in the main from the saga, but that the Cyclic poets were content to take unchanged many cruel and fantastic features which Homer deliberately omitted or modified. Through the Cyclic poets we can sometimes see the material "upon which Homer laid his creative hand." By thus learning something of what lay before Homer, we can also learn how he handled it, what interested him and what did not. The comparison of the old material in the Cycle with the Homeric poems will help to reveal the "Individuell-Homerische." The crucial difficulty with this line of argument, of course, is that it assumes what we do not know at all, that the Cycle, or rather our paltry extant summary of the Cycle, is a valid witness to the content of the pre-Homeric saga, and that we have some magic instrument by which we can separate out the old material. Scheliha makes this assumption especially difficult by separating Homer from the Cycle by three or four centuries, centuries, too, which saw the collapse of Mycenaean civilization and the encroachment upon Greece of her Dark Ages. It is a little as though some contemporary prophecies were borne out, our civilization went down in atomic war and ruin, and then in the year 4000 a critic at the Zambezi Institute for

Advanced Study tried to use a twenty-line summary of Shaw's *Caesar and Cleopatra* as evidence for the material on which Shakespeare laid his creative hand. Scheliha discusses at length a number of features of the Troy Story which Homer omits, modifies (?), or mentions only in passing: the madness of Odysseus, for example, the murder of Palamedes, the rape of Cassandra, the murder of Polyxena. In all of this Scheliha attempts to show how Homer worked steadily to ennable and humanize his often unseemly material. She is convinced that the civilization Homer describes is the civilization of his own day. But just as in dealing with the data of tradition Homer regularly removed or minimized what was cruel, treacherous, cowardly, magical, or fantastic, so from the life he saw about him he kept and adapted only what suited his idea of man, and presented a civilization uniformly refined, humane, and decorous. This feature of his work is examined in three spheres: warfare, the position of women, the gods. In Homeric warfare, for instance, treachery, poison, even weapons effective from a distance are all more or less eliminated and the fighting is hand to hand and man to man. The great war itself is ennobled by being given an ethical motivation—the sanctity of the relationship of guest and host—instead of being a mere fight for booty. Scheliha's point in these chapters is rather reminiscent of Gilbert Murray's theory of expurgation, but she differs fundamentally from him in making the expurgation the deliberate work of a single great poet and not part of the gradual growth of a traditional book. Her sketch of Homer's motives and procedure is so complimentary to him that lovers of Homer must feel some regret that we do not really know whether anything of this sort went on or not; we keep coming up against the hard fact that we simply do not know to what extent all this chivalry and decency were peculiar to Homer and to what extent they may actually have existed in his world.

The good points in the chapter on Homer's narrative art are frequently marred by some highly improbable subtleties, particularly by a tendency to see cunning connections between parts of the poems widely separated from one another. I cannot believe, for example, that in the *Odyssey* the scene in which Odysseus and Telemachus remove the arms from the hall has been prepared for at the beginning of the poem by having Athena put her spear in the spear-rack, thus reminding us that there are weapons in the hall and making us wonder how under these circumstances Odysseus can possibly destroy the suitors; or that in the *Iliad* Homer had a conscious artistic purpose when he used of Andromache at VI, 389 and at XXII, 460 expressions which are quite like each other.

Chapters VI and VII deal mainly with the subject which is apparently of greatest interest to the author, the characters of the poems who are Homer's original invention. This portion of the book seems to me at once the most skillful in execution and the most misguided in purpose. The discovery of invented characters is particularly important to Scheliha because it contributes so much to the search for the "Individuell-Homerische." A poet who deals with traditional material adds to it new inventions, she argues, because he wants to fashion something which is not in his material,

but which is important to him. If we can separate out the invented characters we can see there better than anywhere else the real Homer, his ideals, loves, and hates, because these characters can be wholly the poet's own. This reason for hunting original inventions in Homer has the advantage of some novelty but not that of validity. Surely, we could just as well get a view of a poet's real nature by examining carefully his methods of dealing with traditional characters, as Scheliha herself recognizes in connection with characters she believes Homer greatly modified. But while one procedure is as good as the other, neither has a great deal of practical value, because on the one hand we do not know what characters Homer invented, and on the other hand the pre-Homeric nature of the traditional characters must be conjectured from Homer himself.

It is vital for Scheliha to begin by demonstrating that certain characters are Homer's own invention, and this she attempts to do. The goal which she has in view here is, I am convinced, a hopeless one, but her treatment of the problem shows some most praiseworthy and welcome innovations. She does not content herself with a series of wild and unsupported dicta as have so many of her predecessors along this well-trodden road. She frankly recognizes that her aim is one of great difficulty, and soberly and soundly describes those difficulties at the outset. She is consistently aware that Homer owed a great deal to tradition, and she does not share the view of so many of her fellow workers in this garden that there is something definitely not respectable about this fact. Many of those who see in Homer a great original inventor treat his indebtedness to tradition rather as we might imagine a Victorian biographer would treat the fact that the subject of his biography was illegitimate. Neither is Scheliha satisfied with the simple syllogism which lies behind so much writing in this field of Homeric studies: All great poets are great original inventors; Homer is a great poet: therefore Homer is a great original inventor. She realizes that, if we are to be able to distinguish invented from traditional characters, we must discover criteria through whose use we can separate one group from the other, and she proceeds to indicate what she considers such criteria should be. All of this represents an adult approach to a problem which has often been treated in a very naive way. I do not believe that her criteria are always sound, and even if they were they would not, I think, be adequate for her purpose, but Scheliha has the great merit of going about the matter in the right way, and if anyone ever does succeed in reaching the goal at which she has aimed he will pretty certainly reach it by the methods she has established.

Scheliha divides the characters of Homer into three groups: 1) Traditional characters already part of the Troy Story (whom Homer may have modified); 2) Traditional characters from other legends whom Homer brought into the Troy Story; 3) Characters whom Homer invented. Here we need concern ourselves only with the class to which Scheliha herself devotes most attention—the invented characters. They can be recognized as follows: no traits are assumed as already known; all their actions are adequately motivated by Homer himself; they play neither in the Troy Story nor in any other saga an indispensable role; their significance works itself out within the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*; they have at most a secondary

role in the Cycle; their names and, if they come into question, their origins and ancestors, are invented for precisely these characters. In selecting these criteria Scheliha has obviously been greatly influenced by Scott's attempted proof that Hector is Homer's invention (she expresses admiration for this in her notes, though she is not completely convinced by it), but it is a great help towards clarity to have these tests analyzed and collected as Scott never attempted to do. Stated thus in compact form, the criteria have a certain impressiveness, and I think it would be a fine thing if all those who look for invented characters in Homer would consider them very carefully before making any specific claim. They might have a salutary effect in a negative way by destroying at birth some hopeful visions. They are, however, completely inadequate to demonstrate positively that any character is the invention of Homer. So many of them are so regrettably subjective; Scott showed in his discussion of Hector's epithets what an advocate could do with the first one, for instance. Our vast ignorance removes most of the value from the others. We do not have the early Troy Story or any other early saga; we are dependent in the main on Homer and the summaries of the Cycle. These are not nearly enough to give us reason to believe that we have an adequately full and rounded view of the role or roles of any individual character. Others of the criteria might at most be taken to suggest a relatively late addition to the Troy Story or that a character is not historical but the result of poetical invention. For all of Scheliha's careful and apparently scientific approach we are just about as far as ever from any touchstone which will tell us that a character came from Homer's brain.

Armed with these criteria, Scheliha proceeds to the discussion of a number of characters she is convinced are Homer's invention. Among them are: Thersites, Phoenix, Telemachus, Eumaeus, and, above all, Patroclus, who is given an entire chapter and who provides the title for the book. She does not rigorously apply all of her criteria to the various personages, but usually contents herself with at most one or two. When she does apply them she regularly demonstrates little except the inadequacy of the criteria. In fact, at one point she herself frankly admits that in the last analysis the only reason for her conviction that these characters are the invention of Homer instead of some earlier poets is that they seem peculiarly "Homeric." Here we are obviously in the realms of the purely subjective, and what began as a scientific demonstration has become only a matter of opinion. This is not to say that these chapters are wholly lacking in value. Her analysis of the characters and of Homer's art is often valid and well put. She has, for instance, a fine and vigorous attack on those who hold that in Nestor (whom Scheliha believes Homer transferred to Troy from an old Pylian epos) Homer meant to portray a comical old chattering bore.

After the fashion of this school of searchers after new inventions in Homer Scheliha gives at times a strangely inconsistent picture of the poet. She believes, for example, that Homer left the names of the Myrmidons and the Cretans in the Homeric poems in order to introduce two new characters, Phoenix and Patroclus, into that traditional romance. This timid worshipping of tradition, unwilling

to make a small addition to one part of the tradition, is elsewhere, however, regarded as a bold disdainer of tradition, who seems to have been more than willing to introduce any number of important new characters or any other new features he chose. If Homer was really as fickle as all this, maybe there was something in Butler's idea about the authoress of the *Odyssey* after all.

Scheliha frequently dwells on the importance which Homer attached to friendship and the emphasis which he gives it in his poems, especially the *Iliad*. Many of her remarks on this topic are worth consideration, but in general, I think, she exaggerates its importance. Neither do I find as much didactic purpose in Homer as she does. "Take my word for it, poor Homer . . . had never such aspiring thoughts." Her pleasant eulogy of Homer as a great poet of friendship ends rather unpleasantly with a discussion of Homer's connection with paederasty in Greece. Although she concludes that Homer did not represent any of his heroes as practising paederasty, she believes that, since his poems stress friendship between men and praise so enthusiastically the beauty of boys, "hat er die griechische Knabenliebe gleichsam inauguriert" (p. 315). In this connection she might well have considered *Iliad*, XXIV, 130-1.

A good feature of the book is that the author shows far more appreciation and knowledge of works in other languages than most scholars writing in German. At least a third of the works she cites are in languages other than German: Italian, French, and, above all, English (to say nothing of some Latin treatises). The author's familiarity with foreign works on Homer extends even to recent journal articles, for example, those of G. M. Calhoun.

On the physical side the book is handsome and beautifully printed. Nearly all the slips I have noted are probably attributable to the author and not to the printer. Most of these are in the citations from English authors; the most impressive is the reference on p. 389 to Frazer's *Golden Bow*. Incidentally, the statement on p. 346 that Leaf (*Homer and History*, p. 297) thought it possible Homer was born at Pylos is, to say the least, an overstatement of what Leaf really said. The method of footnoting is a curiously ingenious device for tormenting the reader. Not only are the notes in the back of the book instead of where they belong, but there is never any indication in the text that a note exists. The reader must keep turning to the back of the book and laboriously scan the lemmata to see if there are any comments on what he has recently read. The weary reading of a number of contemporary works of scholarship (and the new *Speculum* and *Classical Philology*) makes me suspect that a secret society has been formed on a world-wide basis whose sole purpose is to make footnotes as difficult to consult as possible. I for one wish the members were not such clever inventors.

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MICHAEL GRANT. Aspects of the Principate of Tiberius. New York, American Numismatic Society, 1950. Pp. xviii + 205; 8 pls. \$5.00. (*Numismatic Notes and Monographs*, No. 116.)

This new product of the prolific Michael Grant's numismatic labors lays all students of Tiberius under a very heavy debt to him. The volume's principal aim is to describe and discuss the Tiberian issues of the *coloniae civium Romanorum* outside the Spanish peninsula—Spanish mintages having been much better collected and studied than the non-Spanish, and the very few issues of *municipia* being treated in an appendix. There are three chapters, a brief conclusion and a dozen appendices.

The first half of chapter one comprises descriptive catalogue with bibliographical matter, etc., of fifty-three coins (though later in the book, p. 138, Grant repeats his doubts about the inclusion of #32), arranged in five geographical categories. The great majority of these coins is also illustrated on the plates. The rest of the chapter discusses their metrology, occasions of issue, signatories and formulas, and the extent of the coinage. Here there appears almost at once an important dictum which recurs repeatedly throughout the book: comparison of Tiberius' principate with that of Augustus must be made, not with Augustus' whole long reign, but with its last sixteen years, the assumption of the title *Pater Patriae* in 2 B. C. marking conveniently the opening of the last period of Augustus' rule. On this just basis of comparison there is no significant contrast between Augustus and Tiberius in the metrology of the colonial mintages, in the founding of colonies and the issue of coins commemorative thereof, in the power of the *quinquennales* over local finance, or in the amount of colonial and municipal coinage. Discussing Tiberius' "policy of gradual encroachment on the Roman cities," Grant interprets with absolute literalness the phrase of Tacitus, *Annals*, IV, 67, *perosus . . . municipia et colonias omniaque in continentis sita*—"hated the Italian colonies and *municipia* in later life." But the context in Tacitus is of course Tiberius' reluctance to leave Capri for the mainland, and surely *perosus* is no more than Tacitean rhetorical exaggeration. Nor does Grant's case require this very dubious support.

The author disputes, on grounds which are to this reviewer entirely convincing, Mattingly's view that local coinage in Africa, Gaul, and Spain was markedly restricted in consequence of the revolts of Sacrovir and Tacfarinas. Rejected also (appendix 8) is Mattingly's corollary theory that the "altar" coinage was suppressed after Sacrovir's revolt.

Chapter two discusses the names and titles of Tiberius; Tiberius and the proconsuls of Africa; Mars, Victoria, Felicitas; Pax Perpetua; and old and new types. Tiberius' official titulatures, Tiberius Caesar Augustus, Tiberius Caesar Divi Aug. f. Augustus and Tiberius Caesar, are linked "not with *imperium*, or for the most part with any formal *potestas*, but with that range of conceptions lying outside the scope of such formal powers and conveniently comprised within the term *auctoritas*" (p. 41, and cf. his *From Imperium to Auctoritas*). From significant comparison of these with

Caesar Augustus Divi f. Pater Patriae in regard to prenominal, gentile, and cognominal positions, Grant concludes that Tiberius was "unwilling to model himself so closely on [Augustus] as to suggest comparison or rivalry" (p. 50). He draws a very illuminating parallel between African (and Sicilian?) and Asian issues of c. A. D. 21 honoring proconsuls who were *amici Tiberii*, and African and Asian issues of 7 B. C. honoring proconsuls who were *amici Augusti*; both occasions are related to rearrangements of the dynastic succession. And, discussing auspices and *imperium*, Grant concludes "that under Tiberius as under Augustus our proconsuls of Africa . . . were subordinate to his auspices; but that these auspices, in relation to that province, were thought of as linked not with *imperium* but with the religious conceptions embodied in the words 'Augustus' and *auctoritas*" (p. 72). Insisting on his own military preeminence and his inheritance from Augustus, Tiberius emphasized Mars and Victoria and Felicitas. In note 280 on p. 77 for *Ann.* 6.34 read, apparently, 6.32; and to the references there 2.64 and 3.47 might be added. Especially interesting is discussion of "the little known *aes* piece, apparently a medallion" possibly depicting the Ara Pacis, with legend *PACE AVG PERP*. This legend, both in its ablative case and in the employment of the epithet *Perpetua*, forecast much later developments in the official coinage. Incidental to the discussion is a differentiation of *perpetua* and *aeterna*. In the former "the suggestion is that this peace needs to be worked for and will not come with the inevitability of fate. Such a conception is consistent with the sober and laborious spirit of Tiberius' rule, and deserves to rank with *Moderatio* as one of its peculiar catchwords" (p. 86). Other legends, *DEO AVGVSTO PROVIDENTIAE AVGVSTI* (spelled out in full), *GENETRIX ORBIS* (of Livia), and *IVNCTIO* (of Germanicus and Drusus) have only much later parallels or none at all.

The title "Imperator Perpetuus" (*I. L. S.*, 121) of Tiberius shows up in note 67 on page 48 and then in the text on page 86, with citation of Hammond, Charlesworth (news of whose most untimely death comes as this is being written), Guey, and Momigliano. Now Dessau warned that the *perpetuus* should be taken with the preceding *sacerdos* and *flamen*, not with *imperator*. Hammond repeated that warning; Charlesworth ignored it. Guey, remarking that *imperator perpetuus* had lost the meagre support of Florus, II, 34, where editors now read *dictator perpetuus*, reverted to Wilmanns (*ap.* Mommsen, *C. I. L.*, X, p. 774) and understood *im perpetuum*, comparing the frequent *im pace*. This Momigliano warned is conjectural, though to the present writer very attractive. But what all these scholars pass over very lightly is that *IMP PERP* is engraved in an erasure where there remains no trace whatever of the original phrasing. Therefore the words post-date the rest of the inscription and, however one chooses to interpret them, they stubbornly remain irrelevant to Tiberius' titulature.

Chapter three treats of the family of Tiberius; the Gens Iulia; the younger Julio-Claudians; *Divus Augustus*; and most importantly *Julia Augusta*. She is discussed as Goddess (Ceres, Juno, and Genetrix Orbis), as "Virtue" (*Pietas*) and as Priestess. It was on

this last formula, Grant shows, that Tiberius founded his attempted solution (not to be sure entirely successful) of the problem presented by her formidable position in the State, for which naturally no Augustan precedent was available. Tiberius found a *Roman* solution in Republican coins honoring the Vestal Virgins. Grant has very salutary remarks on her position: that she was not co-ruler; that she had no *imperium*; that she inherited less of Augustus' *auctoritas* than did Tiberius; that she could not exercise it as he could through the senate by *tribunicia potestas*.

The great interest of the summary "Conclusion" may be hinted by quoting two sentences. "Thus, if in one sense A. D. 37 marked the end of an era, it is equally true to say that, despite the wishes of the new *princeps*, A. D. 14 marked the beginning of one." "DEO AVGVSTO and GENETRIX ORBIS, on the coinage of Spanish colonies, show respectively the repercussions, ominous for the future, of the embarrassing greatness of Tiberius' predecessor and his no less embarrassing will."

The appendices discuss in some detail matters or problems touched more lightly in the text. Grant now considers that of the crocodile series from Nemausus (cf. *From Imperium to Auctoritas*) the first issue is local, the main Augustan and Neronian issues are official, and some of the Gaian and Claudian are medallie (p. 135, n. 4). One wonders why AVG or A on Utican coins with duoviral names is interpreted as Augustalis or [duovir] Augusti, when the apposite note remarks "one specimen is now seen to read *Augur*" (pp. 139 f.). There is a fifteen-page bibliography, two pages of addenda, nine of indices (persons, places, and general) and a five-page key to the plates.

In notes 79 on page 27, 88 on page 28, and 23 on page 151, for "Rogers" read "Smith." Other *errata*, not very numerous, are not likely to trouble the reader.

This reviewer makes urgent protest against the form of cross-reference which the author employs, i. e., cf. such and such chapter, section, sub-section. This is a plague upon the reader, who must in each case refer to the table of contents, scan it for the page on which the cited sub-section commences, and then turn through the pages of the sub-section until he comes upon the relevant passage. Let us have cross-references by page.

But these criticisms and objections, which bulk large in a review's proportions, are of very minor moment in relation to the book itself. The work is highly illuminating and importantly valuable to our present knowledge and further study of Tiberius.

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M. SCHUSTER, ed. Catulli Veronensis Liber. Leipzig, B. G. Teubner, 1949. Pp. xiv + 153.

This new edition of Catullus in the enlarged Teubner format comes from the hands of a competent scholar to whom we are indebted for the learned article on the poet in *R.E., s.v. Valerius Catullus* (1948), cols. 2353-2410. Through sagacious exploitation of the fruits of other scholars' studies and through judicious avoidance of the recklessness of some of his predecessors Schuster has succeeded in producing a text which is, on the whole, both conservative and sensible. It might be said that the editor shows the mediocrity of little originality, for he has prudently resisted the temptation to introduce even a single *scripti* (he does allow himself one *dilevi* on 55, 14—unnecessarily; see the commentaries of Ellis and Lenchantin *ad loc.*). But this self-restraint in the now traditional cruces of the text may in most cases be well considered a virtue, especially since, except for sure corrections, guesses are best relegated to the *apparatus criticus* or the other usual depositaries. Schuster himself refers to a discussion on many of the readings in this edition to be found in his article "Marginalien zu einer neuen Ausgabe Catullus," *Wien. Stud.*, LXIV (1950), a work not accessible to me at the time of writing. Of course, it is also safer, though not always wiser, to use emendations proposed by others, and in one poem, at least, I shall have occasion to show that Schuster was definitely misguided in his choice of ingenious emendation (on 66, 54 and 77-8).

In the *praefatio* the more important manuscripts are very briefly described, but on this subject Schuster adds nothing to what has already been said by his predecessors. Differing with Morgenthaler he feels inclined to agree with Hale that O (Oxonensis) is derived directly from V (the now lost Véronensis), though he gives no reasons for his stated preference. On the other hand, and quite rightly surely, he rejects with Morgenthaler Hale's thesis that r (Romanus) is a twin to G (Sangermanensis) and that the *deteriores* are derived principally from the former. The editor timidly refrains from presenting a stemma of his own, but citing Rubenbauer, who is actually repeating the words of W. G. Hale in *T.A.P.A.*, LIII (1922), pp. 107 and 112, he expresses the belief that the sources and relationship of the *deteriores* constitute a much more complicated problem than earlier editors have allowed and that cross-currents represent an important factor in their tradition.

It is regrettable that Schuster, instead of contenting himself merely with these generalizations, did not elaborate on the subject, especially since in his *apparatus criticus* (for the sake of clarity and economy, no doubt) the variants of the *deteriores* are only irregularly reported and consequently no satisfactory picture of the situation can be constructed. In fact, a complaint may justifiably be made that Schuster's tidy *apparatus*, which contains really only a selection of readings given in the editions of Schwabe, Ellis, and Schulze, often fails to reveal the peculiar characteristics of even the two main codices, O and G. While there is no need to clutter up an *apparatus* with the familiar orthographical variants of mediaeval

flavor, still the rules which an editor chooses to follow should be stated and consistently adhered to. This Schuster does not do. For example, on 5, 10 he reports the reading *millia* in G, but from his silence in 16, 12; 41, 2; 48, 3; 66, 78 the trusting soul might be led or rather misled to assume that in those places G offers *milia*. The editor also rather arbitrarily omits obvious errors of the type which should be listed to assist the interested reader in reconstructing for himself the archetype V on the basis of the readings of O and G. Thus, for example, we miss the variant of O in 4, 7 (*insula vegetadas*), that of V in 7, 1 (*quod*), albeit he reports it in 24, 2, the corrected transposition of G in 15, 2 (*pudentem peto*), the omission of G in 21, 5 (*nam*, later suprascribed), the variant of O in 39, 20 (*expolitor*), that of G in 61, 200 (*rememorare*), that of G in 100, 6 (*perfecta est exigitur est*), where the reading of O (*perfecta est igitur est*) is incorrectly ascribed to V. Similar variants of T (Thuanicus) in 62 are wanting, as, for example, *avelle* in line 22, *vir* in line 28, *carpiunt* in line 37. These few instances of many such omissions should serve to indicate, if nothing else, the fact that this new edition by no means renders obsolete the older critical works of Schwabe, Ellis, and Schulze or more recent ones such as the very respectable critical text by E. Cazzaniga (*Catulli Veronensis Liber* [Turin, Paravia, 1945]). Of this last work Schuster seems to have been unaware.

As for the constitution of the text itself the readings adopted are by and large satisfactory. In some instances a critic might disagree with the editor in the choice he makes where different but equally supported lections are found or where to remedy obvious corruptions various emendations have been proposed. However, I see no cogent reason to admit in 2, 7 the *ut* of Pisanus in place of the *et* of V. The apparent difficulty in the syntax is due to the following *solaciolum*. Many refined explanations have been offered by various commentators, but Lenchantin is doubtless right when he considers this word coordinate with *karum* in line 6, which is the internal object of *iocari*. The construction may be difficult, but it is not impossible. In 65, 12, where V offers the puzzling *tegam*, Schuster receives into the text the reading *canum* of the Datanus (and Riccard. 606). The explanations given for *tegam* by its defenders (cf. the commentaries of Ellis and Lenchantin *ad hoc*) are scarcely more convincing than Munro's attempt to show how an original *canam* was corrupted into *tegam*. If some change is necessary, the simplest solution by far, it would seem, is to read *legam*, a correction of the *Itali*. It adequately supplies the sense required, closely approximates the reading of V, and explains how the variant *canam* might have arisen as a gloss.

On the basis of new papyrus evidence which apparently was not accessible to Schuster we know now that in 66 the healing hand was at least twice applied though the disease lay not in the text but in the mind. The reading in line 54 (*alis equos* V) has been a perpetual source of embarrassment to editors and commentators alike. When a fragment of Callimachus' *Coma Berenices* was published by G. Vitelli in *Pap. Soc. It.*, 1092, it became clear from the phrase θῆλυς δήτης that the horse of Catullus referred to a wind. But since

winds were usually regarded as horsemen rather than horses (cf. A. E. Housman, *C.R.*, XLIII [1929], p. 168; R. Pfeiffer, *Philol.*, LXXXVII [1932], pp. 197-201), it was felt that the *equos* of the text must be returned to the barn. Schuster, accordingly, followed Bickel (*Rh. Mus.*, XC [1941], pp. 112-15) in corrupting *alis equos* into *alitebos*, which, we are informed, stands for the vernacular *halitibus*. However, in *P. Oxy. ined.* C, fr. 1 *recto* another fragment of the same passage is found. It supplies a very crucial lacuna of the previous fragment and shows beyond all reasonable doubt that Callimachus too referred to the wind as a horse ( $\pi\pi\tau\sigma[\varsigma]$ ). For details on this new fragment and its relationship to the text of Catullus reference should be made to R. Pfeiffer, *Callimachus*, I, *Fragmenta* (Oxford, Clarendon, 1949), pp. 116 ff. Thus the *textus receptus* can stand with only the slight change of *alis* to *ales*, as already found in the Datanus. Bentley's correction *Locridos* in this same verse for the manuscript *elocridicos* is confirmed by the reading of the new papyrus.

In 66, 77-8 Schuster was again unfortunately dazzled by the brilliance of unnecessary emendation. The manuscripts read:

quicum ego dum virgo quondam fuit omnibus expers  
unguentis una milia (millia G) multa bibi.

However this sentence is to be punctuated, the difficult word is *milia*. Instead of concentrating on the root of the problem, Schuster appropriates the emendations of Eschenburg and Bickel (*Rh. Mus.*, XC [1941], pp. 136-146) and presents the following text:

quicum ego, dum virgo quondam fuit Hymenis expers,  
unguenti cuatum milia multa bibi.

Fortunately there is no longer need to go to such extremes. In *P. Oxy. ined.* C, fr. 1 *verso* we find the Greek verses corresponding to this passage (cf. R. Pfeiffer, *op. cit.*, p. 120):

$\eta\varsigma \alpha\pi\omega$ , παρ[θ]ενη μὲν ὅτι' ήν ἔτι, πολλὶς πέπωκα  
λιτιά, γυναικελῶν δ' οὐκ ἀπέλαυσα μύρων.

It should be added that the antecedent of  $\eta\varsigma$  in the Greek is *κορυφῆς*. Thus Lobel, by making the simple change of *milia* to *vilia* on the basis of the Greek *λιτά*, restores tolerable sense to the two lines. Pfeiffer is doubtless right in placing a comma before *omnibus* and after *unguentis* with *expers* understood to agree with *ego*, in view of the Greek *γυναικείων . . . μύρων*, though Maas, cited by Pfeiffer, *op. cit.*, p. 502, would delete the comma before *omnibus*. Maas' explanation of *quicum . . . una* as standing for *cum quo* (sc. *vertice*) *una* must be correct. Those who are still troubled with *omnibus*, which Pfeiffer feels should correspond to *γυναικείων*, will find themselves in good company.

Apart from the text which, except for a few such aberrations, is reasonably satisfactory, a virtuous feature of this new edition is the set of references on every page between the text of the poems and the *apparatus criticus*. Here attention is directed not only to *testimonia* and parallel passages in Greek and Latin literature illustrating similar usage and thought but also to scholarly works

which are concerned with a particular poem or a part of it. Such references can, of course, represent only a selection of material available, but they should nevertheless prove helpful to the student of Catullus. The conscientious critic, I suppose, might be tempted to deplore the omission of many important parallels or learned articles and to add several recondite references of his own harvest, but that would be sheer pedantry. Worthy of mention also are the *index metricus*, in which the meters and prosody of Catullus are discussed, and especially the *index verborum et locutionum*, in which verbal, grammatical, and rhetorical peculiarities of Catullian usage are conveniently collected and arranged in alphabetical order. The brief geographical, historical, and biographical notices and pertinent references to special studies incorporated in the *index nominum* at the end of the book are not without their merit.

In conclusion, it may be said that though this edition of Catullus represents no great milestone in the history of Catullan scholarship, still for its several virtues and careful execution (typographical errors are few and far between) it would be a safe investment for the Classical student who wants to have a Teubner of his own.

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*The Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, edited with translations and notes by E. LOBEL, E. P. WEGENER, C. H. ROBERTS, and H. I. BELL. Part XIX. London, Egypt Exploration Society, 1948. Pp. xvi + 180; 13 plates.

The preface of part XVIII of the *Oxyrhynchus Papyri* declared that part XIX was "designed to contain among other things much more Alcaeus and Sappho." This promise was not kept, although the copy was ready, for the excellent reason that Professor Pfeiffer had progressed so far in his work on the Clarendon Press edition of Callimachus that "it seemed proper to postpone everything else to the making available to him of *all* of this author that could be found among the Oxyrrhynchus fragments." Accordingly most of the literary part of this volume consists of Callimachus fragments and some scraps of Euphorion and Nicander bearing upon Callimachus. Seven, possibly eight, of the papyri contain material from the *Aetia*, two add scraps of the *Iambi*, two belong to the *Hecale*, and two to the *Hymns*. The general editor of the volume is Mr. H. I. Bell; the papyri connected with Callimachus were edited by Mr. E. Lobel, and the documentary papyri, prepared by Miss E. P. Wegener under the supervision of Mr. C. H. Roberts, were finally checked by Mr. Bell. A valuable and comprehensive set of indices completes the volume.

Pap. 2208, frag. 1 [2].<sup>1</sup> Parts of ten lines from the passage

<sup>1</sup> Numbers in square brackets give the number of the pertinent fragment in *Callimachus*, ed. Pfeiffer (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1949). The abbreviation Pf. refers to Pfeiffer's *Callimachi fragmenta nuper reperta* (Bonn, 1923).

between the "Telchines" Prologue to the *Aetia* and the first *aition* show that in his description of the dream in which the Muses appeared to him Callimachus obviously recalled Hesiod's prologue to the *Theogony*.

Pap. 2208, frag. 2 [113]. The suggestion of Lobel that *ειρηνή* (lines 4 and 9) formed part of a name has led Pfeiffer to recognize this scrap as part of the Ciris story, which may have occurred in Book I.

Pap. 2208, frag. 3 [114]. From the cooperative efforts of Lobel and Pfeiffer it is clear that we have here the remains of a dialogue between the poet and the statue of Apollo at Delos made by Angelion and Tectaeus. This dialogue technique recalls Iambus IX, which consists of a dialogue between an ithyphallic herm and a lover (cf. *Y. C. S.*, XI [1950], pp. 91 ff.). The *aition* probably belongs to Book III.

Pap. 2209A [21]. The second *aition* of Book I, to which this papyrus belongs, discussed two rituals at Anaphe and Lindus, both marked by raillery. The combination of similar stories is found also in Iambus X (*Y. C. S.*, XI, pp. 96 ff.). But here Callimachus goes even farther; in describing the rites at Anaphe he apparently makes reference to mockery in the rites of Demeter, and in the Lindus *aition* he introduces the encounter of Heracles and Thiodamas, source of yet another sacrifice accompanied by mockery. We note, too, that whatever differences may or may not have arisen between Apollonius Rhodius and Callimachus, in the Anaphe incident, at least, Apollonius followed the steps of his master closely. It is possible that the same is true of the account of the subsequent stop at Aegina, described by Callimachus in Iambus VIII (*Y. C. S.*, XI, pp. 84 ff.).

Reconsideration of this fragment and other fragments dealing with the arrival of the Argonauts at Anaphe shows how precarious it is to arrange any fragmentary Callimachean narrative on a strictly chronological basis. We can now see, for instance, that some kind of catalogue of the heroes was introduced at this penultimate stage of their journey and that some of the events at the start of the journey were recalled here—an instance of the "flash-back" technique which Callimachus apparently also used in the *Hecale*.

Pap. 2209B [118: possibly from Book I]. Lobel shows that some building operation is described; Pfeiffer further suggests that two temples are mentioned, one built *ex tempore*, the other by skilled architects. A similar contrast of the crude and the artistic is perhaps found in the accounts of two statues of Hera at Samos in two successive *aitia* of Book IV [100, 101].

Pap. 2210. Twenty-four unhappy scraps, only two of which can be identified with known Callimachean material. Frag. 1 [119] forms part of frag. 465 Schn., and frag. 16 [43] belongs to the account of Sicilian cities in Book II. All 24 fragments may belong to this book.

Pap. 2211 provides further evidence that neither Book III nor Book IV of the *Aetia* was "one continuous song," but separate pieces merely juxtaposed (cf. *Y. C. S.*, XI, pp. 144 ff.). The verso of frag. 1 contains an *aition* explaining the exclusion of unmarried Attic girls from certain rites of Demeter [63]. It is followed immediately by an account of Simonides' tomb and its destruction given by the dead man himself [64]; for a similar technique, suggesting expansion

of a sepulchral epigram, cf. Iambus XI (*Y. C. S.*, XI, pp. 101 ff.). After the loss of some lines at the bottom of 2211 verso, the recto continues with the end of a poem dealing with the four Argive springs [66]. Immediately, with a coronis to mark the start of the poem, there begins the well-known Acontius and Cydippe *aition* [67]. The variations in length and tempo and the sudden transitions clearly advocate discretion in the reconstruction of Callimachean material. Fragment 2 verso can be combined with 2208, frag. 3 and 2212, frag. 19 to form part of the account of the statue of Apollo at Delos (see above, p. 100); there are also indications of some unrecognizable Thracian story [114]. The recto, combined with *P. Oxy.* 2167, frag. 5, deals with an unknown Onnes [115].

Pap. 2212 consists of 30 scraps which probably belong to the end of Book III of the *Aetia* or to the start of Book IV. Verse 1 of the last *aition* in Book III (Euthycles of Locri) can be recognized in frag. 1b [84]. Part of the story of Heracles and Molorchus, also from Book III (*P. Oxy.* 2169) is found in frag. 18 [59], and Pfeiffer has subsequently combined fragments 2, 4, and 5 as remnants of the love story of Phrygius and Pieria [80], which must have immediately preceded the Euthycles *aition*—an extraordinary example of what can be accomplished by careful study of the scraps.

Pap. 2213. Most of the 25 fragments belonging to this papyrus look unpromising, but with Lobel's assistance Pfeiffer has assigned fragments 1, 9, and 17 to the Phrygius and Pieria story of Book III [80-82], and shown that in frag. 2 we have bits of the end of an *aition* concerning Elis and the start of another about Isindus [77a. 78]. Frag. 8 contains 16 mutilated lines of the Euthycles *aition* [85], and frag. 11—30 letters in nine lines!—was recognized by Lobel as part of the Acontius story. A most important contribution is that of a single letter in frag. 25 (Addenda, p. 145): this scrap, which belongs to the right side of frag. 1, bears the number ፫ and indicates that somewhere in the Euthycles *aition*, last in Book III, the book reached a length of 1,000 lines. Lobel knows of "no other direct evidence about the length of any book of the work."

Pap. 2214 is a comparatively large fragment of 30 mutilated lines. Its Callimachean origin is attested by coincidence with known Callimachean citations, and it may be assigned with reasonable probability to the *Aetia* [186]. Most of what is preserved refers to the gifts sent to Delos by the Hyperboreans.

Pap. 2215, frag. 1, partly fills the gap in the middle of Iambus I as preserved in *P. Oxy.* 1011 (*Y. C. S.*, XI, pp. 32 ff.). The length of the poem is now determined at 39 verses, and a suggestion previously made that the poem contained the complaint of a poor poet-lover, rejected for a richer rival, is fully confirmed (cf. *A. J. P.*, LXVII [1946], pp. 1-15). Lobel, in one of his rare lapses into literary criticism, comments on this fact, but also confesses an unjustified, and surely misplaced, surprise at the fact that a stichic poem has an odd number of verses. Fragment 2 comes from the early part of Iambus IV.

Pap. 2218, a scrap which is clearly the beginning of a trochaic poem dealing with Artemis and Crete, is included with due caution because of the possibility that it is the beginning of Iambus XII

(*Y. C. S.*, XI, pp. 107 ff.). There can be no doubt about the identification.

Pap. 2216 [238] and Pap. 2217 [260] preserve fragments of the *Hecale*. On the recto of the former there are remains of an address by one character to another (Theseus to Aegeus? Aegeus to Aethra?), on the verso are parts of the description of a storm (mentioned in the *Diegeseis*). Unfortunately we gain no knowledge of the poem's general arrangement, since the relative order of recto and verso cannot be determined. The other papyrus contains the beginning of the crow's prophecy about the punishment of the raven which brought bad news to Apollo. But "no light is thrown on why and how the crow and her auditor were introduced into the narrative or who her auditor is."

Pap. 2225 offers parts of verses 11-243 of Callimachus, *Hymn IV*, often very scrappy, but more nearly complete in verses 158-212. We learn nothing, however, about the defective ends of 177-8 and gain only the beginnings of 200-201. Moreover, in place of 177 we find traces of two entirely unknown verses, while 83 and 189 are replaced by fragmentary lines which suggest no improvement. Some variations may be careless errors, others confirm happy emendations. In general the papyrus raises more problems than it solves.

Pap. 2226 disturbs the hitherto stable text of Callimachus, *Hymn VI* by omitting verses 118-137 and adding at least one verse after 138. Lobel sees no means of resolving this problem. But it should be noticed that 116-17 and 138 make a satisfactory, if somewhat abrupt, closing appeal by the poet for Demeter's favor.

Pap. 2219 and Pap. 2220 possibly contain fragments of the *Dionysus*, the *Hesiodus*, and the *Chiliades* of Euphorion. They do not further our knowledge of the poet, but suggest that certain fragments often associated with Callimachus are wrongly attributed: Callimachus, frag. 36 Pf. is found in 2220, and frag. an. 110 Sehn. may be included in 2219.

Pap. 2221, part of a commentary on Nicander, *Theriaca* 377-95, possibly by Theon, includes a new quotation from Callimachus, Iambus IX (*Y. C. S.*, XI, pp. 91 ff.), as well as quotations from other authors. The text of Nicander presupposed by this commentary is about one thousand years older than ms. II.

Pap. 2223 and Pap. 2224, verses from Euripides' *Bacchae* (1070-1136) and *Hippolytus* (579-604), are edited by Roberts. The former papyrus was available to Dodds when he published his edition of the *Bacchae*, and Roberts is content to quote his estimate of the text: the fragment comes from a careless copy of a text far better than our sole complete manuscript of the *Bacchae*. It is of some interest that the papyrus confirms no less than 13 modern corrections. There is evidence of an entirely new line between 1104 and 1105; verses 1091 and 1092 are omitted, rightly in Dodds' opinion, though 1092 seems much less questionable than 1091. Verse 1074 is also omitted, but no comment is made by the editors—somewhat surprisingly, since verse 1073 has been suspected and could be dispensed with, whereas 1074 seems necessary as an expansion of the metaphorical *ἀναγέννεται* of 1072. The chief interest in the second papyrus, I think, lies in the use of *ἴαν* in verse 585 (*ἴαχάν*)

codd., ἀχάνειον edd., ἀχάνειον schol.) ; the ἀχάνειον of our modern texts shows how successive corrections leave the original farther behind.

Pap. 2222 (first century after Christ) is part of a chronological list of the Ptolemaic kings; its presence among the literary papyri seems rather incongruous. The chronicle is valuable in clearing up a few undetermined points, if the scribe can be considered reliable. We learn that Ptolemy Neos Philopator did succeed his father before he was executed by Euergetes II; that Alexander II, whose exact age was unknown, reigned 15 days with Berenice and was killed at the age of 11; that Ptolemy XI Auletes was in exile for two rather than three years and died at the age of 42. An interesting feature is the chronicler's reluctance to include women in the list of rulers: Berenice, who ruled briefly with Alexander II, is apparently not mentioned, and there is no reference to the interregnum of Cleopatra Tryphaena and Berenice IV.

The bulk of the Callimachean papyri belongs to the second century after Christ; two come from the third and fourth centuries. The Nicander and Euphorion fragments are probably from the first century, and Pap. 2214 was written *circa* 10 B. C. Pap. 2211 and Pap. 2216 are third century codices.

The documentary papyri are presented in five groups: letters from officials, declarations to officials, petitions, contracts, and accounts.

In the first group we find a mutilated letter from a prefect (?) to a strategus (Pap. 2227: A. D. 215-16), attesting the existence of a πολέμαρχος, a magistrate hitherto unknown in Egypt; an order for the delivery of a prisoner (Pap. 2229: A. D. 346-50); and part of a copy of a strategus' correspondence (Pap. 2228: A. D. 283?). Parts of seven letters are preserved in the last document, the sixth and seventh almost completely. The papyrus is remarkable palaeographically, since it is written in six different hands, for which at least two and perhaps five clerks are responsible; and the sixth letter, an order for the delivery of mules, is interesting, since it is clear that there was some dispute between the government and the senators, who, for personal reasons, were anxious to set the price as high as possible. The price indicates a period of inflation.

The second group consists of a declaration by the guild of cloth-dealers in Heracleopolis that they have valued 200 military blankets, delivered them, and received payment (Pap. 2230: A. D. 119); a nomination of two men to the offices of collector of chaff and collector of meat (Pap. 2232: A. D. 316); the beginning of a report by some irenarchs who had been ordered to investigate an attack by people from the village of Tychinphagi upon a neighboring hamlet (Pap. 2233: A. D. 350); and a statement by Aurelia Thermuthion that she is the legal heir of her daughter, who died intestate, and that she is providing a claim, in duplicate, to a deed of succession (Pap. 2231: A. D. 241). This document is the first instance of a παράθεσις of succession.

Two petitions are included in the volume. Pap. 2234 (A. D. 31) is an appeal by one Ilhermon for redress and protection against some fishermen who were violating the fishing rights of the property on which he paid taxes. In Pap. 2235 (A. D. 346) Aurelius Horus

presents a petition on behalf of his grandchildren against the scribe of Terythis, who was trying to levy taxes on their property, although it was not within his jurisdiction. Here is an illustration of the illegal expedients which officials had to adopt to try to reach their tax quotas.

Three of the contracts are simple and straightforward. Pap. 2236 (early third century after Christ) deals with the sale of half of a house; Pap. 2237 (A. D. 498) is an acknowledgment of a loan; and in Pap. 2238 (A. D. 551), a deed of surety, three people guarantee the return by one Onnophris of some gold stolen by him and undertake to produce him whenever required. More significant is Pap. 2239 (A. D. 598), an overseer's contract, which supplies evidence on the functions of the *ēπικείμενος* and on the salary of such an employee, and shows that it was accepted practice for the overseer to increase his income through perquisites. The contract is unusual in that no term of appointment is given, whereas elsewhere contracts are valid only for one year. One might assume that this meant that the contract was a renewal, but the reference to an *εἰσβατικόν*, the entrance fee, makes this improbable.

The remaining documents are mostly financial accounts. Pap. 2240 (A. D. 211) preserves columns 15 and 16 of the accounts of a large estate, giving a list of arrears owed to the landlord, then the expenses; the account was apparently checked later. On the back of this papyrus is a list of rents in wheat (Pap. 2242: third century after Christ); the rents were presumably paid only on naturally irrigated land; for instance, in one area of 15 arourae rent was owed only on 1 $\frac{1}{8}$  arourae; the rest of the land was probably not reached by Nile waters. Pap. 2241 (A. D. 283-4) is part of another list of rents in money and kind from State lands; the entries are *κατ' ἄνδρα*. Here, as in Pap. 2241, the arithmetic is frequently incomprehensible. From some of the well-known Apion family estates comes an account of receipts and expenditures (Pap. 2243a: A. D. 590). This account resembles other documents of the Apion family (cf. Pap. 1911, 1912, and 2195, from 557 and 576 A. D.) and provides "a remarkable proof of the strength of tradition" in management. The back of column I contains a brief, casual list of documents belonging to the same family. The last papyrus (Pap. 2244: sixth-seventh century after Christ) is an account of axles supplied for water-wheels. The various entries mention the *γεωργός*, his locality, the *μηχανή* concerned, and the number of axles supplied. Sometimes there is added the date of issue and the source of supply. Receipts for axles or spare parts have been occasionally published before, but there has been no list so comprehensive as this papyrus.

Most of the documentary papyri are translated, a valuable help to those less well acquainted with the technicalities of Hellenistic Greek. Practically no help of this sort is given for the literary papyri, and the notes are far from copious. It is to be regretted that Lobel clings so closely to his austere concept of the duty of a papyrologist. Those who have come to know Lobel's wide knowledge of Greek literature and his critical sense will not believe that this reticence is "to be accounted for by the limits of the editor's com-

petence" (*P. Oxy.*, XVIII, p. vi). This is, perhaps, the complaint of an indolent reader. It cannot invalidate the achievement of the editors of the XIXth part of the *Oxyrhynchus Papyri*; the book is a worthy member of a series of great volumes.

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A. A. VASILIEV. *Justin the First. An Introduction to the Epoch of Justinian the Great.* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1950. Pp. viii + 439. \$6.00. (*Dumbarton Oaks Studies*, I.)

To the many works of fundamental importance which he has produced in nearly sixty years of devoted scholarship, A. A. Vasiliev, the eminent and revered dean of Byzantinists, has now added a definitive study of the reign of Justin I (518-527). Careful interpretation of a wide range of sources, searching critical analysis of complicated problems, some of which are treated with almost monographic thoroughness, and convincing conclusions whenever they are possible, these are the merits of a book which should be a source of gratification and pride to a great scholar. Occasionally the machinery of investigation intrudes into the text and interrupts the smooth flow of the narrative, but the author's lively interest in his subject and his lucid exposition are assurance that the reader's attention will be stimulated and maintained.

Aside from Ernest Stein's long article, "Justinus," *R.-E.*, X (1919), cols. 1314-29, no special study until now has been devoted to the elderly emperor Justin, who has been overshadowed by his brilliant nephew and successor, Justinian. Vasiliev gives a portrayal of Justin against a background so broad that the book is also a reconstruction of the whole period. He shows how Justin was dominated by Justinian, whose rule from behind the throne began from the moment of Justin's elevation. When, in 527, Justinian became emperor, he continued policies unquestionably inaugurated under his influence during the nine years of his uncle's reign. Justinian's principal ideas, his ambitious plans for the reconquest of the west, his religious orientation as one of the foundations for his future western campaigns, his conception of a great legislative work, his building activities, all these were definitely formulated during Justin's reign. Professor Vasiliev's book, is, therefore, as the subtitle indicates, an introduction to the epoch of Justinian, and as such it will be a necessary point of departure for any new study of that period.

The book consists of a brief sketch of the historical background; eight chapters devoted respectively to Justin's rise from swineherd to emperor, his domestic rule, religious policy, foreign policy (in two chapters), economic conditions, and legislation; an epilogue describing his death and burial; an excursus on the Archangel Ivory in the British Museum and the coins of Justin; and an excellent index of

names and subjects, including sources and modern writers. Scholars will be grateful for the extensive notes which provide full bibliographical data.

The longest, and in many respects the most interesting, chapter considers Justin's religious policy. Justinian's influence on the development of that policy is demonstrated, and the imperial efforts to enforce the Chalcedonian creed and to restore normal relations with the Pope, after the breach of 482, are very carefully analyzed. The chapter includes a translation of contemporary documents of observers at the Synod of Constantinople in 518. The records, probably by eyewitnesses of the stormy popular response to Justin's restoration of orthodoxy, have never before been translated into English. Together with other documents which are summarized, they bring out vividly the importance of Christological questions in Byzantium, not only for religion, but also for politics, ecclesiastical as well as secular, if indeed the distinction can be made in Byzantine history.

Vasiliev's book was written before the appearance of Ernest Stein, *Histoire du Bas-Empire*, II. *De la disparition de l'Empire d'Occident à la mort de Justinien (476-565)* (Brussels, 1949; Vol. II of his *Geschichte des spätromischen Reiches* [Vienna, 1928]). Stein's chapter on Justin I (pp. 219-273) in no way diminishes the value and the importance of Vasiliev's study which is much more detailed and more fully documented. There are naturally some differences of opinion, but on minor points rather than on larger problems. Some examples may be given. Stein, p. 221, following his article in *R.-E.*, X, col. 1315, states that Justin was a *patricius* at his accession to the throne, whereas Vasiliev, p. 68, n. 50 end, is unable to find the evidence for this. Vasiliev, p. 251, n. 1, accepts, but Stein, p. 795, *Excursus F*, rejects, Duchèse, *L'église au sixième siècle*, p. 74, n. 2, on the date of Pope John's voyage to Constantinople. Vasiliev, p. 272, does not know how to account for the abrupt retirement of a Byzantine army after an invasion of Mesopotamia in 527, while Stein, p. 272, attributes the retreat to the summer heat which caused great hardship among the troops. In this connection it may be noted that Stein, p. 272, n. 2, not only provides a convincing reconstruction of the event, but establishes the correct sequence of Byzantine commanders. Finally, Vasiliev, p. 414, following contemporary sources, attributes Justin's death to an old reopened wound in the foot, whereas Stein, p. 273, accepts the opinion of a Brussels physician that the cause of death was "en réalité de gangrène sénile ou syphilitique."

One or two additional suggestions may be made. Vasiliev used (p. 10, n. 5 *et passim*) the first edition of K. Krumbacher, *Geschichte der byzantinischen Literatur* (Munich, 1891), instead of the extensively revised second edition of 1897. Vasiliev's chapter on economic conditions has little material on Byzantine Egypt; A. C. Johnson and L. C. West, *Byzantine Egypt: Economic Studies* (Princeton, 1949) now provides some additional data. Vasiliev, p. 375, accepts Procopius' statement (*Anecdota*, XIX, 4-8) that Justin spent the reserve of 320,000 pounds of gold left him by his predecessor, Anastasius. Vasiliev argues cogently that the expenditure of this

vast sum was necessary and denies Procopius' accusation of prodigality. There is, however, some question that Justin actually spent the whole amount, for according to John of Ephesus, *Hist. Eccles.*, Pars III, v. 20 (*C. S. C. O., Scriptores Syri*, 3rd Series, III, 205), the treasure of Anastasius was not completely exhausted half a century later in the reign of Tiberius II (578-582) (cf. Stein, *op. cit.*, p. 244, n. 2). Finally, in connection with Vasiliev's discussion of the Decree on Prescription (pp. 404-6) it should be noted that the question of *possessio* receives special attention in Ernst Levy's recent book, *West Roman Vulgar Law (Memoirs of the American Philosophical Society, XXIX [Philadelphia, 1951])*, chap. III B (pp. 176-94).

If there is today a larger interest in Byzantine history, a greater appreciation of its importance, much of the credit belongs to the great Byzantinists, Krumbacher, Bury, Baynes, Diehl, Schlumberger, Grégoire, Stein, and, as his latest book so clearly demonstrates, Vasiliev—*primus inter pares*.

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MARCEL DURRY. *Éloge d'une matrone romaine (éloge dit de Turia).*

Texte établi, traduit et commenté. Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1950. Pp. xviii + 83. (*Collection des Universités de France.*)

The so-called *Laudatio Turiae*, found in collections at Rome, is a Latin inscription of about 5 B.C. with the funeral oration delivered by an old man over the courageous woman who had saved his life during the proscriptions and been his companion in a happy marriage for forty-one years. It consists of seven fragments of which the first were published separately by R. Fabretti, *Inscriptionum antiquarum . . .* (Rome, 1699) and G. Marini, *Iscrizioni . . . delle Ville e de' Palazzi Albani* (Rome, 1785) and were united and illustrated in a masterly study by Mommsen, who reported his discovery in 1863. The last two fragments, one discovered in 1898 near the fourth milestone along the Via Portuense and the other in a Roman museum in 1949, were identified respectively by Giuseppe Gatti and Arthur E. Gordon. The inscription is familiar to most scholars from the editions of Dessau (*I. L. S.*, 8393) and Arangio-Ruiz (*Fontes*, III, 69), but the two most important studies of the inscription as a whole are those of Mommsen and Durry.

The importance of Durry's edition lies both in its clear report on the contributions from other scholars and in what he himself contributes. It is a pity that the book was published seven months before Gordon's fragment, which contributes both to the text and to an evaluation of previous efforts at reconstruction, but that is a misfortune which has befallen many workers in the field of epigraphy. As far as the reviewer can judge, the index is about perfect, the translation excellent, the bibliography complete, and the commentary very useful, but what the reviewer particularly respected was the beautifully written introduction of 98 pages, in which Durry

not only discussed the modern reconstruction of the inscription, the historical, prosopographical, and even legal problems, but treated the document within the framework of Roman funeral and marriage customs and literary parallels in such a comprehensive, competent way that the cultural significance of the inscription fully emerges. The philological mastery is everywhere apparent, and there are passages of such elegance and discernment as to make the book a delight to read.

In respect to the mention of Milo and to the controversial historical background of the fragment from the Via Portuense, Durry concludes that the events occurred in 49-48 B.C., and that the anonymous speaker, at that time the fiancé of the anonymous deceased, was in exile as a partisan of Pompey. Durry makes, moreover, a lucid analysis of the relation of the *laudatio* to the consolations, panegyrics, and other "descendance illégitime" of the funeral oration as a type; and he analyzes brilliantly the unique, essentially nonliterary character of this *laudatio*.

A contemporary editor of such a text has perhaps more of a problem than Dessau faced, because conjectural restorations, if not entirely outmoded, are more severely censured today. Durry was not deceived as to the conjectural character of almost every restoration in this inscription, but he decided that at least Mommsen's restorations, now a kind of vulgate, were sufficiently probable to justify their retention in view of the gain in readability from restoration. The latest discovery probably vindicates this decision, because, as Gordon points out (*A.J.A.*, LIV [1950], p. 224), the new fragment shows that in six out of nine lines Mommsen had more or less correctly inferred the true sense and in one line had made a perfect restoration. But on p. 45, in respect to the reconstruction of the fragment from the Via Portuense, where we do not have Mommsen's guidance, Durry comments, "Sans méconnaître l'intérêt des tentatives de Dessau, influencé par Hirschfeld, et de De Sanctis, je m'inspirerai des compléments de Costa, *parce qu'ils tiennent le mieux compte du nombre de lettres à restituer* (italics mine); mais toutefois pour les lignes 6a, 7a, 8a, je propose des compléments nouveaux, avec des corrections aux lignes 3a, 9a, 10a." Well, then, counting "I" as only half a letter, let us compare the number of letters restored:

Line	De Sanctis	Dessau	Arangio	Costa	Durry
2a	13½	..	13½	13½	13½
3a	12	8½	12	10	12
4a	15	12	15	13	15
5a	17	8½	..	15	15
6a	15	12	12	17	14½
7a	15	23½	22	11	11½
8a	20½	28	20½	15	12
9a	15½	..	15½	15	17½
10a	17½	..	17½	23	18½
11a	25	..	29	36	36

The vertical fracture visible in the photographs suggests that lines 2a through 9a have lost about the same amount. In line 10a, however, about 6 letters more have been lost than in line 9a, while in line 11a about 18½ letters more have been lost than in line 9a.

The latest discovery, which permits but has not yet produced an accurate measurement of the width of the column, could be used to control the extent of the lacunae on the fragment from the Via Portuense, among others. As for the disputed first letter of line 6a, Arangio rejected and Durry accepted Costa's reading on the basis of Costa's photograph without checking the stone itself; Gordon's photograph seems to support Dessau and Arangio, but Gordon, who saw the stone, does not mention the disputed letter.

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GEORGE HADDAD. *Aspects of Social Life in Antioch in the Hellenistic-Roman Period.* New York, Hafner Publishing Co., 1949. Pp. 196. (Diss.)

The commentaries of the fathers of the Early Christian Church in Antioch and the bitterly satirical *Misopogon* of the apostate Emperor Julian laid a very understandable foundation for ascribing to the people of that city levity, riotousness, poor morals and all the less attractive characteristics of the population of a large city of the Roman empire.

This reputation Dr. Haddad attempts to analyze and refute, laying the blame, with considerable verisimilitude, on the conditions of rule and the examples of the rulers. The fact that Antioch was a great political and military capital, first of the Seleucids and later of the Roman East, led to its being spoiled by the favors of kings and emperors, and exposed it to repeated contacts with a dissolute soldiery, and the author insists repeatedly that the bad name enjoyed by the city in the comments of modern writers is due in large measure to their failure to see that for better or worse the Antiochenes shared neither more nor less in the characteristics common to the age.

In approaching this problem, which is the main theme of the dissertation, Haddad considers at length the political and economic status of the city, its size and growth, together with the question of the racial or cultural origins of its population. A study of these elements results in the conclusion that "we have not been able to find a more accurate racial or national label to apply to the Antiochenes except that of the 'Antiochene race and nationality'." In this part of the study the evidence for the various languages in use is considered, and seems to show that both Latin and Greek were common as written or spoken languages there, and that there are proofs that the Syrian tongue was used as a spoken language. There are many references in ancient literature to the people of Antioch as being Greek, such as in Julian, *Misopogon*, 367 c, but it is generally to be taken in the broader sense of the greater Hellenistic World, nor can Pausanias' reference (VI, 2, 7), where they are spoken of as Syrians living by the Orontes, be considered a serious racial term.

A section of the dissertation also considers the Jewish population of the city, mentioning among other quarters the Keration which Haddad places near the eastern gate on the authority of Leclerc writing in 1907. More recent study of the topography of the city, which being as yet unpublished was not available to the author, suggests that this quarter is better placed in the region of the Daphnetic gate to the southwest.

Estimates of the population vary in ancient authors to a surprising degree, and are almost always inconclusive or obviously exaggerated. In reviewing the figures Haddad concludes that for the end of the first century a figure of 200,000, excluding slaves, and for the fourth century approximately 250,000 free inhabitants is somewhere near the truth. With the slave population this would bring the later figure close to the half million mark.

The study is fully documented and contains a very ample bibliography. If the results are less conclusive than one might wish, the author has presented a very considerable body of material, discussed and weighed the relative merits of evidence and presented a very good case in favor of the population of Antioch as being no worse, nor any better than in any other city of those times of comparable population. We are too well acquainted with the diatribes of reformers of more recent times to put overmuch faith in the picture of Antiochene morals painted by Chrysostom and others of like purpose.

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ERNESTUS DIEHL. *Anthologia Lyrica Graeca, editio tertia. Fasc 1: Poetae Elegiaci; Fasc. 2: Theognis, Ps. Pythagoras, P's. Phocylides, Chares, Anonymi Aulodia.* Leipzig, Teubner, 1949, 1950. Pp. 144; viii + 116. (*Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana.*)

*Editio tertia* on the title-pages of these fascicles is qualified in a prefatory note signed by the publishers and Rudolf Beutler. The present edition is not a new recension but merely records marginalia left by Diehl, chiefly bibliographical, together with similar new bibliographical material culled from other sources. The text itself remains virtually the same. There are a handful of minor alterations, such as *<ἴσως>* for *<όμως>* in Tyrtaeus 8, 6, or *ἢ λέοντες* for *ἱθέλοντες* in Xenophanes 13, 1; some rearrangement of papyrus lines, as in Tyrtaeus 1; better readings of epigraphic material, as in Sophocles' *Paeon* (based on Oliver's work). But these new little books are nevertheless indispensable for their citations of new critical and interpretive work, apparently quite complete despite the editor's depreciation of omissions as being due to war conditions. The neat presentation of such a volume of information in so small a compass is a miracle of condensation. The exploitation of this material is left to the reader or to a subsequent editor. Reference is made, for example, to Lattimore's suggestion in Mimnermus' *Smyrneis*, but

the text is not changed. Despite its accretions the printed page of the new edition is more spacious and more handsomely arranged than its predecessor. Other improvements also are in the realm of taste: the substitution of Greek titles for Latin; the relegation of pseudepigrapha to the end of the volume; and, most of all, the omission of Diehl's shriekingly nationalistic preface which laid the frustration of a noble German victory to the *hostium partiumque fraudibus et fallaciis* and made the chief use of Greek poetry the inculcation of militant patriotism.

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#### EDITORIAL NOTE.

Professor N. I. Herescu has requested that the attention of the readers of this Journal be called to a reply which he has published to a review of his book, *Bibliographie de la littérature latine* (Paris, Les Belles-Lettres, 1943), by W. C. McDermott (*A. J. P.*, LXIX, pp. 342-4). The reply is entitled "Notes additionnelles à la *Bibliographie de la littérature latine*, au sujet d'un compte rendu singulier" (Paris, Institut Roumain d'Études Latines, 1951).

#### BOOKS RECEIVED.

(It is impossible to review all books submitted to the JOURNAL, but all are listed under BOOKS RECEIVED. Contributions sent for review or notice are not returnable.)

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Johnson (Allan Chester). *Egypt and the Roman Empire*. Ann Arbor, *Univ. of Michigan Press*, 1951. Pp. 183. \$3.50. (*The Jerome Lectures, Second Series*.)

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La Penna (Antonio). *Properzio. Saggio Critico. Seguito de due ricerche filologiche*. Firenze, *La Nuova Italia*, 1951. Pp. 201. (*Studi di Lettere, Storia e Filosofia pubblicati dalla Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa, XXIII.*)

Lausberg (Heinrich). *Elemente der literarischen Rhetorik. Eine Einführung für Studierende der romanischen Philologie*. München, *Max Hueber Verlag*, 1949. Pp. 93.

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## AESCHYLUS AS A POLITICAL THINKER.

There have always been poets who have taken part in the politics of their countries and who expressed their political views in their works; on the other hand politicians always have existed who were endowed with the gift of poetry and who proclaimed their political ideas by means of their poems. A hundred years before Aeschylus, Alcaeus of Lesbos, the passionate fighter in the civil war of his native city, had fused his political rage in burning songs. Some years earlier Solon, the Athenian compatriot of Aeschylus, who was the leader of his country in a decisive moment of its history, had used the poetical form of elegy to call his fellow citizens to action, to explain his political creed, and to justify what he had done. Monody and elegy, both poetic forms to express personal feeling and thought, were fit, too, for the manifestation of political ideas.

But further questions arise: was the poetic form of tragedy also a suitable instrument for the discussion of political questions, for participation in the struggles of political life? And was Aeschylus a man who thought in political forms and who wanted to express his political convictions in his poetry? The facts of the political history of Athens in the first half of the fifth century as well as the history of tragedy at this time seem to favor a positive answer to these questions. The conditions of production and performance of tragedies which developed within the first decades of the history of tragedy were the following: only within the frame of certain festivals of Dionysus were tragedies performed, chiefly the Great Dionysia (in March), and later, the Lenaea (January-February). The highest officials of the

Athenian state had to organize these festivals and were responsible for them; the Archon Eponymos for the Great Dionysia, the Archon Basileus for the Lenaea. The equipping of the choruses was one of the duties rich citizens had to perform for the community and was equivalent to a tax on their property. If a poet wanted to perform a tragedy he had first to apply to the archon who was in charge of the festival for a chorus. The archon could grant or refuse the chorus. Thus it depended upon the state and its officials whether or not a poet could perform a drama, whether or not he could appear publicly as a poet at all; consequently, dramatic art was subject to the struggle of political forces and was itself a part of this struggle. Somehow the poet himself had to be an exponent of political tendencies. Three tragic poets were accepted for each festival by the archon, each of them was given a choregus and a chorus and—by means of allotment—the actors he needed. The performance itself, then, was a contest among the three choruses, the three choregi, the three poets, and, later on, the actors. Five citizens out of the whole community were designated as arbiters by a very complicated procedure of drawing lots and by further selection. These arbiters, designated so carefully and impartially, must needs have represented the whole population as well as its political attitudes and momentary tendencies. When they gave their judgment they may have been influenced not only by literary considerations and philosophical views, but also, and perhaps even primarily, by their political tendencies. The day after the festival, in the theatre itself, an assembly of the people took place to judge the performance of the festival, the responsible archon, the choruses, the poets, and all the other questions connected with the festival. Under these conditions it seems hardly possible that a poet could stand outside of the political forces and struggles of the city's public life.

As to Aeschylus personally, we have no evidence of any activity of his as a politician and it is unlikely that he ever held a leading political position; nevertheless we may be sure that as a citizen of early fifth century Athens, as a man who fought in the great battles of the Persian war, and as a tragic poet, he was deeply interested in the politics of his city and his time. Thus we must deal, in this paper, with a double problem; first, we must consider Aeschylus as a poet and as a man from a point

of view which does not seem to have been given the attention it deserves; second: we must become acquainted with tragic poetry in general as a means of expressing political thoughts,—a possibility which so far seems to have been overlooked in great measure.<sup>1</sup>

Our method in solving these problems will be the following: we shall have to express the actions in Aeschylus' plays as far as possible in political terms as if they were historical and political events. Not before having defined in this way the general political problems which Aeschylus formulated in constructing the actions of his different tragedies shall we look for the special political problems of Athenian public life in the time in which these tragedies were written. Only in this way, I think, will it become clear to what degree Aeschylus' poetry was influenced by contemporary political problems, and in what theoretical and philosophical spirit he approached these problems.

We may begin our discussion with a consideration of that one of Aeschylus' tragedies which dealt with an historic event of only a few years before and which, for this reason, will be the most suitable of all to make clear the poet's thoughts on political causalities and connections. Eight years after the Greek victory

<sup>1</sup> Wilamowitz, *Aischylos, Interpretationen*, pp. 250 f. (written in 1914), even denies the possibility of interpreting Aeschylus from a political point of view. In recent years, however, scholars have become more and more conscious of the political character of Aeschylean tragedy. Some aspects of political thinking are dealt with in B. Daube, *Zu den Rechtsproblemen in Aischylos' Agamemnon* (Diss. Basel, 1939). W. Jaeger in his *Paideia* (2nd ed., 1945), I, pp. 238-67, though concerned mainly with other problems, hints repeatedly at Aeschylus' political thought. Under Jaeger's direction a thesis on "Types of Rulers in the Plays of Aeschylus" was written, in 1941, by Noreen Woods (Chicago, 1941), the typewritten manuscript of which I was able to read. In this connection also G. Thomson's *Aeschylus and Athens* (2nd ed., 1946), may be mentioned. Most recently attempts have been made to evaluate Aeschylus' political thought in a closer connection with events of the time in which the plays were written: J. S. Davison, "The Date of the Prometheia," *T. A. P.A.*, LXXX (1949), pp. 66-93; L. A. Post, "The Seven against Thebes as Propaganda for Pericles," *C. W.*, XLIV (1950), pp. 49 ff. A complete inquiry, however, not only into one or another political allusion in Aeschylus' plays, but into the way he puts political problems and tries to solve them in a general and philosophical manner, has, so far as I know, not yet been made.

in the naval battle of Salamis, seven years after the decisive defeat of the Persians in European Greece at Plataea, and after the extermination of their fleet at Mycale, a promontory in Asia Minor near the city of Miletus, Aeschylus performed in 472 his tragedy named *The Persians*. It is the only Greek tragedy we possess which we could call in our terms an "historical drama." But there is ample evidence that in these early days of the development of the Greek tragedy a considerable proportion of the dramas dealt with themes of contemporary history. We may recognize in this fact a sign of the essential relationship of political thought and tragic form.

A few years before Aeschylus' *Persians* was performed another poet of the time, Phrynicus, who may have been about ten or twenty years older than Aeschylus, had dramatized the defeat of the Persians in a tragedy named the *The Phoenician Women*. Only a few fragments of this drama have been preserved and we know only the main features of the plot.<sup>2</sup> At the Persian court in Susa, the capital of the country, the news of the defeat at Salamis had been announced; the tragedy opened with a scene in which a eunuch prepared the place for a Persian senate of old men to confer. The Persian senate was supposed to make decisions as to the measures to be taken after the defeat at Salamis. Besides this chorus of old noblemen there was, in this play, a main chorus of Phoenician women who, in their songs, mourned the defeat and the death of so many warriors; to this chorus of Phoenician women the play owed its name. The advice and measures brought forward by the senate turned out to be ineffective and too late: in a central scene of the play—as we are informed by a papyrus discovered not too long ago<sup>3</sup>—a messenger announced the second decisive defeat—in the battle of Mycale. The return of the vanquished king and a song of mourning about the new disaster that had struck Persia seem to have ended the play. We do not know very much about the *Phoenician Women* of Phrynicus, but a definite political tendency can be observed. The drama develops in Susa, an indefinite time after the message of the defeat at Salamis has arrived, on the very day of the arrival of the messenger who

<sup>2</sup> See my paper, "Die Phoenissen des Phrynicos und die Perser des Aischylos," *Museum Helveticum*, II (1945), pp. 148 ff.

<sup>3</sup> *P. Oxy.*, II, 221, 1899. F. Marx, *Rh. Mus.*, LXXVII (1928), p. 355.

brings news of defeat in the battle of Mycale, and the very day of King Xerxes' return from Europe. At the same time, perhaps on the same day as the battle of Mycale in Asia Minor, the Persian land forces were defeated near Plataea in Boeotia. On the day of the arrival of the message from Mycale no tidings of the European disaster could have reached Susa. By choosing this moment for the action of his play Phrynicus draws the attention of his public to the two Greek victories of Salamis and Mycale, excluding thus even the possibility of mentioning Plataea. Both victories, the one at Salamis and the other at Mycale, were due to the Greek fleet and to the policies of the great builder of the Athenian fleet, Themistocles.<sup>4</sup> At Salamis Themistocles himself as the commander of the Athenian part of the Greek fleet played a decisive part in the victory. It is very likely that Themistocles himself was the choregus of this performance.<sup>5</sup> Thus the tendency of Phrynicus' play was the glorification of Themistocles and his policies. After the battle of Salamis the influence of Themistocles and his progressive and democratic policy had been reduced step by step by his aristocratic opponents; a glorification of his great success may, in these times, have been very welcome to him.

Eighteen years before, in 494, Phrynicus had composed another tragedy dealing with contemporary historical events: the fall of Miletus in the Ionic insurrection. It was the time when Themistocles' policy aimed at the building up of a great Athenian fleet and when he tried to carry out this purpose against the influence of the aristocratic party. Bringing on the stage the capture of Miletus, a consequence of the politics of Themistocles' opponents, Phrynicus clearly aimed at supporting Themistocles. Both in 494 and in 476, then, Phrynicus appears to have supported Themistocles' aims. In his mind the historical course of the Persian war was this: with the disaster of the fall of Miletus the war had begun, with the victory of Mycale—quite near Miletus—it had ended. The final success of the

<sup>4</sup> The most complete collection and evaluation of the historical evidence concerning Themistocles, his life and chronology, is found in U. Kahrstedt, *R.-E.*, s. v. "Themistocles."

<sup>5</sup> Plut., *Them.*, 5.

Greek weapons and the consequence of Themistocles' policy was retaliation for Miletus.<sup>6</sup>

Having considered Phrynicus' *Phoenician Women* we shall understand better the political tendency of Aeschylus' *Persae* which was modelled, as we are told by a Greek scholar and grammarian,<sup>7</sup> closely after Phrynicus' *Phoenician Women*. Aeschylus' *Persae* develops at the Persian court in Susa, exactly as Phrynicus' *Phoenician Women* does. A chorus of old Persian noblemen plans to deliberate. Fear for the army, which is so far away, weighs heavily upon the Persian capital, but hitherto no message has arrived. Thus Aeschylus repeats the place of action and the basic feature of his predecessor's composition: court of Susa, message of the defeat. But within this frame he changes the action in decisive respects. Phrynicus had had a female and a male chorus singing beside and against each other. Aeschylus restricts himself to one chorus of old Persian noblemen, and in this one chorus he represents the opposing political tendencies of the Persian people. For this purpose he makes use of the structure of many Greek choruses, especially tragic choruses: the possibility of their separation into half choruses. In the chorus of the *Persae* from the very beginning two diametrically different parties oppose each other.<sup>8</sup>

To the martial, confident party, which is sure of the victory, answers a fearful and pacific one, which anticipates defeat. Two principal political tendencies are visible in these two parties of the chorus: a war party, which aims at a policy of military expansion and aggression, and a peaceful party, which, in the uncertainty of the issue, turns out really defeatist. Thus this chorus is composed of two principal types of human characters and tendencies, which are present in every community, every state, and every people; in case of war these are the two forces the struggle between which becomes particularly acute. Aeschylus

<sup>6</sup> On the political meaning of Phrynicus' "historical" tragedies see Thomson, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

<sup>7</sup> Hypoth. Aesch. *Persae*.

<sup>8</sup> Aesch., *Pers.*, 139. On the partition of this parodos between two half choruses see my article: "Die Phoenissen des Phrynicos und die Perser des Aischylos," *loc. cit.*, pp. 148 ff. The division runs as follows: Whole chorus: 1-7; Half chorus B: 8-15; Half chorus A: 16-58; B: 59-64; A: 65-92; B: 93-101; A: 102-113; B: 114-139.

starts from his personal experience in the concrete and special case of the war against the Greeks, but he forms his chorus of old Persian noblemen in such a universal and convincing manner that the knowledge of political forces and their struggle, once drawn from the concrete case, may be applied to every time and every political situation.

Not only the struggle between fundamental types of human character and politics within the Persian state, but also the military conflict between Persia and Greece are made the object of rational knowledge by the poet; here too he wants to find out the law of historic development. Two great battles of the Persian war are decisive for his view of the historical meaning of this conflict; the two battles which were fought within the European Greek territory, the defeat of the Persian fleet at Salamis and the disaster of the Persian army at Plataea. Thus the wickedness of crossing the sea from Asia to Europe is revenged; for Aeschylus sees a violation of the divine law in this crossing of natural borders. In a great and central scene of the play the ghost of the late King Darius is conjured up from the underworld as a representative of the divine order and constitution of the world. And he explains the reasons and the meaning of the disaster.<sup>9</sup> With a rational perspicuity which reminds us of the historical clarity and severity of Thucydides, Aeschylus makes his Darius point out and prove once for all the hopelessness of a Persian expedition against Greece because of the inevitable difficulties, the impossibility of sufficient supply.

Aeschylus is aware, too, of the consequences to the inner structure which threaten the Persian empire after the defeat in the external war. Again and again in speeches and songs, the fear of an insurrection, primarily of the subjugated peoples, is to be heard: most distinctly in a pair of strophes of the chorus: 584-96. Aeschylus won this knowledge by observing the real events of the Persian war; immediately after the battle of Salamis a revolt broke out in Babylon and influenced the Persian efforts in the war against the Greeks. But he formulates it in such a manner that it can be understood as a general law of political history. Any form of domination disintegrates in a similar way after defeat in a war.

<sup>9</sup> *Pers.*, 739-52, and 787-94.

If Aeschylus deems the crossing of the sea a wicked violation of divine law and at the same time a political mistake, then his own attitude to the main problem of the actual policy of Athens in these times was very probably the following: the Persians must not cross the sea and interfere in the politics of European Greece, but then, likewise, the Greeks must not fight the Persians on the Asiatic side of the sea. And it is, I think, this fundamental political concept which accounts for the fact that Aeschylus excludes the very possibility of mentioning the only one of the three great battles which was fought in Asia Minor, the battle of Mycale. For the time at which the action of the *Persae* takes place is earlier than the time of the action of Phrynicus' *Phoenician Women*. The very day when the action of the *Persae* begins with a struggle between the two half-choruses the messenger arrives with a report of the Salaminian defeat. At this moment of the action, the battles of the next year—479—can only be mentioned by prophecy. And Aeschylus makes his ghost of King Darius predict only the disaster of the army at Plataea in European Greece; nothing is said about Mycale. Phrynicus had built up his historical and political view of the great war upon the two victories of the Greek fleet: Salamis and Mycale; Aeschylus on the contrary develops his historical philosophy out of the two battles which took place in European Greece: Salamis and Plataea. It seems clear that Aeschylus supports a foreign policy of Athens which would be restricted to Europe.

Given this fundamental attitude with regard to foreign politics which Aeschylus expresses by his play, the question arises whether these political ideas were really existent at the time of the performance of the *Persae*. After the battle of Salamis Themistocles had changed his foreign policy very quickly: he prevailed on the Athenians to build defence walls around the city and down to the Piraeus harbour. And in so doing Athens opposed Sparta, her rival city in European Greece, while at the same time the war against Persia lost much of its importance. Throughout the fifth century the democrats opposed Sparta and tried to make peace with Persia, whereas the conservatives wanted the alliance with Sparta in order to fight Persia. In the years after the battle of Salamis these two tendencies were represented by Themistocles and Cimon. There seems to be no doubt that Aeschylus by means of the ideas expounded in the *Persae* sup-

ports the politics of Themistocles and his democratic party. The speech of his messenger is our oldest, most authentic, and historically most valuable information upon the battle of Salamis. In this famous passage he makes his messenger relate the well known stratagem of Themistocles by which Xerxes was induced to fight under unfavorable conditions. It was hardly possible for Aeschylus both to point to Themistocles and his merits and to express his own political ideas in a more distinct manner. He performed his *Persae* in the year 472 B. C.; Themistocles' position in Athens had grown weaker and weaker during the seventies of the fifth century and at the very time of the performance of the *Persae* the question of his banishment by ostracism seems to have actually arisen. The conclusion seems inevitable that Aeschylus wanted to support Themistocles by his *Persae*.<sup>10</sup> It is an interesting detail that Aeschylus' choregus in this year was young Pericles, who later was to become leader of the democratic party and of the city of Athens. Our evidence, however, is not abundant enough to enable us to make a full historical evaluation of this fact. Aeschylus was not strong enough to change the course of events; a year or two later Themistocles had to leave Athens.

The interpretation of the *Persae* makes it clear that Aeschylus not only took a vivid interest in all problems of actual policy and supported a definite political line, but also based his ideas upon general philosophical, historical and political views; and he expressed his political ideas in the poetic form of tragedy. He was more than a citizen who was interested in the politics of his city and dealt with them; he was a political thinker. But still we could believe that the *Persae* was an isolated case of the expression of political thought in a tragedy; the poet's only historical drama might be his only political one too. An interpretation of Aeschylus' other tragedies, however, will show that they were all political in their very essence.

Some years before the *Persae* Aeschylus performed his Danaid trilogy, the first drama of which is preserved, namely the *Suppliants*. It is the oldest Greek tragedy we still possess and in the archaic form of its composition it seems to us the very origin of tragic art.

<sup>10</sup> I cannot find the slightest evidence for Thomson's assumption that

Danaus and his fifty daughters were linked to the Greek city Argos through their ancestress, Io, who once was the beloved of Zeus. Io had been driven from Argos by the anger of Hera and finally had reached Egypt. After many generations her descendants, Aegyptus and Danaus, divided the domination of Egypt between themselves. The fifty sons of Aegyptus then demanded the fifty daughters of Danaus, their father's brother, in marriage; the Danaids refused. Finally Danaus and his fifty daughters left Egypt and arrived as suppliants in their ancestral home, Argos. With the arrival of this chorus of suppliants led by their father Danaus the action on the stage opens. The King of Argos, Pelasgus, is the first to meet the newcomers. To him they have to prove their Argive origin and it is he whom they ask to receive them in Argos and to protect them against their cousins. Whether or not the Danaids have a legal right to be received in Argos, whether or not human sympathy would not hesitate to give them the protection they need does not matter; for Pelasgus as a king and as a responsible political leader who has to make the decision, a question of political foresight and political conscience arises. There is no doubt that the Egyptians will demand the extradition of the fugitives, and to refuse it almost surely will mean war. As a politician Pelasgus has to refuse the request of the Danaids for the sake of the security of Argos. In a *kommos* between the chorus and the king the two claims struggle against each other: the prayer of the suppliants and the political reason of Pelasgus. The decision is such a grave and difficult one that Pelasgus as a really democratic monarch explains that he is unable to act without the consent of the people's assembly.<sup>11</sup>

Aeschylus makes Pelasgus' decision appear to be the result of the struggle of the opposing forces, and not before the fugitives threaten to hang themselves at the altars of the gods is Pelasgus' decision made. The fear of this pollution of the city acts as an even stronger force upon the mind of Pelasgus than the fear of a war with the Egyptians. And it is this moral force which compels Pelasgus to promise that he will support the request

Aeschylus as well as young Pericles was a supporter of Cimon (*op. cit.*, p. 309).

<sup>11</sup> *Suppl.*, 365 ff., 396 ff.

of the Danaids in the people's assembly and to agree not to deliver them to the Egyptians.

In this scene Pelasgus seems to be an incarnation of political thought and wisdom, in contrast with the chorus, an incarnation of the predominance of feeling in women. After he has acknowledged the Argive origin of the suppliants and has guaranteed them protection, Pelasgus makes the fundamental distinction between his role as a private citizen and his role as the responsible leader of his state.<sup>12</sup>

The reason for his attitude is a general political consideration: Pelasgus is aware of the responsibility of the political leader, and he knows that public opinion criticizes first and foremost men in leading positions. In his speech he gives to this voice of public opinion a very pregnant and plastic expression.<sup>13</sup> In this one verse, almost in the concise form of an epigram, two fundamental political attitudes are expressed as opposing each other: on the one hand, preoccupation with the advantage of one's own city,—a nationalistic and even chauvinistic narrow-mindedness which does not care for moral obligations beyond these limits; on the other hand, the will to act according to moral principles which are higher than the limits of the single state. These two fundamental attitudes work in any community and in any time, particularism and cosmopolitanism.

Pelasgus acts not as an individual but as the holder of the highest office of the state; he is led not by his personal feelings and sympathies, but by the interest of the community. He acts in an essentially political manner and considers both the circumstance of the present situation and all possible consequences. This fundamentally political intellect creates a really democratic attitude: wherever the commonwealth is at stake the community must make the decision. For Pelasgus the question whether or not he would have the power to carry through his own will immediately does not even arise.<sup>14</sup> He needs the force of Peitho, of persuasion, in order to convince the people's assembly. Aeschylus makes King Pelasgus act and speak in the spirit of the Attic democracy.

Thus Pelasgus seems to be the poetic incarnation of the ideal of the democratic ruler of the state. And in the very same

<sup>12</sup> 365 ff.

<sup>13</sup> *Suppl.*, 401.

<sup>14</sup> *Suppl.*, 365 ff.

tragedy Aeschylus completes the picture of an ideal democratic constitution: to the ruler corresponds the people's assembly as outlined by Aeschylus.<sup>15</sup> He almost seems to describe a plebiscite of real Greek political life: decision to comply with the request of the suppliants, obligations of the state and of every one of its citizens, and threat of punishment against all who act against it. The way in which this plebiscite is secured is also typical: the speech of Pelasgus and the conclusiveness of his arguments induce the assembly to reach a unanimous decision.

The further action of the play develops as a natural consequence of the plebiscite. Danaus observes the landing of an Egyptian boat and hurries to the city in order to ask for help. In the meantime an Egyptian herald with a band of slave soldiers advances to the chorus of maidens and tries to tear them from the altars by force and to lead them to the boat. At this moment of utmost danger Pelasgus comes to the rescue with a band of soldiers. The force of the Egyptian herald has to give way to the stronger force of Pelasgus. Again Aeschylus outlines a fundamental political situation. On the one hand there is the herald who acts as an official emissary of the Egyptian state. He thinks that he is acting within his right in bringing back the maidens whom he deems to belong to his masters. The intervention of Pelasgus on behalf of the suppliants consequently means to him the refusal of his rights and, as would his counterpart in a real situation, he announces the war which the Egyptians will make in order to enforce the extradition of the maidens. Pelasgus, on the other hand, acts as the highest executive officer of his state. First he intervenes with his soldiers in order to prevent an act of violence by a foreign power in the area of Argos and against the will of the Argive people. Secondly, he negotiates with the Egyptian herald as with the official delegate of Egypt. Carrying out the plebiscite, he refuses to extradite the maidens notwithstanding the herald's threats of war. The specific situation and its development in the drama seem to describe in a poetic manner a typical political situation with all the essential features. The drama ends with the entrance of the rescued chorus into the city.

The whole action of the tragedy thus appears in all its phases

<sup>15</sup> *Suppl.*, 605 ff.

as the result of a continuous and permanent struggle of opposing forces, just as historical and political events do. Pelasgus' decision in favour of the suppliants is the result of his consideration of two dangers: the danger of war and the danger of pollution of the city by the suicide of the suppliants. The chorus of the maidens is weaker than the band of Egyptian slaves. They would have been led away by force if Pelasgus had not rescued them. As soon as Pelasgus with his soldiers appears to help the Danaids, the Egyptians have to give in, and finally the expulsion of the herald by Pelasgus appears as a victory of the stronger force over the weaker one. Two political and constitutional factors are described like ideal forms of real political life: the assembly of the Argive people and the democratic and constitutional king as a responsible ruler of the state. In Pelasgus Aeschylus has described his idea of a statesman.<sup>16</sup>

We must inquire further what actual political situation in Athens brought about Aeschylus' poetic creation. We cannot discern it as clearly as in the case of the *Persae* because we are not quite sure of the date of the performance of the *Suppliants*. The stage technique as well as the very archaic character of the whole drama, however, makes the *Suppliants* appear to be the oldest tragedy of Aeschylus, but shows that it can hardly have been performed before 480 and the battle of Salamis.<sup>17</sup> If these considerations are valid, the performance took place some time in the years after the battle of Salamis, when Themistocles' policies were leading to antagonism toward Sparta and when at the same time in the Peloponnesian itself the opposition to Sparta's hegemony, headed by Tegea and Argos, was growing stronger and stronger. At this very time the performance of a tragedy dealing with an Argive myth, the action of which takes place in Argos and glorifies Argive democracy, clearly seems to have a bearing upon the actual problems of foreign policy.

<sup>16</sup> Jaeger, *op. cit.*, I<sup>2</sup>, p. 252, only hints at the political meaning of Aeschylus' Pelasgus.

<sup>17</sup> Two actors are used in Aeschylus' *Suppliants*, only one actor, most probably, in Phrynicus' *Phoenician Women*, which was performed in 476. (See my article, "Die Phoenissen des Phrynichos und die Perser des Aischylos," *loc. cit.*, pp. 178 ff.). It does not seem very likely that Phrynicus could cling to his old technique of only one actor very long after Aeschylus had developed his new technique of two-actor plays.

Aeschylus' attitude towards these problems is made clear in an unmistakable manner by the famous song of blessing for Argos which the poet makes his chorus sing after the favourable decision of the people's assembly. If we are not mistaken Aeschylus already supported the policy of Themistocles' alliance with Argos against Sparta in his *Suppliants*, about four years before his *Persae* was performed.

The same principal features of Aeschylus' political thought which are evident in the *Persians* can be observed in the *Suppliants*. In the real political situation of the day the poet supports that policy which he thinks right; but at the same time he formulates and elucidates the problem in a theoretical and universal manner. He discovers the historical law and expresses it in his drama by forming the concrete action in such a way that it appears to be an illustration of general human life and history. In every situation, in every scene of the play, the strongest force decides the progress of events, and each situation appears as the result of the struggle of opposing forces. This kind of dramatic movement appears as contention of mass against mass, as a struggle of forces against each other, that is to say, as an essentially political process; and it is developed by the action of choruses. Thus we come quite near to the original form of drama: Greek tragedy originated in the song of the chorus, the chorus dividing itself into two halves, or two choruses singing and dancing alternately together and against each other. It is this division of opposing masses that creates the tension out of which dramatic action develops. The creation of the actors and the roles of single persons is a second step in the history of drama. Thus the dualism of opposing masses and wills in the original form of drama appears to be the artistic expression of the entire human community and its tensions just as the state and its political history is the concrete form of existence of this community. The opposition of choruses, the tension and solution of their forces, is essentially equivalent to the struggle of opposing forces which makes political life. Tragedy seems to be man's artistic creation, as a  $\zeta\ddot{\omega}\nu\pi\omega\tau\kappa\kappa\nu$ , just as the state is his political creation.

Gradually in the history of tragedy the choruses lost their importance and thus this form of poetry developed into an instrument for the expression of actions and sufferings of indi-

viduals. The human, individual, unpolitical tragedy of Sophocles, which up to the present day defines the idea of tragedy, is a later form. In the work of Aeschylus we can observe chronologically the development in the direction of the individual. In his earliest drama, the *Suppliants*, we have the impression of witnessing the gradual separation of the individual from the chorus, the discovery of the individual as a subject of tragic poetry.

Another early play of Aeschylus, the *Prometheus*<sup>18</sup> is entirely concerned with this newly discovered area of dramatic art. Notwithstanding its character as a tragedy of individuals, it remains in its spirit essentially political and, in this fundamental attitude, it is faithful to the original form of tragedy.

Zeus, the king of the gods, and Prometheus, two individuals, struggle against each other, each of them using his own means of power. And in this case the forces are divided between the two opposing persons in a peculiar manner. All the might and all the force seem to be on the side of Zeus, all the powerlessness with Prometheus.<sup>19</sup> But all the same Prometheus resists. The indeterminable, mysterious and yet real force of true power and the seeming, momentary and passing violence which is in reality impotence fight against each other.

Kratos and Bia, personifications of force and violence, made into characters in the drama by Aeschylus, bring in Prometheus; Hephaestus, the god of craftsmanship and fire, binds him in unbreakable iron chains on a rock far away from all human beings in the land of the Scythians. So Zeus punishes Prometheus because he has stolen the fire of the gods and given it to mankind. Even in the names of the persons there is expressed the cause which they serve: the force and violence of Zeus.

A chorus of daughters of Oceanus, the god of the ocean, visits the chained god in his loneliness. And gradually the mysterious power with which the chained and tormented Prometheus confronts Zeus and his violence is unveiled.<sup>20</sup>

In the next scene this struggle assumes concrete form: Oceanus visits Prometheus and proposes to mediate with

<sup>18</sup> On the date of the *Prometheus* see note 26 below.

<sup>19</sup> "Zeus is a modern tyrant as seen by the contemporaries of Harmodios and Aristogeiton," says Jaeger, *op. cit.*, I<sup>2</sup>, p. 252.

<sup>20</sup> *Prom.*, 167 ff.

Zeus. But Prometheus refuses disdainfully—incomprehensibly to Oceanus who does not see anything but the sufferings of the chained god on the one side and the force of Zeus on the other side. But Prometheus knows his real power and opposes it to Zeus.

Discussing, in the following scene with the chorus, the reasons for his punishment, he discloses the sources of his power.<sup>21</sup> His knowledge is his power. The tragedy of *Prometheus* is a concrete expression of a fundamental truth: knowledge is power, which is true not only in a philosophical but also in a political sense.

In the central scene of the play another victim of Zeus appears as a counterpart to the chained Prometheus: Io, the beloved of Zeus, who is driven over the whole earth as a restless and frantic victim by the wrath of Hera. And again in this scene the limits of Zeus' power, who seems to be almighty, are indicated.<sup>22</sup>

Quite clearly Prometheus' knowledge is seen as the source of his power in the following scene between him and the chorus.<sup>23</sup>

In the last scene the two powers finally oppose each other directly in a great struggle: Zeus who sends his servant Hermes to force Prometheus by terrible threats to surrender his secret, and Prometheus who sets the power of his own seeming impotence against the really powerless force of Zeus. Hermes threatens: the rock will be transferred to Tartarus together with Prometheus; after a long period of time the rock will come to the upper world again, but the eagles of Zeus will come every day and will eat the daily renewed liver out of the chained and defenseless body. There will be only one solution to this torture: another immortal god must be willing to go down to the world of the dead instead of Prometheus. It is the last and most terrible threat of force—but it makes clear its powerlessness. Prometheus remains unmoved and firm. He undergoes his pain as his fate, not as an outcome of Zeus' power. Force has no effect at all upon his knowledge and inflexibility. Thus the rock and the chained god go down to Tartarus with lightning and thunder. The final liberation of Prometheus was performed in the following dramas of the trilogy which now are lost.

Aeschylus' *Prometheus* seems to be a continuous discussion of a fundamental political problem: what is power? And it is one

<sup>21</sup> *Prom.*, 511-25.      <sup>22</sup> *Prom.*, 757-70.      <sup>23</sup> *Prom.*, 807-927; 937-40.

of the deepest things that have been thought and artistically formulated in antiquity on the essence of power. Hardly anywhere has the problematic and mysterious essence of power been described in such a concrete way as in the progress and construction of this play. Force has only the appearance of power: the threats and punishments of Zeus are illusory; in reality only powerlessness rages in this way. Only seemingly does the chained and tortured Prometheus succumb; despite his lack of force there is superior strength, real power, in his knowledge and his will.

Aeschylus knows that every power, and particularly that of Zeus which is converted into violence, is limited. In the course of the world it is subject to the law of *ἀνάγκη*, the fate of the world;<sup>24</sup> and temporally, too, it is limited.<sup>25</sup> But it reveals its most amazing limits in the persons themselves, both in those who exercise it as well as in those upon whom it acts. Again and again the chained Prometheus is faced with persons who have accepted—every one in his way—the force of Zeus: Hephaestus, Kratos, and Bia, who execute the chaining; the chorus of the Oceanids, who advise him to yield; Oceanus, who has submitted to the government of Zeus and now wants to mediate for Prometheus; Io, the former beloved of Zeus, who now, as a victim, is driven over the whole earth; Hermes, who acts as a mere servant of Zeus and executes his orders with disdain for the unbroken spirit of the adversary. For all of them, the force of Zeus is a reality because they acknowledge it and yield to it. But this same force is powerless against the will of Prometheus, who does not acknowledge it and does not yield to it. In the last analysis, power not merely is an emanation of the one who possesses it and exercises it, but is effective only by the agreement of the one who yields. It is the same fundamental knowledge which makes Pelasgus in the *Suppliants* act in such an eminently political way. All the different aspects of the theoretical problem of power are personified in concrete form in the vivid personalities of the drama.

We cannot date the *Prometheus* of Aeschylus with absolute certainty; but many facts suggest an early performance of this play—in the second half of the seventies of the fifth century, between the *Suppliants* and the *Persae*.<sup>26</sup> In these years there

<sup>24</sup> *Prom.*, 511-13.

<sup>25</sup> *Prom.*, 937-40.

<sup>26</sup> On the date of the *Prometheus* see my *Trilogie des Aischylos*, pp.

was a decisive struggle in Athens between Themistocles and his democratic party and Cimon and his conservative party, a struggle which ended in the banishment of Themistocles by ostracism. In the atmosphere of this struggle the fundamental thoughts of Aeschylus upon the essence of power may have arisen. Again we can witness the process of growth in Aeschylus which leads from his participation as a citizen in the events of actual policy to a theoretical and general elucidation and finally to an artistic formulation of the political problems.

Five years after the *Persae* Aeschylus' Theban trilogy, *Laius*, *Oedipus*, *Seven against Thebes*, was performed. Only the last tragedy of this trilogy, the *Seven against Thebes*, is preserved. In this play we are informed that long ago Oedipus had cursed his sons Eteocles and Polyneices so that they would have to divide the heritage by the sword. It is not stated how the conflict arose, but we may assume that the same presuppositions held for this trilogy as for the *Oedipus at Colonus* of Sophocles. After the blind Oedipus had left the country, the two brothers agreed they should alternate with each other in governing Thebes, each of them governing one year. Eteocles was the first to rule the city; after his year was over he did not resign but retained the power and exiled his brother. Polyneices fled to Argos, became the son-in-law of the Argive king Adrastus, and collected an army in order to conquer Thebes by force. At the critical and highly political moment when this army is preparing for its decisive attack the play begins in the besieged city. Eteocles, who is in power, acts like all other rulers in the works of Aeschylus; he is fully aware of his great responsibility and he knows that the man who rules the country will be held responsible for any disaster.<sup>27</sup> These are almost the same

155 f. and the introduction to my new edition of Droysen's German translation of Aeschylus (Zurich, 1952). I am still convinced of the validity of the arguments brought forward to prove an early performance of the *Prometheia*, about 474 or 473. To consider the *Prometheia* the latest Aeschylean trilogy, written even after the *Oresteia*—as for instance, Thomson, *op. cit.*, p. 276, and Davison, *loc. cit.*, pp. 66 ff. do—seems to me impossible for the simple reason that the poet makes use, in the *Prometheus Bound*, of only two actors; that seems, so far as we can see, impossible after Sophocles had introduced the third actor into the dramatic technique.

<sup>27</sup> *Seven*, 1-9.

thoughts that Pelasgus expressed in the *Suppliants*; they were familiar to Aeschylus and seem to have been expressed very often in his political maxims.

Eteocles reprimands very energetically the chorus of maidens who flee fearfully to the altars.<sup>28</sup> Evidently he is led by care for the morale of the fighting soldiers, knowing that fear and despair transfer themselves easily, like sparks of a fire. This is the problem and danger of every state at war.<sup>29</sup>

But there is in this play a still more important political problem than that of the responsible ruler of the state in a grave situation of war and of imminent siege. Eteocles and Polyneices had made a treaty which stipulated an annual change in the government. This treaty concerning the highest post in the state could almost be called an essential or even the most essential part of the constitution of Thebes. And this treaty has been violated by Eteocles. Every official act of Eteocles might for this reason be regarded as illegal. Polyneices doubtless was entitled to rule the state when it was his turn to do so; but had he also the right to carry through his claim by force and with the aid of a foreign army? That is the problem. Aeschylus expresses this struggle between the two rights very clearly in the scene between Eteocles and the messenger (631 ff.). Polyneices wants to fight with his brother and either kill him and die himself or expel him from the country just as he himself had been expelled by Eteocles,<sup>30</sup> and he even implores the gods of his country to fulfil this wish of his.<sup>31</sup> On his shield there is to be seen a warrior whom Justice leads back into his native city.<sup>32</sup> Eteocles, in his answer to the messenger, cannot and does not refute the right of Polyneices with irresistible arguments; he just denies that Dike is with his brother. But the longer this speech grows, the less convincing it becomes.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>28</sup> *Seven*, 181-9.

<sup>29</sup> "We seem to hear a fifth century general giving orders to his army," says Jaeger, *op. cit.*, p. 253.

<sup>30</sup> *Seven*, 634-8.

<sup>31</sup> *Seven*, 639-41.

<sup>32</sup> *Seven*, 642-8.

<sup>33</sup> *Seven*, 653-71. The other tragedians, as far as we can see, also considered Polyneices a victim of Eteocles' injustice. Cf. Sophocles, *Oedipus Coloneus*, 1287-1345. (I once tried to prove that the *Oedipus Coloneus* was modelled after the *Oedipus* of Aeschylus: *Trilogie des Aischylos*, pp. 215 ff.). Cf. also Euripides, *Phoenician Women*, 335-637, particularly 469 ff. and 499-525.

Thus in this play a general political problem is described which is fundamental among all peoples and in all states and which, especially in the Greek city states with their changing party governments, was always of the utmost relevancy, namely, the relations between the government and the opposition. This problem is presented in the *Seven against Thebes* in its last and extreme form, as a struggle between a government which has violated the constitution and the opposition which has even emigrated and which proceeds not merely to insurrection by means of armed force but to invasion of its own country with the help of a foreign army. In this dilemma Aeschylus sees no solution, no clear decision between right and wrong. Both brothers know the curse of their father, both of them know that their action means their death, and nevertheless they seek the decision by duel with each other. And both of them die in this fight. This is the natural and tragic end of the struggle of two illegalities against each other. The action of the play as such gives concrete form of these fundamental political thoughts and problems; for Aeschylus there is no need for theoretical discussion.

If we look, again, for the concrete political situation of Athens in which a tragedy like the *Seven against Thebes* was born, we find that Themistocles had left Athens after his ostracism and had gone to Argos—just as did the Polyneices of the tragedy. The conservative and pro-Spartan party of Cimon had won the victory in Athens. In Argos, Themistocles continued his anti-Spartan and anti-conservative policy. After 469—we do not know the exact date—Sparta prevailed on Athens to put Themistocles on trial for his connection with Pausanias, the former Spartan king, who had been tried for high treason and pro-Persian intrigues. Themistocles was sentenced to death in his absence, and the trial took place at the very time when Aeschylus wrote his Theban trilogy. The fight between the powerful Cimon and his conservative party on the one hand and the exiled Themistocles and the democratic faction on the other was the political reality which was the background of the Aeschylean drama and which found its artistic expression in it. In Athens and in reality, political power had sentenced the exiled Themistocles to death. Aeschylus' judgment was just; he divided responsibility and guilt equally between the

ruling Eteocles who had violated the treaty and the exiled Polyneices who marched against his native city with a foreign army. Both of them expiated their deed by their death. This was a judgment not of a political party, but of a political thinker. And we may gather from this drama that Aeschylus still sympathized with Themistocles and his politics.<sup>34</sup>

Nine years later (458) the *Oresteia* of Aeschylus was performed. This last work of the poet differs widely from the earlier ones not only chronologically but also from the point of view of the theatrical technique and the spiritual development of Aeschylus. He had learned to make three actors perform instead of the two in the earlier plays, and consequently much more than in the earlier plays—except perhaps the *Prometheus*—the heroic individual is the focus of the tragic action while the community has lost much of its meaning, and its fate is heard of only softly and as if from far away. To this development of the tragic art corresponds a diminution of the merely political and a growth of other problems.

To express the situation in the *Agamemnon* in terms of political life one would have to say that the legitimate sovereign Agamemnon had been absent for many years in a war, there was no definite news about what had become of him, and rumours even told that he was wounded or dead. This situation accounts for an atmosphere of uncertainty in which a revolution may take place. The history and the genealogical relations of the sovereign family act also in the direction of a revolution. Agamemnon's father had already fought with his brother Thyestes for the government; he had won in this struggle and exiled Thyestes. When Thyestes, encouraged by messages from his brother, came home as a suppliant, Atreus slew the former's sons and offered the meat of the dead children to the unsuspecting father. Horrified by this crime Thyestes cursed Atreus and his whole house. Aegisthus is Thyestes' son and he has used the absence of Agamemnon to begin his revenge. Connecting himself in

<sup>34</sup> Our interpretation of the *Seven against Thebes* has shown why we agree with L. A. Post, "The Seven against Thebes as Propaganda for Pericles," *C. W.*, XLIV (1950), pp. 49 f., in attributing a high political importance to this play, but, on the other hand, why we cannot accept the identification of the Aeschylean Eteocles with Pericles as proposed by Post.

adultery with Agamemnon's wife, he takes the preliminary steps to put aside Agamemnon and, at the same time, to change fundamentally the political situation. The day of Agamemnon's return is also the day of the murder, and of the coup d'état. The political forces of the situation are represented by the chorus of old men on the one hand, who are faithful to the legitimate monarch, and by Aegisthus and Clytemnestra on the other hand, who head the revolutionary party.

The moment of the coup d'état, prepared long before, comes when the cries of the murdered king are heard outside the palace. The chorus is prepared for this event by the prophecy of Cassandra and at the moment of Agamemnon's death begins to act as a political body. This chorus has to make up its mind how to act in this situation and immediately is divided into two parties according to the basic temperament of the individuals—quite similarly to the chorus of the *Persians*. Every one of the twelve old men states his opinion in a double verse.<sup>35</sup> One party of them decides to act immediately, the other party wants to be sure of the events beforehand and to deliberate carefully. Whatever the chorus decided to do if they had time enough, they would not be able to change the situation, for Agamemnon is dead.

What one of the old men of the chorus had expressed had become a fact by the murder of Agamemnon: a government erected by force, a tyranny established. This becomes clear when Clytemnestra with the axe in her hands comes out of the palace. To the horrified chorus who openly condemns what she has done she answers by a challenge to struggle—which in this situation is but a threat of force.<sup>36</sup> Aegisthus joins Clytemnestra as the new ruler who openly confesses that the revolution was to his advantage. He, too, has to face the condemnation of the chorus, and like Clytemnestra he appeals to force against what opposes him.<sup>37</sup> Aeschylus makes Aegisthus the complete counterpart of a real political figure, just as he did in the case of Pelasgus or even Eteocles. He is the man of intrigue, of coup d'état, of force and violence. In this person Aeschylus shows what political power won illegally and working illegally really means.

To the other party, which for the moment is overwhelmed,

<sup>35</sup> *Ag.*, 1348-71.

<sup>36</sup> *Ag.*, 1420-5.

<sup>37</sup> *Ag.*, 1612-24.

nothing remains but the hope that Agamemnon's son Orestes, who is exiled, may come back as an avenger.<sup>38</sup>

Again Aeschylus formulates the main features of the political life of every state: the co-operation between a suppressed opposition within the country and its exiled leaders. The antagonism between the government newly established by means of the coup d'état and the party of legality which is powerless at the moment remains unresolved and breaks out again in the second tragedy of the trilogy when, years later, Orestes comes back.

In the second play of the trilogy, the *Choephoroi*, Aeschylus describes the second phase of this struggle between legality and usurpation.

Orestes has come home to accomplish his revenge. His first visit is to his father's tomb. So from the very beginning of the play it is evident that the continuity of legality is going to be re-established, the party which was suppressed by Aegisthus' coup d'état proceeds to action. Clytemnestra has had an ominous dream, and she sends a chorus of servant maidens to Agamemnon's tomb to avert the evil omen. This chorus of maidens reveals the heavy and dark atmosphere of the country which is ripe for a new revolution.<sup>39</sup> So uncertain and disputed is power based on murder and coup d'état. It lacks the general consent and is at bottom nothing but force; it will collapse if faced with stronger force.

Aegisthus still has the force, but mysteriously the real power grows and is nourished by the emanation of the dead Agamemnon, the murdered legal ruler; out of his tomb his party draws and sucks its strength. Orestes had been at the tomb; later Electra is there.<sup>40</sup>

At Agamemnon's tomb Electra and Orestes meet and unite for action. Praying to their dead father, Orestes, the leader of Agamemnon's party, receives his last confirmation and strength to act. In this scene Aeschylus' conception of the essence of power grows to living dramatic form as it did years before in the *Prometheus*. In Agamemnon's tomb the idea of legality is embodied and gives to Orestes, Electra, and the whole party their real power, which is stronger than the mere force of Aegisthus' power.

<sup>38</sup> *Ag.*, 1646-8.

<sup>39</sup> *Cho.*, 55-8.

<sup>40</sup> *Cho.*, 105-23; 129-44.

By the murder of Aegisthus and Clytemnestra the hitherto concealed and merely potential power of Agamemnon's party becomes real; and again a complete revolution of the political situation is accomplished.<sup>41</sup> So far the action of the play is political. Then again the personal fate of the individual becomes the central subject of the tragedy: Orestes' atonement as the murderer of his mother.

In the last tragedy of the *Oresteia*, the *Eumenides*, Orestes' final salvation is accomplished. He had first been at Delphi, where Apollo had purified him ritually; then he came to Athens in order to be freed of his guilt by a regular judgment of a law court. When he applied to Athens' goddess, Athena, for merciful reception and help, he promised as a gift in return for his rescue an alliance with Argos.<sup>42</sup> And with still more stress he celebrates the new friendship between Athens and Argos in his last speech after his absolution by the Areopagus.<sup>43</sup> So in the midst of the personal tragedy actual Athenian political problems of Aeschylus' times seem to be dealt with. One almost seems to hear in these words of Orestes the official Athenian diplomacy; it seems as if Aeschylus wanted to give mythological foundation to the official tendency of Athenian foreign policy.

The law court which Athena institutes to judge, for the first time in the trial of Orestes and later in all cases of murder, is the Areopagus.<sup>44</sup> Nothing is said, in this play, of any political function of the Areopagus; it is nothing but a law court for trials of murder. At the same time, however, the aristocratic character of this body is emphasized;<sup>45</sup> and even more stress is laid on this aristocratic character in Athena's speech to the judges themselves at the moment of their inauguration.<sup>46</sup> The Areopagus is a law court for trials of murder, nothing else. If anywhere in this play, then, here would have been the occasion to speak about a political function of this council. The function of a law court, however, has a higher, an ethical meaning: it is the foundation of the loyalty of all citizens. And even more: the Areopagus must remain forever composed as it is now.<sup>47</sup>

<sup>41</sup> *Cho.*, 973-7.

<sup>42</sup> *Eum.*, 754-77.

<sup>46</sup> *Eum.*, 487 ff.

<sup>42</sup> *Eum.*, 287-91.

<sup>44</sup> *Eum.*, 482-8.

<sup>46</sup> *Eum.*, 681-710.

<sup>47</sup> *Eum.*, 693 ff.; 699 ff.; 708. Athena's admonition, 707, sounds like severe advice for all time.

In the *Oresteia*, as far as it deals with political thoughts, there is described first and foremost a general problem: the struggle of the power of legality against usurped force, the change of political power by a coup d'état. In a new form it is the same struggle between real power and the only seeming power of mere force which Aeschylus had already dealt with in the *Prometheus*. But besides this general and philosophical problem two concrete questions of actual Athenian politics are alluded to: in foreign policy the alliance with Argos, in domestic policy the position of the Areopagus.

The date of the *Oresteia* being known, we are able to see the historical background and the political atmosphere in which these thoughts of Aeschylus grew. In Athens the fight between the conservatives and the democrats continued. The conservatives, in their domestic policy, wanted to prevent any further democratization of the constitution, and, consequently, wanted to continue, in their foreign policy, the alliance with Sparta. The democrats, on the other hand, wanted, in their domestic policy, to establish decisively and definitely the supremacy of the great mass over the power of the rich and noble citizens, whereas, in their foreign policy, they wanted to form an alliance with Argos and to fight the Spartan predominance in Greece. The main issues of the actual political life in these years were the position of the Areopagus in domestic policy and the choice of alliance with Argos or with Sparta in foreign policy. Both of them are of great importance in the *Eumenides*.

In 462 the conservative leader Cimon had prevailed over the democrat Ephialtes and was sent with an army to help the Spartans against the revolting Messenians. But during his absence the democrat Ephialtes and the young Pericles, by a coup d'état, deprived the Areopagus, which primarily was a council of nobility and therefore a conservative stronghold, of its political prerogatives and reduced it to a mere law court in trials of murder. When Cimon came back in 461—after the political failure of his expedition to Messenia—and tried to re-establish the old constitution, he was exiled by ostracism, as ten years before had been the democrat Themistocles. In this very year the democratic leader Ephialtes was murdered. The democratic development of the constitution, however, continued. In the year after the performance of the *Oresteia*—458/7—the

third property class, the *Zeugitae*, was granted eligibility to the archonship and, herewith, the possibility of membership in the Areopagus. On the other hand the conservative forces were still powerful and continued their efforts. In 457 we have evidence of the strong political influence of Cimon in Athens, and in 456 he was called back officially.

At the very time when Aeschylus wrote his *Oresteia* he witnessed in his own city the bitter fight between government and opposition, between legal power and coup d'état, the collaboration between an inner opposition and its exiled leader. And it was this struggle of power that he described poetically and philosophically in his trilogy. That Aeschylus' political philosophy grew out of his observation of this struggle and of his participation in actual political life is proved by the fact that he alluded to the two main issues of Athenian domestic and foreign policy in these days: to the position of the Areopagus and to the alliance with Argos. He appears to have fully agreed with the foreign policy of the democrats: the alliance with Argos. In domestic policy, however, his point of view seems to have been much less radical. To be sure he accepts the restriction of the Areopagus to a law court, but he insists on the aristocratic composition of this body. In these last years of his life his own position is less decisively on the democratic side than it used to be in his younger days; he is now several steps nearer to a middle course between democrats and conservatives.<sup>48</sup>

We can now sum up the results of our interpretation of all the extant Aeschylean tragedies which represent to us his work in the last twenty years of his life. Aeschylus' tragedies are still very near to the choral origin of tragic art; and this form of poetry, being the artistic expression of community and group feeling and thought, is in its essence closely related to other creations of the spirit of man as a social being, that is to say, closely related to state and to politics. Thus this form of art is extremely well suited to the expression of general and philosophical political thoughts and to dealing with concrete and special questions of actual policy. We have become acquainted with a feature of Aeschylus the tragedian which has to a certain degree been neglected so far, but which, nevertheless, is essential to him

<sup>48</sup> See Thomson, *op. cit.*, p. 286.

as a poet and as a man: his political thought. It has become clear that he participated in the political struggles of his day and that he always supported the democrats, who in these very years won the decisive victories for democratization of Athenian political life. This party is represented in these times by the names of Themistocles, Ephialtes, Pericles. But still more important than his attitude towards actual political questions is his philosophical and rationalistic understanding of fundamental political problems and his ability to concentrate them into dramatic actions and tragic personalities. Solon in his elegies, Alcaeus in his songs, could speak immediately of themselves and could indicate a definite and actual political situation. The tragic art of Aeschylus required an impersonal, indirect way of expression both of the poet's thoughts and of the actual events; it enforced clarification and realization of the ideas in mythical figures and actions. Themistocles and Cimon, democrats and conservatives, could fight for their influence and power in Athenian political life; the poet, however, was not able to describe the deeper ideas of these fights in a general and rationalistic way except by transposing them into the primeval age of myth and into the poetic form of tragic action. Not before being embodied in Pelasgus and Danaus, in Xerxes, in Zeus and Prometheus, in Eteocles and Polyneices, in Agamemnon, Aegisthus, and Orestes, not before being expressed in this objective shape were they formulated so as to be true in general of all human fights for power in all places, in all times. The talent for such an objectivity and generalization, especially of political thought, seems to have been one of the most important gifts of the Attic spirit. Fifty years later than Aeschylus, the Athenian Thucydides described the Peloponnesian War as an individual event, but in relating the special facts he wanted to point out the perpetual laws of historical evolution. Our interpretation has shown Aeschylus to be a true forerunner of Thucydides. His genuinely Attic spirit made him see in the individual things that which is general, in the present moment that which is eternal, in the event the law, in the appearance the idea. This spirit made him more than a politician, it made him a political thinker.

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## HORACE, C., I, 3.

In an introductory note to Horace's propempticon to Virgil (*C.*, I, 3),<sup>1</sup> C. H. Moore in his edition of 1902 commented:<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The most interesting comments on this poem are still, to my mind, those of G. L. Hendrickson, "Horace's Propempticon to Virgil," *C.J.*, III (1908), pp. 100-4, and A. Kiessling-R. Heinze, *Q. Horatius Flaccus* (Oden u. Epoden) *ad loc.* For Horace's indebtedness to Callimachus here, see G. Pasquali, *Orazio Lirico* (Firenze, 1920), pp. 260 ff., who, however, seems at times a bit imaginative in his reconstructions.

For some recent studies on this ode, see L. Delatte, "Caelum ipsum petimus stultitia," *L'Ant. Cl.*, IV (1935), pp. 309-36 (who argues that Horace, under Cynic influence, is here condemning the study of cosmology, astronomy, and astrology [such an ode as I, 11 does doubtless reflect the poet's real views, but then, cf. *C.*, II, 17]); L. Herrmann, "Nostrum Scelus," *Rev. Belge*, XV (1936), pp. 981-5 (who holds that the *nostrum scelus* refers to Virgil's *sceleris nostri* of *E.*, 4, 13 [but see below, pp. 157 f.] which in turn depends upon Cat., 64, 397 ff. which relate *inter alia* to fratricide. Herrmann cites *Epod.*, 7, 18, *C.*, I, 35, 33 and I, 2, 29, in the last of which, he maintains, the *scelus* is the murder of Caesar, whereas the *scelus* in I, 3, 39 is more general, and *C.*, I, 3 chiefly deals with man's "audace dans le crime." As for date and occasion of I, 3, he would refer it to the fall of 38 B.C., and suggests that Virgil accompanied Maecenas then to Athens or was planning to do so); P. Culmont, "Horace, Ode I, 3," *Les Études Class.*, VIII (1939), pp. 87-90 (on handling of "le topique du genre et de l'espèce"); A. Hahn, "Horace's Odes to Vergil," *T.A.P.A.*, LXXVI (1945), pp. xxxii-iii ("The poem, which has been thought tactless, is really humorous, as the extravagant tone suggests; Horace is teasing Vergil, who inveighed against sea-faring in *Ecl.* 4, for crossing the sea himself, . . ."); W. Wili, *Horaz u. d. aug. Kultur* (Basel, 1948), pp. 225 f. (who declares that "höht sich das Lied . . . zum Weltgedicht, das in der römischen Antike ausser Horaz als 'reflexive Form' keinen Vergleich kennt, sondern diesen nur im Chorlied der griechischen Tragödie gewinnen würde"—a view which is not inharmonious with the burden of the present study).

In this essay it is assumed that *C.*, I-III were published in 23 B.C. (although see F. L. Santee, "The Date of Publication of Horace's Odes I-III," *T.A.P.A.*, LXII [1931], p. xxxii, who also allows for 22 B.C.), that the Virgil of the ode is the poet (because of the *animae dimidium meae* and the position of the ode in the collection), and that the poem refers to a projected trip of which we know nothing from Virgil's biographers.

<sup>2</sup> C. H. Moore, *Horace, Odes and Epodes* (New York, 1902), p. 63, apparently following W. Y. Sellar, *Virgil* (Oxford, 1897), p. 118.

It is remarkable that after the first eight verses which contain the propempticon proper, Horace, who was usually so tactful, should quickly revert to the old philosophical and theological notions of the sinfulness of human enterprise without observing how out of place such ideas were here, when Vergil was just about to show such enterprise by undertaking this voyage.

This comment, which probably seemed to many an unsatisfactory one, was questioned—and answered—in 1907 by Professor Hendrickson.<sup>3</sup> In a typically illuminating study he fully acquitted Horace of this charge of tactlessness, and stoutly confirmed the poem's formal unity.<sup>4</sup> "These reflections," he suggested, "though put in the enunciative form, were in reality an expression of grief, an imprecation upon man's audacious enterprise, which had devised the means of separating friends," and he went on to show that Horace was thoroughly familiar with the traditional elements of this form.

The present essay aims at suggesting some additional interpretations, based upon Hendrickson's conclusion that the poem reflects Horace's genuine grief at the impending departure of his friend, albeit this grief is expressed in a highly formal mould. The interpretations proposed below will deal with Horace's treatment of "man's audacious enterprise," by examining the moods and insights which the sequence of emotions, aroused by his grief, may have momentarily inspired in him as he worked with the conventional patterns of form and motives.

In his comment quoted above, Moore implied that Horace in this ode had resurrected these "old philosophical and theological notions" out of a sort of quaint and whimsical archaism, and that they meant virtually nothing to him. They would, then, be merely outmoded, conventional views, without significance for a member of the Augustan world. Such an attitude toward this poem is not uncommon.

A minor criticism that can be levelled against such an interpretation is that it fails to consider that hostility to "progress"

<sup>3</sup> See ref. in note 1.

<sup>4</sup> K. Prodinger, "Zu Horazens Ode I 3," *Wien. Stud.*, XXIX (1907), p. 171, even went so far as to conclude that *C., I, 3* is actually two separate poems.

was likely to be encouraged by Stoic doctrines,<sup>5</sup> and that Stoicism's appeal to the eclectic Horace must ever be reckoned with.<sup>6</sup> Indeed, the doctrine was by no means limited to the Stoics and Cynics. Lucretius speaks of the *improba navigii ratio* (V, 1006),<sup>7</sup> and one may guess that this, like much else in Lucretius, by now

<sup>5</sup> In general, probably the viewpoint of J. B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress* (New York, 1932), pp. 11-15 (who comments on *C.*, I, 3 on pp. 17-18) on antiquity's lack of a concept of progress is correct (though, as Professor A. D. Nock points out to me, it must be here and there modified in the case of some thinkers in the light of such statements as Polyb., IX, 2, 5; Cic., *Rep.*, II, 2 and perhaps *Off.*, I, 11; Sen., *Ep.*, 64, 7-8. See also W. Nestle's interesting "Griechische Geschichtsphilosophie," *Archiv f. Gesch. d. Philos.*, XLI [1932], pp. 80-114). Certainly the old views of a "golden age" of simplicity, of the wisdom of the past, and of man's subsequent degeneration were generally held as true throughout antiquity, although in some respects Epicureanism, of course, offers a considerable departure from the norm (see Bury, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-17 and the views and references given by M. Taylor, "Progress and Primitivism in Lucretius," *A.J.P.*, LXVIII [1947], pp. 180-94). As for Stoicism, its subscription to the common theory of world-cycles, and its advocacy of the simple life according to Nature (with eulogy of primitivism, e. g. Sen., *Ep.*, 90, 4-5 and *passim*) tended to prevent the adherents of this school from acquiring a concept of progress (albeit Seneca allowed for the advancement of knowledge in a unique fashion; see his *Q.N.*, VII, 30, 5 and Bury, *op. cit.*, pp. 13 f.). Whether, however, one can go so far as L. P. Wilkinson in his excellent *Horace and His Lyric Poetry* (Cambridge, 1946), p. 81, as to speak, aenit *C.*, I, 3, of a "Stoic hatred of all progress" is not easy to determine. The long and the short is that we appear to have scant evidence on the various Stoic views held in the Augustan period. For one thing, diatribes against excesses were common to most moralists. For another, Stoic doctrines, unlike Epicurean, were constantly being changed and modified—one cannot speak of an "orthodox" Stoicism—and it is hard indeed to fancy that amid such divergences one can hope for much certainty in sorting our strata and groups (as, for Stoicism of the late republic, Cicero's *N.D.* illustrates many of the difficulties). Finally, it were bold, and doubtless foolish, to seek consistent philosophical adherence, for any period, in such poets as Virgil and Horace.

<sup>6</sup> On Horace's indebtedness to the diatribe, with its Cynic-Stoic doctrine of life "according to Nature," and especially to Bion the Borysthenite, see R. Heinze, *De Horatio Bionis Imitatore* (Bonn, 1889).

<sup>7</sup> I am not concerned here with the problem of the reading *navigii* (which indeed is suspect), but with the meaning of *improba*. Here it cannot mean "sinful," but rather (see *T.L.L.*, *sub voc.*) *fraudulenta* (an interpretation supported by the *pellacia subdola* and *in fraudem* of the preceding lines).

was a part of popular philosophy. A more serious charge that can be brought against such an interpretation as Moore's is that, in failing to try to understand the developing symbolism and spirit of the ode,<sup>8</sup> it may fail to realize that Horace, under certain emotional pressure, could rise in a carefully veiled formalism to the lofty heights which we usually associate with the true lyric spirit.<sup>9</sup> The latter view conflicts, of course, with the common picture of Horace as always the tactful, urbane, and gently humorous poet who, though temperamentally unable ever to be strongly moved or soar like a Pindar, charms us nevertheless by the genial expression of his practical wisdom. But *insurgit aliquando*, Quintilian reminds us.

This study will propose that at times Horace could indeed soar, and that in sections of *C.*, I, 3 we have one of those times. The tone of the poem, to my mind, is not conventional or humdrum. Here Horace would seem to have gone beyond the traditional, Hesiodic strictures against sailing as dangerous but, on the other hand, he has not subscribed literally to the Cynic-Stoic

<sup>8</sup> F. Solmsen, in his highly instructive "Horace's First Roman Ode," *A.J.P.*, LXVIII (1947), pp. 341-2, wisely stresses the importance of understanding symbolism in the *Odes*. On imagery in odes to his friends, see M. Andrews, "Horace's Use of Imagery in the Epodes and Odes," *Greece and Rome*, XIX (1950), p. 114.

<sup>9</sup> For the most part, certainly, Horace was too much the reflective, if informal, thinker, too deeply steeped in Hellenistic philosophy, too earnestly wedded to *nil admirari*, and too genuinely concerned with the current problems of social and political reconstruction to soar *ore rotundo* (*A.P.*, 323). See text below, pp. 154-5. And he gives clear warning of the risk of trying to emulate Pindar (*C.*, IV, 2). But on Pindaric influence, however, see E. Fraenkel, "Das Pindargedicht des Horaz," *Sitzungsber. Heid., Philos.-hist. Kl.*, XXIII (1933), 2. Abh.; E. L. Highbarger, "The Pindaric Style of Horace," *T.A.P.A.*, LXVI (1935), pp. 222-55; D. Norberg, *L'olympionique, le poète, et leur renom éternel. Contribution à l'étude de l'ode I, 1 d'Horace* (*Uppsala Univ. Årsskrift*, 1945: 6), with important review of same by G. Norwood, *A.J.P.*, LXVIII (1947), pp. 432-5. Yet at times (e.g. *C.*, I, 37 or II, 1, or as a *Musarum sacerdos* in episodes in the Roman odes) he shows that he can reach the sublime, despite frequent self-deprecations (e.g. *C.*, I, 6, 9 ff., 17 ff., II, 1, 37 ff., III, 3, 69 ff., *S.*, II, 1, 12 ff., *Epist.*, II, 1, 250 ff.) and despite his Callimachean subscription to a *spiritum tenuem* (*C.*, II, 16, 38), as well as his inclusion of himself among the *mutis piscibus* (*C.*, IV, 3, 19). On the general subject, see the sensible comments of Wilkinson (cited in note 5), pp. 89-94.

condemnation of sailing as sinful. Sailing becomes here only a symbol for man's sinfulness. Nor does sailing itself occupy the poet's entire attention. For he moves on to consider other forms of *impietas* and the tragic ruin it entails.<sup>10</sup> Here the progression of instances—Virgil, mankind, Prometheus, Daedalus, and Hercules—is highly important. For it may let us know that, after all, the poet is not so much interested in the forms and nature of *impietas* as in his developing contemplation of man's *audacia* in his sinfulness. The ode, then, according to such an interpretation, is a study, set forth in a careful formalism, of man's greatness in the face of Heaven's decrees—in fine, a study of man's tragic heroism.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>10</sup> In this connection one may wonder whether there is more meaning in the *Melpomene* of C., III, 30, 16 than usually is granted (on which see A. W. Verrall, *Studies in the Odes of Horace* [London, 1884], Essay I [*Melpomene*], pp. 1-10).

<sup>11</sup> *Stobaei Hermetica*, Exc. 23, 44-46 (W. Scott, *Hermetica* [Oxford, 1924], I, pp. 483-4), to which Professor A. D. Nock has called my attention, is full of importance for the interpretation of C., I, 3. In this passage Momus criticizes Hermes for making man, and points out that if man has the unfettered use of his senses, in his audacity man will explore the secrets of earth, sea, and heaven, and may even dare to storm the heavens themselves (cf. *caelum ipsum petimus*). As a check on man's aggression, Momus asks that man be given irrational passions.

As Ferguson notes, *Hermetica*, IV, pp. 455-61 (and also see R. Reitzenstein, "Die Göttin Psyche," *Sitzungsbs. Heid.*, Philos.-hist. Kl., VIII [1917], 10. Abb.) this discussion apparently reflects the Stoic diatribe in contents and form, with Momus complaining about faculties given man by Pronoia, and with Hermes assuming the usual position of Prometheus. Momus, then, would be the critic of Prometheus (Hermes), and his jealous criticism would be that man will become virtually a god, unless care be taken.

In such a debate, one may recognize both hostile criticism of man's misuse of his faculties and, so to speak, an inverted panegyric on man. The parallels between this passage in the *Hermetica* and C., I, 3 are striking, and surely Reitzenstein, *op. cit.*, pp. 76 ff., is right in proposing that both works go back in part at least to the same tradition. The Hermetic passage would seem to reflect a teleological debate on Pronoia (helped on by Momus' adverse criticisms which, however, will ultimately be used to justify Stoic doctrine on Providence and Necessity), with elements of the Prometheus story brought in. But then one must ask: do both works—the Hermetic passage and C., I, 3—share the same mood and temper?

The Momus-Hermes passage would seem to emphasize man's *intelle-*

First, a word or two on the form, so that we can see how Horace handled the traditional elements.<sup>12</sup> About the history of the προπεμπτικὸν (*sc. μέλος*) we know little. In earlier Greek literature lines of farewell and tirades upon sailing and the first sailor occur occasionally. But these are not propemptica, though quite possibly germs of the form. A fragment of Sappho may be the opening of a propempticon, but this is a sheer guess.<sup>13</sup> It is not until we come down to the Hellenistic period—to Theocritus,<sup>14</sup> Callimachus,<sup>15</sup> and Erinna<sup>16</sup>—that we can definitely put our finger on examples of the form. Hence to the present writer, although Theocritus' humorous twist to his propempticon-passage might appear to indicate serious predecessors, all in all the form would seem to be a Hellenistic invention. And the conceit of addressing the ship, a device first to be noted in Callimachus, perhaps smacks of Alexandrianism.<sup>17</sup>

But if we wish to know the rules for the form, for actual practice we must turn to Ovid<sup>18</sup> and Statius,<sup>19</sup> and for theory

*tual* audacity (cf. Man., II, 127 and Plin. Maj., II, 95), and the *scelus* here may be chiefly curiosity of mind. But in Horace, as Ferguson, *op. cit.*, p. 458, note 6, remarks, the audacity consists more of man's *physical* invasion of other elements than land. But more important, does Horace, as Reitzenstein suggests, share Momus' "world-weary pessimism" and the belief that man's audacity is folly? Horace agrees with Momus, I grant, that the exercise of such *audacia* is folly, but to my mind he does not share Momus' pessimism. Quite the contrary! For in Horace it is the panegyric of man (expressed in twisted form in the Hermetic passage) which dominates, and Horace's ultimate feeling would seem to be one of admiration at man's *audacia* rather than a lengthily-reasoned acceptance of Necessity.

<sup>12</sup> On this subject, see F. Jäger, *Das antike Propemptikon u. d. 17. Gedicht d. Paulinus von Nola* (Diss., Rosenheim, 1913).

<sup>13</sup> Berl. Klassikertexte, 5, 2, 12 f. (Diehl 96); on this frag. see U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Sappho u. Simonides* (Berlin, 1913), pp. 48-50.

<sup>14</sup> 7, 52-89, on which see A. S. F. Gow, *Theocritus* (Cambridge, 1950), II, *ad loc.*

<sup>15</sup> Frag. 400 Pfeiffer. Horace surely had this poem, as well as Meleager, A. P., XII, 52, in his mind as a *mise en scène*; see discussion of Pasquali (cited in note 1).

<sup>16</sup> Frag. 2 Diehl.

<sup>17</sup> C., I, 3 is not addressed to Virgil, as the *O. C. D.*, *sub Propemptikon*, states.

<sup>18</sup> Am., II, 11.

<sup>19</sup> Silv., III, 2.

to the late rhetorician Menander,<sup>20</sup> and from them attempt to reconstruct the traditional elements. Hendrickson, and later and more fully, Felix Jäger, have performed this task.<sup>21</sup> The upshot is, as the commentary of Kiessling-Heinze with its usual discernment notes, that Horace by no means slavishly followed the usual *τόποι*, but in fact was consciously radical. Such a conclusion does not seem startling in the light of what we have learned from Wilamowitz, Reitzenstein, Pasquali, and others, as to how Horace used Hellenistic motives and forms. Here in this ode, for example, Horace says nothing about the usual happy reunion with his friend at the end, nor indeed a word at all about his return. More important, with a feeling for *εὐφημία*, he eschews the customary *τόπος* of cursing the inventor of ships and sailing—the *σχετλιασμός* in which Ovid and Statius revelled—and, with a transition of Pindaric swiftness, he passes to reflections on the first sailor's hardihood and the general theme which occupies the rest of the poem, man's boldness in *impietas* and the many forms of death which await him because of his *nefas*, *stultitia*, and *scelus*. It is not Fate nor God, he declares, who brings woes and tribulations on mankind, but man himself with his *ἰδίας*, his lack of pious submission and restraint. And this general theme is brought up to date, up to Horace's own age, by the present tenses in the abrupt and ironical last strophes:

nil mortalibus ardui est:  
caelum ipsum petimus stultitia, neque  
per nostrum patimur scelus  
iracunda Iovem ponere fulmina.

If, then, Horace does not indulge in a number of the usual *τόποι* of the genre, may we not consider that what he says here was meaningful to him and, in his estimation, likely to be meaningful to Virgil, too? Otherwise, one is forced to conclude that Horace designed the appeal of the ode to lie wholly either in form or in humor.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>20</sup> Spengel, *Rhet. Graec.*, III, pp. 395-9.

<sup>21</sup> See notes 1 and 12.

<sup>22</sup> W. Y. Sellar, *Virgil* (Oxford, 1887), pp. 120-1, and J. W. Duff, *A Lit. Hist. of Rome—Golden Age* (New York, 1927), p. 519, raise the question of humor here; Hahn (cited in note 1) considers this the explanation of the ode.

This leads us to an analysis of the poem. Lines 1-8 are a formal prayer for Virgil's safety, but in tone more than formal. For the *animae dimidium meae* deeply pervades these lines and sets the opening mood. If it be argued that this phrase is but a translation of Meleager,<sup>23</sup> and anyway a commonplace,<sup>24</sup> it must be replied at once and strongly that to use tradition in this way—especially Greek tradition for the friend sailing to Greece—is the most effective way of expressing the fullness of one's feelings. What we know of the relations between Virgil and Horace—and the admittedly sparse facts need not be given here—might seem to tell us that Horace would write his friend a personal and significant poem. Mutual poetic experiences and mutual affection would then underlie the *animae dimidium meae*. If we can understand the emotional color of this section of the poem, this may help us to find out what Horace felt and thought when he wrote his friend about to set out *finibus Atticis*.

Sadness and grief at the prospect of being separated from Virgil is the underlying note, it would seem, of this first, outwardly formal, section. This grief, in turn, leads the poet on in a progression of emotions to the fear of forever losing his friend, and this feeling carries the poet on in the later sections to quite different moods and thoughts—from Virgil's own courage to the heroic boldness of man in his impiety, and its vast and ruinous consequences.

All this is done, admittedly, with touches of humor, at least at the start and close. Horace is not the sentimentalist who leaps at once into the fullness of any mood, and he constantly uses his wit or whimsey to serve as a guard against any such romantic plunge, just as he often ends on a note of self-depreciation or irony. Typical is the amusingly pretentious

obstrictis aliis praeter Iapyga (4)

and the commercial image of Virgil as a *depositum*, carried out with its *creditum debes* and *reddas incolumem*. Then, too, however conventional it be to invoke Venus and the Gemini for a

<sup>23</sup> See note 15. This frag. of Meleager is perhaps part of a propecticon.

<sup>24</sup> See N. Festa, "Animae dimidium meae," *Sophia*, I (1933), pp. 436-41. Cf. C., II, 17, 5, where Maecenas is similarly called *meae partem animae*.

safe voyage, and beyond the fact that Venus as Aeneas' mother and the Gemini as proverbial protectors of friends might be appropriate here,<sup>25</sup> surely Horace is smiling slightly at the thought of his Virgil entrusted to the care of such divinities—a pleasant blending of *Dichtung* and *Wahrheit*! Finally, at the beginning of the poem, could Horace have recalled with some amusement that once Virgil himself had reverted to the old commonplace in describing the new Golden Age?

cedet et ipse mari vector . . . (*E.*, 4, 38).

But one must remember that Horace was one of the few Latin writers who, disregarding Stoic  $\tau\delta\pi\acute{e}\pi\sigma\nu$  and Roman *gravitas*, dared to mingle the humorous and the serious in the same work.<sup>26</sup> One need only think of *C.*, II, 13 on the *triste lignum*—first the exaggerated abuse of the wretched tree, then the serious doctrine that man cannot foresee his end, and the whimsical fantasy of his personal trip to the underworld and all he would see there. And this reminds us that he can drop humor as quickly as he can pick it up, just as in the ode on Cleopatra he can brusquely shift from one serious mood to another serious one, quite the reverse of the first.<sup>27</sup>

The second section, lines 9-20, deals with sailing and the first sailor. But the content transcends the traditional pattern. The first sailor is not cursed. Neither, for that matter, is sailing itself, albeit nominally sailing is an example of man's *impietas*. Rather, the emotional center of this section lies in *robur* and *aes triplex* and *nec timuit* and *quem mortis timuit gradum* and *siccis oculis monstra natantia*. The emphasis, then, is not on

<sup>25</sup> G. D. Kellogg, "Horace's Most Ancient Mariner," *C. W.*, XVII (1924), p. 82, points out that Castor and Pollux were also Argonauts (and thus connected with the early heroism of sailing). See text below, p. 157. If in origin the Dioscuri, in Horace's version (cf. *C.*, III, 3, 9-10), were human beings who by their virtues were raised to the status of gods, then perhaps the mention of them in line 2, however conventional, may be of interest alongside the mention of Hercules in line 36.

<sup>26</sup> See the interesting remarks of Wilkinson (cited in note 5), pp. 63 f. on this matter.

<sup>27</sup> And note, too, that *C.*, I, 37 ends as abruptly *sans reprise* as does *C.*, I, 3, in a fashion which to later ages and critics might seem quite unclassical! With Horace, of course, this is typical.

what constitutes *impietas* but on man's courage in his *impietas*, and these lines are really, when all is said and done, lines in praise of courage.

Now, what of Virgil? At once should we not guess that neither Virgil nor Horace actually believed that it was sinful or wicked to sail the seas? The phrase *impiae rates* (lines 23-24) is not to be taken seriously; it is only a moralistic commonplace, frequent enough in the Latin poets, and a direct heritage from Hellenistic philosophy. Doubtless each poet did share the general Italian aversion to sailing. It is even possible to imagine that Horace may once have come close to shipwreck.<sup>28</sup> Certainly, to judge from his imagery, the ocean perhaps *par excellence* was for him, as to many an ancient poet, the symbol for a wild and dangerous element over which man had no control and which at any moment might drag him down to death.<sup>29</sup> Thus, to cite but one example, *C.*, II, 10 both begins and closes with sea-symbolism:

Rectius vives, Licini, neque altum  
semper urgendo neque, dum procellas  
cautus horrescis, nimium premendo  
litus iniquum.  
  
contrahes vento nimium secundo  
turgida vela.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. *C.*, III, 4, 25-28 and 27, 18-20. On this see T. Frank, *Catullus and Horace* (Blackwell, 1928), p. 170 with the suggestion that Horace "had been sent as the questor's scribe with the fleet which operated against Sextus Pompey in the year 36, for the fleet was in that year overtaken by a storm off Palinurus and a large part of it wrecked." Also see E. Galletier, "Horace et les souvenirs de son voyage en Grèce," *L'Ant. Cl.*, IV (1935), p. 342.

<sup>29</sup> On the fear of the sea, see *R.-E.*, 2. Reihe, 3. Halbband, *sub Schifffahrt*, cols. 413-14; also, references collected under "Sailing" and "Sea" by O. E. Nybakken, "An Analytical Study of Horace's Ideas," *Iowa Stud. Class. Philol.*, V (1937), p. 84. The dangers associated in the Italian mind with sea-voyages must here be emphasized, that the extent to which Horace may reasonably have felt fear for his friend and admired his courage may be properly understood. Perhaps nothing better illustrates the important rôle which the hardships and perils of a sea-trip played in ancient life than the commonness in classical literature of similes and metaphors dealing with sailing, e.g. the ship of life or of state or the gaining of the harbor (on which see references noted by Campbell Bonner, "The Ship of the Soul on a Group of Grave-Stelae from Terenuthis," *Proc. Amer. Philos. Soc.*, LXXXV [1941], p. 87, note 4).

And, to be sure, an ethical doctrine is connected in Horace's mind with the ocean—the Cynic-Stoic dislike of the *mercator* as the symbol for man's boundless greed for wealth and luxury,<sup>30</sup> the same doctrine enunciated by Aristotle in the *Protrepticus*: “We ought not to sail to the pillars of Hercules and run many dangers for the sake of wealth, while we spend neither labor nor money for wisdom.”<sup>31</sup> Hence for Horace often the *mercator* is the foe of his own chief ethical views: Contentment with Little, and Moderation in Living. Hence, too, the foe of the commonwealth.<sup>32</sup> But here in *C.*, I, 3 any such philosophical association, although perhaps foreshadowed in the commercial images at the start of the poem (see p. 147), would seem at the most to be a subordinate theme. Rather, in this work we appear to be back in the classical age of Greece, and the emphasis is not on the sinfulness of sailing but on the intrepidity of man—his vaulting ambition in defiance of the gods.

If the emphasis of lines 9-20 lies in the praise of courage, may not the situation, then, be quite the reverse of what Moore proposed? The poem would not be tactless in the face of Virgil's “enterprise,” but, on the contrary, a good part of it would be inspired by this “enterprise.” One always dislikes to see a beloved friend depart. One feels grief. And then, if his trip is likely to be dangerous, one may admire the courage and bravery of the friend. In the end, this admiration may receive more expression than the grief. The admiration may be considerably out of proportion with reality, but all the same it is an unconscious testimony to one's affection. And at this point, Horace's grief has shifted to admiration for Virgil's courage, and from there to man's courage. It is not, at this juncture, a matter whether such courage in man is good or bad or both, or what it finally brings to man; so far, it is merely a question of the courage itself as an admirable force.

In lines 21-33 we move on, again in a subtle fashion, to another theme. God is *prudens*, just as in *C.*, III, 29, 29-30:

<sup>30</sup> See references collected under “Merchant” by Nybakken (cited in note 29), p. 63.

<sup>31</sup> Frag. 52 Rose (p. 62, lines 9 ff.), on which see W. Jaeger, *Aristotle* (trans. R. Robinson, Oxford, 1934), pp. 59-60.

<sup>32</sup> See Solmsen (cited in note 8), pp. 344-5 and *passim* on Horace's connection of ethics with politics.

prudens futuri temporis exitum  
caliginosa nocte premit deus,

but man is *audax* (line 25)! But what sort of arrangement is this? Why should God be called *prudens* for separating lands from (by?) oceans? Because God, separating out the elements, put man in the element, land, where he was to belong and be safe.<sup>83</sup> But man in his *audacia* leaves his natural element, and puts out to sea, and thus works his own ruin *per vetitum nefas*, hastening Death's approach. What, then, of the "forbidden wickedness"? Is it not in defiance of God's separation of the elements and assignment of man to the land that man's courage is revealed, and courage, too, of an heroic and tragic sort? And for this courage, symbolized here by the picture of men against the sea, man suffers and in the end often encompasses his own downfall.

. . . Samson hath quit himself  
like Samson, and heroily hath finished  
a life heroic, . . .

This shift in emphasis from the negative side of *impietas* to heroic courage and ultimate ruin is surely the reason for bringing in, at this moment, Prometheus, who, like man (line 25), was also *audax* (line 27).

But to digress for a bit on the workings of Horace's poetic imagination, one must turn back to Hesiod. For we meet an ambivalence in the Horatian mind. On the one hand, the poet used sailing—appropriately since the poem is a propempsicon—in a commonplace, moralistic fashion as a form of *impietas*. But he became serious and enthusiastic when this convention led him to ponder the rôle of man, and the impious courage

<sup>83</sup> Cf. Plutarch's comment on the sea as πολέμιον τῇ φύσει τοῦ ἀνθρώπου στραχεῖσιν (*Qu. Conv.*, 729 B). Kiessling-Heinze are surely right in holding that the emphasis of these lines is on "das Festland als sicheren Wohnsitz vom Meere, das nicht berührt werden sollte," and any such interpretation as that implied by P. Shorey, *Horace Odes and Epodes* (Boston, 1904), p. 155, that God isolated men in various continents so as to give them peace, seems unjustified. As for *dissociabilis* (on which see *T. L. L.*, *sub voc.*), Kiessling-Heinze ("*dissociabilis* nicht *quod dissociari* oder *dissociare potest*, sondern == *insociabilis* [*indomitae et insociabili genti* Liv. XXXVII, 1] . . . wobei *dis-* wie in *dispar, dissimilis* nicht lediglich negiert, sondern separiert") seem preferable to Bentley's contention that it has here an active force.

which at once exalts man and ultimately quickens the approach of his end. On the other hand, the dangers involved in sailing, as well as the memory of Virgil's comments on sailing in the *Fourth Eclogue*, must have suggested Hesiod to him, albeit Hesiod, like Cato in Latin letters,<sup>34</sup> had treated sailing merely as a risky business.<sup>35</sup> From a practical point of view one should avoid it if possible, and, if it should not be possible, one should indulge in it only at the right season. And, says Hesiod grimly, there is no sailing at all when Justice prevails (*Works and Days*, 236-7). The Hesiodic strictures on sailing must have led Horace's mind back to the Hesiodic union of Prometheus and the brood of fevers, for in the same work (lines 47 ff.) Hesiod tells the story of how, to punish Prometheus for his theft, Zeus sent Pandora down to Epimetheus, and Pandora took off the lid of the great jar, and she scattered abroad the many sorrows. Only Hope remained, "but the other numberless plagues wander amongst mankind; the earth is full of evils and the sea is full. Of themselves diseases descend constantly upon mankind by day and by night, bringing troubles to mortals silently." Hence, surely, Horace follows his mention of Prometheus with

post ignem aetheria domo  
subductum Macies et nova Februum  
terris incubuit cohors (29-31).

To revert to the suggestion that the theme of lines 21-33 is the praise of courage, even though this courage bring in its train eventual doom, we must look at Prometheus from another point of view. For this heroic Prometheus is not just the Hesiodic Prometheus, but the Aeschylean, too—the Prometheus who was man's benefactor. So, if this interpretation be correct, Horace has deftly passed from a consideration of the perils which man's *audacia* brings him to sheer admiration for the heroic stature of the courage, even though to exercise this be *stultitia*.

The theme grows stronger in the next section, lines 34-36. From the Titan Prometheus we pass to a mortal, Daedalus, a man who by his daring, his heroic daring, surpassed his human nature. In the end his son's fate was

. . . vitreo daturus  
nomina ponto . . . (C., IV, 2, 3-4).

<sup>34</sup> *R. R.*, praef. 3.

<sup>35</sup> *Op.*, 618-94.

But the career of this craftsman and inventor has been a splendid and brave one, worth the final penalty. And now one feels that Horace's admiration, born of the momentary mood and no constant characteristic, has reached its fulness. For the instant, as he is swept along on his course, he contemplates only the heroic greatness of man. It may be a greatness which will finally cause his fall. But no matter. In this mood the humanist Horace admires man, the hero. Thus he can proudly and exuberantly declare, despite Heaven itself, that

nil mortalibus ardui est (37),

just as Goethe could proclaim that

Nur allein der Mensch  
Vermag das Unmögliche.

And this is the humanism of Sophocles, when he reflected on the wonder of man: "this marvelous creature, driven by stormy south winds, crosses even the gray sea, passing half-buried through the wave that would engulf him."<sup>36</sup>

Then comes the climax, Hercules. The poet has traversed the elements of water (sailing), of fire (Prometheus), of air (Dædalus), and now we descend to earth (to the underworld with Hercules to break the bonds of Death). The poet has said in lines 32-33 that Prometheus' theft hastens the approach of Death, but he also called Death inevitable.<sup>37</sup> One might think, then, that one was in the Hellenistic world, not the classical, if it were not for Hercules and his Harrowing of hell—*perrupit Acheronta*. This is certainly the heroic Hercules of the *Iliad*,<sup>38</sup> of Pindar,<sup>39</sup> and later of Seneca,<sup>40</sup> the Hercules who defied Death. And for him Death was not the end. Horace tells us his reward in another ode:

hac arte Pollux et vagus Hercules  
enitus arcis attigit igneas (C., III, 3, 9-10),

<sup>36</sup> *Antig.*, 332 ff.

<sup>37</sup> As in C., III, 1, 14 and 24, 6; see Solmsen (cited in note 8), p. 347, note 36.

<sup>38</sup> E, 395 ff.

<sup>39</sup> *Ol.*, 9, 33.

<sup>40</sup> *Herc. Fur.*, 889 ff., on which see J. Kroll, *Gott u. Hölle* (Teubner, 1932), pp. 440-1.

and the *ars* is explained in the same ode's first line:

Iustum et tenacem propositi virum.

From this section, lines 34-36, what is the final impression? The *audax* outstrips the *prudens*. Heroic man against Heaven is indeed admirable. It is commonly believed that Horace, the singer of the Golden Mean, was incapable of intense enthusiasm for such a theme as man's heroism—man's irrational heroism (*scelus* and *stultitia* notwithstanding). And it is certainly true that it is not a common mood with him. But then, heroism and respect for heroism are not easily maintained in such an age as the early Augustan period, a time of vast adjustments, facing much political and economic insecurity as well as grave problems of reconstruction, and an age which may have seemed to Horace dangerously full of bourgeois mercantilism and ostentatious luxury.<sup>41</sup> Yet it would seem that in moments of insight, under strong emotional pressure, Horace was deeply moved by such a contemplation of man as the heroic one. For example, if one were to name two figures in his poems for whom he plainly had deep respect, are not these likely to be Cleopatra and Regulus? Each was indeed heroic in the classical meaning of tragic heroism. Again, the poet who could rise to

audire magnos iam videor duces  
non indecoro pulvere sordidos,  
et cuncta terrarum subacta  
praeter atrocem animum Catonis  
(C., II, 1, 21-24),

is surely enthusiastically aware of heroism, in an age which could produce little more in that line than a Brutus or a Cato. To turn to the very ode which most clearly presents the doctrine of the Golden Mean, *C.*, II, 10, may not one at times feel that the poet describes the extremes with a deal more spirit than the middle course? But then, in this respect one may feel that Horace was no different from most of his countrymen who, perhaps by enunciating such doctrines and thus revealing their

<sup>41</sup> It is not meant that Horace was an immediate victim of such forces—nor that these were the only important forces of the day—but rather that the serious, philosophic views which he embraced (cf. *virtute me involvo*, *C.*, III, 29, 55) in his pleas for right-thinking versus materialism generally inhibited an heroic outlook.

nature's opposite tendency, more often put such views on paper than into practice. So, to take one last example, when Horace advises us in the quiet final ode of Book I (38, 3-4) to "cease to look where the late rose lingers," what is the ultimate impression which the figure leaves? We know from the emphatic *quo locorum* that these last roses are very rare. Nominally, the poet tells us to forget them. But his two lines leave a memory—an image which oversteps the little poem and comes into a life of its own. And then one suspects that in fact Horace had a secret longing for these last ones, difficult to find.

But Horace is no Pindar. Horace's lot was cast in the commercialism, the luxury, and the incertitude, of the Augustan empire. It is only, then, on rare occasions that he rises to an admiration of the heroic. His own life—and this is no reference to the whimsical humor of

sed me per hostis Mercurius celer  
denso paventem sustulit aere

(C., II, 7, 13-14)

—was probably anything but heroic. He took his doctrines of Contentment with Little and Moderation seriously, and doubtless himself lived by them and genuinely respected them. Philosophizing is not the stuff of heroism. Then, too, his humor would usually inhibit a personally adventuresome approach to life, so that even when he proclaims his chiefest tenets, he self-consciously employs such humorous symbolism as

contracta pisces aequora sentiunt  
iactis in altum molibus. . .

(C., III, 1, 33-34).<sup>42</sup>

But then, as we said, the times were not ripe for dynamic courage. Materialism and uncertainty were rampant. On the other hand, there was a strain in him, a touch, which could, if properly aroused, lift him up to an unfettered admiration for the heroic, as perhaps in this ode to Virgil and the ones on Cleopatra and Regulus. For the moment he saw the meaning of true heroism—its nobility and dignity and the ruin that went with it. Horace, then, is the humanist looking at the hero. But no fool himself. Rather, it is, he grimly tells us at the end,

<sup>42</sup> For other instances of this symbol in Horace, see Solmsen (cited in note 8), p. 343, text and note 23.

the hero who is the fool:

caelum ipsum petimus stultitia, neque  
per nostrum patimur scelus  
iracunda Iovem ponere fulmina

(C., I, 3, 38-40).

Heroism is nobility, but is also folly, but a folly well worth the ultimate suffering. The best of men will go on defying Heaven. They will pay the penalty, but the splendor of mankind remains. Hence the ironical close of the poem, as this poet of the cosmopolis weighs humanity. For after all, it is we, the mortals, the bold ones, who do not "allow" prudent Zeus to lay aside his thunderbolts. Not Zeus who does "allow" us! Zeus is forever kept busy by courageous man. And on this partly defiant, partly tired note the poem ends.

The work, then, according to this interpretation is anything but a tactless expression of outmoded philosophical views. Rather, it is the tragic story of the bravery of men, and one the insight to which was perhaps given the poet as he began to think on Virgil's trip, the possible loss of his *animae dimidium meae*, Virgil's courage, and the meaning of man's heroic courage, and the glory and ruin it contains for men. It is, in fine, a poem filled with the Greek spirit of tragic heroism.

Finally, how appropriate would the poem, on such an interpretation, be to Virgil? Perhaps there is, and need be, no specific answer to this question. If the views set forth above contain any truth, then it might be enough to suppose that a work so imbued with the spirit of classical Greece would indeed be acceptable to Virgil at any time, and particularly as he was about to sail off to Greece.

But if one wishes to hunt for more definite links, possibly the *Fourth* and *Sixth Eclogues* should be studied.<sup>43</sup> In the *Sixth*, lines 41-44, Virgil gives a brief résumé of the world's past in the mention of Pyrrha, Saturn, Prometheus, and Hylas. The *Saturnia regna*, reflecting Hesiod's views (see above p. 152), and suggestive of *redeunt Saturnia regna* of the *Fourth Eclogue* (line 6), implies an age when there was no sailing. Another link may exist in the reference to Hylas. For he naturally

<sup>43</sup> Such a connection is suggested, though not developed, by Kellogg (cited in note 25), p. 83.

suggests Hercules, and in *C.*, I, 3 as in this poem we find the combination of Prometheus and Hercules. And then one recalls that it was Hercules who finally freed Prometheus. Further, Hylas calls to mind the Argonauts and, as Jachmann suggested,<sup>44</sup> the Hylas reference in this passage (*E.*, 6, 41-44) may be meant to remind the reader of the first sailors and their courage. Hercules, as one of the Argonauts (albeit not an original one), would be amongst these pioneers in the minds of Virgil and Horace. Lastly, the next person mentioned after this sequence is Pasiphaë, who might suggest Daedalus. Perhaps, then, such allusions may have been in Horace's thoughts as he wrote this poem to Virgil.

Perhaps, too, elements in the *Fourth Eclogue* may have influenced Horace in *C.*, I, 3. If Skutsch was right in believing that the *Fourth* to a degree was a reply to Horace's *Sixteenth Epode*,<sup>45</sup> then it might not be unreasonable to propose that Horace sometimes had the *Fourth* in mind as he wrote the propemphicon to Virgil. For example, when Horace in *C.*, I, 3 turns back to Hesiod (see above, p. 152), does he do so deliberately, recalling that Virgil had done so in this eclogue in which he may have answered Horace's epode?<sup>46</sup> Then, too, the *Fourth Eclogue* refers to the *sceleris vestigia nostri* (line 13). This is almost certainly a localized reference to the civil wars. But this theme is expanded by Virgil later in the poem when, with this phrase consciously or unconsciously in mind, he writes, in the same metrical position, *priscae vestigia fraudis* (line 31). This phrase

<sup>44</sup> G. Jachmann, "Vergils Sechste Ekloge," *Hermes*, LVIII (1923), p. 294.

<sup>45</sup> F. Skutsch, "Sechzehnte Epode u. vierte Ekloge," *Neue Jahrb.*, XXIII (1909), pp. 23-35. Among recent studies on this subject, two seem especially valuable: E. Griset, "Ancora sul famoso epodo XVI di Orazio," *Il Mondo Class.*, VIII (1938), pp. 33-41; K. Barwick, "Zur Interpretation u. Chronologie d. 4. Eclogue d. Vergil u. d. 16. u. 7. Epode d. Horaz," *Philol.*, XCVI (1943), pp. 28-67.

<sup>46</sup> While Virgil, of course, drew heavily upon Hesiod for general elements in his picture of the Golden Age, he also seems to have used actual Hesiodic phraseology (e.g. cf. *E.*, 4, 18 with *Op.*, 118; *E.*, 4, 30 with *Op.*, 232 f.; *E.*, 4, 39 with *Op.*, 236 f.). Similarly, K. Barwick, "Horaz Carm. I, 2 u. Vergil," *Philol.*, XC (1935), pp. 257-76, suggests that in *C.*, I, 2 Horace wished deliberately to recall *G.*, I, 463 (to show that the prayer had finally been heard).

comes close in meaning to Horace's *per nostrum scelus* (*C.*, I, 3, 39). For Virgil then goes on at once to declare that for a while, before the advent of the Golden Age, men will continue to sail the seas, to gird towns about with walls, and to plough the soil. Then he adds

alter erit tum Tiphys, et altera quae vehat Argo  
delectos heroas . . . (34-35).

Now we are back to the theme of the bravery of these first sailors, and indeed in *delectos heroas* we are back to Hesiod's fourth age of man, the heroic age. This, too, Horace may have had in mind as he developed the theme of heroism in his propempticon.

Finally, if Virgil had been considering the composition of the *Aeneid* at the time *C.*, I, 3 was written to him, or if indeed he had already begun at that time his prose or perhaps even his poetic version, then it may not be utterly fanciful to imagine that Horace was familiar with some of Virgil's plans and thoughts, and to see some general connections between the propempticon and the projected epic. If *C.*, I, 3 is devoted to heroic man, to his courage and trials and nobility and suffering, surely such a poem would not be inappropriate to the poet pondering the characters and fates of an Aeneas or a Dido or a Turnus, and the full significance for mankind of *pietas* and *impietas*.

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## BIOGRAPHY AND TRAGEDY IN PLUTARCH.

Plutarch's *Biographies* and *Essays* contain many interpretations of philosophical, historical, and biographical materials in dramatic terms. In the *De Genio Socratis*, for example, the return of the Theban exiles is compared to a drama: ή δὲ χείρων . . . τύχη . . . καθάπερ δρᾶμα τὴν πρᾶξιν ἡμῶν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς διαποικίλλουσα κινδυνώδεσιν ἐπεισοδίοις εἰς αὐτὸν συνέδραμε τὸ ἔργον, ὃξεν ἐπιφέρουσα καὶ δεινὸν ἀνελπίστον περιπετεῖας ἄγῶνα (596 DE). And the period in the life of the younger Cato after his marriage to Marcia was "problematical" like a drama: καθάπερ ἐν δράματι τῷ βίῳ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος προβληματῶδες γέγονε καὶ ἀπορον.<sup>1</sup> It is evident that tragedy held an important place in Plutarch's literary background; yet his allusions to it usually emphasize defects rather than merits, and "tragic," "dramatic," and "theatrical" are normally terms of censure in his writings. It is the purpose of this paper to investigate his conception of tragedy by examining (I) his reasons for condemning it, and (II) his use of it in the *Life of Demetrius*, where it occupies an unusually prominent place.

### I

Plutarch's condemnation of tragedy may, for convenience, be discussed under three heads: (1) the material or subject matter, (2) the audience, and (3) the actor. The material is false, the audience is deceived, and the actor pretends to be other than he really is.

1. The falseness of tragedy (and of poetry in general) is clearly brought out in the essay *De Audiendis Poetis*. The poet, who aims at the pleasure or amazement of the audience,<sup>2</sup> finds fiction and myth more suitable to his purpose than the austerity of truth.<sup>3</sup> Homer, Pindar, Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides are cited among those who insert myth and falsehood into their

<sup>1</sup> *Cato Minor*, 25, 770EF. Plutarch often speaks of historical persons as acting a part; e.g. *Lysander*, 23, 446D; *An Seni Respublica Gerenda Sit*, 797D (= *Praecepta Gerendae Respublicae*, 806 A).

<sup>2</sup> *Aud. Poet.*, 17A: πλάσμα πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἡ ἔκπληξιν ἀκροατοῦ.

<sup>3</sup> *Aud. Poet.*, 16A-C.

poems.<sup>4</sup> This does not mean that Plutarch utterly rejects epic, lyric, and tragedy, for, as he says in another essay, “even writers of tragedies and comedies always try to be of some benefit”;<sup>5</sup> but the poets are beneficial to the extent that their works contain philosophical teachings; they are poets in that they mix philosophy with fiction.<sup>6</sup>

In the *Biographies* and *Essays* Plutarch often links the tragic and theatrical with the mythical and false, in contrast to the historical and true. In the *Theseus* he distinguishes between the times covered by historical records and probable accounts, and the earlier period of “marvellous and tragic events, the realm of poets and mythographers, where there is not yet credibility or clarity.”<sup>7</sup> In telling the lives of Theseus and Romulus he is reduced to inferring the truth from the “least tragic” accounts.<sup>8</sup> The myth of the Minotaur is *τραγικώτατος*; the Athenian tragedians disliked Minos and covered him with infamy.<sup>9</sup>

Among historical writers those who give false accounts introduce tragedy and drama into their narratives, as Theopompus *γράφει καὶ τραγῳδεῖ* that the Athenians’ behavior after the calamity at Chaeronea was base and ignoble,<sup>10</sup> whereas the fact was quite otherwise; and Phylarchus, “all but erecting a machine in history as if in tragedy,” gives an account of the treatment of Themistocles’ body after his death, which any one would recognize as fictitious.<sup>11</sup> The impostures of Herodotus even surpass those of the tragedians.<sup>12</sup> The history of Ctesias often turns aside from truth to the mythical and dramatic (*πρὸς τὸ μυθῶδες*

<sup>4</sup> *Aud. Poet.*, 16-17.

<sup>5</sup> *Adversus Coloten*, 1127 A.

<sup>6</sup> *Aud. Poet.*, 15 EF.

<sup>7</sup> *Theseus*, 1, 1 B: *τὰ δὲ ἐπέκεινα τερατώδη καὶ τραγικὰ ποιηταὶ καὶ μυθογράφοι νέμονται καὶ οὐκέτ' ἔχει πίστιν οὐδὲ σαφήνειαν.*

<sup>8</sup> *Theseus*, 2, 1 D: . . . *εἰ τῶν ἥκιστα τραγικῶς εἰρήσθαι δοκούντων δφελός ἔστι πρὸς ἀλήθειαν.* Cf. *Romulus*, 8, 22 C: . . . *ὑποπτὸν μὲν ἐνίοις ἔστι τὸ δραματικὸν καὶ πλασματῶδες . . .*

<sup>9</sup> *Theseus*, 15, 6 D; 16, 7 AB. For Plutarch’s source here cf. Plato, *Minos*, 318 DE, 320 E-321 B (see below, note 65).

<sup>10</sup> *Demosthenes*, 21, 855 CD.

<sup>11</sup> *Themistocles*, 32, 128 CD.

<sup>12</sup> *De Herodoti Malignitate*, 870 C: *τι γάρ ἔδει ἡτίθεσθαι τοῖς μηχανῆς τραγικῆς, ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπερπαίοντα τοὺς τραγῳδοὺς ἀλαζονεῖα;*

καὶ δραματικὸν ἐκτρεπόμενος τῆς ἀληθείας);<sup>13</sup> and similarly some authors think that they should write of Alexander's death as a tragic exit from a drama.<sup>14</sup>

In the *Essays* Plutarch applies the word "tragic" even to the false views of rival philosophical schools. In the work *De Pythiae Oraculis* (399E-400C) he summarily rejects as part of the "Stoic tragedy" the suggestion that a statue of a palm tree surrounded at the base by frogs and watersnakes might allegorically express the Stoic doctrine that the sun is nourished by exhalations from the moisture in the earth. And the Epicurean Colotes "brings a tragedy against Stilpo" (*τραγῳδίαν ἐπάγει τῷ Στίλπωνι*) when he declares that Stilpo removes the possibility of human life by denying that one thing may be predicated of another.<sup>15</sup> The ancient grammarians and rhetoricians had described tragedy as false and improbable;<sup>16</sup> Plutarch, by conversion, appears to designate what is false and improbable as tragic.

2. There is an element of deception in poetry,<sup>17</sup> as in painting.<sup>18</sup> This deception arises in part from the poets' conscious and intentional use of fiction to please or amaze the audience,<sup>19</sup> in part from the fact that the poets are themselves deceived.<sup>20</sup> In the *Biographies* and *Essays* it is deception with intent to amaze or terrify that is most closely associated with tragedy and the theatre. When Themistocles despaired of persuading the

<sup>13</sup> *Artaxerxes*, 6, 1014 C.

<sup>14</sup> *Alexander*, 75, 706 C: . . . ἀλλὰ ταῦτά τινες φοντο δεῖν γράφειν ὡσπερ δράματος μεγάλου τραγικὸν ἔξδιον καὶ περιπαθὲς πλάσαντες.

<sup>15</sup> *Adv. Col.*, 1119 C. In this same essay (1023 B) he calls the illusions of the insane and delirious "tragic," comparing them with poetic fantasies.

<sup>16</sup> *Rhet. ad Herenn.*, I, 13: *Fabula est quae neque veras neque verisimiles continent res, ut eae sunt quae tragœdiis traditae sunt.* Cf. Quint., II, 4, 2.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. *Aud. Poet.*, 15 C: τὸ ἀπατηλὸν αὐτῆς (sc. τῆς ποιητικῆς); and 15 D: *Τορύλας* δὲ τὴν τραγῳδίαν εἶπεν ἀπάτην . . .

<sup>18</sup> *Aud. Poet.*, 16 B: ἀλλ' ὡσπερ ἐν γραφαῖς κινητικώτερόν ἐστι χρῶμα γραμμῆς διὰ τὸ ἀνδρείκελον καὶ ἀπατηλὸν . . .

<sup>19</sup> *Aud. Poet.*, 16 A-17 C, esp. 17 C: καὶ οὕτε Ὁμηρος οὕτε Πίνδαρος οὕτε Σοφοκλῆς πεπεισμένοι ταῦτ' ἔχειν οὕτως ἔγραψαν.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. *Aud. Poet.*, 17 D: αὗται (sc. αἱ φωναὶ) πεπονθότων εἰσὶ καὶ προελωκότων ὑπὸ δόξης καὶ ἀπάτης.

Athenians by human arguments to abandon the city and trust to the ships, he “constructed a machine,” as in a tragedy, and confronted them with supernatural portents and oracles.<sup>21</sup> Similarly, when Lysander conspired to overthrow the hereditary monarchy at Sparta, he constructed a tragic machine.<sup>22</sup> His plot rested on a “fiction” (*πλάσμα*, 448A), and the whole affair was a “drama” which failed because one of the “actors” lost his nerve.<sup>23</sup> Again, the “drama” of Numa was the love of some goddess or mountain nymph and the meetings with the Muses.<sup>24</sup> Numa’s ὅγκος and *σχηματισμός* are compared with those of Pythagoras, Numa’s reputed teacher, who is credited with many *τερατώδεις μηχανάς*.<sup>25</sup>

Perhaps one should note that while these “tragedies” or “dramas” in every case involve recourse to the supernatural, the tragic devices of Themistocles and Numa were intended to serve essentially good ends and are not explicitly called false. Lysander’s purpose, on the other hand, was quite the opposite, and his device is completely discredited. In the “drama” of Marius and Martha, the Syrian prophetess, Plutarch leaves it in doubt whether Marius was persuaded by her or was only acting and pretending.<sup>26</sup>

Apart from the supernatural, a misleading display of power or wealth is called “tragic” or “theatrical.” In the *Aratus* Antigonus is reported as saying that Aratus, on hearing of Ptolemy’s elephants, fleets, and palaces, was amazed at his wealth, but subsequently saw that it was all “tragedy and scene-painting.”<sup>27</sup> Demosthenes made a theatrical display of his

<sup>21</sup> *Themistocles*, 10, 116 D: ἔνθα δὴ Θεμιστοκλῆς ἀπορῶν τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις λογισμοῖς προσάγεσθαι τὸ πλῆθος, ὡσπερ ἐν τραγῳδίᾳ μηχανὴν ὅρας, σημεῖα δαιμόνια καὶ χρησμοὺς ἐπῆγεν αὐτοῖς.

<sup>22</sup> *Lysander*, 25, 447 E: . . . ὡσπερ ἐν τραγῳδίᾳ μηχανὴν αἴρων . . .

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 26, 448 D: ἔξεπεσε τοῦ δράματος ὁ Λύσανδρος ἀτολμίᾳ τῶν ὑποκριτῶν καὶ συνεργῶν ἐνός . . .

<sup>24</sup> *Numa*, 8, 65 A: τῷ δὲ Νομῷ δρᾶμα θεᾶς τίνος ἡ νύμφης δρεῖας ἔρως ἦν καὶ συνονοσία πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀπόρρητος, ὡσπερ εἴρηται, καὶ κοινὰ μετὰ Μουσῶν διατριβαλ.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 64 F-65 A.

<sup>26</sup> *Marius*, 17, 415 B: τοῦτο μὲν οὖν τὸ δρᾶμα πολλοῖς ἀμφισβήτησιν παρεῖχε, εἴτε πεπεισμένος ὡς ἀληθῶς εἴτε πλαττόμενος καὶ συνυποκρινόμενος ἐπιδείκνυται τὴν ἄνθρωπον.

<sup>27</sup> *Aratus*, 15, 1033 E: νυνὶ δ' ὑπὸ σκηνὴν ἐωρακὼς πάντα τὰ ἔκει πράγματα

armament before Syracuse in order to terrify the enemy.<sup>28</sup> Great successes gave Tigranes, king of Armenia, a *φρόνημα τραγικὸν καὶ ὑπέρογκον*, and as evidence of his power he was constantly attended by four conquered kings—a “tragedy” that did not at all terrify or dismay the young Appius Claudius.<sup>29</sup> The palace of Menelaus was like a theatre, displaying his wealth but failing to restrain his wayward wife.<sup>30</sup>

Even a philosopher may be guilty of attempting to impress his audience by tragic means, through amazement or terror. In the *De Genio Socratis* one of the speakers in the dialogue is indignant at the suggestion that Socrates’ sign was really a sneeze or random word, which Socrates “tragically” called supernatural.<sup>31</sup> In *Quaestiones Convivales* (724D) one of the speakers accuses the others of constructing a tragic machine and using a god to frighten the opponents. The Epicureans, in their attack on providence, portray it as a hobgoblin to scare children, or an accursed and tragic punishment.<sup>32</sup> Plutarch recommends that the serious student disregard dramatic and theatrical speakers,<sup>33</sup> and that inquiries be carried on not tragically, but calmly.<sup>34</sup>

3. It is already evident from the passages cited that there is much pretense in tragedy. This pretense is implied by the very notion of an actor, who appears to be other than he really is.<sup>35</sup> Tragedy thus sets up a distinction between appearance and reality, that which is really evil or in some sense inferior appearing to be good or superior. The flatterer who plays the part

*τραγῳδίαν* δύνται καὶ σκηνογραφίαν δύλος ἡμῖν προσκεχώρηκεν. Compare Pompey’s remark about Lucullus in *Pompey*, 31, 635 D: ἔλεγε τραγῳδίας καὶ σκιαγραφίας πεπολεμηκέναι βασιλικαῖς τὸν Λευκολλον . . .

<sup>28</sup> *Nicias*, 21, 537 A: . . . θεατρικῶς καὶ πρὸς ἐκπληξιν πολεμίων ἔξηστημένος.

<sup>29</sup> *Lucullus*, 21, 505 B-D, esp. 505 D: ταῦτη μέντοι τὴν τραγῳδίαν οὐχ ὑποτρέπεις οὐδὲ ἐκπλαγεῖς Ἀππιος . . .

<sup>30</sup> *De Cupiditate Divitiarum*, 527 E-F; cf. 528 B.

<sup>31</sup> *De Genio Socratis*, 582 BC: . . . εἰ μὴ πταρρύδν μηδὲ κληδόνα τὸ σημεῖον δλλὰ τραγικῶς πάνι δαιμόνιον ὄντομαζεν.

<sup>32</sup> *Non Posse Suaviter Vivi Secundum Epicurum*, 1101 C.

<sup>33</sup> *De Audiendo*, 41 F-42 A.

<sup>34</sup> *De Facie in Orbe Lunae*, 926 C: μὴ τραγικῶς, δλλὰ πράως σκοτῶμεν. For a similar remark in the military sphere, cf. *Lucullus*, 11, 498 C.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. *Demosthenes*, 22, 856 A, where Plutarch remarks that those who act the parts of kings and tyrants in the theatres do not weep or laugh as they themselves wish, but as the play demands.

of a friend is a “tragic actor,”<sup>36</sup> and the Epicurean is acting (*ὑποκρίνεται*) when he prays and worships.<sup>37</sup> A tragic figure may have an exaggerated opinion of his own greatness, as was the case with Tigranes.<sup>38</sup> Valerius Poplicola conducted himself “more tragically” than Tarquinius: he lived on the Velia in an unapproachable house that dominated the Roman Forum, and when he descended his manner was disdainful and his retinue of royal magnificence.<sup>39</sup> Antony’s assignment of the Eastern provinces to Cleopatra and her children, in a ceremony that included golden thrones and oriental dress, was thought to be tragic, arrogant, and contemptuous of Rome.<sup>40</sup> Nero was provided with tragic stage, masks, and buskins by the praise of flatterers.<sup>41</sup> The elder Dionysius was a tragic actor; Plutarch quotes Timaeus on the coincidence that Euripides died on the day on which the elder Dionysius was born: ἅμα τῆς τύχης, ὡς Τίμαιος ἔφη, τὸν μιμητὴν ἐξαγούσας τῶν τραγικῶν παθῶν, καὶ τὸν ἀγωνιστὴν ἐπεισαγούσας.<sup>42</sup>

In all these instances (if Dionysius may be considered similar to the others) the comparison with tragedy indicates disapproval of evil conduct that includes external show. The tragic actor may in some cases be aware of the disparity between the appearance he puts on and the reality it conceals, as in the case of the flatterer, the praying Epicurean, and, probably, those interpreters who added unnecessary *τραγῳδία* and *δύκος* to the oracles.<sup>43</sup> But in other instances the actor is himself deceived into thinking that the appearance is the reality. Here belong the tyrants, who act on the basis of false opinion about good and evil and about their own greatness. The role of false opinion is made fairly explicit

<sup>36</sup> *Quomodo Adulator ab Amico Internoscatur*, 50 E; cf. Ps.-Plut., *De Liberis Educandis*, 13 B: *ὑποκρίται φίλτας*.

<sup>37</sup> *Non Posse Suaviter Vivi*, 1102 B.

<sup>38</sup> See above, p. 163.

<sup>39</sup> *Poplicola*, 10, 102 BC.

<sup>40</sup> *Antony*, 54, 941 A-C. Cf. *De Alexandri Magni Fortuna aut Virtute*, 329 F, where Persian dress is called “tragic.”

<sup>41</sup> *Quomodo Adul.*, 56 E. On Nero as a tragic figure see also *Galba*, 14, 1058 E, quoted in note 46, below.

<sup>42</sup> *Quest. Conviv.*, 717 C. There may be a textual corruption here, as the chronology is quite impossible. See below, p. 166, for the theatrical funeral of Dionysius.

<sup>43</sup> *De Pythiae Oraculis*, 407 B.

in the case of Nero, who yielded to flattery, and of Tigranes, who was corrupted by success.<sup>44</sup> It appears also in the essay *De Exilio* (600E), where, after reminding his exiled friend that the supposed evil of exile is a fabrication of unfounded opinion, Plutarch exhorts him, by applying reason, to discover the unsoundness, emptiness, and tragic show (*τετραγωδημένον*) of this supposed evil.

Tragedy suggests calamity,<sup>45</sup> as its falseness, deceit, and pretense lead to disaster. The “tragic tyrant” of Thessaly, so called by Dionysius because of his early removal—he ruled only ten months—, is compared with the rapid succession of emperors who followed Nero, four in less than ten months. They made their entrances and exits as on a stage, each the cause of his own destruction.<sup>46</sup> Crassus’ end was both literally and metaphorically tragic: his head was used as a “prop” in the presentation of the *Bacchae*, a spectacle which constituted the final act of his campaign, as of a tragedy.<sup>47</sup> Even more horrible were the “most tragic sufferings” (*τραγικωτάτοις . . . πάθεσιν*) of the defeated Cimbrians: the Cimbrian women, who accompanied the army, killed their own husbands, brothers, fathers, children, and finally themselves.<sup>48</sup> The murder of Antistius and suicide of his wife amplified the “tragedy” of Pompey’s marriage to Aemilia (already pregnant by her former husband), after he had divorced Antistia to please the tyrannical Sulla. Aemilia’s subsequent death in childbirth completed the disaster.<sup>49</sup>

<sup>44</sup> Cf. for example the words (*Lucullus*, 21, 505 B): *πάντων δσα ξηλοῦσιν οἱ πόλοι καὶ θαυμάζουσιν οὐ μόνον δύτων περὶ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δι' αὐτῶν γεγονέναι δοκοῦντω.*

<sup>45</sup> Cf. the conjunction of terms in *Quaest. Conviv.*, 714 E: (*σφάλματα*) *οἰκτρὰ καὶ τραγικὰ καὶ μεγάλας ἀποτεένεις ἔχοντα*, and *Galba*, 12, 1058 A: *τραγικῶν παθῶν καὶ συμφορῶν μεγάλων*.

<sup>46</sup> *Galba*, 1, 1053 D, esp. the words: *ἡ δὲ τῶν Καισάρων ἐστία, τὸ Παλάτιον, ἐν ἐλάσσονι χρόνῳ τέσσαρας αὐτοκράτορας ὑπεδέξατο, τὸν μὲν εἰσαγόντων ἥσπερ διὰ σκηνῆς, τὸν δὲ ἔξαγόντων.* Yet Nero was more “tragic” than Galba; cf. the rebuke of Antonius Honoratus to his soldiers (14, 1058 E): *νῦν δὲ Γάλβαν προδιδόναι (sc. τὸν στρατιώτας), τίνα φόνον μητρὸς ἐγκαλοῦντας ἡ σφαγὴν γυναικός, ἡ πολαν αἰδουμένους θυμέλην ἡ τραγωδίαν τοῦ αὐτοκράτορος;*

<sup>47</sup> *Crassus*, 33, 564 E-565 A, especially *εἰς τοιοῦτόν φασιν ἔξοδον τὴν Κράσσου στρατηγίαν ὡςπερ τραγωδίαν τελευτῆσαι.*

<sup>48</sup> *Marius*, 27, 421 A.

<sup>49</sup> *Pompey*, 9, 623 B.

Not every allusion to tragedy and the theatre carries with it all the unfavorable connotations that Plutarch associates with these words. But usually, even in very general and casual references, there is a suggestion of disapproval, as when Plutarch says that men have become inferior not merely to ancient generals and political leaders, but even to poets, sophists, and actors.<sup>50</sup> One may detect a note of censure in the mention of Dionysius' funeral, which Philistus admired as a theatrical exit from tyranny, as from a great tragedy.<sup>51</sup> Rich men and kings, like tragedians, need a sympathetic chorus or an applauding audience;<sup>52</sup> but the fame gained from the theatre does not outlast the performance.<sup>53</sup> The make-believe of tragedy is antithetical to the serious business of life,<sup>54</sup> and theatrical ostentation is contrasted to genuine concern for the public welfare.<sup>55</sup> Sulla is condemned for his partiality to actors,<sup>56</sup> and Agesilaus' scorn of the actor Callippides is mentioned with approval.<sup>57</sup> Archias, the officer of Antipater who was sent to arrest Demosthenes after Chaeronea, was reported to have been an actor, and Demosthenes taunted him about it, defying him at the last to "act the part of Creon" and throw out his body unburied.<sup>58</sup> Tragedies, Plutarch says, result from madness mixed with anger.<sup>59</sup> Tragic actors pride themselves on their ability to excite men to grief and lamentation, whereas the aim of philosophy is quite the reverse;<sup>60</sup> and Plutarch warns that caution must be

<sup>50</sup> *An Seni Resp.*, 785 A.

<sup>51</sup> *Pelopidas*, 34, 296 F: . . . Φίλιστος ὑμῶν καὶ θαυμάζων τὴν Διονυσίου ταφήν, οἷον τραγῳδίας μεγάλης τῆς τυραννίδος ἔξδοιον θεατρικὸν γενομένην.

<sup>52</sup> *Quomodo Adul.*, 63 A.

<sup>53</sup> *Praecepta Gerendae Reipublicae*, 823 E.

<sup>54</sup> See especially the opposition of the theatrical to the military in *Eumenes*, 2, 583 D, and *Otho*, 5, 1069 B.

<sup>55</sup> *Lysander*, 21, 445 C: . . . οὐ πρὸς ἐτέρων χάριν οὐδὲ θεατρικῶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ τῷ Σπάρτη συμφέρον αὐθεκάστως στρατηγοῦντος.

<sup>56</sup> *Sulla*, 2, 452 A; 36, 474 E; cf. the mention of Nero's generosity toward actors in *Galba*, 16, 1060 A.

<sup>57</sup> *Apophthegmata Laconica*, 212 F, and *Agesilaus*, 21, 607 D. Cf. also Solon's indignation at Thespis, *Solon*, 29, 95 C.

<sup>58</sup> *Demosthenes*, 28 f., 859 B-F.

<sup>59</sup> *De Cohibenda Ira*, 462 B: (μανία) . . . μιχθεῖσα δ' ὁργῇ τραγῳδίας ποιεῖ καὶ μύθους.

<sup>60</sup> *De Se Ipsum Citra Invidiam Laudando*, 545 F.

observed in introducing children to those tragedies ὅσαι λόγους ἔχουσι πιθανοὺς καὶ πανούργους ἐν πράξεσιν ἀδόξοις καὶ πονηραῖς.<sup>61</sup>

Plutarch's allusions to drama and the theatre reflect a Platonic rather than an Aristotelian approach to tragedy.<sup>62</sup> As Plato at times speaks in a way that appears to equate true tragedy with philosophy,<sup>63</sup> his view can by no means be identified with that of Plutarch; yet in his criticisms of the imperfect productions of the non-philosophical tragedians he anticipates many of Plutarch's statements. A playful passage in the *Cratylus* on the double nature of Pan associates the "tragic" life with myth and falsehood: ἐνταῦθα γὰρ πλεῖστοι οἱ μῆθοι τε καὶ τὰ ψεύδη ἔστιν, περὶ τὸν τραγικὸν βίον.<sup>64</sup> Later in the same dialogue Plato speaks of those who tampered with the form of words as wishing to be tragedians and neglecting the truth;<sup>65</sup> and he calls the resort to the supernatural a tragic "machine."<sup>66</sup> A somewhat more serious passage in the *Gorgias* (502 BC) evokes from Callicles the admission that the aim of tragedy is the pleasure of the audience, and that the writer of tragedy prefers a pleasant evil to an unpleasant good, hence tragedy is a form of flattery. In the *Laws* the theatre suggests to Plato confusion (659 A, 876 B), base pleasure (659 BC), lawlessness and perverted judgment (700 D–701 B). In general he finds the theatre antithetical to philosophical inquiry and the pursuit of the good life.<sup>67</sup>

The non-philosophical aspect of poetry is best brought out in the *Republic*. The imitative poet, Plato says, is concerned with appearance rather than reality,<sup>68</sup> with the false rather than the true.<sup>69</sup> In order to please his audience he imitates the irrational

<sup>61</sup> *Aud. Poet.*, 27 F.

<sup>62</sup> On Plutarch's relation to Plato see R. M. Jones, *The Platonism of Plutarch* (Menasha, Wisconsin, 1916 [University of Chicago Dissertation]).

<sup>63</sup> E. g., *Laws*, 817 B-D, where the true tragedy is that of the law-giver.

<sup>64</sup> *Cratylus*, 408 C. Cf. *Minos*, 318 DE, where the ill repute of Minos at Athens is called Ἀττικόν . . . μῆθον καὶ τραγικόν. Cf. also *Minos*, 320 E-321 B.

<sup>65</sup> *Cratylus*, 414 CD; cf. 418 D: τετραγωδημένον.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, 425 D.

<sup>67</sup> E. g., *Symposium*, 194 B; *Gorgias*, 502 DE; a similar antithesis between theatre and truth appears in Ps.-Plato, *Axiochus*, 370 D.

<sup>68</sup> *Republic*, 602 B: οὐν φάίνεται καλὸν εἶναι τοῖς πολλοῖς τε καὶ μηδὲν εἰδέσσιν, τοῦτο μαμήσεται.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, 605 C: τοῦ δὲ ἀληθοῦς πόρρω πάνυ ἀφεστῶτα. Cf. 408 BC for an

rather than the rational part of the soul (604E-605A), and thereby harms his hearers.<sup>70</sup> The audience, in turn, corrupts others (492 BC). The actor also is injured by imitating what is unworthy of him (395B-396E). Especially significant for the background of Plutarch is Plato's association of tragedy with the worst forms of government, democracy and tyranny,<sup>71</sup> and his observation that tragic poets are praisers of tyranny (568 AB).

Plato's evaluation of tragedy in ethical terms is much closer to Plutarch's attitude than the more strictly literary approach of Aristotle. Plutarch is not concerned with the analysis of the parts of a tragedy or the modes of imitation. And Plutarch's tragic figures are not his great heroes, such as Alexander and Epaminondas; they are his villains: the elder Dionysius, Antony, and Nero. They hardly fit the Aristotelian description: ὁ μῆτε ἀρετῆ διαφέρων καὶ δικαιοσύνη, μῆτε δὲ κακίαν καὶ μοχθηρίαν μεταβάλλων εἰς τὴν δυστυχίαν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἀμαρτίαν τινά.<sup>72</sup>

## II

We have seen that as a biographer Plutarch uses such terms as "theatrical" and "tragic" to characterize certain kinds of persons in certain types of situations. Normally the analogy is not sustained. It appears at the appropriate moment and is then dropped. But in the *Demetrius* the allusions to drama are so persistent that the whole structure of the biography appears to be conceived in terms of a tragedy. The *Demetrius* not only illustrates Plutarch's views of tragedy; it shows how these views can provide a basis for a biographical scheme.<sup>73</sup>

example. Even Homer, the first teacher and leader of the tragic poets, is not to be honored above the truth: 595 BC; cf. 606 E-607 A.

<sup>70</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 605 B: τὸν μυητικὸν ποιητὴν φήσομεν κακὴν πολιτείαν ιδεῖς ἐκάστου τῇ ψυχῇ ἔμποιεῖν.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, 568 B-D; cf. 577 B, the *τραγικὴ σκευὴ* of the tyrant. In a democracy men imitate each other (563 AB).

<sup>72</sup> Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1453 a 8-10.

<sup>73</sup> The dramatic treatment of historical figures was not original with Plutarch. Waldo Sweet, "Sources of Plutarch's *Demetrius*," *C. W.*, XLIV (1950-51), pp. 177-81, argues quite plausibly that the Peripatetic Duris, who was fond of such dramatic treatment, may have so portrayed Demetrius. Sweet also argues (p. 179) that the tragic element in the *Demetrius* "conforms to the Aristotelian canon in every respect"; but here I should disagree. Much has been written on the relation of

Demetrius and Antony, his Roman counterpart, "bear witness to Plato that great natures produce great vices, as they do great virtues."<sup>74</sup> In the beginning Demetrius is portrayed as essentially a good man, generous and just.<sup>75</sup> But his successes brought with them luxury and dissipation, and his mind, which was not in a healthy state,<sup>76</sup> was corrupted by excessive honors and flattery,<sup>77</sup> with the result that he became cruel and tyrannical.<sup>78</sup> He experienced many reversals of fortune,<sup>79</sup> but for a time he still retained enough of his better qualities to be able to recover from repeated disasters. In the end, however, he was completely broken, passing from a wild animal<sup>80</sup> to a tame animal.<sup>81</sup> He died of idleness, gluttony, and wine.<sup>82</sup>

Plutarch presents the decline of Demetrius in Platonic terms. The corruption by flattery suggests Plato's account of the corruption of the philosophic nature in *Republic* V. Of the effects of flattery Socrates says (494 CD):

What, then, do you think that such a person will do in such circumstances, especially if he belongs to some great city, is rich and of noble birth, and is, besides, impressive in looks and stature? Will he not be filled with extravagant hopes, conceiving that he is capable of ruling both Greeks and barbarians, and will he not on this account raise himself up, being inflated in his folly with vain posturing and pride?

This is precisely the effect that flattery had on the undisciplined mind of Demetrius.<sup>83</sup>

history to tragedy. See, for example, the material given in B. L. Ullman's "History and Tragedy," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXIII (1942), pp. 25-53.

<sup>74</sup> *Demetrius*, 1, 889 C. The same thought occurs in *Coriolanus*, 1, 214 AB. The reference is probably to Plato, *Rep.*, 491 DE or 495 B.

<sup>75</sup> For example in the episode of Mithridates (4) and the freeing of Athens (9).

<sup>76</sup> 13, 894 E: προσδέψθειραν αὐτὸν οὐδὲ ἄλλως ὑγιαίνοντα τὴν διάνοιαν.

<sup>77</sup> The flattery of Aristodemus (17) is the most conspicuous example.

<sup>78</sup> 18, 896 EF. Numerous instances of cruelty appear in the subsequent chapters, for example, the murder of the young Alexander (36).

<sup>79</sup> Cf. 35, 905 D: ἀλλ' ἡ τύχη περὶ οὐδένα τῶν βασιλέων ἔοικεν οὕτως τροπὰς λαβεῖν μεγάλας καὶ ταχείας . . .

<sup>80</sup> 48, 912 EF; cf. 49, 913 C.

<sup>81</sup> Cf. *Comparison of Demetrius and Antony*, 6, 957 E.

<sup>82</sup> *Demetrius*, 52, 915 A.

<sup>83</sup> Cf. *Demetrius*, 18, 896 E.

Demetrius' moral decline from justice through ambition to the pursuit of pleasure parallels the descent from aristocracy through timocracy to tyranny in *Republic* VIII and IX. As a military conqueror Demetrius was a timocratic man, dominated by a love of honor (*φιλοτιμία*) and love of contention (*φιλονικία*).<sup>84</sup> Eventually, however, his appetites prevailed. To be sure he was never victim of a strong desire for wealth (the "oligarchic" stage), nor did he have a "democratic" desire for all pleasures without discrimination. But he was fond of luxury (19, 897B; 42, 909B), and his appetite was for those pleasures which Plato considers the most tyrannical: love and wine (*Rep.*, 573 AB). Like Plato's tyrant, he was finally reduced to bestiality.<sup>85</sup>

The tragic element keeps pace with the moral degradation. Demetrius is first compared to a tragic actor when as a consequence of flattery he and his father have accepted the title of "King" (18, 896E):

This was not merely the addition of a name and a change of form, but it excited proud thoughts in the men, inflated their judgments, and made them haughty and oppressive in their manner of life and intercourse with others, just as actors of tragedies, on changing costumes, change also their walk, their speech, their manner of reclining and of address.

On a later occasion he had the Athenians assemble in the theatre, then surrounded the stage with armed men and made his entrance as a tragic actor (34, 905AB; cf. 44, 911A). While he was king of Macedonia his army "saw in Pyrrhus alone the image of Alexander's daring," and said that "the other kings, especially Demetrius, played Alexander's gravity and grandeur like actors on the stage."<sup>86</sup> And Plutarch goes on to speak of Demetrius' extravagant costume as a great tragic spectacle which offended the Macedonians (41, 909A).

Demetrius' pride and ostentation were attended by false

<sup>84</sup> Cf. *Rep.*, 545 A. The terms occur in the *Demetrius* at 8, 892 A (*φιλοτιμία*), and 40, 908 C (*φιλονικία*). It appears that the early love of honor was mostly attended by good will and generosity; the later love of contention was often attended by ill will and anger.

<sup>85</sup> *Rep.*, 571 CD; cf. 566 A (a wolf in cruelty), and 586 AB (a farm animal in subservience to the belly).

<sup>86</sup> 41, 908 F-909 A; cf. also 25, 900 D. Such passages as these show that the dramatic element was already present in accounts of Demetrius.

opinion and ignorance. He was persuaded by flatterers to accept a false estimate of his own greatness. He considered himself superior to Philip and Alexander (25, 900C). He mistook the honors given him by the Athenians for expressions of genuine good will (30, 903AB). "Because his power was attended by ignorance, vice usurped the place of virtue and linked glory with injustice."<sup>87</sup> His was a world of vice rather than virtue, of ignorance rather than knowledge, of appearance rather than reality—in short, the world of tragedy.

The setting is now prepared for his acts of *hybris*, such as the treatment of the boy Democles (24), and for his reversals of fortune. The final catastrophe is not a sudden one; it comes only after a long succession of defeats and victories, and the gradual decline of Demetrius' military power is accompanied by moral and ultimately physical deterioration. Finally, during the three years of captivity that preceded his death, he seemed to have lost all conception of any good beyond a captive's pleasures (52). After his death he was given a "tragic and theatrical" funeral, which brought to a close the "Macedonian drama."<sup>88</sup>

Thus the *Demetrios* is a Plutarchian tragedy. It embodies the same conception of tragedy as is found in Plutarch's other writings, a conception which is derived from Plato rather than Aristotle. The *Demetrios* is indeed an excellent example of Plutarch's Platonism, combining Plato's criticisms of tragedy with his portrayal of moral decline. And, paradoxically, it is appropriate that a "drama" of this kind be written in narrative rather than imitative form, for Plutarch agrees with Plato that we should be spectators and imitators of the lives of good men, but limit ourselves to historical accounts of the lives of the bad.<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> 42, 909 E: οὐτως ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ χώραν τὸ αἰσχρὸν ὑπὸ δυνάμεως ἀμαθοῦς ἐπελθόν, συνφέλωσε τῇ δέξῃ τὴν ἀδικίαν.

<sup>88</sup> 53. Allusion to the stage appears also at 28, 901 E. Aeschylus is quoted at 35, 905 D; Sophocles at 45, 911 C, and 46, 912 B; Euripides at 45, 911 D.

<sup>89</sup> 1, 889 C: οὐτως μοι δοκοῦμεν ἡμεῖς προθυμότεροι τῶν βελτιόνων ἔσεσθαι καὶ θεαταὶ καὶ μημηταὶ βίων, εἰ μηδὲ τῶν φαύλων καὶ ψεγομένων ἀνιστορήτως ἔχοιμεν. Cf. Plato, *Rep.*, 396 C-E.

## THE ARISTOTELIAN CONCEPT OF THE TRAGIC HERO.

Because of a rather puzzling use of certain terms the concept of the tragic hero in the *Poetics* of Aristotle presents a problem. Three passages in particular cause difficulty. I shall first set forth the nature of the puzzle, next study the general Aristotelian use of the words in question, and then establish the meaning of the words in their context. Finally, after suggesting what I believe to be the correct interpretation of the proper hero for tragedy, I shall attempt to show that this interpretation accords with Aristotle's theory of tragedy as a whole.

It is necessary to review the passages which embody the concept we are seeking. First, brief references to it (1448a 1-5, 16-18, b 24-27) in the early part of the *Poetics* introduce us in a general way to Aristotle's thought on the matter. In these chapters Aristotle is defining tragedy by genus, species, and differentiae. It is, first of all, imitation. Within that genus it is of the species which imitates men in action by language and music in a direct way; in other words, it is drama. Finally, it is differentiated from comedy by the objects of the imitation, since it imitates good men, while the latter is concerned with men of the baser sort. So far there is no cause for misunderstanding, no trace of inconsistency, and no need for a more careful definition of terms.

We turn next to the beginning of chapter 13 (1452b 30-53 a 17), where Aristotle discusses the matter in detail:<sup>1</sup>

We assume that, for the finest form of Tragedy, the Plot must be not simple but complex; and further, that it must imitate actions arousing pity and fear, since that is the distinctive function of this kind of imitation. It follows, therefore, that there are three forms of Plot to be avoided. (1) A good man (*τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ἄνδρας*) must not be seen passing from happiness to misery, or (2) a bad man (*τοὺς μοχθηρούς*) from misery to happiness. The first situation is not fear-inspiring or piteous, but simply odious to us. The

<sup>1</sup> The translation is that of Bywater, *Aristotle on the Art of Poetry* (Oxford, 1909). All the translations quoted herein from other works of Aristotle are from *The Works of Aristotle Translated into English*, ed. W. D. Ross (11 vols., Oxford, 1910-1931).

second is the most untragic that can be; it has no one of the requisites of Tragedy; it does not appeal either to the human feeling in us, or to our pity, or to our fears. Nor on the other hand should (3) an extremely bad man be seen falling from happiness into misery. Such a story may arouse the human feeling in us, but it will not move us to either pity or fear; pity is occasioned by undeserved misfortunes, and fear by that of one like ourselves; so that there will be nothing either piteous or fear-inspiring in the situation. There remains, then, the intermediate kind of personage, a man not pre-eminently virtuous and just (*οὐ μήτε ἀρετῆ διαφέρων καὶ δικαιοσύνης*), whose misfortune, however, is brought upon him not by vice and depravity but by some error of judgment, of the number of those in the enjoyment of great reputation and prosperity; e. g. Oedipus, Thyestes, and the men of similar families. The perfect Plot, accordingly, must have a single, and not (as some tell us) a double issue; the change in the hero's fortunes must be not from misery to happiness, but on the contrary from happiness to misery; and the cause of it must lie not in any depravity, but in some great error on his part; the man himself being either such as we have described, or better, not worse, than that.

Now the crux in this passage is the meaning of "good" in the phrase "a good man." What does Aristotle mean by a "good" man? Are we to understand the adjective in an ethical sense, as being approximately equivalent to "virtuous," or in a purely social or aesthetic sense? Both interpretations have been upheld by reputable scholars. I shall return to this point presently, but first I want to introduce two more passages, both from chapter 15.

In the former, at the opening of the chapter (1454a 16-20), Aristotle writes:

In the Characters there are four points to aim at. First and foremost, that they shall be good (*χρηστά*). There will be an element of character in the play, if (as has been observed) what a personage says or does reveals a certain moral purpose (*προαιρεσίν τυχεῖ*); and a good element of character, if the purpose so revealed is good.

The remaining passage is found near the end of the chapter (1454b 8-15):

As Tragedy is an imitation of personages better than the ordinary man, we in our way should follow the example of

good portrait-painters, who reproduce the distinctive features of a man, and at the same time, without losing the likeness, make him handsomer than he is. The poet in like manner, in portraying men quick or slow to anger, or with similar infirmities of character, must know how to represent them as such, and at the same time as good (*έπιευκής*) men, as Agathon and Homer have represented Achilles.

The pertinent sections of the *Poetics* are now all before us. I should like to turn back now to chapter 13 and examine the difficulties it presents and the interpretations of three of the principal editors of this century, Bywater, Gudeman,<sup>2</sup> and Rostagni.<sup>3</sup> Aristotle makes it quite clear that the plot must not show a bad man under any circumstances, no matter what the course of his fortunes. He also says that a good man must not be represented passing from happiness to misery, since this is odious. What, then, is the tragic hero to be? There remains "the intermediate kind of personage, a man not pre-eminently virtuous and just." The words here used to define the proper hero, "not pre-eminently virtuous and just," seem to fix the meaning of good in the negative part of the passage, where we are told that "a good man must not be seen passing from happiness to misery." Aristotle must mean that a virtuous man must not be seen under these circumstances, but rather, one "not pre-eminently virtuous and just." So far the positive and negative parts of the exposition fit together and there is no inconsistency. "Good" (*έπιευκής*) is to be understood in an ethical sense. But a difficulty seems to arise when we examine the words which close the same passage, "The man himself [i. e. in the perfect Plot] being either such as we have described, or better, not worse, than that." This in itself is not serious, however, for we may suppose that Aristotle simply wanted to relax somewhat the rigor of his earlier statement in order to allow for deviations which he knew actually to exist among the Greek tragedies with which he was familiar. A more serious difficulty, on the other hand, presents itself when we compare the statements in chapter 13, which we have just reviewed, with those in chapter 15, where we are informed that the characters must be good. This appears to be an outright contradiction of chapter 13. Perhaps the word

<sup>2</sup> *Aristoteles Περὶ Ποίησις* (Berlin and Leipzig, 1934).

<sup>3</sup> *Aristotele Poetica* (2nd ed., revised, Turin, 1945).

"good" here (in chapter 15) must be taken in some other than the ethical sense; for example, noble, or prosperous. In this case we might reproach our translator for choosing an ambiguous or misleading English word, especially when we observe that the Greek word translated as "good" in this passage is *χρηστός*, whereas in the other it was *ἐπιεικής*. This might resolve the dilemma, if it were not for the fact that in the remaining passage from chapter 15, in which we read that the poet must know how to represent his heroes as good men, as Homer had Achilles, the Greek word which Bywater translates as "good" is *ἐπιεικής* again, rather than *χρηστός*.

It is opportune here to inquire what the commentators have to say of these difficulties. Bywater believes that the Greek words *ἐπιεικής* and *χρηστός* may be and here are used synonymously.<sup>4</sup> He thereby defends his translation and leaves us facing the inconsistency between chapters 13 and 15. This he discusses in a note on *ἐπιεικής*, where it is first used in chapter 13,<sup>5</sup> in which he writes:

The sense we are to attach to the term in this passage is shown by the equivalent that replaces it in 13, 1453a 8, *ἀρετὴ διαφέρων καὶ δικαιοσύνη*. . . . It is difficult to reconcile his present view with what he tells us elsewhere of the tragic hero (see on 13, 1453a 16), or his present use of the term *ἐπιεικής* with that in 15, 1454b 13. . . . All this may show perhaps that strict consistency of language is not always to be expected even in Aristotle.

Bywater, then, leaves us with the rather frigid comfort that inconsistency there is and we must expect no better.

Gudeman in his note on the same passage<sup>6</sup> adopts a different interpretation, according to which *ἐπιεικής* has no ethical significance, but means eminent, great, or noble. Like Bywater, he draws his interpretation from another phrase later in the same passage, but from one other than Bywater's. To him the significant words are "of the number of those in the enjoyment of great reputation and prosperity." He also takes the phrase "through vice and depravity" as parallel and in contrast with "pre-

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 226. Cf. p. 213.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 213-14.

<sup>6</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 237-8.

eminently virtuous and just" and would have us translate "a man not pre-eminent for virtue and justice or through vice and depravity." I think that this is an impossible rendering of the Greek; but, be that as it may, Gudeman is firm in his opposition to those who would understand the "good man" of this passage as one "integer vitae scelerisque purus." In his note on *χρηστός* in chapter 15<sup>7</sup> he, like Bywater, regards it as synonymous with *ἐπιεικής*, and this leads him, in agreement with his view on chapter 13, to maintain that "good" in chapter 15 cannot be ethical in connotation, but means, here as earlier, eminent, great, or noble. Rostagni produces still a third interpretation,<sup>8</sup> for he believes that in chapter 13 "good" (*ἐπιεικής*) is wholly moral or ethical in significance, while in chapter 15 "good" (*χρηστός*) has no ethical connotation but refers simply to persons superior to the normal. Now, on the face of it, do these more recent interpretations improve upon Bywater's? Gudeman's, by accepting the identity of the meaning of "good" in the two chapters and rejecting the ethical connotation in both, removes the inconsistency between the chapters, to be sure, but reduces chapter 13 in itself to absurdity. He would make Aristotle say, in effect: "An eminent man must not be seen passing from happiness to misery . . . but the intermediate kind of personage, a man not pre-eminent for virtue and justice or for vice and depravity, . . . one of those in the enjoyment of great reputation and prosperity." Rostagni, on the other hand, allows chapter 13 to stand on its own merits, with "good" taken in the ethical sense, and, by refusing to understand *χρηστός* in chapter 15 as synonymous with *ἐπιεικής*, eliminates the inconsistency between the two chapters. This is an attractive solution as far as it goes, but it leaves the latter part of chapter 15 out of harmony with the first part.

Obviously, we must look into the problem more carefully. First, can *χρηστός* be used as a synonym for *ἐπιεικής*? We must answer this in the affirmative, for Vahlen in 1866 conclusively demonstrated<sup>9</sup> that it can. It is altogether legitimate, then, to believe that it is possible to take it as synonymous with *ἐπιεικής*.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 270-1.

<sup>8</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 69, 82.

<sup>9</sup> "Beiträge zu Aristoteles Poetik," II, in *Wien. Sitzungsb.*, LII, pp. 163-4.

in the passage in chapter 15 under consideration. But the words are not universally equivalent, so that it is not necessary to hold that, since *χρηστός* can and often does have the meaning of *ἐπιεικής*, it must have that meaning in this particular instance. At best we can say that it may have it. But before we proceed further in this direction, we must turn to *ἐπιεικής*, in order to try to determine its significance.

Since Bywater and Rostagni understand *ἐπιεικής* in the ethical sense, as meaning "good," i. e., "virtuous" or "just," while Gudeman stoutly denies it this meaning, we must endeavor to learn which sense is more probably correct here. I shall, accordingly, examine the use of the word in the whole body of Aristotle's works, with a view to establishing, if possible, the predominant significance of the term in his writings. In Book V, chapter 10, of the *Nicomachean Ethics* *ἐπιεικής* is treated fully and formally. It is there equivalent to "equitable" and is one of the moral virtues, clearly an ethical usage. Aristotle says in part (1137a 31-1138a 3) :

Our next subject is equity and the equitable, and their respective relations to justice and the just. . . . The same thing, then, is just and equitable, and while both are good the equitable is superior. What creates the problem is that the equitable is just, but not the legally just but a correction of legal justice. . . . And this is the nature of the equitable, a correction of law where it is defective owing to its universality. . . . It is evident also from this who the equitable man is: the man who chooses and does such acts, and is no stickler for his rights in a bad sense but tends to take less than his share though he has the law on his side, is equitable and this state of character is equity, which is a sort of justice and not a different state of character.

In this same passage Aristotle remarks in passing (1137b 1) that "we apply the name (*ἐπιεικής*) by way of praise even to instances of the other virtues, instead of 'good' (*ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀγαθού*)."<sup>1</sup> There is a similar discussion of equity in the *Rhetoric*, Book I, chapter 13 (1374a 18-28) :

We say that there are two kinds of right and wrong conduct towards others, one provided for by written ordinances, the other by unwritten. . . . The . . . [unwritten] kind has itself two varieties. First, there is conduct that springs from exceptional goodness or badness (*τὰ μὲν καθ' ἵπερβολὴν*

*ἀπερῆς καὶ κακλας*), and is visited with censure and loss of honor, or with praise and increase of honor and decorations: . . . The second kind makes up for the defects of a community's written code of law. This is what we call equity....

Here again, *ἐπιεικής* is clearly a term with pronounced ethical connotation; observe also that it is used in contrast with "exceptional goodness." The passage concludes with the following account (1374b 10-22):

Equity bids us be merciful to the weakness of human nature; to think less about the laws than about the man who framed them, and less about what he said than about what he meant; not to consider the actions of the accused so much as his intentions, nor this or that detail so much as the whole story; to ask not what a man is now but what he has always or usually been. It bids us remember benefits rather than injuries, and benefits received rather than benefits conferred; to be patient when we are wronged; to settle a dispute by negotiation and not by force; to prefer arbitration to litigation—for an arbitrator goes by the equity of a case, a judge by the strict law, and arbitration was invented with the express purpose of securing full power for equity.

Another passage in Book II of the *Rhetoric* (chapter 1) throws further light on Aristotle's use of *ἐπιεικής* (1378a 7-18):

There are three things which inspire confidence in the orator's own character—the three, namely, that induce us to believe a thing apart from any proof of it: good sense, good moral character (*ἀπερή*), and goodwill. False statements and bad advice are due to one or more of the following three causes. Men either form a false opinion through want of good sense; or they form a true opinion, but because of their moral badness do not say what they really think; or finally, they are both sensible and upright (*ἐπιεικεῖς*), but not well disposed to their hearers, and may fail, in consequence, to recommend what they know to be the best course. These are the only possible cases. It follows that anyone who is thought to have all three of these good qualities will inspire trust in his audience. The way to make ourselves thought to be sensible and morally good (*σπουδαιοί*) must be gathered from the analysis of goodness already given....

Here we have left the strict definition of *ἐπιεικής* as equitable and find it clearly used in the sense of morally excellent, for it is the

adjective used to describe the man who possesses ἀρετή and serves as a synonym for *σπουδαῖος*, an indubitably ethical term. There are some passages in the *Nicomachean Ethics* which show a similar sense of our word. In Book III, chapter 5 (1113b 11-14), we read "Now if it is in our power to do noble or base acts, and likewise in our power not to do them, and this was what being good or bad meant, then it is in our power to be virtuous (*ἐπιεικέστι*) or vicious (*φαύλοις*)."<sup>1</sup> In chapter 6 (1115a 12-14) appears the following: ". . . to fear some things is even right and noble, and it is base (*αισχρόν*) not to fear them—e. g. disgrace; he who fears this is good (*ἐπιεικῆς*) and modest (*αιδήμων*), and he who does not is shameless (*ἀναισχυντος*)."<sup>2</sup> Book 4, chapter 7, yields the following instance (1127a 33-b3): "We are not speaking of the man who keeps faith in his agreements, i. e. in the things that pertain to justice and injustice (for this would belong to another virtue), but the man who in matters in which nothing of this sort is at stake is true both in word and in life because his character is such. But such a man would seem to be as a matter of fact equitable (*ἐπιεικής*)."<sup>3</sup> Finally, in Book VII, chapter 10, we read of the incontinent man who is yet not wicked, for, says Aristotle (1152a 17), "his purpose is good." Two passages in the *Politics* are worthy of our attention. The first is from Book II, chapter 11 (1273b 3-5): ". . . it is absurd to suppose that a poor and honest (*ἐπιεικῆς*) man will be wanting to make gains, and that a lower stamp of man (*φαυλότερος*) who has incurred a great expense will not."<sup>4</sup> Here we have our term used not only in an obviously moral sense but also of a man who can in no respect be called eminent or noble. The second is from Book IV, chapter 8 (1322a 20-24): "It is well to separate off the jailorship also, and try by some device to render the office less unpopular. For it is quite as necessary as that of the executioners; but good men (*ἐπιεικεῖς*) do all they can to avoid it, and worthless (*μοχθηρούς*) persons cannot be safely trusted with it."<sup>5</sup>

We have now seen a sufficient number of examples to enable us to form a sound opinion about Aristotle's use of the adjective *ἐπιεικής*. It varies within a rather narrow range from the technical and highly specialized sense of equitable to the more general sense of honest or good, and in all these instances it has had a clear ethical significance. Not once, on the other hand, does it

mean eminent, great, or noble. Out of about seventy-five occurrences of the word listed in Bonitz's *Index Aristotelicus* (Berlin, 1870, p. 271b), I have found upon examination that in sixty-eight cases the word is used with an ethical connotation, while in four instances the ethical interpretation is doubtful or improbable, and in only three is it manifestly impossible. This establishes, I submit, a very strong presumption in favor of the ethical significance of *ἀπεικῆς* in any given instance; so strong, indeed, that where the context not only does not render the ethical interpretation impossible but even suggests and supports it, we must accept it. Such is the context which we have in chapter 13 of the *Poetics*. We must conclude, therefore, that in the phrase "good man" in that chapter, "good" is to be taken in the ethical or moral sense to mean virtuous, honest, or upright. We thus reject Gudeman's view in this chapter and adhere to that of Bywater and Rostagni.

Now that we have established the significance of *ἀπεικῆς* in chapter 13, we are ready to turn again to *χρηστός* in 15. We have seen that it is possible for us, with Bywater and Gudeman, to regard the two words as equivalent, but the possibility is not a necessity and does not therefore of itself eliminate the chance that Rostagni may be right in denying the coincidence here of the meanings of the two words. We must, accordingly, examine the context in chapter 15 for evidence on which to base an interpretation of that chapter.

The adjective *χρηστός* is here applied to character, which is a technical term in the *Poetics*. "Character," writes Aristotle, "is what makes us ascribe certain moral qualities to agents" (1450a 5-6). And again, "Character in a play is that which reveals the moral purpose (*προαιρέσις*) of the agents, i. e. the sort of thing they seek or avoid, where that is not obvious—hence there is no room for character in a speech in a purely indifferent subject" (1450b 8-10). Moreover, we are told that "there will be an element of character in the play, if . . . what a personage says or does reveals a certain moral purpose; and a good element of character, if the purpose so revealed is good."

If any doubt remain concerning the ethical quality pervading this whole passage, an examination of the meaning of *προαιρέσις*, which Bywater translates moral purpose, should resolve it. It

receives its most elaborate treatment in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book III, beginning with the second chapter.

Both the voluntary and the involuntary having been delimited, we must next discuss choice; for it is thought to be most closely bound up with virtue and to discriminate characters better than actions do. Choice, then, seems to be voluntary, but not the same thing as the voluntary; the latter extends more widely (1111b 4-8). . . . Choice involves a rational principle and thought. Even the name seems to suggest that it is what is chosen before other things (1112a 15-17). . . . We deliberate about things that are in our power and can be done (1112a 30-31). . . . We deliberate not about ends but about means (1112b 12). . . . The object of choice being one of the things in our own power which is desired after deliberation, choice will be deliberate desire of things in our own power; for when we have decided as a result of deliberation, we desire in accordance with our deliberation (1113a 9-12).

Having thus established the definition of *προαιρέσις*, i. e. choice or moral purpose, Aristotle goes on that virtue and vice are within our power (1113b 2-14), and he winds up the whole discussion with this summary (1114b 26-1115a 3):

With regard to the virtues in *general* we have stated their genus in outline, viz. that they are means and that they are states of character, and that they tend, and by their own nature, to the doing of the acts by which they are produced, and that they are in our power and voluntary, and act as the right rule prescribes. But actions and states of character are not voluntary in the same way; for we are masters of our actions from the beginning right to the end, if we know the particular facts, but though we control the beginning of our states of character the gradual progress is not obvious, any more than it is in illness; because it was in our power, however, to act in this way or not in this way, therefore the states are voluntary.

This essential concept of *προαιρέσις* or choice as deliberate desire of things in our own power is found throughout Aristotle's use of the term. Consider, for example, what he says in Book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, chapter 2 (1139a 31-35): "The origin of action—its efficient, not its final cause—is choice, and that of choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end. This is why choice cannot exist either without reason and intellect or

without a moral state; for good action and its opposite cannot exist without a combination of intellect and character." In the *Physics*, Book II, chapter 5 (197a 5-7), we find essentially the same notion: "It is clear that chance is an incidental cause in the sphere of those actions for the sake of something which involve purpose (*προϊόντες*). Intelligent reflection, then, and chance are in the same sphere, for purpose implies intelligent reflection." Compare *Rhetoric*, Book I, chapter 13 (1374a 11-13): "It is deliberate purpose that constitutes wickedness and criminal guilt, and such names as 'outrage' or 'theft' imply deliberate purpose (*προϊόντες*) as well as the mere action." Again in the *Metaphysics*, Book Δ, chapter 1 (1013a 20-22), we find *προϊόντες* or "will" as a first cause or beginning: "Hence the nature of a thing is a beginning, and so is the element of a thing, and thought and will, and essence, and the final cause. . ." In chapter 5 of the same book the meaning is implied by what impedes it (1015a 27): "We call necessary . . . the compulsory and compulsion, i. e. that which impedes and tends to hinder, contrary to the impulse and purpose." The term *προϊόντες* occurs frequently elsewhere in the works of Aristotle, but I think that a sufficient number of examples has now been presented to demonstrate the way in which he uses it and the fact that it invariably occurs with an ethical significance.

We can now turn back to *χρηστός* in chapter 15 of the *Poetics* and determine which interpretation is the correct one for that passage. In view of the fact that it is there used in immediate conjunction with character and moral purpose, both words of an essentially ethical orientation, the conclusion would seem to be inescapable that in such a context *χρηστός* or "good" must be used in the sense of "upright" or "virtuous."

At this point let us summarize what we have found out about the interpretations of chapters 13 and 15. In the phrase "a good man passing from happiness to misery" we know that we must understand a "virtuous" man, that is, a morally blameless man. In this we agree with Bywater and Rostagni, but disagree with Gudeman. As for the expression "the intermediate kind of personage, a man not pre-eminently virtuous and just," granting due force to the word pre-eminent, we must understand this as a moral specification. "The intermediate kind of personage" is virtuous; not pre-eminently so, to be sure, but never-

theless to some degree good. With the bad man barred, men of two grades of virtue are left, the acceptable hero, whom, to avoid confusion, Aristotle does not here call ἐπιεικῆς, and the good man of the earlier expression, who must be understood by contrast as ἀρετῆ διαφέρων. This interpretation is supported also by the closing summary of this section, in which Aristotle seems to wish to correct any misunderstanding of the quality of the intermediate kind of personage by inserting the words *or better*: "The man himself being either such as we have described *or better*, not worse, than that." Finally, I should like to invite attention to another phrase which may also be regarded as describing the tragic hero. Fear, we are told, is occasioned by the misfortune of one like ourselves. Therefore, if the drama is to invoke fear in us, it must place before us the misfortunes of a man like ourselves. But remember that the *ourselves* here includes Aristotle himself, his colleagues and pupils, and the main body of the literate public of Athens. Is it likely that Aristotle would deny all virtue of such a group?

Chapter 15 need give us no further difficulty. We are to take "good" in both the passages as meaning "morally good" and the two are seen to be consistent with each other and with our suggested explanation of chapter 13. We may conclude our study of this section by noting that our interpretation here agrees with Bywater's and is opposed to Gudeman's and Rostagni's.

It is pertinent next to inquire what can have led Gudeman astray in both instances. I think that we can answer this by noting the direction of the error and the basic view of the *Poetics* held by that scholar. In both chapters Gudeman adopts what he calls a purely aesthetic attitude and opposes the ethical point of view which our interpretation would seem to impute to the author. For the cardinal principle of Gudeman's criticism of the *Poetics* is that the work is the expression not of an ethical or moral but of an aesthetic and hedonistic theory of tragedy, in contradistinction to the ethical character of Plato's dramatic criticism. His initial conception of the nature of Aristotelian literary criticism has led him to reject the appearance of an ethical element on every possible occasion and in every possible detail. His general view he expounds in his introduction (pp. 27-8), and his attitude in detail he makes clear, among other

places, in his commentary where he attacks Vahlen for attributing to *χρηστός* in chapter 15 the ethical significance of *σπουδαῖος* (p. 271). Now I think Gudeman is right in the broader sense, in maintaining that the *Poetics* represents a basically aesthetic criticism of tragedy, but I cannot agree with him in imposing this opinion in detail upon the entire treatise, for here, in the matter of the proper tragic hero, for instance, and in the discussion of the best kind of plot, I believe that Aristotle makes an essentially moral analysis.

A review of the structure of the *Poetics* as a whole will reveal how Aristotle's treatment of the elements of plot and character is related to his fundamental concept of tragedy and how the evidently moral basis of this treatment fits into the essentially aesthetic plan of the larger structure.

Tragedy is, to begin with, a form of *μίμησις*. This may at first seem neither strange nor of much moment, since Greek authors had referred to drama and other works of art as imitation rather frequently and in Plato's criticism of poetry the term imitation looms large. But Aristotle means by *μίμησις* something wholly different from what any of his predecessors had meant by it and his view of tragedy as *μίμησις* is of primary significance for his entire criticism. In the first chapter of the *Poetics* several examples of *μίμησις* are given: epic poetry, tragedy, comedy, dithyrambic poetry, and the playing of the flute and lyre (1447a 13-28); another form of imitation having no name of its own is the mimes of Sophron and Xenarchus; all the Socratic dialogues, which are *μυμήσεις* and so poetry because of their content, although they are not written in meter; while the works of Empedocles, on the other hand, though composed in meter, are not imitations and therefore may not properly be called poetry (1447a 28-b 32). Rather, these are physical treatises. From this we may infer that the essence of poetry is not its metrical form but the fact of its being an imitation, and that the end or purpose of imitation is not to teach but to produce an activity that will find its fulfillment in pleasure. Furthermore, the proper object of imitation is men in action (1448a 1-9) and, finally, it is the duty of the poet to represent not what actually happened on any particular occasion, but what could happen in accordance with probability or necessity (1451a 36-b 11). In short, Aristotle's concept of *μίμησις* is dynamic and *μίμησις* is concerned with

universals. From this the difference between the meanings of imitation in Plato and Aristotle should be evident: for in the former it is the rigid and literal imitation or reproduction of particulars, not of reality but of appearances (*Republic* X, 598b); it is mere play and not to be taken seriously (*ibid.* 602b); it makes men worse rather than better (*ibid.* 604e, 606c, d); and it is not to be judged by the criterion of pleasure (*Laws* 667e).

What kind of imitation, then, is tragedy? Aristotle defines it in the sixth chapter of the *Poetics* (1449b 24-28) as "the imitation of an action that is serious and also, as having magnitude, complete in itself; in language with pleasurable accessories, each kind brought in separately in the parts of the work; in a dramatic, not in a narrative form; with incidents arousing pity and fear, wherewith to accomplish its catharsis of such emotions." The end or purpose of tragedy, accordingly, is the catharsis of pity and fear and similar emotions. Now catharsis is accompanied by pleasure and the catharsis of pity and fear by the tragic pleasure. "Not every kind of pleasure," says Aristotle, "should be required of a tragedy, but its own proper pleasure" (1443b 11). Elsewhere, too (*Politics*, Book VIII, chapter 7), in speaking of melodies which appeal to the emotions, he says that those who are susceptible to emotion are, under the influence of such melodies, as if possessed, but afterward they are restored, having experienced catharsis. "Those who are influenced by pity and fear, and every emotional nature, must have a like experience, and others in so far as each is susceptible to such emotions, and all are in a manner purged and their souls lightened and delighted" (1341b 32-1342a 16). The end of tragedy, then, being a catharsis which is accompanied by pleasure, it is obvious that Aristotle's essential principle of criticism is aesthetic.

This requirement that tragedy produce its catharsis of pity and fear governs the entire analysis of tragedy. The fact that tragedy is a *μίμησις* of a certain kind determines the object of the imitation, men in action. But the sort of men who are to be imitated and the kind of action in which they must be shown depend on the central and dominant fact that the imitation must bring about its catharsis of pity and fear and thus afford the spectators the concomitant pleasure. That tragedy must

direct its attention to pity and fear is owing to the fact that it is with these that the tragic catharsis is concerned.

Now since the catharsis of pity and fear is effected by arousing those emotions in the spectators, the whole practical effort of the tragic poet must be directed toward creating situations which will arouse them. Pity and fear thus come to be the end of tragedy in the practical sphere and the evocation of these emotions guides the considerations of those whose task it is to write tragedy. In order to show how this may be done, Aristotle has analyzed tragedy into its six elements of plot, character, thought, diction, melody, and spectacle—one of the most characteristically Aristotelian achievements of the treatise—and the discussion of each in order is aimed at improving the poet's ability to shape his material to the desired end. Effects other than pity and fear are extraneous to tragedy and may even prove detrimental to it.

Pity and fear are affections of the soul. Fear is occasioned by the misfortunes of one like ourselves and pity by undeserved misfortune.<sup>10</sup> Hence it must be clear that they are both essentially moral in nature; for a man like ourselves or a little better is, as we have discovered, moderately virtuous, and the judgment whether suffering is deserved or not is a moral judgment. It may be objected, in the case of fear, that since this is also defined in Aristotle as the expectation of evil,<sup>11</sup> one might experience it on behalf of an exceptionally saintly man or even on behalf of a scoundrel, provided the circumstances of his outward fortune resembled ours. This, however, would seem to be ruled out, first, by what Aristotle specifically says in chapter 13 of the *Poetics*, since we have concluded that we must accept a moral or ethical interpretation for that whole passage, and second, by the consideration that any effect other than the proper tragic pity and fear may prove detrimental to these (*Poetics* 1453b 1-12). For the spectacle of an extremely good man suffering or about to suffer harm or the contemplation of a wicked man under any circumstances will probably prove so violently revolting to the ordinary decent spectator as to destroy utterly any tragic effect.

This notion of the revolting or odious (*τὸ μαρόν*) removes all

<sup>10</sup> *Poetics*, 1453a 5-6.

<sup>11</sup> *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1115a 9, *Rhetoric*, 1382a 21, b 28-1383a 12.

possible doubt about the ethical quality of pity and fear (*ibid.* 1452b 36, 1453b 39, 1454a 3). The odious must be avoided by all means, for it is deadly to the proper tragic effect. And the odious is whatever is repugnant to our moral feelings; it is what prevents our experiencing pity for the sufferings of a wicked person; it is the result of any act which cannot be morally excused. The possibility of introducing the odious causes Aristotle to reject various possible types of plot as unsuitable. Indeed, at one point in the *Poetics* (1453b 15 ff.) he rejects a type of plot of which he had earlier (1453a 12 ff.) approved. I. M. Glanville, in an admirable discussion of this problem<sup>12</sup> has shown that this apparent inconsistency is owing to a change in Aristotle's moral and psychological theory, chiefly a narrowing of the definition of involuntary and compulsory action, which left a greater number of situations open to the charge of being odious, i. e., morally reprehensible. Aristotle never loses sight of the fact that man is a morally responsible being, in whose power is the choice between good and evil, a being who has the ability to distinguish virtue from vice and to achieve the one or surrender to the other.

Since man is by nature moral and since pity and fear depend upon certain moral conditions to evoke them, it is now clear why the type of the tragic hero must be defined in moral terms. It could hardly be otherwise. The hero, the course of the plot, the character, the convolutions of discovery and reversal, and all the machinery of the practical creation of the tragic effect must be adjusted to the moral nature of man and the moral origin of the tragic emotions.

But on the higher plane, the final cause of the whole moral effect, the cause without which it would be meaningless and would, indeed, not even exist, is the catharsis of pity and fear, an activity of the soul which finds its completion in pleasure. In this way the moral basis of the plot and characters is firmly fixed in the whole aesthetic structure of Aristotelian criticism of tragedy. And the bond of their unity is Aristotle's definition of pleasure as the completion of an activity. "For, while there is pleasure in respect of any sense," he says (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1174b 20-1175a 1), "and in respect of thought and contemplation no less, the most complete is pleasantest, . . . . Pleasure com-

<sup>12</sup> "Tragic Error," *C. Q.*, XLIII (1939), pp. 47-56.

## THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FIVE THOUSAND.

Several historians have reached the conclusion that the “Constitution of the Five Thousand,” outlined in Chapter 30 of the *Athenaion Politeia*, came into force in the interval between the overthrow of the Four Hundred in September, 411 B.C., and the restoration of democracy, soon after the battle of Cyzicus (April, 410).<sup>1</sup> I find this an intelligible account of one of the most confused and difficult chapters of Greek constitutional history. I wish to defend it here against the view now put forward by Professors Kurt von Fritz and Ernst Kapp (“FK” I shall call them for short hereafter) in the stimulating introduction and commentary which accompany their new translation of the *Athenaion Politeia*.<sup>2</sup> I need hardly add that I have little interest in mere polemics. My purpose rather is to treat afresh some of the points in the relevant evidence which seem to need further clarification.

The FK view, in their own words, is “that the rule of the Five Thousand which followed the Four Hundred was [i] identical with the restoration of democracy, or [ii], gradually and insensibly, led over to the full restoration of democracy” (p. 181). That FK should entertain the first possibility ([i]) at all is most surprising. For quite apart from the body of supplementary evidence so ably analyzed by Ferguson,<sup>3</sup> this possibility,

<sup>1</sup> V. Ehrenberg, “Die Urkunden von 411,” *Hermes*, LVII (1922), pp. 613 ff.; *R.-E.*, s. v. “Losung”; W. S. Ferguson, “The Constitution of Theramenes,” *C.P.*, XXI (1926), pp. 72 ff.; “The Condemnation of Antiphon,” *Mélanges Glotz*, I (1932), pp. 349 ff.; cf. also his chapter (XI) in *C.A.H.*, V (1927), “The Oligarchical Movement in Athens,” pp. 312 ff., especially at pp. 338 ff.; U. Wilcken, “Zur oligarchischen Revolution in Athen vom Jahre 411 v. Chr.,” *Sitzb. Berl. Akad.*, 1935, pp. 34 ff. Needless to say, these authors do not agree with one another in everything, nor I with them. I shall make no effort to reckon with all their opinions, and shall wholly ignore the unnecessary and unfounded assumptions with which Wilcken has encumbered the argument.

<sup>2</sup> New York, 1950, pp. 25 and 180 ff. The work appears in the Hafner Library of Classics, and the publishers should be congratulated for making accessible to the student at such a modest price (Text Edition, \$1.25) a work embodying original scholarship of a high order. The translation is accurate and clear; the printing is excellent.

<sup>3</sup> See the two papers listed above at n. 1. They contain as much meat

one would think, is sufficiently ruled out by our chief literary sources which speak of the formal enactment<sup>4</sup> and actual operation<sup>5</sup> of a hoplite constitution of "Five Thousand." How could we possibly think any such scheme a "restoration of democracy," knowing that it would disfranchise more than half<sup>6</sup> the civic body, indeed a larger fraction of the free native population than was disfranchised under the oligarchy of Boeotia?<sup>7</sup>

per square inch as any discussion of this, or any other, problem of Greek constitutional history. It is a pity that FK have not examined his argument, and told us how much of the evidence on which Ferguson rests his case they would throw out and for what reason.

<sup>4</sup> Thuc., VIII, 97, 1; Lys., 20, 16; Arist., *Ath. Pol.*, 33, I. All three mention the "handing over" of the government to the "Five Thousand"; but Lysias' speaker says nothing about the *δπλα παρεχόμενοι*.

<sup>5</sup> *Ath. Pol.*, 33, 2, "It would appear that in this period Athens had a good form of government (*καλῶς πολιτευθῆναι*), when, in a time of war, the government was in the hands of those able to serve with full equipment," translation as in FK. Similarly what is praised by Thucydides (VIII, 97, 2) is not a paper scheme, but a form of government in full operation.

<sup>6</sup> Ferguson says "three quarters" (*C. A. H.*, V, p. 340), which is doubtless closer to the true fraction, and even this may be an understatement. For the total population we would have to add something to Gomme's estimate of 22,000 for 400 B. C. (*Population of Athens* [1933], p. 26: problematical enough, as he concedes, but the best we have) to account for the intervening losses of Aegospotamoi and the blood-letting under the Thirty. What of Polystratus' 9,000 figure (Lys., 20, 13), solemnly accepted by Ehrenberg (*Hermes*, 1922, p. 614), Ferguson (*C. A. H.*, V, p. 338; *Mél. Glotz*, I, p. 365), and many others, as the true number of those enfranchised by the regime? Presented by his son to a democratic court as ground for clemency and without corroboration of any kind, this may be suspected of stretching the actual figure to its furthest credible limits. Can we infer from it (and from Thuc., VIII, 97, 1, "and all who could furnish themselves with armour were to belong to this number [*sc.* the Five Thousand]") that "the (5,000) figure lost all meaning and became a mere synonym for . . . the *δπλα παρεχόμενοι*" (FK, p. 180)? But if so, why all the fuss about the figure in the official programme? A larger and more elastic figure would have served better the demagogic needs of the regime, especially with the fleet at Samos. The 5,000 figure could not have stuck without good reason, and would hardly be "meaningless," though it would seem to be intended as an estimate, rather than as a fixed limit.

<sup>7</sup> The safest index to the proportion of enfranchised to disfranchised Boeotians is that of heavy- to light-armed troops; 8,500 of the former (counting even peltasts along with cavalry and hoplites) to "more

The main circumstance which has led FK to think seriously of so extreme a view is the fact that the itemized account of constitutional *μεταβολαι* at *Ath. Pol.*, 41, 2 says nothing at all about the constitution of the Five Thousand: "the eighth was the *κατάστασις* of the Four Hundred; and after it, the ninth, the democracy once again."<sup>8</sup> On its face this is surely embarrassing for the Ehrenberg-Ferguson-Wilcken view, though no less so, one would think, for Aristotle himself: How could Aristotle praise at 33, 2 the workings of a constitution unique in Athenian history, and then ignore its very existence in what is to all appearance a complete list of Athenian constitutions? Yet, to my knowledge, no effort has yet been made to reckon with the difficulty; and FK, who work it for all it is worth as an argument for [i], ignore both its contradiction with the earlier portions of the *Athenaion Politeia* and the fact that, if unexplained, this omission at 41, 2 tells as much against the second possibility ([ii] above) they are prepared to entertain, as against the general view they wish to combat.

One assault on the problem would be by way of an alternative

than 10,000" of the latter (Thuc., IV, 93, 3). R. Bonner, "The Boeotian Federal Constitution," *C.P.*, V (1910), p. 407, gets a much larger ratio (68%), but only by substituting Beloch's guesses about the Boeotian population for the firm figures just cited from Thucydides, and also by ignoring the fact that the force of 11,000 hoplites and 1,100 cavalry given in the Papyrus is only approximate (*P. Oxy.*, V, 173: *περὶ χιλίου μὲν ὀπλιτας*, etc.) and is doubtless meant as maximum, as H. Swoboda observed ("Studien zur Verfassung Boiotiens," *Klio*, X [1910], p. 320, n. 3). From pseudo-Herodes, *Peri Politeias*, 30 one gathers that the enfranchisement of a third of the civic body was considered the lowest reasonable limit among the oligarchies installed by Sparta at the end of the Peloponnesian war (for the date see E. Drerup's monograph on this work, *Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Altertums*, Band 2, Heft 1 [1908], especially at pp. 106-7).

<sup>8</sup>This gets added force from their interpretation of the first sentence of chapter 34: "These men, then (*μὲν οὖν*), were quickly deprived of their political power by the people." FK take "these men" here to refer to the Four Hundred, rather than to the Five Thousand. This is a possible construction, though their argument for it is an over-statement: "in this book the sentences with 'then' (*μὲν οὖν*) which are found at the beginning of a chapter never continue the narration . . . , but always give a summary of the main event told in the preceding chapter" (p. 181). See *per contra* the *μὲν οὖν* at the beginning of chapters 28 and 30.

punctuation and a very slight alteration of the text,<sup>9</sup> so that the sentence would read, “the eighth was the *κατάστασις* of the Four Hundred and the one after it; while the ninth was the democracy once again.” In this form the text would recognize the constitution of the Five Thousand, but only in the colourless words, “the one after” the *κατάστασις* of the Four Hundred. And it is just the colourlessness of the expression that makes me reluctant to accept this solution to the problem. For the list of *μεταβολαί* is not a bare index. More than once its writer lingers to indicate his judgment of the direction of the change; and he pastes a very conspicuous moral label on the “seventh” *μεταβολή*. Should we not then expect some contrasting hint of Aristotle’s wholly different view of the Five Thousand in the “eighth”? Should we not, at the very least, expect him to name the Five Thousand in their own right, instead of acknowledging their existence in words suggesting a nondescript sequel to the Four Hundred? I am not inclined to overestimate the cogency of this line of reasoning. But it at least makes one wonder if there is no other way out of the difficulty. I think there is.

Let us begin by asking: Is there anyone whose views *Ath. Pol.*, 41, 2 might conceivably echo who *would* think of the Five Thousand as a restoration of democracy? Obviously there was one such group: the extreme oligarchs to whom this would seem “outright democracy” (*Thuc.*, VIII, 92, 11) and who doubtless so spoke of it among themselves in their back-room talk. Yet this no less obviously could not be Aristotle’s source, for no part of his treatise could by any stretching of the word be called a mouthpiece of so extreme a view.<sup>10</sup> But was there not another,

<sup>9</sup> I. e. the insertion of an ή before *μετά ταύτην*, as e. g. in H. Oppermann’s (Teubner) edition, 1928. This part of the sentence would then read, *δύο δέ δὴ τῶν τετρακοσίων κατάστασις καὶ <η> μετά ταύτην*.

<sup>10</sup> I do not think anyone will question this statement. It will stand, in spite of the fact that a comparison of *Ath. Pol.*, 29 ff. with the corresponding chapters in Thucydides will show that Aristotle’s account is kinder to the Four Hundred, omitting so much as a hint of the terroristic tactics, so vividly described by Thucydides, by which the democracy was destroyed. This might be explained by the far greater brevity of Aristotle’s account; in any case the resulting effect is to bleach out the sinister hues of the Thucydidean picture and leave the otherwise uninformed reader with an account which is no worse than neutral, and is actually much better since it follows the unfavourable

much larger group, so openly favored by Aristotle, the Five Thousand themselves (or, more precisely, those of their number who were *bona fide* partisans of the hoplite constitution), who would be almost as likely to speak of their regime as the restoration of democracy, especially later, when democracy was back in good earnest? How very convenient they would find it then to say and believe (or make believe) that after all *they* had been the saviours of democracy, that they had already restored it in overthrowing the Four Hundred. This way of talking would be just what we would expect in accounts favourable to the Five Thousand, notably Androtion, "who is almost universally agreed to be his (Aristotle's) main source, his handbook as it were for the history of Athens."<sup>11</sup> The apostles of the Theramenean gospel in fourth century Athens could certainly not afford, perhaps even did not wish, to speak of the brief advent of their political apocalypse in 411/10 as anything but "moderate" democracy.<sup>12</sup> History itself here would lend some colour to their propaganda. For one thing, we know from Thuc., VIII, 92, 11 (as we might have guessed, anyhow) that those who gave the Four Hundred the *coup de grace* included true blue democrats who "were still hiding their purpose under the name of the 'Five Thousand,'" since they were afraid to press openly for "the rule of the demos." Thus when the Five Thousand came

account of the preceding democracy and its leaders in *Ath. Pol.*, 29. Cf. G. Matthieu, *Aristote, Constitution d'Athènes* (1915), pp. 85-7; but Matthieu may be going too far in arguing that Aristotle is consciously trying to "combat" (p. 87) the Thucydidean picture.

<sup>11</sup> F. Jacoby, *Atthis* (1949), p. 213. Cf. Herbert Bloch, "Studies in Historical Literature of the Fourth Century B.C.," *H. S. C. P.*, Suppl. Vol. I (1940), at pp. 352-53.

<sup>12</sup> As J. A. O. Larsen justly observes, after 403 "the former moderate oligarchs continued to advocate the same changes which they had always advocated, but they no longer spoke of them as oligarchic but as contributing to a better democracy" ("Cleisthenes and the Development of the Theory of Democracy at Athens," in *Essays in Political Theory Presented to Sabine* [1948], p. 16). This fits Isocrates (see W. Jaeger, "The Date of Isocrates' *Areopagiticus* and the Athenian Opposition," *H. S. C. P.* Suppl. Vol. I [1940], pp. 442 ff.), though in one important respect Isocrates toned down this programme: he says nothing about restricting citizenship to the ὄπλα παρεχόμενοι, doubtless because this would make it still harder for him to fight off the charge of oligarchic sympathies (*Areop.*, 57, 60; cf. *Panath.*, 114).

into power their body included some crypto-democrats. Moreover, several of their constitutional innovations were so congenial to democracy that they could be taken over intact after the demise of the Five Thousand.<sup>13</sup> Finally this demise itself was so peaceful that not a single one of our sources even bothers to date its passing or record its interment.<sup>14</sup> All this would strengthen the hand of the propagandist who would merge the Five Thousand with the democratic restoration. If the eleven *μεταβολαί* at *Ath. Pol.*, 41, 2 are borrowed from Androtion or some other conservative Attidographer,<sup>15</sup> we would have a good

<sup>13</sup> Conveniently itemized by Ferguson, *Mélanges Glotz*, I, p. 364, n. 1, who also lists the officers carried over from the Five Thousand to the democracy. To the latter some would add the Anagrapheis of the laws; so apparently W. R. M. Lamb, *Lysias* (1930), p. 609. FK, p. 174, say that "a committee of Anagrapheis remained in office until the dissolution of the democracy in 405 B.C." and refer to Lys., 30, 2 and 29. I cannot see that these texts prove that the initial appointment came under the regime of the Five Thousand which ended soon after the battle of Cyzicus (April, 410 B.C.); any anagrapheis appointed by the Five Thousand would have been probably installed early in their regime (fall of 411); and even if the appointment came only in the spring of 410, the point at issue would be proved only if the speaker meant the "six year office" as a full six years or dated the dissolution of democracy in 405 rather than 404, both of which are doubtful. The general probabilities seem to me to favour appointment of Anagrapheis immediately after the restoration of democracy in the summer of 410 as part of the general house-cleaning. The speaker in Lys., 30 digs up all the dirt he can find against Nicomachus; had his appointment come under the Five Thousand this would hardly be passed by.

<sup>14</sup> Ferguson, *loc. cit.*, remarks that the very existence of the Five Thousand is "strangely forgotten" "in the tradition preserved in the Attic Orators (in which the memory of the Four Hundred was kept alive by frequent expressions of condemnation)." This may be explained by (a) sympathy for the Five Thousand (as in Isocrates), (b) the fact that the ancestors of the Athenian orators had doubtless been enrolled among the Five Thousand, and, more generally, (c) by the fact that it was the Four Hundred who were directly responsible for the *δῆμου καράλυσις* at this time, and (d) by the natural polarization of thought around the two extremes. For recognition of the (list of) the Five Thousand in the intermediate position see e.g. Lys., 30, 8.

<sup>15</sup> The evidence for borrowing here is strengthened by the contrast between its recognition of a Draconian constitution (as at chapter 4) and the very different view expressed by Aristotle at *Pol.* 1274b 15, "There are laws of Draco, but he legislated for an existing constitution, and there is nothing peculiar in his laws that is worthy of

explanation of the omission of the 5,000 as a separate constitution; though this would neither exonerate Aristotle from contradiction with his earlier statement at 33, 2, nor offer the slightest reason why we too should swallow the Theramenean line and recognize as "restoration of democracy" a regime which robbed the *thetes* of rights they had already won under Solon.<sup>16</sup>

## II

Consider now the second possibility entertained by FK ([ii] above): that the constitution of the Five Thousand *did* come into operation, but faded "gradually and insensibly" out of existence. What is the evidence? "Thucydides (8. 97. 2) says that under the new constitution following the overthrow of the Four Hundred, 'at first' public affairs were handled well, indicating that there was a gradual change" (p. 181). This construction of the text is not without precedent;<sup>17</sup> but I fail to see how it could be justified. The whole sentence reads, *καὶ σόχ ἡκιστα δὴ τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον ἐπὶ γε ἐμοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι φαίνονται εὐ πολιτεύσαντες*, and the underlined words must surely be translated, "for the first period of time, in my day at least." The sense is that this is the first stretch of good government Athens has had, not absolutely the first, but the first in Thucydides' time. The translation FK must have in mind would detach *τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον* from *ἐπὶ γε ἐμοῦ*, but on what warrant I cannot imagine. What is there in Thucydides to support the assumption that *τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον* does not refer to the first period of good government in Thucydides' lifetime, but to the first in some

mention, except their severity in imposing heavier punishments" (Rackham's translation).

<sup>16</sup> Anyone tempted to idealize the condition of the *demos* in the most liberal of hoplite constitutions would do well to recall the phrase of ps.-Xen., *Ath. Pol.*, 3, 11 with reference to a regime so proud of itself as *oligarchia isonomos* (Thuc., III, 62, 3): *ἐντὸς δλέγον χρόνου* (*sc.* after the election of the *βελτιστοι*) *δ δῆμος ἔδούλευσεν δ ἐν Βοιωτοῖς.*

<sup>17</sup> Jowett translates, "This government during its early days . . ."; C. F. Smith (in the Loeb Class. Library), "And during the first period . . ." At VII, 87, 1 *τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον* certainly has this sense, but there, unconnected with anything like *ἐπὶ γε ἐμοῦ*, it clearly refers to the first stretch of the period under consideration. For the interpretation I am defending see Classen, *Thukydides* (1885), *ad loc.*

other period, unspecified in the text? Certainly the immediate sequel offers no support for such a presumption: "for there was a moderate blending of the few and the many, and this it was that first (*πρῶτον*) caused the state to recover . . ." <sup>18</sup> *πρῶτον* here tallies with *τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον* in the former sentence, the two sentences being connected in the expression of the same idea, since the second is explanatory (*γάρ*) of the first. No one would question that *πρῶτον* in the second sentence means "for the first time"; why assume that *τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον* in the preceding has an entirely different sense?

There is one more thing in this chapter of Thucydides that FK take as evidence of "gradual and insensible" transition: "He speaks of many 'Assemblies of the People' which were held immediately after the overthrow of the Four Hundred, which seems to imply that under the new regime the Assembly of the People again had the supreme power of the state" (p. 181). Wilcken <sup>19</sup> and Ferguson <sup>20</sup> have discussed this passage (VIII, 97, 2) from their own point of view, but they too, like FK here, seem to me to get more out of it than it has to offer. All that it does say is that, at some later time (*υστερον*), i. e. after the first Assembly on the Pnyx which "handed over" the state to the

<sup>18</sup> The translation by C. F. Smith, who hardly does justice to *μετρία* *ἥ εἰς τὸν δλίγον καὶ τὸν πολλοὺς ξύγκρασι*—but who can?

<sup>19</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 50 ff. Wilcken adopts the emendation *<έν> πυκνή* for *πυκνά* (after Herwerden and Hude), but I do not see that this affects the problem at issue.

<sup>20</sup> *Mélanges Glotz*, I, pp. 364 ff. He feels positive that "On these occasions (*sc.* of the *pyknai ekklēsiai*) the body assembled was obviously *οἱ τὰ ὅπλα παρεχόμενοι*. The lower classes could not have been present. They were excluded by the vote taken on the Pnyx" (pp. 364-5). Thucydides makes no distinction except in time between these *pyknai ekklēsiai* and the one on the Pnyx. Were the lower classes present on the Pnyx? If so (though Thucydides speaks only of hoplites in the earlier assembly in the theatre of Dionysus, VIII, 93, 1 and 4), why should they not continue to meet to implement the original decision? My own guess would be that few *thetes* would show their face at any of these Assemblies, but not because of formal exclusion, which would have impaired the value of these meetings as ostensible organs of the whole Athenian *demos* giving its blessing to the new outfit. Another point: at *C. A. H.*, V, p. 338 Ferguson speaks of the *nomothetae* of this passage as "a constituent assembly." The only "constituent assembly" we can get out of Thucydides is in the *pyknai ekklēsiai* themselves.

Five Thousand, "other Assemblies were also held in rapid succession (*πυκναί*), as a result of which they voted (the appointment of) *nomothetae* and the other measures pertaining to the constitution." The only business of these Assemblies mentioned here is concerned with the constitutional change-over. There is not a word in the text to the effect that they had anything else on the agenda, or any power to deal with anything else, or that they continued meeting once the constitutional business was disposed of. But why did they meet at all after the meeting on the Pnyx? If the state was "handed over" to the Five Thousand, what is the need for any further "Assemblies"? To this there is no answer in this text, and we can only reconstruct it by harking back to the earlier procedure under the Four Hundred as recounted by Aristotle. There, long after the commitment of the *politeia* to a restricted body (29, 5) had been formally approved (30, 1), a meeting of the assembly is called again to approve the constitutional drafts of *Ath. Pol.*, 30 and 31.<sup>21</sup> The only possible reason for such a procedure would be the eagerness of the Four Hundred to get the semblance of full legality for their regime. But the leaders of the Five Thousand would be even more eager to squeeze the maximum of approval from a body that could be passed off as the unrestricted Athenian *demos*. The fleet at Samos was still in revolt; would it recognize them any more than their predecessors? What could do more to ingratiate them with the fleet than to have the constitutional framework of the new order taken up *in extenso* by the Assembly, so that its final form would appear as the work of the Assembly and of Nomothetae appointed by the Assembly.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>21</sup> *Ath. Pol.*, 32, 1, ἐπικυρωθέντων δὲ τούτων ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους. I assume with Oppermann (index to his edition, s. v.) that *plethos* here = *demos*, and agree with FK (*ad loc.*) that it is not intended to be another expression for an assembly of the Five Thousand mentioned in the preceding sentence (as also at 30, 1). I take it that it was (at least in theory) a meeting of the old Assembly to secure final approval for the new constitution. The prolongation of the life-time of the old Assembly to this moment is matched by the prolongation of the old Boule to the same moment (*loc. cit.*).

<sup>22</sup> The exact role of these Nonothetae cannot be determined with certainty. In these unusual circumstances, it could hardly parallel the ordinary legislative procedure of fourth-century Athenian democracy. When the democracy was restored in 403 (decree of Teisamenus

The final evidence of the "gradual and more or less unnoticeable" return of democracy is found by FK in the silence of our sources of which I spoke earlier. It is safe enough, I imagine, to infer from this that it all happened very quietly. But a peaceful change need not have been a gradual one. It is hard to see why the Therameneans should decide to fold up unless something happened to change drastically their political fortunes. This would surely be the victory at Cyzicus which changed overnight the course of the war, left Athens so unexpectedly the mistress of the seas once again, and made the return of the fleet an imminent possibility. When this news reached Athens the Therameneans would know that their constitution was finished. The "Council of the Five Hundred appointed by lot"<sup>23</sup> could now be brought into being. The Assembly could now take over as the sovereign organ of the whole Athenian *demos*.

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*ap.* Andoc., 1, 83-84) two sets of Nomothetae were appointed, one elected by the Council, the other by the Demes; the former was a drafting body whose laws were subject to the *dokimasia* of the latter acting in conjunction with the Council. In the present case the Nomothetae elected by the Assembly may have been either (a) a drafting body whose laws would be referred for final action to the Assembly or (b) a body fully empowered to enact legislation. (a) seems the more probable hypothesis by analogy with the later procedure of 403 and with that of 412 as recounted by Aristotle (note 20, above). (b), however, is perfectly possible in itself and fits better the actual phrasing of Thuc., VIII, 97, 2.

<sup>23</sup> ἡ βουλὴ οἱ πεντακόσιοι <οἱ> λαχόντες τῷ κυάμῳ: designation of the Council in the preamble of the decree (*ap.* Andoc., 1, 96) passed after the restoration of democracy in the first prytanny of 410/9, which "implies, not only that the preceding Council was not elected by lot [as Ed. Meyer and Beloch had already observed], but equally that its number was not five hundred," Ferguson, *C.P.*, 1926, p. 75.

## REVIEWS.

EUGÈNE DUPRÉEL. *Les Sophistes: Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus, Hippias*. Neuchatel, Éditions du Griffon, 1948-49. Pp. 408. (*Bibliothèque Scientifique* 14: *Philosophie et Histoire*).

In 1922 M. Dupréel published *La Légende Socratique et les Sources de Platon* in which he undertook to revolutionize the history of Greek philosophy by maintaining not only that the events of Socrates' life, his physical appearance, and even his condemnation and death are mere fictions of Plato and the so-called Socratic writers but that there never was any Socratic philosophy at all nor any original Platonic or Aristotelian philosophy either. What is conventionally called Aristotelianism, he explained, is really the doctrine of Hippias of Elis with an admixture of the ethics of Prodicus; and as for Plato, he had neither any concern for philosophical truth nor any consistent point of view of his own but was simply a brilliant and irresponsible composer of literary pastiches in which he put together as suited his whim but always to the greater glory of his lay-figure, Socrates, the doctrines that he looted from Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus, and Hippias.

Merely as an inversion of the Taylor-Burnet hypothesis Dupréel's thesis had its amusing aspect; but the way in which he eliminated that rival paradox to make way for his own is also instructive for his method of handling evidence. That Socrates was not the author of the theory of ideas, he insisted, "Aristotle affirms, and it requires the erudite eccentricity of a Taylor to maintain the contrary" (*La Légende*, p. 190). Yet when Aristotle affirms that Socrates was not the author of the theory he also affirms that Plato was (*Metaphysics* 987 A 1-10, cf. 1078 A 9-32 and 1086 A 31-B 11), and one hesitates to characterize the eccentricity required to suppose that Aristotle's statement refutes Taylor's theory of Socrates without at the same time refuting Dupréel's theory of Plato. The reviewers did not fail to point out the complete lack of cogency in Dupréel's construction, which was correctly characterized by one of them as a chain of hypotheses all depending ultimately from an unsupported hypothesis, the chain as a whole supposedly having none of the weakness of all of its component links;<sup>1</sup> and another, after having described Dupréel's method in similar terms, remarked: "I am afraid that I must say to him what Socrates said to Hippias: ἐνθυμοῦμαι, ω̄ ἔταιρε, μὴ παλέης πρός με καὶ ἐκὼν ἔξαταράς."<sup>2</sup>

M. Dupréel has now repeated much of the content of his earlier

<sup>1</sup> A. Mansion, *Revue Neo-Scolastique de Philosophie*, XXVI (1924), p. 217 in his review of *La Légende Socratique*, *ibid.*, pp. 214-18.

<sup>2</sup> A. Diès in his review of *La Légende Socratique* reprinted in his book, *Autour de Platon*, pp. 182-209. See also the reviews by Nestle (*Phil. Woch.*, XLII [1922], pp. 1110-12), Shorey (*Class. Phil.*, XVII [1922], pp. 268-71), Carteron (*Rev. Philosophique*, XCVI [1923], pp. 122-34), and the remarks of L. Stefanini in his *Platone* (references *sub nomine* Dupréel in the Indice dei Nomi, II, p. 523).

book and by employing the same method with even greater abandon has staked out still more extensive claims for Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus, and Hippias in the four monographs on these sophists that constitute his new volume. To it the criticisms of the earlier one apply with proportionate intensification. He has answered none of them<sup>3</sup> but instead proclaims from the eminence of his self-assurance that truth needs no excuses (p. 403). How he has reached this truth a few typical examples will suffice to show.

Mistranslation is one way. *τὶ η̄ τὰ πάντα ἔστιν; . . . πάντα ὁν* τὴν ἔστι (*Dissoi Logoi* 5 [15]) means to Dupréel (p. 211, cf. also p. 93) ". . . est une chose ou est-il toutes choses? . . . Si l'homme est tout, il est en quelque façon"; and then he assures us that this argument is modelled upon that of *De Melisso* 979 B 9-10, *εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ δὺ ὅν ἔστι καὶ τὸ δὺ ὅν ἔστιν, ἀπαντά ἔστιν*,<sup>4</sup> which he says means "si un être est, il doit être tout." Neither passage means anything like what he says it does, nor has either anything to do with the other. Truth needs no excuses, but none exists for an interpreter of Greek texts who thinks that ὁν is the present participle of the verb "to be."

Another way is the manufacture of evidence by the mutilation of texts. For example, Dupréel writes (p. 244): "Rapprochons d'abord la première phrase de ce paragraphe 2 (scil. of the Hippocratic *De Arte*): *δοκέει δή μοι τὸ μὲν σύμπαν τέχνη εἶναι οὐδεμία οὐκ ἔσυστα, de Politique* 284 D: *δοκεῖ μοι . . . ὡς ἄρα ἡγητέον ὁμοίως τὰς τέχνας πάρος εἶναι.* Des deux côtés le contexte et l'esprit de l'ensemble montrent assez qu'il n'y a pas là une analogie fortuite et sans portée." Whatever analogy there may be between the sentences here printed, however, neither one means anything like the sentence of the *Politicus* that Dupréel pretends to quote. That sentence has no

<sup>3</sup> Without so much as noticing Diès' elaborate refutation (*Autour de Platon*, pp. 188-204) he repeats (pp. 202, 318) his earlier assertion that *Hippias Major* 301 B proves Hippias to have rejected the theory of ideas separate from sensible objects (i.e. "Platonism") and to have espoused instead a theory of the reality of integral beings that possess at once a "form" and a capacity to act upon one another (i.e. "Aristotelianism"). To Diès' earlier refutation I would for the present add only the following note. The *form* διανεκῆς in the passage of the *Hippias Major* (*μεγάλα . . . καὶ διανεκῆ σώματα τῆς οὐρανοφύκότα*) is no reason for supposing that these words are quoted from Hippias of Elis. Dupréel contended that "the form διανεκῆς is found here only because Hippias wrote in the Doric dialect" (*La Légende*, pp. 203-4); and even Miss Tarrant in her commentary (*The Hippias Major Attributed to Plato* [Oxford, 1928], p. 78) wrote "possibly we have here a word traditionally a favorite of Hippias himself, put into his mouth in the Doric form he would naturally use and parodied in the same form by Socrates at 301 E." Yet διανεκῆς (*pace* Liddell and Scott, *s. v.*) is not the Doric form of the word but the *regular Attic form*, as is proved by at least four public inscriptions of the 4th and early 3rd centuries B.C. (*I.G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 1666 B [line 60], 1668 [line 81], 1361 [line 5], 1682 [line 10]) and as any Platonic commentator might have learned by consulting Moeris (p. 195 [Bekker]) or Meisterhans, *Grammatik der attischen Inschriften*<sup>5</sup> (1900), p. 16, n. 76.

<sup>4</sup> This is the text of Diels and of Apelt. Dupréel (p. 211, n. 1) prints the text of Bekker (. . . τὸ τε μὴ δὺ ἔστι . . . ἀπαντά ἔστιν); but even that will not yield the meaning that he ascribes to it.

stop after *éναι* but reads: . . . ὡς ἄρα ἡγγέτεον δμοίως τὰς τέχνας πάσας ἔναι καὶ μεῖζόν τι ἄμα καὶ ἐλαττον μετρεῖσθαι μὴ πρὸς ἀλληλα μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ μετρίου γένεσιν.<sup>5</sup> It means that the existence of all the arts and measurement by an absolute standard imply each other; and this meaning is assured, if assurance be needed, by the following sentence, τούτου τε γὰρ ὅντος ἐκείνα ἔστι, κάκεινων οὐσῶν ἔστι καὶ τούτο, μὴ δὲ ὅντος ποτέρον τούτων οὐδέτερον αὐτῶν ἔσται ποτέ. This not only has nothing to do with the words quoted from the *De Arte*; it is entirely alien to their context, in which the existence of any art is supposedly assured by the very fact that it has been named.<sup>6</sup> By such "analogies," however, Dupréel establishes the truth that no one must question.

The same word or phrase found in two different writings, however common it may be or however different the contexts in question, suffices him for proof that both compositions derive from the doctrine of one of his four sophists; and texts that expressly contradict his grand construction are ordinarily not mentioned at all or else are interpreted as meaning the opposite of what they plainly say. So on p. 314, for example, the theory of Non-Being in Plato's *Sophist* is said to be in complete accord with that of the Hippocratic *De Arte* because in *Sophist* 238 C the Stranger says that τὸ μὴ ὁν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό is ἀδιανόητό τε καὶ ἀφρηγτον καὶ ἀφθεγκτον καὶ ἀλογον and in *De Arte*, chap. 2 the author asserts that τὰ μὲν ἔοντα αἰὲν ὀρᾶται τε καὶ γινώσκεται, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἔοντα οὔτε ὀρᾶται οὔτε γινώσκεται. Dupréel apparently expects his readers not only to believe that τὰ μὴ ἔοντα in the latter sentence means the same thing as Plato's τὸ μὴ ὁν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό but also not to remember that according to the Stranger (*Sophist* 250 D-E) Being in this sense (τὸ ὁν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό) is as obscure as absolute Non-Being whereas (258 B-D) τὰ μὴ ὄντα in the sense of the *De Arte* exist just as τὰ ὄντα do. This argument of the *De Arte* far from being "in complete accord" with the doctrine of the *Sophist* reflects the very kind of confusion that Plato in that dialogue undertook to dispel.

The Hippocratic *De Arte*, Dupréel asserts (p. 251), is an authentic work of Hippias. Does not the author of that essay say (chap. 13 [12: VI, p. 24, Littré]) that the medical art ἀνάγκας εὑρηκεν γοὺν ἡ φύσις ἀξέπιος βιασθεῖσα μεθίησιν *<scil. τὰ σημεῖα>*, and does not Plato put into the mouth of Hippias the words ὃ δὲ νόμος, τύραννος ὁν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, πολλὰ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν βιάζεται (*Protagoras* 337 D)? "In both places," says Dupréel (p. 250), "art is said to do some violence to nature, though in the latter case it is done by law in general, the work of men, and in the former only by medicine and its rules. The word βιάζεσθαι is found in both statements." Such reasoning could as well support the thesis that the *De Arte* was the work of Antiphon,

<sup>5</sup> This is the reading of the MSS, but the sense is not substantially affected if *έναι* [*καὶ*] *μεῖζόν* *τε* be read with Burnet and Diès.

<sup>6</sup> Dupréel himself elsewhere (p. 308) recognizes this as the meaning of the argument in *De Arte*, chap. 2 when he wants to identify it with the implication of Theaetetus' remark in *Sophist* 221 D 3-4; but he says nothing of the fact that this argument is inconsistent with the author's later statement (chap. 6) that something may have *οὐσίην* *οὐδεμίην* *ἀλλ'* *ἡ δρομα* (cf. F. Heinemann, *Nomos und Physis*, p. 157).

whose emphasis upon the hostility of *νόμος* and *φύσις* is preserved in his own words and who wrote *τῶν δὲ τῆς φύσει ἔνυμφύτων ἔάν τι παρὰ τὸ δυνατὸν βιάζηται . . . οὐδὲν ἔλαττον τὸ κακόν . . .* (Frag. B 44 [II, p. 347, Diels-Kranz]). It could be argued that this remark of Antiphon's leaves room for an *ἀξένιμος βία* as the sentence put into the mouth of Hippias does not, though the truth is that neither one as it stands says anything resembling the sentence of the *De Arte*. Dupréel's crowning argument for Hippias' authorship of the *De Arte* is still more amazing. At the end of the essay (chap. 14 [13: VI, p. 26, Littré]) the author refers to expositions of those who know the art *ἄς ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ἐπιδεικνύουσιν, οὐ τὸ λέγειν καταμελήσαντες*<sup>7</sup> ἀλλὰ τὴν πίστιν τῷ πλήθει ἐξ ὅν ἀν ἰδωσιν οἰκειοτέρην ἡγεύμενοι ἢ ἐξ ὧν ἀν ἀκούσωσιν.

Dupréel is sure (p. 251) that this must be an application of Hippias' notion of the priority of action to words, for in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* IV, 4, 10 Hippias says that many who speak justly act unjustly but no one who acts justly could be unjust. Dupréel is not troubled by the fact that Hippias says this in reply to Socrates' words, *εἴ δὲ μὴ λόγῳ ἀλλ’ ἔργῳ ἀποδείκνυμαι· η οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἀξιοτεκμαρτότερον τοῦ λόγου τὸ ἔργον εἶναι;*<sup>8</sup> He is not troubled either by the fact, which he does not mention, that this notion was an early commonplace.<sup>9</sup> It is no indication at all of the authorship of the *De Arte*, where its expression, moreover, by an amusing coincidence is more nearly parallel to a fragment of Antiphon's than it is to the words put into the mouth of Hippias.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>7</sup> So Gomperz (*Apologie der Heilkunst*<sup>2</sup> [1910]) instead of *καταμελήσαντες* (cf. also L. Edelstein, *ΙΕΡΙ ΑΕΡΩΝ und die Sammlung der Hippokratischen Schriften*, p. 108, n. 1).

<sup>8</sup> According to Dupréel not only must anything that Xenophon or Plato puts into a sophist's mouth have come from that sophist's own writings but this is also true of anything that the sophist's interlocutor gets him to admit or uses in refutation of him. So, for example, "if Hippias in the *Hippias Major* is discomfited by the examples with which Socrates confronts him, that is only a trick of Plato's. . . . Socrates in order to confound his interlocutor uses ideas borrowed from that interlocutor himself and turns them against him" (p. 301, cf. also pp. 204, 218). Even this remarkable "canon," however, is not flexible enough for Dupréel. Since the words of Protagoras in *Protagoras* 350 D-351 A are not in accordance with Dupréel's notion of his doctrine, they must represent not anything that Protagoras believed but the doctrine of Hippias (p. 252)!

<sup>9</sup> Cf. the words of Socrates to Critoboulus in *Memorabilia*, II, vi, 6; and for the proverbial superiority of ocular evidence: Heraclitus, frag. B 101 a (I, p. 173, 15-16 [Diels-Kranz]); Solon, frag. 8, 7-8 (Diehl<sup>2</sup>); Herodotus, I, 8, 2; and Empedocles' protest against this popular notion (frag. B 3, 9-13 [I, p. 310, 8 ff., Diels-Kranz]). For the ethical application in *Memorabilia*, IV, 4, 10 cf. Democritus, frags. B 55 and 82 and Antiphon, frag. B 56.

<sup>10</sup> Frag. 34-35 (*Antiphontis Orationes et Fragmenta* ed. F. Blass<sup>2</sup>, p. 121): *οἱ γὰρ ἀνθρώποι ἄττα ἀν ὄρωσι τῇ ὕψει πιστότερα ἡγοῦνται η ὅλοι εἰς ἀφανές ἤκει δὲ ἐλεγχός τῆς ἀληθείας.* Dupréel never mentions Antiphon, though he is one of the few sophists of whose authentic writings extended fragments are now available and though Heinemann has argued (*Nomos und Physis*, pp. 142-3) that, if *Protagoras* 337 C-D accurately reproduces Hippias' words, Hippias was merely a popularizer

By the same kind of inconsequence Dupréel concludes that whether in the Platonic dialogues *εἰρεσις*, *δύναμις*, *μέτρον*, or their cognates appear they are leit-motifs announcing Hippias as the author of the doctrine there expounded (p. 323). In *Phaedrus* 267 B Socrates, having said that Prodicus claimed the discovery that art demands discourses which are neither long nor short but *μέτρον*, adds that Hippias, he thinks, would cast his vote with Prodicus. To Dupréel (pp. 264-5) this means that Hippias was the real author of this notion; and, when in *Sophist* 263 A Theaetetus, in reply to the Stranger's question whether "Theaetetus is seated" is a long statement, says with amusement *οὐκ, ἀλλὰ μέτριος*, Dupréel (pp. 322-3) concludes that this must be an imitation of the same original text to which *Phaedrus* 267 B alludes and that therefore Hippias must have assimilated the falsity of statements to a "lack of moderation" and believed that a discourse which holds to the strict expression of truth is neither too long nor too short. Moreover, since the notion of *μέτρον* plays a great part in the *Philebus*, the doctrine of the *Philebus* too must come from Hippias; and, since this dialogue is generally supposed to show Pythagorean influence, that merely proves that Hippias must have been connected with the great western school of mathematicians (p. 342).<sup>11</sup> In fact, the only "evidence"

of the doctrine that Antiphon had earlier espoused. In view of Dupréel's arguments for assigning the *De Arte* to Hippias and his silence concerning Antiphon, it is both amusing and instructive to observe the similarities between the *De Arte* and the fragments of Antiphon that one could cite to maintain a thesis. The rare word *ἐπιθυμημα* (chap. 1 [VI, p. 3, 5, Littré]) is cited as peculiar to Antiphon (frag. B 110); so are (frag. B 76) the construction of *καταμελεῖν* with the accusative (chap. 14 [13, VI, p. 26, 10-11, Littré]) and (frag. B 8) the use in prose of the poetical *δόμα* (chap. 13 [12, VI, p. 24, 5, Littré]). The bold phrase, *γνώμης δύει* (chap. 11 [VI, p. 20, 3, Littré]), with which *τῆς δέξης δύμασιν* of Gorgias, *Helen*, § 13 has been compared, comports both with Antiphon's use of *γνώμη* (cf. frags. B 1, B 2, B 3) and with that of *δύει* for *δόμαλμοις* especially attested for him (frag. B 7). It is known that Antiphon wrote on medical subjects (cf. III, p. 654, 17 ff. [Diels-Kranz]); and his frag. B 2 can be cited as a parallel to *De Arte*, chap. 7 (VI, p. 10, 23-24, Littré). Most striking of all, however, is the fact that the unusual contrast of *νομοθετήματα* and *βλαστήματα* in *De Arte*, chap. 2 (VI, p. 4, 11-12, Littré) has its closest parallel in Antiphon's use of *νεομοδέτητα* of *τὰ κατὰ νόμον* (frag. B 44, col. 2, 30 ff.) and of *βλαστός-βλαστάγειν* as the characteristic indication of *φύσις* (frag. B 15). All of this and more too would not constitute evidence that Antiphon wrote the *De Arte*, which he certainly did not; but it shows by comparison how utterly baseless is Dupréel's assumption that Hippias was its author.

<sup>11</sup> Dupréel considers Hippias of Elis to have been "one of the greatest mathematicians of antiquity" (p. 189), this solely on the ground that it was he who invented the "quadratrix" to which Proclus refers (*In Euclidem*, p. 272, 7-10 and p. 356, 10-12 [Friedlein]). In the first place, it ought to be obvious that Hippias of Elis could have discussed or even discovered this curve without having been either a systematic mathematician (cf. Aly, *Formprobleme der frührer griechischen Prosa*, pp. 144-6) or a mathematical philosopher. Moreover, although Björnbo (R.-E., VIII, 1708-9), Tannery (*Mem. Scientifiques*, II, pp. 1 ff.), and Heath (*History of Greek Mathematics*, I, pp. 182, 219, 225-6) believed

there is that τὸ μέτριον played any rôle in the thought of Hippias is the latter's trivial suggestion in *Protagoras* 338 A-B that Protagoras and Socrates choose an umpire who φυλάξει τὸ μέτριον μῆκος τῶν λόγων ἔκατέρου. Dupréel might just as well have argued that all Platonic contexts in which the notion of μέτριον occurs were lifted from Antiphon, who used the terms μετριολόγος (frag. B 100) and συμμετρίαι (frag. B 106), or from Democritus, who said ἀνθρώποισι γὰρ εἰθυμίη γίνεται μετριότητι τέρψιος καὶ βίον συμμετρίη (frag. B 191, cf. frags. B 233 and B 285). His proof of the rôle of δύναμις in Hippias' "philosophy" is, if anything, still more fantastic. We are told (p. 315) that *Sophist* 247 D-E (. . . τίθεμαι γὰρ ὅρον δρίζειν τὰ ὄντα ὡς ἔστιν οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι πλὴν δύναμις) is "a fragment of Hippias, assuredly the most significant of all" and that (p. 367) the definition of "faculties" in *Republic* 477 C is shown by the Greek itself to belong to Hippias, presumably once more because of the word δύναμις (φήσομεν δυνάμεις ἔιναι γένος τι τῶν ὄντων αἷς δὴ καὶ ἡμεῖς δυνάμεθα ἢ δυνάμεθα καὶ ἄλλο πᾶν ὅτι περ ἣν δύνηται). The only "proof" offered of this and of all the general assertions that Hippias had "a philosophy of action or the capacity to act, applied to the production of a synthesis of Being and action and to the determination of one by the other" is the following (p. 276). Because in *Cratylus* 425 C Socrates says νῦν δὲ τὸ λεγόμενον κατὰ δύναμιν δεῖσθαι ἡμᾶς περὶ αὐτῶν πραγματεύεσθαι, which seems to refer to the same proverb as that to which he refers in *Hippias Major* 301 C with the words οὐκ οὐδὲ βούλεται τις . . . ἀλλ' οὐδὲ δύναται, Dupréel takes the two passages to be "parallel" to *De Arte*, chap. 9 (VI, p. 16, 12-13 [Littré]), ἐξεύρηνται γε μὴν οὐ τοῖσι βούληθεισιν ἀλλὰ τούτων τοῖσι δυνηθεῖσιν, and concludes from this that "chaque fois que l'on rencontre les idées de pouvoir, de capacité, les mots δύναμις, δύνασθαι, etc., on est fondé de pressentir quelque réminiscence de notre penseur" (i. e. Hippias).<sup>12</sup> Need one really point out that, whoever

that the Hippias to whom Proclus refers in these two passages was the sophist of Elis, the identification remains more than doubtful. The fact that Proclus mentions Hippias of Elis in his Summary (*In Euclidem*, p. 65, 14 [Friedlein]) as having spoken of the fame that the brother of Stesichorus gained in geometry makes it the more strange that he does not mention any geometrical accomplishment of the sophist himself in that section; nor does Aristotle ever mention the quadratrix of Hippias, although he discusses the attempts of Antiphon, Bryson, and Hippocrates of Chios to square the circle. Moreover, Proclus names the Hippias of the quadratrix between Nicomedes and Perseus (*op. cit.*, p. 356, 10-12), both of whom lived in the 2nd century B. C. (cf. R.-E., XVII, 500 and XIX, 1021); and it is highly unlikely that he would thus have placed the sophist of the 5th century B. C. Hippias was a common name, and recently discovered inscriptions show that it was even commoner in Athens in the 3rd and 2nd centuries B. C. than had hitherto been supposed; Wilamowitz was fully justified (*Platon*, I<sup>2</sup>, p. 136, n. 1) in declaring it mere arbitrariness to assign to the sophist the mathematical achievement in question on the basis of the name alone.

<sup>12</sup> This fantastic "canon" requires Dupréel to transgress his more general principle and to assert (p. 252) that *Protagoras* 350 D-351 A, though spoken by Protagoras, must really have been the doctrine of

the author of the *De Arte* was, this last passage is no evidence at all either of his having had a philosophy of "dynamism," such as Dupréel ascribes to Hippias, or of any intended reference to a particular author or philosophy in the passages of the *Cratylus* and the *Hippias Major*? In *Cratylus* 425 C τὸ λεγόμενον shows that Plato is adapting to his use a popular proverb; and the same thing is indicated in *Hippias Major* 301 C by the words, φασὶν ἀθρωποι ἐκάστοτε παροιμιάζουσι, which follow τις and which Dupréel conveniently omits from his quotation.<sup>13</sup>

These examples of Dupréel's reasoning are not unfairly chosen; they are in fact rather above the average of his arguments in cogency, as can be seen by comparing them with the following. When Socrates introduces an apophthegm with the phrase, φησὶν δὲ Λάκων (*Phaedrus* 260 E),<sup>14</sup> this indicates that his source is the sophist of Elis "whose close connections with the Lacedaemonians are known" (p. 257). The appellation ξένος Ἐλεάτης itself suggests that this figure in the *Sophist* and *Politicus* is a mouthpiece for the doctrines of Hippias, who is called ξένος Ἐλεάτης in *Phaedrus* 267 B and *Hippias Major* 287 C; does not Socrates refer to the Eleatic Stranger as a superior spirit and Theodorus call him μετριώτερος (p. 307)? Whenever the authentic dialogues mention *cum grano salis* a man of

the historical Hippias (cf. note 8 supra). One might ask why there is nothing of this "dynamism," which is supposed to be the foundation of Hippias' philosophy, in the *Dissoci Logoi*, since that writing according to Dupréel (p. 191) is entirely constructed upon the unified doctrine of Hippias. His reasons for assigning all the content of the *Dissoci Logoi* to Hippias are no better, however, than those that he gives for the authorship of the *De Arte*. For a sober and well-founded account of the relation of the *Dissoci Logoi* to the different sophists and to Socrates cf. W. Nestle, *Vom Mythos zum Logos*<sup>2</sup>, pp. 437-47.

<sup>13</sup> The proverb occurs in Menander, frag. 50 (K) as ξῶμεν γὰρ οὐχ ὡς θέλομεν ἀλλ' ὡς δυνάμεθα, and Suidas (s. v. ξῶμεν) quotes this as "used by Plato in the Hippias," cf. also Caecilius Statius, frag. 11 (Ribbeck) and Terence, *Andria* 805. The common sentiment that one should not attempt the impossible or even wish for it (cf. Chilon in D. L., I, 70 and Stobaeus, *Ecl.* III, 172; Quintilian, IV, 5, 17) occurs in Plato's *Laws* 742 E; cf. Democritus, frag. B 3 (II, pp. 132, 17-133, 4 [Diels-Kranz]) and Gorgias, frag. B 11 a (II, p. 300, 23 [Diels-Kranz]). With this might be compared the injunction in the *De Arte* against the physician's undertaking to treat incurables (chaps. 3 [VI, pp. 4, 18-6, 1, Littré] and 8 [VI, p. 12, 14 ff.]); cf. *Art.*, chap. 58 (IV, p. 252, 8-17 [Littré]), *Prog.*, chap. 1 (II, pp. 110, 8-112, 11 [Littré]), Plato's *Republic* 360 E-361 A. For the somewhat different notion at the end of *De Arte*, chap. 9, that βούλησις is not enough but δύναμις is also required for accomplishment cf. Gorgias, frag. B 8 and Plato's Gorgias 509 D ff. and with what follows in the *De Arte* (δύνανται δὲ οἱ τά τε τῆς παιδείης μὴ ἐκποδὼν τά τε τῆς φύσιος μὴ ταλαιπωρα) cf. Hippocrates, *Lex*, chap. 2 (IV, p. 638, 14 ff. [Littré]): φύσιος γὰρ ἀντιπροστούσης κενὰ πάγτα φύσιος δὲ εἰς τὸ ἄριστον δύνησεντης διδασκαλη τέχνης γίνεται (with *Lex*, chap. 3 on education cf. Antiphon, frag. B 60).

<sup>14</sup> For this "Laconian saying" see Plutarch, *Apophthegmata Laconica* 233 B. On Laconian apophthegms in general cf. Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1394 B 33 ff.; Plato's *Protagoras* 342 D-E; Plutarch, *Moralia* 510 F ff. For the phrase φησὶν δὲ Λάκων cf. Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1419 A 31 ff.; Plutarch, *Moralia* 439 F; Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* I, 46, 111 and V, 14, 40.

superior ability, one may safely see a reference to Hippias (pp. 261-2); and when in *Hippias Minor* 368 C Socrates says that Hippias wore a Persian girdle that he had woven himself this "makes it probable that the sophist had himself compared the royal art with that of a weaver as the Stranger does in the *Politicus*" (p. 234) and also justifies the ascription to Hippias of any passage in which the art of weaving is mentioned (e. g. p. 362 on *Republic* 401 A).

Upon reasoning such as this—and no page of the whole book rises above this level—depends Dupréel's discovery of the great new truth that Aristotle's reflections upon philosophy are a synthesis of the theses of Prodicus and Hippias (p. 140), that Prodicus was the author of the moral theories that constitute the doctrine called Socrate (pp. 148-9), that Socrates' remarks on measurement at the end of the *Protagoras* were taken from Hippias (p. 251), that in fact it is simply the doctrines of Hippias that are reproduced in the latter part of the *Phaedrus* from 259 onwards (pp. 256-65), in the opinions expressed by the Stranger in the *Sophist* (pp. 306-23) and the *Politicus* (pp. 230-42), by Parmenides in the *Parmenides* (pp. 323-33), and by Socrates in the *Cratylus* (pp. 265-79),<sup>15</sup> in the *Theaetetus* (pp. 281-306),<sup>16</sup> in the *Philebus* (pp. 333-49), in large portions of the *Republic*, which was constructed by combining the rival systems of Hippias and his "idealist" opponents (pp. 352-85), in the first part of Diotima's speech in the *Symposium* (pp. 385-

<sup>15</sup> Hermogenes and Cratylus both represent the doctrines of Protagoras, whose notions are thus divided between them and presented with a purposeful incoherence (p. 265; n. b. that in *La Légende*, p. 240, Cratylus was the representative of the "mathematical idealism" that Aristotle combats in the *Metaphysics*). Since Dupréel's Hippias held what is popularly called the Aristotelian doctrine and violently opposed what has come to be known as Plato's theory of ideas, Dupréel has to maintain (pp. 278-9) that Socrates at the end of the *Cratylus* refers not to any such theory of ideas but to "a simple substantialist realism." This he does by quoting 440 B 4-6; but he does not mention the words with which Socrates introduces this passage (439 C ff.): πότερον φῶμέν τι εἶναι αὐτὸν καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐν ἔκαστον τῶν δυτῶν οὗτων η̄ μῆ; . . . αὐτὸν τοὺντις ἔκεινο σκεψώμεθα, μῆ εἰ πρόσωπόν τι ἔστιν καλὸν η̄ τι τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ δοκεῖ ταῦτα πάντα ἴειν· ἀλλ᾽ αὐτό, φῶμεν, τὸ καλὸν οὐ τοιούτον δεῖ ἔστιν οἴοντες ἔστιν; and later (439 E): εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ ωσαύτως ἔχει καὶ τὸ αὐτὸν ἔστι, πῶς ἀν τοῦτο γε μεταβάλλοι η̄ κινοῖτο, μηδὲν ἔξιστάμενον τῆς αὐτοῦ ιδέας; So Socrates explicitly says that he is not talking about "des êtres concrets du sens commun, étendus et temporal," as Dupréel asserts; and the ἐν ἔκαστον τῶν δυτῶν in 440 B 6, as αὐτὸν . . . ἐν ἔκαστον τῶν δυτῶν in 439 C 8 f. proves, refers to the ideas as do the similar phrases in *Phaedo* 78 D (αὐτὸν ἔκαστον δὲ ἔστιν, τὸ δὲ), *Republic* 493 Ε (αὐτὸν τι ἔκαστον), *Republic* 596 Α (εἶδος γάρ πού τι ἐν ἔκαστον εἰώθαμεν τίθεσθαι).

<sup>16</sup> Since the "digression" of the *Theaetetus*, however, does not fit Dupréel's notion of Hippias, it must have been taken from Prodicus (pp. 287-9). It is amusing to observe that the philosophic soul, which is here supposed to represent the ideal of Prodicus in opposition to that of Hippias, is nevertheless spoken of as γεωμετροῦσα . . . ἀστρονομοῦσα καὶ πάσαν πάντη φύσιν ἐρευνωμένη τῶν δυτῶν ἔκαστον δλου (173 Ε-174 Α), activities the mere reference to which elsewhere is enough to cause Dupréel to ascribe the whole context to Hippias.

93),<sup>17</sup> and in the conception of ὁρθὴ δόξα, the mathematical section of the *Meno*, and even the doctrine of reminiscence.<sup>18</sup> The specific conclusions hardly matter, however, for by using Dupréel's "method" one could easily reach any number of conclusions inconsistent with his but equally startling and equally invalid. Even as it would be impossible in less space than a book at least as long as his to describe the paralogisms, the misinterpretations, and the suppression or ignorance of evidence on which each step in his construction is built, so it would have been unnecessary to take the space for as many examples of them as have here been given, were it not that several reviewers through irresponsibility or their own desire to reconstruct philosophic systems for the sophistical heroes of Dupréel, have declared that the book "has important consequences for the history of philosophy, especially for the solution of Platonic problems"<sup>19</sup> or that it is "un allarme dato agli storici della filosofia e un invito."<sup>20</sup> An alarm it surely is, and it should be a warning of the depths to which the study of all ancient history may swiftly fall if such an irresponsible misuse of texts and such an uncritical attitude towards the rules of evidence, instead of being censured for what they are, are given by reviewers the honorific title of "la via intuitiva-filosofica."<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Socrates says (*Symposium* 198 D), φυην δειν τάληθη λέγειν περὶ ἔκστατον τοῦ ἐγκωμιαζομένου, which according to Dupréel (p. 386) is "the Hippian manner of opposing truth to the adulterated charms of pure rhetoric"; but he is apparently unaware that Gorgias himself at the beginning of his Encomium on Helen said: ἔγώ δὲ βούλομαι . . . δεῖξας τάληθες παῖσαι τῆς ἀμαθίας (II, p. 288, 11 ff. [Diels-Kranz]). Later (p. 392) Dupréel adduces as "proof" that Hippias was the source of the first part of Diotima's speech the phrase καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα in 211 C, for "this typical and rare expression" is used by Hippias in *Hippias Major* 286 A-B in giving the contents of his set speech about Neoptolemus and Nestor; but this expression, far from being "typical and rare" occurs among countless other places in *Laches* 180 C, *Gorgias* 474 D-E, *Republic* 394 E (in a sentiment that could not have been shared by Hippias), 444 E, 560 B (in a book which Dupréel says [p. 378] contains nothing significant for his subject!).

<sup>18</sup> Pp. 304-5 and p. 386 ("nous savons de reste que le *Ménon* est à base de philosophie hippienne"). Dupréel does not observe, of course, that reminiscence is of knowledge gained while the soul is outside of the body (*Meno* 86 A), i.e. direct knowledge of the ideas. In note 1 on p. 304 he does not hesitate to ascribe to Hippias even the mathematical achievement ascribed to Theaetetus in *Theaetetus* 147 D-148 B and to suggest that Hippias was the real author of all the mathematical work usually ascribed to Theaetetus.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. *Sophia*, XVIII (1950), p. 414.

<sup>20</sup> M. Untersteiner, *Rivista Critica di Storia della Filosofia*, V (1950), p. 138-9. Untersteiner has however begun to ascribe to Hippasus the theory of the irrational numbers in his article "Hippasus und die Irrationalzahlen" in *Quellen und Quellenkritik*.

<sup>21</sup> Untersteiner, *op. cit.*, p. 138. I must mention here by way of correction the kind review of Dupréel's book by T. Todor, *Pis Maistralis*, A. S. XXVIII (1950), pp. 354-62.

Euripides, *Helena*. Edited with Commentary and General Remarks  
by A. Y. CAMPBELL. Liverpool, University Press, 1950. Pp.  
xvii + 172. 12s. 6d.

This new edition of the *Helen* is almost entirely devoted to establishing a correct and intelligible text. In a brief preface Professor Campbell states that the work is the fruit of many years of reading the play and attempting, at various times, to find solutions for the many difficulties in the *textus receptus*. In his view, esthetic appreciation of the literary and dramatic qualities of a play must wait upon "the substitution of an acceptable for an unacceptable text." For this reason, he has placed his exegesis of the significance and merits of the play at the end of the volume, in a little essay entitled "Remarks on the Play" (pp. 157-69). He stresses the excellence of the character-drawing in the case of Helen, who is here presented as "the perfect wife"; he agrees with Weeklein and Mahaffy in believing that the more favorable picture of the Spartan Menelaus in this play (as compared to the odious character presented in the earlier *Andromache* and later *Orestes*) reflects the attitude of Euripides toward the Peloponnesian War: in 412 B. C. (the date of the *Helen*) not Sparta, but the Persians, the "barbarians" in general, were the real enemy. The drama underscores the folly of war (the Trojan War was fought over a phantom) and highlights Greek courage and resourcefulness; and it reflects "anti-barbarian nationalism." In passing, Campbell devotes several pages to a discussion of the *Bacchae*, which merits fuller treatment elsewhere.

But it is as a specimen of textual criticism that this edition must be judged. The preface to the Notes states that "the chief purpose of these notes is to offer solutions of all difficulties not already settled by previous editors or critics"; and elsewhere the editor remarks, "I have done all I could to make the text of this play a substantially perfect restoration." (Italics mine.) Accordingly, the notes are entirely concerned with textual matters; literary and dramatic points are mentioned only to support or refute various textual readings. The remainder of this review, therefore, must be devoted to Campbell's handling of the text.

The extent of Campbell's revision of the Greek text of the play may be gathered from the following figures: taking the Oxford Text of Gilbert Murray as a current and standard *textus receptus* (at least, for British and American readers), we find at least 270 different readings in this new edition. Of these variants, between 140 and 150 are new readings or emendations proposed by Campbell himself. For purposes of comparison, it is worth noting that Murray, apparently a conservative editor, introduces only 22 new readings into his text of the same play; Nauck's edition of 1885 prints 28 emendations in his text, although possibly twice as many changes are suggested in his critical apparatus. At any rate, Campbell is not the man to hide his conjectures behind a polite *velim*, *malim*, or *expectes*, or any of the other shields that editors use to protect themselves from the slings and arrows of outrageous critics. Readers of this review will not expect a detailed discussion of these many textual changes; and the reviewer will cheerfully admit that he is hardly qualified, either by training or by temperament, to

pass a definitive judgment on most of them. But a few passages may be cited and a few details given, in order to illustrate Campbell's approach and methods in editing the play.

The purpose, we are told, of the many and often violent changes in the text is to make "perfect sense," good grammar, and better meter. These are laudable aims, which every editor must share and every reader applaud; but there are limits to the process of making perfect sense in poetry, as Bentley's unlucky "emendations" of Milton remind us. At times, Campbell seems determined to improve on Euripides. For example, at line 873 the priestess Theonoe says to Helen (in our received text):

Ἐλένη, τί τάμα—πῶς ἔχει—θεσπίσματα;  
ἢκαι πόσις σοι Μενέλεως ὁδ' ἐμφανῆς. . . .

("What of my prophecies now, Helen? How do they stand? For your husband Menelaus *has* come, etc.") It is objected that this speech makes Theonoe appear to boast somewhat idly of the truth of her prophecies, to the detriment of an otherwise serious and dignified character. To remove this blemish, Campbell therefore rewrites:

Ἐλένη, ποταίνι' ὡς ἔχης θεσπίσματα κτλ.

("Helen, that you may now have a fresh prophecy, etc."). This is equally good sense and Greek grammar, but is it really necessary? Why should not Theonoe stress, in passing, the truth of her previous statement to Helen (reported in lines 530-4) that Menelaus is still alive and will come to her? Has Campbell "emended" this line, or has he not rather rewritten it to conform with his ideas of what is appropriate characterization in the drama?

Here is another example: the vulgate text of lines 260-6 reads as follows:

260	τέρπας γὰρ ὁ βίος καὶ τὰ πράγματα' ἔστι μου, τὰ μὲν δι' Ἡραν, τὰ δὲ τὸ κάλλος αἴτιον. εἴθε ἔξαλευφθεῖσ' ὡς ἄγαλμ' αἰθίσ πάλιν αἴσχιον εἶδος ἔλαβον ἀντὶ τοῦ καλοῦ <sup>1</sup> καὶ τὰς τύχας μὲν τὰς κακὰς ἃς νῦν ἔχω
265	"Ελλῆνες ἐπελάθοντο, τὰς δὲ μὴ κακοὺς ἔσωξον ὥσπερ τὰς κακὰς σώζουσί μου.

This seems to mean (roughly): "Portentous is my life, and my fortune, partly because of Hera, but in part my beauty is to blame. Would that I were erased, like a picture, and had received an uglier form in place of my fair one! And would that the Greeks had forgotten these misfortunes that I now suffer, and kept in mind my honorable career, as now they remember my shameful one." This is, to be sure, slightly awkward and repetitious, but it seems to involve no insuperable difficulties, if by her ill fortune (*τύχας*) Helen means her unsavory reputation among the Greeks. But to Campbell, the whole passage seems fatuous and ludicrous, even utter nonsense; he rewrites as follows (adding a new line after 262):

<sup>1</sup> ἀντὶ τοῦ καλοῦ λαβεῖν, MSS.

- 260      τέρας δ' ὁ βίοτος καὶ τὰ πράγματ' ἔστι μοῦ,  
         τὰ μὲν δι' Ἡραν, τὰ δὲ τὸ κάλλος αἰτιον  
 263      αἰσχιον εἶδος μ' ἀντὶ τοῦ καλοῦ λαβεῖν.  
 262      εἴθ' ἔξαλειφθεῖσ' ὡς ἄγαλμ' αὐθις πάλιν  
 262a     καλλιον εἶδος ἔλαβον ἀντὶ τοῦ κακοῦ  
         καὶ τοὺς τύπους μὲν τοὺς κακοὺς οὖς νῦν ἔχω  
 265      "Ελλῆνες ἐπελάθοντο, τοὺς δὲ μὴ κακοὺς  
         ἔσωξον ὥσπερ τοὺς κακοὺς σφύζουσί μου.

Now, unless *εἶδος* is to be understood in the sense of "reputation" (a meaning for which I can find no parallel), this seems to reverse completely the sense of the speech: Helen is now praying for a fairer form to replace her present ugly appearance, although there is no other suggestion that she has lost her well-known beauty; Menelaus and the messenger have, at any rate, no difficulty in recognizing her. And even if we admit that Helen is referring to "surface blemishes" on her reputation (as Campbell's note seems to suggest), this new text still seems to me to involve too many alterations to be convincing. If the vulgate text were completely unintelligible, one might accept Campbell's readings, *exempli gratia*, as a suggestion of what Euripides *might* have written. But the editor has no such reservations in his mind; this is purportedly a "perfect restoration" of the original text. That this passage may be an improvement on the text as preserved in our manuscripts or printed by other editors, I am willing to concede; but I cannot bring myself to believe that it is what Euripides originally wrote.

One more example will suffice: at line 437, Menelaus knocks at the gate of the palace, only to be rudely ordered away with threats of immediate death by the Old Woman who guards the doors. To this Menelaus replies (441-2, Murray's text):

ὅ γραῖα, ταῦτα, ταῦτ'. ἐπεὶ (ἔπη, MSS) καλῶς λέγεις.  
     ἔξεστι, πείσομαι γάρ· ἀλλ' ἀνε λόγον.

This is a somewhat lame and halting answer; we may suppose that Menelaus is taken aback by the violence of the Old Woman's speech. But in Campbell's opinion, "The MS. reading is unlike Falstaff; it is so imbecile that it is a cause of inanity in editors and even in critics." He therefore writes (noting that the previous speech of the Old Woman is "within"):

ὅ γραῖα, χαῖνα ταῦτ'. ἔμοι δ' ἀπλῶς λέγειν  
     ἔξεστ', ἐπείγομαι γάρ· ἀλλ' ἀνε μοχλόν.

On the basis of this improvement, Campbell characterizes Menelaus (in his "Remarks on the Play") as "a man battered, embittered, bold, blunt, Byronic; decisive and caustic. We feel his character from the first and he never loses it" (p. 158). This is surprising, as his next speech (line 445) says, in effect, "Oh! please don't hit me!" And in the rest of his dialogue with the Old Woman he is generally conciliatory.

Separate treatment should be given to Campbell's handling of the lyrics. It should be noted that he is a firm believer in exact, regular

correspondence between strophe and antistrophe; as he remarks (p. xiii), "Until some one has the patience (and time) to go through all the lyrics of tragedy from this—i. e., the genuinely critical—point of view, it must remain idle to dogmatize about antistrophic licenses." To be sure; but until that time comes, one might as well pay some attention to the manuscript tradition; to amend passages that make passable sense and correct Greek solely to secure exact metrical correspondence involves just as much of an assumption as the belief in antistrophic licenses. Hence, when Campbell remarks, after completely rewriting lines 1319-36, "Observe that where my changes alter the metre, they make it correspond exactly to the strophe. I hope this feat will not be thought to have been beyond the powers of Euripides": we might ask whether Euripides necessarily attempted to secure such exact response. Perhaps other reasons—musical or choreographic—made a certain amount of license preferable. At any rate, there is good ancient evidence from the fifth century that Euripides was noted—even notorious—for metrical and musical licenses.

For the rest, it must suffice to note the following drastic changes in the lyric passages: lines 229-51, which other editors treat as an epode, have been rewritten to form a third strophe and antistrophe. In the first stasimon (1107-64), Campbell has reversed the order of strophe and antistrophe B, in order to secure a smoother connection of ideas or themes. And the second stasimon (1301-68) has been almost completely rewritten, in order to secure "a lucid, coherent, and consecutive story." It is true that in this new text, the myth of Demeter's search for Kore is clearer and easier to follow than in any other edition. But again a question arises: is this the essence of the *lyric* style in handling myths, namely to tell a lucid, coherent, and consecutive story?

This review is not meant to imply that all of Campbell's changes are gratuitous and unconvincing. In many cases, some correction of the manuscript reading is necessary, and Campbell's emendations make good sense. In several cases, this reviewer feels that his readings are improvements over all previous editions (e. g., at lines 399, 497, 525, 577). There is no doubt that future editors of Euripides will have to reckon seriously with this edition. But one may be permitted to question whether such a radically new, completely reconstituted text of the *Helena* was really needed at the present moment. Campbell is convinced that a study of the literary and dramatic qualities of a tragedy is useless if the words of the text are wrong. This, of course, is obviously true; but the work of many generations of acute textual criticism has produced, it would seem, a reasonably intelligible text of Euripides. After all, how different is the play in this new version? Despite the many drastic changes, this reviewer feels that it is the same *Helen* that he knew before: one of Euripides' best plays of romantic adventure, with a charming picture of the keen-witted Greek Helen. A few minor changes may be noted in the details of characterization, some of the repartee in stichomythy is more pointed, and the lyrics are metrically more regular; but that is all. Scholars should always be grateful for improvements in their basic texts; progress is essential in classical studies, as well as in the sciences; but improvements in the texts of

standard authors form only one of the many fields in which progress is needed, and it might be argued that it is today one of the least important of those fields. Campbell was previously known to this reviewer only as the author of an excellent, keenly critical and stimulating study of Horace; his valuable time and critical acumen might have been better employed in writing other similar books.

But, quite apart from the value of such a work as a "scholarly contribution," Campbell urges strongly the educational value of such studies. The point of view from which he apparently would have us approach our literary studies may be summed up in his own words (Preface, p. xi): "If the ancient literature and particularly its poetry still retains an educational value, such (i. e. textual) problems serve to elicit that value in its most concentrated form. . . . The peculiar excellence of the classical poetry lies in its monumental quality; it has endured not merely because it is good in content, but because it was so stringently conditioned. He who has the patience to wrestle with a textual corruption feels the stringency of those conditions and therefore appreciates that monumental quality as no one else ever can. . . . The issues opened by a big fat crux are the best means possible of making a keen student appreciate the value, and so understand the necessity, of all the various technical branches of classical study." This seems to suggest that the chief value of classical studies and teaching lies in an appreciation of the peculiar formal qualities and techniques which shaped the literary works, quite apart from what these works may have to say. Such studies have their place, especially in graduate seminars; the gifted, imaginative student who after long struggles succeeds in reaching some solution for a hopelessly corrupt line of (say) Aeschylus may properly feel that he is closer to an understanding of the creative process of the poet. Nonetheless, this reviewer remembers sitting through a course in graduate school in which the great religious dramas of Aeschylus were presented solely as a series of "good fat crucis." He can testify that, as a preparation for understanding the meaning of Greek tragedy and for passing on some conception of its values to students later committed to his charge, such a method of instruction leaves a great deal to be desired.

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- T. ROBERT S. BROUGHTON, with the collaboration of MARCIA L. PATTERSON. *The Magistrates of the Roman Republic*, Volume I, 509 B.C.-100 B.C. New York, American Philological Association (to be ordered through the Association's agents: Lancaster Press and B. H. Blackwell), 1951. Pp. xix + 578. (*Philological Monographs*, No. XV, vol. I.)

Students of the Roman Empire have long enjoyed the help of the *Prosopographia Imperii Romani* both in its original and now partly in its second edition. No such tool, no *Prosopographia Liberae Rei*

*Publicae*, has aided the researches of students of the earlier period. The need for such a work is patent: it was felt in the late Republic itself by Atticus who based his *Liber Annalis* upon his researches about the noble families and the holders of the chief magistracies (Nepos, *Att.*, 18; cf. Cic., *Ad Att.*, XIII, 4-6). Professor Broughton has now gone a long way towards filling this gap for his contemporaries. A full-scale Republican *Prosopographia* would probably present an enterprize too arduous for a single writer and too ambitious for publication in these days, but we have here a most valuable substitute, a list of magistrates and officials which would indeed necessarily form the essential basis and the most important part of a complete Prosopography.

Within the covers of one work it will now be possible to survey the administrative personnel of the Republic. How great an advantage this is can best be measured by recalling the *disiecta membra* of the modern literature, often difficult of access and widely scattered. For consuls, dictators, and censors, it is true, we now have Degrassi's monumental *Inscriptiones Italiae*, XIII, but for the praetorian Fasti there are Wehrmann, Hölzl, Maxis, Stella Maranca; for aediles Seidel; for quaestors Sobeck; for ambassadors Krug; for tribunes Niccolini; for priests Bardt and Klose; for promagistrates we have to turn to works on provincial Fasti, as those by Wilsdorf, Pallu de Lessert, Waddington, Chapot, and now more recently to Magie and W. Jashemski; other material has to be sought in the prosopographical articles of Münzer and others in Pauly-Wissowa, in Drumann-Groebel or Orelli's *Onomasticon*. Not many private libraries will have such an array of these and other such necessary works on their shelves. But now comes the first of the two indispensable volumes of Broughton *M.R.R.* (as no doubt the work will be dubbed) with a wealth of compact reference and information.

Volume I includes magistrates and officials from 509 to 100 B.C. (the section on 218-201 B.C. was prepared by Dr. Marcia Patterson); the second volume will continue the annual lists to 31 B.C., where *P.I.R.* commences; it will also include magistrates whose dates are quite uncertain, together with the Monetales, and will provide an Index containing a summary reference-list of careers. The method employed is to list the officials year by year (the traditional Varronian chronology being adopted). Each entry is followed by references to the ancient evidence for the name, office, and date, and then by a summary, with references to the sources, of the individual's activities in office; discrepancies and difficulties are discussed in notes placed at the end of each year. The officials are listed in the following order: consuls, dictators, masters of horse, censors, praetors, aediles, iudex quaestionis, tribunes of the plebs, quaestors, promagistrates, military tribunes, legates (i. e. ambassadors sent by the Senate to deal with foreign powers, envoys sent by the Senate to officials or vice versa, and lieutenants serving with definite military functions), prefects, commissioners (appointed or elected to assign land, dedicate temples, etc.) and finally priests and Vestal Virgins. The inclusion of priests of the various colleges, who were neither magistrates nor appointed annually, is nevertheless both wise and welcome: priesthoods were coveted by the Roman

nobility for the political influence which they afforded no less than for the social prestige. The separate listing of the Moneyers, promised in Vol. II, may be more open to doubt; it is true that their dating in the period before the last decade or two covered by the present volume is very controversial, but in the later Republic much greater accuracy can be obtained, and there it might have been helpful to have them lined up with the other officials (after all in this volume praetorships of uncertain date are often listed under specific years, with some such observation as "the latest possible date under the Lex Villia"); one advantage, however, is that before Vol. II is published Broughton possibly might have the opportunity of assessing the dating suggested in a forthcoming work by the late E. A. Sydenham which represents a considerable advance over Grueber and S. L. Cesano.

It will thus be apparent that a most valuable tool has been placed in students' hands: a source book of the factual information contained in the ancient sources. With this purpose in mind Broughton has restricted discussion mainly to questions relating to individual names, offices, and dates, and to the material necessary to explain the lists which we have; he has therefore excluded the problems of early chronology and of the reliability of the early Fasti and has concentrated primarily upon making available the lists themselves. His own position is, however, fairly conservative: unpersuaded by the recent work of scholars like Hanell, he is inclined to accept almost the entire list of eponymous magistrates, and the authority of Livy is set above that of Diodorus and the Capitoline Fasti: "it is probable that Livy preserves the best record of the magistrates of the Roman Republic" (p. xii).

In general therefore discussion is brief, while occasionally compression has led to slight inelegance if not obscurity of expression. In a work that covers so wide a field there is naturally much room for disagreement on minor points, but the present reviewer has few bones to pick; rather he has found encouragement in the fact that so often Broughton's judgment gives independent support to points of detail which he has accepted in a recent work. A few random and disjointed observations may be added. On some points a little more discussion would have been welcome: e. g. in the case of doubtful identifications, such as the legate Q. Minucius of 174 B.C. (p. 405), since the consul of 197 and the praetor of 165 or 164 do not exhaust the possibilities. Also, in cases of doubt, where the author does not seem to have a very decided preference, the doubt might well be expressed in the heading either by the use of question-marks or by expanding the heading (as here: "Pr. 165 or 164 or Cos. 197" instead of merely "Pr. 165 or 164"). Further, more question-marks might help in places where the date of a man's office remains uncertain, e. g. before M. Livius Drusus on p. 560, while on p. 234 the question-mark should go with the heading *Consul Suffectus*, not with *Aemilius Lepidus*, since if he was not the suffect there is no reason to suppose that there was one in 221 B.C. Again, when it is known that a man's office fell in one of two years, might not his name (though not any discussion) have been inserted with queries twice (e. g. *Ti. Sempronius Gracchus* as tribune in

187 as well as 184, or Glaucia in 104 as well as 101); the information is given in the notes, but such duplication might make for clarity. A few more references to modern literature might be added, e.g. to A. Aymard, *Rev. Ét. Anc.*, 1944 on p. 319, to Balsdon, *P. B. S. R.*, 1938, on p. 519 as an antidote to Carcopino, or to Schulten's *Fontes Hispaniae Antiquae*; also why should Malcovati's *O. R. F.* appear as *F. O. R.?* If, as is presumably true, C. Maenius, consul in 338, was the censor of 318, a cross-reference should appear on p. 155. Cato is listed as augur on the strength of Cie., *Sen.*, 64 (p. 457) but the reading is not discussed, while the passages cited on p. 460 provide evidence for his death not his augurate. The acceptance (p. 578, n. 5) of Sydenham's date for the Caepio-Piso *denarii* (*ca.* 94 B.C.) does not involve postulating yet another Caepio: Sydenham's point is that the use of *cognomina*, instead of *praenomina* or *nomina*, suggests that Caepio and Piso were not the moneyers but were commemorated on the coins, and thus the date of the coins provides no evidence (except a *terminus ante quem*) for that of Caepio's quaestorship. On p. 573, n. 2 it might be made clearer that 104 is also a possible date for the lex Servilia Glauciae. The following misprints may be noted: Hordeonius (p. 37), Hannibal for Hasdrubal and Masinissa for Massiva (p. 291), Appenine (p. 296), L. for M. Aemilius Paulus (p. 347, *s. v.* Aediles), 172 for 173 (p. 419, *s. v.* Sulpicius Galus), 209 for 203 (p. 469, n. 6).

To return from trifles to that meed of praise and gratitude which is Professor Broughton's due. The lists and the headings are set out with great clarity which makes the use of this book easy. It is an indispensable work of reference, of which the compilation must have involved an immense amount of assiduous and careful labour. He has placed all those interested in the history of the Roman Republic deeply in his debt. They now look forward to the completion of the second volume, with the Index which will also facilitate the use of the first. *Finis opus coronat!*

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Theocritus. Edited with a translation and commentary by A. S. F. Gow. Vol. I: Introduction, Text and Translation. Pp. lxxxiv + 257. Vol. II: Commentary, Appendix, Indexes, and Plates. Pp. 635 + 15 plates. Cambridge, at the University Press, 1950.

These splendid volumes are the culmination of the most exciting period in the history of Theocritus editing, the *quadriennium mirabile* which has given us successively Gallavotti, Pisani (both of 1946), Latte<sup>1</sup> (1948), and finally Gow. *Finis opus coronat.* Theocritus is well on his way to becoming the spoiled child of this period of classical philology. Gow's books are beautiful, both within and without, and at a time like the present the completion of such an enterprise

<sup>1</sup> A year spent in the company of Gow induces the wish that the statements in *C. P.*, XLVI (1951), p. 134 had been a trifle less enthusiastic.

is of the greatest credit both to the editor and to the press which produced it.

The text adopted is rather conservative, but this is no doubt an advantage for an edition which will certainly be the standard for a century or more to come and may serve as a model to editors other than those of Theocritus.

When one reads an ancient author, if the reading is fortified also by curiosity, one encounters innumerable problems; and if one turns to the usual sort of commentary, nine times out of nine the questions that perplex are not asked, let alone answered. But with the advent of Gow the situation in Alexandrian studies, at least, is greatly altered: nearly every conceivable issue is raised, and it is through no failure of industry or acumen or resourcefulness that all the answers are not equally convincing.

One of the thorniest of the problems, one which a scholar of even the intelligence and courage of Archibald Campbell<sup>2</sup> confesses to be "too difficult" for him, is that of interpolation. Gow recognizes eleven lines only as certainly to be athetised: 2, 61; 6, 41; 8, 77; 13, 61; 20, 7-8, 33; 23, 30-1; 24, 86-7. In the poems which he regards as unquestionably Theocritean there is generally external evidence available. But even thus abetted he seems to be uneasy and at 8, 77 remarks that "in spite of its presence in" the papyrus, the line "must be a marginal citation from 9.7." Here is a misconception which Jachmann has been combatting now these many years. There seem to be few scholars in England, apart from Edouard Fränkel,<sup>3</sup> who have acquired a taste for Jachmann. This is not the place to urge the deletion of a dozen or so further disfigurements, or to discuss the stanza theory (which Gow unceremoniously rejects at II, p. 16, n. 1, but later appears to invoke on p. 47); but a few points may be raised. If Valckenaer's deletion of 3, 20 (together with Haupt's [*Opusc.*, I, p. 180] transposition of 3, 24 to follow 3, 19) be accepted, a perfect strophic form is restored. 8, 31-2 (Wordsworth) seem a certain interpolation; whether the lines appear in a papyrus or were known to Vergil has little or no relevance to the real question. Vergil imitated 9, but can that be invoked to contest the charge of spuriousness? And surely 9, 6 (Meineke) is to be athetised, as are also 15, 142 (cf. C.P., XLVI [1951], p. 21); 27, 9, 72-3; and 28, 4 (Haeberlin), to name merely a fairly obvious handful. 23, 28-32 and 13, 72-5 (a probable *Schlussinterpolation*) present special problems which must be debated elsewhere.

A few queries of detail: the note on 1, 132-6 is useful, but somewhat confusing. Does not Daphnis mean that his death is so tragic that it signifies in itself a complete reversal of nature? His is a spirit meant for immortality (he thinks), so that his personal calamity upsets the natural order. Anything, therefore, can (and will) happen to anyone or anything.<sup>4</sup>—Is it possible that we have that

<sup>2</sup> Euripides, *Helen*, p. xvi.

<sup>3</sup> At *Agam.* 7 (II, p. 9) Fränkel embraces the new doctrine and, surprisingly enough, calls it "the current view." But this, alas, is probably not true either in this country or abroad. (See, for example, Rose, *C.R.*, LXIV [1950], p. 106).

<sup>4</sup> Is it, after all, conceivable that 136 should be deleted?

exotic rarity, a short vowel subjunctive, at 2, 3 and 28, 6? <sup>5</sup>—May not ῥὸ κάλλος ἐτάκερο (2, 83) mean simply “the beauty of my face grew pale”?—Is there not a lacuna after 5, 24?—At 15, 89 should Praxinoa call her opponent a “gentleman”?—Is “contemptible” the right word for the isopsephist’s art (II, p. 535)? In the same spirit we are told that 23 is a “disgusting” poem (*C. R.*, LIX [1945], p. 53); there are no bouquets for 12 either, where Wilamowitz’ heavy influence is heavily felt.

For some of the testimonia we must still go to Gallavotti or Pisani or Ahrens, or even to Latte (as at 3, 5). Far more disconcerting is the misfortune which has overtaken the apparatus at Ep. 11, 4, 5 (for 5 write 4 and transfer the reading of KCDIunt. to precede that of the Anth., ὅν; insert 5 before ἐπέοικε).

But the absence of serious complaint may indicate the excellence of the work both as a whole and in detail. There is high value throughout and great profit to be had on every page of the commentary; especially important is the treatment of the Bucolic singing contests (II, pp. 92-4) and the notes on 7, 118; 10, 14; 11, 51 ff.; 12, 35 f.; 13, 52; 15, 15 f., to single out merely a few. The treatment of 16 is a triumph throughout. There is a capital correction by Denniston at 3, 27 and a first-rate emendation of Gow’s own at 13, 15, printed modestly<sup>6</sup> in the note (II, p. 235). There are fifteen plates, everyone of them clear, relevant, and beautiful.

The bibliography is so thorough, particularly as the editor notes from 1900-1940, that few additions of any moment can be made.<sup>7</sup> 2, 60-1: Jachmann, “Binneninterpolationen II,” *Gött. Nach.*, 1936, p. 190, n. 1.—2, 66-8: Lawler, *T. A. P. A.*, LXXVIII (1947), pp. 88 ff.—2, 82: Fairclough, *C. P.*, XXV (1930), pp. 38 f.—14, 60: Jachmann, *Stud. zu Juvenal*, p. 212, n. 2.—25: Linforth, *T. A. P. A.*, LXXVIII (1947), pp. 77 ff. and see on several places in 25: Svensson, *Gebrauch d. bestimmten Artikels in d. nachklassischen gr. Epik* (Lund, 1937), pp. 71 f.—25, 163: Barber, *C. R.*, XXXIX (1925), p. 30.—27, 42 f.: Cook, *C. R.*, XV (1901), p. 326.—Ep. 2: Kaibel, *Herm.*, XV (1880), p. 456.—Ep. 14, 2: Rostovtzeff, *C. A. H.*, VIII, p. 630.—Ep. 19: Hansen, *De Leon. Tar.*, pp. 15 f.—Ep. 21: Blumenthal, *Die Schätzung d. Archilochus im Altertum*, p. 16. Latte’s interesting work (*Gött. Nach.*, 1949, pp. 225-32) appeared too late to be of service.<sup>8</sup>

*Theocritum quoque edendo Germanos provocamus.* A true appraisal

<sup>5</sup> For faint traces in Doric see Bechtel, II, pp. 135, 497, 753-4.

<sup>6</sup> Modesty, in fact, is far too much emphasized: I, p. ix: “my own innovations in the text are few and trifling.” The first adjective is true, the second is not; fortunately far otherwise, as at 30, 5. Other changes, not always “trifling,” are to be found at 8, 42, 93; 15, 127 (cf. *C. P.*, XLVI, p. 19); 21, 23, 49, 61; 25, 158; 28, 10, 21; 29, 19; 30, 13; frag. 3, 1. Ahrens, of course, leads the list of great correctors; his name, quite properly, appears more than one hundred times, even in this conservative apparatus. The only others to be cited more than 25 times are Wilamowitz, Brunck, Meineke, and Bergk, in that order (cf. *C. P.*, XLVI, p. 134, n. 5).

<sup>7</sup> And one has always the uneasy feeling that if one searches hard enough everything will turn up.

<sup>8</sup> Though Latte is not likely to be right on 15, 119: see Page, *Greek Literary Papyri*, I, 331, n.

of Gow's work can extend only into the centuries of his ultimate usefulness. If there is to be any future for Theocritean scholarship, his volumes will be of prime importance, to set beside—whose? If Ahrens' commentary had appeared, Gow's might not have been needed so badly. But as it is, one must not list merely illustrious names, Reiske, Valekenaer, Meineke, who should have performed prodigious feats of Theocritean interpretation. They have not, in fact, done so, except as the fancy took them or the pen lay to hand. In sober earnest it may be claimed that Gow is the first editor to force himself to attack everything systematically.<sup>9</sup> That he is occasionally defeated or unsatisfactory is a trifle. He gives one everything, or nearly everything, that may be desired. His work may stand beside Fränkel's *Agamemnon* and Pfeiffer's *Callimachus* as a monument to the intensity and the integrity of scholarship today.

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SIEGFRIED J. DE LAET. Portorium, Étude sur l'organisation douanière chez les Romains, surtout à l'époque du Haut-Empire. Bruges, 1949. Pp. 510. (*Rijksuniversiteit te Gent, Werken uitgegeven door de faculteit van de wijsbegeerte en letteren*, 105<sup>e</sup> Aflevering.)

The *portorium*, as illuminated in this study, was in root a tax on passage. It thus embraced our modern import and export duties, octroi, and tolls, and could be levied at inland as well as coastal points; not only goods but also corpses were subject to it (*Dig.*, XI, 7, 37pr.). When it first appears clearly in Republican history (199 B.C., *Livy*, XXXII, 7) each collecting station was farmed out separately, and this continued to be true in Italy and Sicily throughout the Republic; but by the end of the second century B.C. the equestrians had gained enough capital to form great tax companies which farmed whole provinces.

In the Early Empire the collection unit was usually a group of provinces: the *Quadragesima Galliarum* (at its height embracing all the Gauls, the Germans, the western Alps, and part of Ractia), the *Publicum portorii Illyrici* (the Danube provinces), the *Quattuor publica Africæ* (western North Africa), the *Quadragesima portuum Asiae* (eventually all Asia Minor probably), the *Quinquagesima Hispaniarum*. Other provinces were probably farmed singly, except for Egypt and Syria (with Judaea), where the Hellenistic practice of farming each station separately continued throughout the Early Empire. In the major units the basis of division was on purely geographical lines rather than between senatorial and imperial provinces; and the collecting stations, which De Laet lists in detail, were

<sup>9</sup> One of the innumerable matters for which we must be grateful is I, pp. xxxiv-lv, where Gow sets out clearly all relevant information about the MSS, their interrelation, the editors' notions about this wretched matter, and all kindred woes.

located either on the frontier or on main geographical lines, as river crossings, mountain passes, etc. De Laet thus disposes once for all of Domaszewski's attempt to trace provincial boundaries on the basis of tariff stations. In the Later Empire these large units disappear, and collecting stations were again farmed on an individual basis.

The tax was levied in the main on an *ad valorem* basis, but De Laet argues that no less than three types of rates can be detected in the Early Empire. On the frontiers the *portorium* was highest; at the boundaries of the major internal units it ran from 2% to 5%; and within major units it was collected in lesser amount, sometimes at a specific rate, at various points as a river or pass toll. Although this argument is reasonable, it is not entirely proved. De Laet shows that on the Syrian and Red Sea (*vectigal maris Rubris*) frontiers the Empire did place a 25% tariff on goods coming from the East (*Peripl. Mar. Erythr.*, 19; *A.E.*, 1947, nos. 179-80), and argues cogently that this rate was designed to cut down the loss of gold; this is almost the only place where non-fiscal motives can be detected in the Roman tariff structure. Strabo, IV, 5, 3, may be interpreted to show that trade with Britain was more heavily taxed before the annexation of the island, but further corroboration is needed to prove the point. On the tariff of the *Portus Lirensis*, probably on the Rhine and later absorbed into the Gallic unit, or of the *ripa Thraciae*, we have no useful evidence.

The most important argument De Laet can advance to support his thesis of a differentiation between tariffs on the boundaries of the major internal units and the tolls at stations within these units is that of logic: it would appear unlikely that goods moving from Italy to the Balkans via Aquileia—Poetovio had to pay a full 2% at each of the five tariff stations known on this route. The use of lead seals or pottery stamps (as at Monte Testaccio) to show payment of the tariff may have been intended to prevent new assessment at the internal checkpoints. It is a pity that the station of the Gallic and Spanish districts at Ostia (*C.I.L.*, XIV, 4708) cannot be proved to have collected the tariff for all goods clearing through Ostia either for or from the respective tax districts, for such proof would go far toward showing that the goods so taxed were not taxed again at the internal stations. The freedom of Italy from tariffs, it may be observed, was largely illusory; Rome itself had an octroi, and all products passing in or out of the peninsula were taxed by the provincial tax-farmers.

On the general history of the *portorium* De Laet clarifies our picture considerably and sweeps away a great deal of old rubbish, some of which was embalmed in Rostovtzeff's *Staatspacht*. His argument that Tiberius was responsible for the creation of the great tariff districts is perhaps overdrawn, but his analysis of subsequent territorial unification, administrative centralization, and introduction of uniformity is excellent. At the beginning of the second century the *ripa Thraciae*, *portus Lirensis*, and *Quadragesima Bithyniae* were merged into larger, adjacent units, and the great tax companies were replaced by individual *conductores* or *promagistri*. In the reigns of Marcus Aurelius and Commodus the dual machinery of private collectors with their *familiae* of slaves and state check by low-ranking

imperial procurators was merged into one system of direct state collection by imperial slaves under procurators ranking as *ducenarii*. Egypt and Syria, however, continued to be farmed in detail to local inhabitants, the ill-famed publicans of the Gospels and Talmud.

The author has missed little that is germane to his subject from the Republic through the Later Empire. On the port of Fréjus, cf. A. Donnadieu, *Fréjus* (Paris, 1935); and the analysis of conditions on the lower Danube would have benefited from consultation of Georges Cantacuzène, "Un papyrus latin relatif à la défense du Bas-Danube," *Aegyptus*, IX (1928), pp. 63-96. De Laet argues, correctly I think, that the army itself did not collect the tariffs but lent its assistance to the *vilici* of the tax-farmers by placing a *statio* near a toll point; except on the Moesian frontier, however, he passes over the river fleets in silence. The possible use of the *praefecti orae maritimae* to repress smuggling he ignores except on the north-eastern coast of Spain; cf. *A. J. P.*, LXIV (1943), pp. 56-70, or Guido Barbieri, "Il 'Praefectus Orae Maritimae,'" *Riv. fil.*, N. S. XIX (1941), pp. 268-80; XXIV (1946), pp. 166-71. The grant of local octrois to numerous cities under Alexander Severus, noted in the *S. H. A.*, is most doubtful, especially since Julian did the same (pp. 352; 123, n. 1). The most serious flaw in De Laet's general argument is his insistence that proceeds of the *portorium* went to the imperial *fiscus* rather than to the *aerarium* as in the Republic; his own comment that both senatorial and imperial provinces were grouped in the same major tariff units might have suggested otherwise, and in any event we have been moving during the last two decades to a much sounder appreciation of the true meaning of the term *fiscus*. See now the most attractive interpretation of A. H. M. Jones, "The Aerarium and the Fiscus," *J. R. S.*, XL (1950), pp. 22-9.

Apart from such minor points this is a model study which provides a firm foundation for other studies of Roman finance. The great bulk of the epigraphical evidence is quoted in the footnotes; the bibliography is remarkably full; and clear maps illuminate the discussion wherever they are needed. De Laet has considered all aspects of his subject from the Republic to the Later Empire, including not only the districts and method of collection but also local octrois, exemptions, means of enforcement, and procedures in case of argument. He agrees with Rostovtzeff that the *portorium* was the most important indirect tax in the Early Empire, and makes the hazardous suggestion that the relative abundance of evidence for Gaul, the Danubian area, and Egypt may be an indication of the relatively great significance of these areas in the economic life of the period. Quite neatly he demolishes arguments that the *portorium* was a bar on internal commerce; although goods moving across the Empire had to pay the tax at several points, the rate was not high. Only in aiding the decentralization of industry did the *portorium* play any significant role in economic developments.

One wishes that the social and economic pressures which influenced the structure of the tariff system were more visible, but apart from a few hints (e. g., Cicero, *pro M. Fonteio*, IX, 19-20) the necessary evidence does not appear to be available. De Laet refuses to build hypotheses in thin air; the sober judgment displayed throughout is

that which we have come to expect from the author of *De samenstelling van den Romeinschen Senaat*. Typographical errors are very few; the three indices are most useful.

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Panégyriques latins. Tome I. Texte établi et traduit par ÉDOUARD GALLETIER. Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1949. Pp. lxxii + 140. (*Collection des Universités de France, publiée sous le patronage de l'Association Guillaume Budé.*)

This is the first volume of a new edition of the last eleven of the *XII Panegyrici Latini*. The first of the twelve, Pliny's panegyric of Trajan, was published separately in the same collection by M. Durréy (1947), so that the present volume, omitting Pliny's discourse (which is numbered as I), contains panegyrics II-V.

The publication of the present work constitutes a major addition to the repertory of Latin texts. Not only will M. Galletier's text supersede the Teubner editions of E. Baehrens (1874) and of his son W. Baehrens (1911), which in the past have been the standard critical editions, but it is the first to contain a complete translation. Galletier wisely arranges the panegyries in chronological order, which W. Baehrens abandoned. The present volume thus contains the two panegyries of Maximian by Mamertinus, delivered in A. D. 289 and 291 (Nos. II-III), the panegyric of Constantius (A. D. 297) by an unknown author (No. IV), and the famous discourse in which Eumenius pleads (A. D. 298) for the restoration of the schools of Autun (No. V). The remainder of the edition will contain five panegyries of Constantine, one of Julian, and one of Theodosius I.

The text is supported by a full critical apparatus. The translations are polished and accurate, and are accompanied by a succinct commentary. The Introduction, of almost seventy pages, covers the history of the panegyric as a literary form, the contents of the present collection, the authors of the discourses, the discovery of the text, and the manuscript tradition; a bibliography of modern studies is provided. Each panegyric is prefaced by a separate introduction in which its date, authorship, purpose, and value are discussed.

Galletier has, with the clarity and precision which one has come to expect in the volumes of the Budé collection, provided much of the basic knowledge necessary for the study of the panegyrics. He points out the value of the discourses as contemporary, often eye-witness sources for military and political events; in some instances the panegyrics are the only evidence for important occurrences. Galletier has, however, refrained from giving more than passing attention to the significance of the panegyrics as reflections of the public opinion of the times, and their testimony on the political theory of the late Empire. Readers who wish to pursue this subject should consult (in addition to the study by R. Pichon, published in 1906, which Galletier cites) the valuable and illuminating remarks by N. H.

Baynes in *J. R. S.*, XXXIV (1944), p. 136, and A. D. Nock's article "The Emperor's Divine *Comes*," *J. R. S.*, XXXVII (1947), pp. 102-16. It is instructive in many respects, for example, to compare Themistius' approach to his task with that of the Latin orators (cf. Baynes, *loc. cit.*, and Christ-Schmid-Staecklin, *Gesch. der griech. Lit.*, II, 2 [Munich, 1924], p. 1012).

In the same year as the present volume there appeared (evidently too late for Galletier to use it) K. Ziegler's article "Panegyrikos" in *R.-E.*, XVIII, cols. 559-81. This contains material which does not appear in Galletier's introduction, and vice versa.

One may venture a modest plaint on the subject of the use of *ouv. cité*. At p. 11, n. 7, there is a reference to "Delchaye et Carcopino *ouv. cité*," but a reasonably diligent search of the text and footnotes, both preceding and following, has failed to reveal the full title. There appears to be no book written in collaboration by P. Delchaye and M. Carcopino, so that if one did not recognize the study, one would have to embark upon the considerable labor of tracking down an article on an unknown subject. At p. 8, n. 4, there is a reference to "W. Seston, *ouv. cité*." Turning back the pages, and looking into every note en route (and there are many of them), one eventually comes upon the title forty-three pages away (p. xxix, n. 3).

Unless new manuscript evidence should be discovered, this will be the definitive edition, and will not be superseded. All scholars will congratulate the editor on his fruitful labors.

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ÉMILE BOISACQ. *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque, étudiée dans ses rapports avec les autres langues indo-européennes.* 4<sup>e</sup> édition, augmentée d'un Index par Helmut Rix. Heidelberg, Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, 1950. Pp. xxxii + 1256.

This monumental work of the late Professor Boisacq of Brussels, first appearing in fascicles from 1907 to 1916, has somehow, so far as I can find, escaped review in this Journal. Despite the many years which have elapsed since it was first issued, it is still our major work on Greek etymologies, and therefore deserves at least a brief review here.

The first printing was finished after the First World War had begun, and the author was not able to examine the proofs of the final fascicles, nor the resetting of the first two fascicles, when the original edition of 750 copies had to be increased almost at once. By the anastatic method a second edition was run off in 1923, still bearing the date 1916. The third edition came in 1938, and was likewise unchanged except by the addition of an index of Italie words. Now, a few years after the lamented death of the author, we have the fourth edition, also unchanged except by the addition of an index of words cited in the etymological comparisons.

It would be inappropriate, after the lapse of so many years, to comment upon the detail of the etymologies; that has been done in various journals, long ago. But it is worth while to speak of the Index, carefully prepared by Helmut Rix, since it gives a new value to the edition even though the text is unchanged. In this Index, on pages 1125-1256, there are well over 18000 entries, arranged by languages; 129 languages are represented, 25 of them by from 100 to over 2500 entries (naturally, in view of the date of original composition, Tocharian is sparsely represented, and Hittite not at all). By this Index, Boisacq's dictionary has become a convenient handbook of Indo-European etymology, since the etymologies of words in many languages can thus be found; the same may be said also of Walde's *Lateinisches etymologisches Wörterbuch*, second edition, 1910, which is equipped with a comparable index of words. On the other hand, Walde-Pokorny's *Vergleichendes Wörterbuch der indogermanischen Sprachen*, published at Berlin in 3 vols., 1928-32, is too expensive for private ownership, and its arrangement makes consultation very inconvenient.

When I saw Boisacq in Brussels in 1932, he told me that he was at work on a revision of his dictionary, but that little of real importance had appeared since his first edition, where the bibliographical items, even in the "Additions et corrections," end with 1915. It is regrettable, therefore, that he was never able to carry through to completion the revision: few as the actual changes might be which he would have wished to make in the actual etymologies, the addition of references to the relevant articles of post-1915 date would have been of great value. Even now, a mere listing of the later literature with the words to which they apply, would be extremely useful (in this connection see my review of Hofmann's *Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Griechischen*, 1. Teil [A. J. P., LXXII, pp. 79-81]). Despite which, the fact that the demand for the volume has justified the publisher in issuing this fourth printing, demonstrates the continued heavy demand for the volume and the high esteem in which it is justifiably held.

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#### BOOKS RECEIVED.

(It is impossible to review all books submitted to the JOURNAL, but all pertaining to the classical field are listed under BOOKS RECEIVED. Contributions sent for review or notice are not returnable.)

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Baldry (H. C.). Greek Literature for the Modern Reader. Cambridge Univ. Press, 1951. Pp. 321. \$3.75.

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Coleman-Norton (P. R.), editor. Studies in Roman Economic and Social History in Honor of Allan Chester Johnson. Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1951. Pp. 373. \$5.00.

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Duckworth (George E.). *The Nature of Roman Comedy: A Study in Popular Entertainment*. Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 501. \$7.50.

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Fränkel (Hermann). *Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums. Eine Geschichte der griechischen Literatur von Homer bis Pindar*. New York, American Philological Association (to be ordered through Lancaster Press, Lancaster, Pa.; B. H. Blackwell, Oxford), 1951. Pp. xii + 680. \$7.00 (\$5.50 to members of the Association). (*Philological Monographs*, XIII.)

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Hammond (Mason). *City-State and World State in Greek and Roman Political Theory until Augustus*. Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1951. Pp. x + 217.

Hatch (William Henry Pain). *Facsimiles and Descriptions of Minuscule Manuscripts of the New Testament*. Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1951. Pp. viii + 289; 100 pls. \$15.00.

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## HOMER AND CRETAN HEROIC POETRY: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE ORAL POETRY.

### I. *The Song of Daskaloyannes*<sup>1</sup>

The oral nature of the Homeric poem raises into prominence the study of comparative oral literature, which is as old as Herder and Wolf who used analogies with folk poetry in their conception of Homer. The significance and the true foundations of this method, however, appear only with the recent conclusions of Parry and of Carpenter, namely, Homer is an oral poet and the art of writing was introduced comparatively late into Greece.<sup>2</sup> Parallels appear now not as discrete external coincidences but as cognate manifestations of the epic mind which communicates orally through the rhythm of words and deeds of men worthy of immortality and the moods of the heart which transcend transiency.<sup>3</sup> The magnitude and quality of the creations may differ greatly as seen in the disparity between Homer and the poetry of modern oral literatures, and one may hesitate

<sup>1</sup> I am indebted to the staff of the library of the University of Cincinnati for their effort to put at my disposal their excellent collection of Modern Greek books.

<sup>2</sup> For Parry's bibliography see *A. J. A.*, LII (1948), pp. 43-4; Rhys Carpenter, "The Antiquity of the Greek Alphabet," *A. J. A.*, XXXVII (1933), pp. 8-29, and *Fiction and Saga in the Homeric Epics* (Berkeley, 1946), pp. 1-22; H. L. Lorimer, "Homer and the Art of Writing: A Sketch of Opinion between 1713 and 1939," *A. J. A.*, LII (1948), pp. 11-23.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. C. M. Bowra, "The Comparative Study of Homer," *A. J. A.*, LIV (1950), pp. 184-92.

with Virgil *parvis componere magna*, yet it is time that Homeric scholarship should use comparative oral studies even as the social anthropologist must study primitive societies because "the primitive society is the closest to laboratory conditions the student of man can ever hope to get."<sup>4</sup> Homer must be studied in the laboratory of the creative oral composition which gives us opportunities to understand more intimately the relation of the poet to his audience and to the technique which he uses in shaping his material.<sup>5</sup> In such a task, where *a priori* or habitual notions of the modern mind are often obstacles to the understanding of Homer, the oral composition of even a poor primitive poet in the Balkans can often open areas of understanding hidden from us by other methods. Homeric criticism needs to enlist all the help it can get from comparative oral literature which along with archaeological and historical studies must provide the basis for any inclusive advance. This advance, as Dow remarks in a preface to a recent symposium on the problems of the Homeric epics, can best be achieved by "sober collecting and study of new source materials"<sup>6</sup> rather than by the continuation of the past theorizing, brilliant though that phase was. Thus Homeric scholarship must extend its frontiers and one of these is modern Greek heroic poetry as found in Cyprus, Crete, the Peloponnesus, Epirus, and other places. A study of the oral poetry in these regions in its relation to Homeric oral composition is a desideratum. Though Crete, *μέσῳ ἐνὶ οἴνοπι πόντῳ*, is not a unique phenomenon so far as oral epic poetry is concerned, it is chosen here as a "trial-trench" for the study of our problem. Let us now examine for the first time the conditions of epic poetry in Crete and in particular one of the examples we have at our disposal, *The Song of Daskaloyannes*, a Cretan epic poem.

Cretan oral poetry is rich in *κλέα ἀνδρῶν* and the spirit of the Homeric *ἀριστεῖα* finds cognate expression in the following lines from a Cretan oral heroic poem:

<sup>4</sup> C. Kluckhohn, *Mirror For Man, The Relation of Anthropology to Modern Life* (New York, 1949), p. 14.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. J. A. Notopoulos, "Parataxis in Homer: A New Approach to Homeric Literary Criticism," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXX (1949), pp. 14 ff.

<sup>6</sup> *A. J. A.*, LIV (1950), p. 161.

χαρά 'σ τον πόλεμο, τὸν θάνατον ὅποιος λάχει.  
οὐ τον πόλεμον ὅποιος σκοτωθῇ κερδίζει μά δὲ χάνει·  
κερδίζει δόνομον ἀθάνατον καὶ τοῦ τιμῆς στεφάνη,

“joy be to him who finds death in battle; he who dies in battle wins rather than loses; he wins an immortal name and the garland of honor.”<sup>7</sup> Φαφοντάκης, the editor of Cretan heroic poems, says in the preface to his collection :

From its beginning the poetic imagination of the much-enduring Cretan people is found quite developed and proof of this is the poetic handling of all the main historical events of the island. There has never existed, we believe, any distinguished hero, general or soldier or statesman more or less distinguished, any important battle which ended in victory or defeat, which has not been the theme of the Cretan popular Muse.

These poems, he points out, live orally on the lips of the people and are the creation of Cretan shepherd or farmer poets. These poems, even as in Roumeli and the Morea where the same conditions for oral poetry are manifest, become an intimate part in the life of the people. The mother sings lullabies to her baby to have him grow up into a *palikari* (hero);<sup>8</sup> she sings to him the brave deeds of Cretan heroes; the grandmother imbues the

<sup>7</sup> See Π. Ι. Φαφοντάκη, Συλλογὴ Ἡρωικῶν Κρητικῶν Ἀσμάτων (Athens, 1889), p. 96. For the relation of historical events in Crete to oral heroic poetry compare the account of the revolt in 1866 in Παντελῆ Πρεβελάκη, Παντέρμη Κρήτη (Athens, 1945) with the heroic poems about the heroes of this revolt in the collection of Φαφοντάκη, pp. 89-114. For the sudden gush of heroic poetry after the failure of this revolt see Πρεβελάκη, p. 226. For other sources of Cretan heroic poetry see A. Jeannaraki, *Kretas Volkslieder* (Leipzig, 1876); Εμ. Βαρδίδη, *Κρητικαὶ ῥύμαι* (Athens, 1888); A. Κριάρη, *Κρητικά Ἀσμάτα* (Canea, 1909); Eir. Σπανδωνίδη, *Κρητικὰ Τραγοῦδια* (Athens, 1935); E. Legrand, *Recueil de chansons populaires grecques* (Paris, 1874) and *Recueil de poèmes historiques en grec vulgaire* (Paris, 1877). For a bibliography of Cretan oral literature cf. Γ. Κ. Σπυριδάκη, *Βιβλιογραφία Κρητικῆς Λαογραφίας καὶ Γλωσσολογίας* (Athens, 1934).

<sup>8</sup> About this point see also Solomos' poem Ἐλεύθεροι Πολιορκημένοι. For this phase in Crete see E. K. Φραγκάκη, “Τὸ Δημοτικὸν Τραγοῦδι τῆς Κρήτης,” Ελληνικὴ Δημοουργία, III (1950), pp. 768-9. For the influence of the Cretan oral poets (*λυράρηδες*) on the souls and ideals of those Cretan youth who took to the mountains after the failure of the Cretan revolt of 1866 see the beautiful passage of Πρεβελάκη in Παντέρμη Κρήτη, pp. 226-30.

growing child by the evening fire with the many heroic revolts of Crete and the grandfather sings to the child on his knees the epic glory of Crete. Thus the child receives in its soul the taste for heroic oral poetry which is kept alive by the oral poets of the island.

Cretan oral poetry, still a live tradition as the recent composition by a blind poet of an oral poem on the German airborne invasion of Crete in 1941 shows,<sup>9</sup> is rich in illustrative material for Homer. The persistence in Crete of the heroic age into the present, the geographic isolation of villages in the mountains of Sphakia,<sup>10</sup> the recitation of old poems such as the long epic romance *'Ερωτόκριτος*,<sup>11</sup> and the creation of new ones by ρίμαδόροι and λυράρηδες at social and religious festivals (*πανηγύρια*),<sup>12</sup> the

<sup>9</sup> Laourdas, who personally heard this poem in a *καφενεῖον* in Canea, is the source of this information. Several folksongs on the sufferings of the Cretans during the German occupation show the sensitivity of Cretan oral poetry to contemporary history. Two such poems, one of which mentions the incredible kidnapping of General Karl Kreipe (see the account in W. Stanley Moss, *Ill Met By Moonlight* [New York, 1950]), are quoted in Ε. Κ. Φραγκάκη, "Τὸ Δημοτικὸ Τραγοῦδι τῆς Κρήτης," *Ἐλληνικὴ Δημοτικὴ*, III (1950), p. 772. For the airborne invasion of Crete see W. Churchill, *The Second World War: The Grand Alliance* (New York, 1950), pp. 268-304; "Life's" *Picture History of World War II* (New York, 1950), pp. 52-3.

<sup>10</sup> For a good relief map of Crete and of Sphakia which rises in wavelike profusion to heights ca. 2400 meters see Δ. Διαμαντοπούλου, *'Ανάγλυφος μορφὴ τῆς Κρήτης* (Athens, 1935); for a history of Sphakia see Γ. Παπαδοπετράκη, *Ιστορία τῶν Σφακιῶν* (Athens, 1888); cf. also Μιχ. Δέφνερ, *Οδοιπορικαὶ ἐντυπώσεις εἰς τὴν Δυτικὴν Κρήτην, Μετὰ πολλῶν εἰκόνων* (Athens, 1929). See also the fine description of Sphakia in F. W. Sieber, *Reise nach der Insel Kreta* (Leipzig, 1823) I, pp. 423 ff.

<sup>11</sup> Βιτσέντζου Κοράρου, *'Ερωτόκριτος*, *"Έκδοσις κριτική* (Herakleion, Crete, 1915); J. Mavrogordato, *The Erotokritos of Vincenzo Cornaros: A Greek Romantic Epic*, with an introduction by S. Gaselee (Oxford, 1929); Γ. Σεφέρη, *'Ερωτόκριτος* (Athens, 1946). For a detailed recent bibliography of this poem see Γ. Κ. Σπυριδάκη, *Βιβλιογραφία Κρητικῆς Δαιογραφίας καὶ Γλωσσολογίας* (Athens, 1934), pp. 63-4. This poem, which Koraes called "the Homer of our vulgar poetry," is so well known by Cretans that its text, if lost, can be completely restored orally. It is a mirror in which the Cretans for generations saw models of humanity and exemplary actions. For its influence on Greece see N. Πολιτου, "Ο 'Ερωτόκριτος," *Δαιογραφία*, I (1909), pp. 19 ff.; Η. Πρεβελάκη, *Παντέρημη Κρήτη*, p. 229.

<sup>12</sup> For a vivid account of an oral poet composing at a *πανηγύρι* see the excellent novel of Η. Πρεβελάκη, *'Ο Κρητικός* (Athens, 1948-1949), II,

absence in their heroic poems of supernatural or shamanistic elements and the presence in them of a humanistic epic mentality, all make the Cretan poems an interesting laboratory. In it three factors, about which we should like to know more for Homer's sake, can be studied: (1) the oral poet and his technique of composition and recitation; (2) his relation to his audience and its influence in the oral creation; (3) his relation to his material.<sup>13</sup>

*The Song of Daskaloyannes*<sup>14</sup> throws valuable light on all three. Its prologue and unique epilogue, added by the recorder who is a literate poet-friend of the oral poet, give us a picture of an oral poet which is very close to that of Demodocus and Phemius and Hesiod's shepherd-poet. The oral poet, Μπάρπα-Παντζέλιος, is described with such full detail as to his position and place in the society of Sphakia, as to the details of his oral recitation taken down with pen and paper by his literate companion under a holm-oak in Sphakia, that we have in this poem an almost unique description of the oral poet in all phases of his creation. Next, the poem gives us insights into the relation of the poet to his audience, their epic mentality, ways in which the audience shapes the selection and re-shapes the material, and the context of the recitation. This poem, furthermore, gives us an opportunity to study the relation of a poet to his material. Recently published historical documents from the Turkish archives at Herakleion in Crete<sup>15</sup> show that the revolt of Daska-

pp. 18 ff., III, pp. 9-11; about Πρεβελάκης see the article of Laourdas, "Παντελῆς Πρεβελάκης," *Άγγλοελληνική Επιθεώρηση*, July, 1946.

<sup>13</sup> Notopoulos, *loc. cit.* (above, note 5).

<sup>14</sup> See the recent oral recension and critical edition of this poem by Basil Laourdas, *Μπάρπα-Παντζέλιον, Τὸ Τραγοῦδι τοῦ Δασκαλογιάννη* (Herakleion, Crete, 1947). Among the reviews of this book the most interesting is by "Αρης Δικταῖος" in the periodical *'Ο Αἰώνας μας*, December, 1947. For previous editions and versions of the poem see the sources listed above in note 7; cf. also E. Legrand, *Ο Δασκαλογιάννης, Collection de monuments de la langue Néo-Hell.* (Athens, 1876), pp. 98-102; Ν. Γ. Βαϊγάκις, "Ο Δασκαλογιάννης (Σφακιῶν)," *Προμηθεὺς δὲ Πυρφόρος, Περιοδικὸν δεκαπενθ.* ἐν Πεθύμην (1930), no. 128, and Ι. Ζώγραφάκη, "Γλωσσικὴ ὥλη ἐκ Κρήτης," *Ἐλληνικὸς Φιλολογικὸς Σύλλογος Κωνσταντινουπόλεως*, XXXI (1909), pp. 145, 146, 154.

<sup>15</sup> Β. Λαούρδα, "Η Επανάστασις τῶν Σφακιανῶν καὶ δὲ Δασκαλογιάννης, Κατὰ τὰ ξγγραφὰ τοῦ Τουρκικοῦ Ἀρχείου 'Πρακλείου,'" *Κρητικὰ Χρονικά*, I (1947), pp. 275-90.

loyannes as presented in this poem is in certain important points different from the historical facts. Since the revolt took place in 1770 and the oral poem was put in writing in 1786 we have in this short interval an excellent case history of the way in which an oral poet treats the past,<sup>16</sup> an aspect reserved for a later study. Finally, in this poem the poet not only succeeds in giving us an interesting picture of the oral poet creating for a heroic society but he has managed to penetrate into the larger world of Homer's humanism and art. All these features make this Cretan poem worthy of interest as a study in comparative oral poetry.

The light which this poem throws on the oral poet and his technique of composition and recitation comes mostly from the prologue and the epilogue. The prologue, with its formulaic diction underlined,<sup>17</sup> rings familiar to the student of Homer:

Θέ μου καὶ δός μου φύτιση, καρδιὰ σὰν τὸ καζάνι,  
νὰ κάτσω νὰ συλλογιαστῶ τὸ Δάσκαλο τὸ Γιάννη.  
Θέ μου καὶ δός μου λογισμὸ καὶ μπόρεση ν' ἀρχίξω  
τὸ Δάσκαλο τὸν ἔακουστὸ πρικιὰ νὰ τραγουδήξω.  
Θέ μου καὶ δός μου ἀπομονὴ καὶ νοῦν εἰς τὸ κεφάλι  
ν' ἀναθιβάλω καὶ νὰ πῶ καὶ τῶ Σφακιῶ τὰ βάλη.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Bowra, *loc. cit.*, pp. 188-9.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. the formulaic diction of the opening lines of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* as found in M. Parry, "Studies in the Epic Technique of Oral Verse Making," *H. S. C. P.*, XLI (1930), pp. 118-21. The following references to Jeannaraki's *Kretas Volkslieder* and Legrand's *Recueil de poèmes historiques* (referred to as *J* and *L* respectively, page numbers being cited in *L* and poem numbers in *J*) list the formulas of the prologue as they occur elsewhere in heroic oral poetry either with word-groups unchanged or showing variation:

Θέ μου καὶ δός μου: cf. *L* 132.1; *J* 1.1, 30.1.  
 νὰ κάτσω νὰ συλλογιαστῶ: cf. *L* 246.2; *J* 23.2, 24.2, 29.2, 31.3, 34.2, 48.4, 61.8.  
 δός . . . φύτιση, καρδιά . . . λογισμὸ . . . νοῦν εἰς τὸ κεφάλι: cf. *L* 30.39, 132.2-3, 246.2; *J* 15.2, 23.1, 24.1, 29.1, 48.3; Φαφουτάκη, Συλλογὴ 'Ηρωϊκῶν Κρητικῶν 'Ασμάτων, p. 66.4.  
 μπόρεση ν' ἀρχίξω . . . νὰ τραγουδήξω: cf. *J* 15.3, 62.2.  
 τὸ Δάσκαλο τὸν ἔακουστό: cf. *L* 28.4, 12, 44.224, 58.409, 92.861, 98.922, 945, 262.2, 284.379; *J* 21.11, 62.3.  
 ν' ἀναθιβάλω καὶ νὰ πῶ: cf. *J* 1.3, 31.2; Ερωτόκριτος, Α 8.  
 τῶ Σφακιῶ τὰ βάλη: cf. *J* 30.2, 31.4.

"God, give me light and heart like a cauldron, to sit and call to mind Master John.<sup>18</sup> God, give me reason and strength to begin the bitter song about Master John, known far and wide. God, give me patience and intelligence to remember and to tell of the woes of Sphakia."<sup>19</sup>

A comparison of this prologue with that of *Τιτορία τῆς Μαρκάδας Ἐβραιοπούλας*<sup>20</sup> readily reveals a similarity not only of convention but also of formulaic diction,

Θεὲ ἀφέντη μου Χριστὲ, πῶδωσες τὴν ζωὴν μου  
καὶ χάρισες καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, δύναμι σ' τὸ κορμίν μου,  
ὅλοψύχως σοῦ δέομαι, δὸς φύτισι καὶ γνώσι  
καὶ δύναμιν σ' τὰ χέρια μου, καλὴ καρδιὰ κάμπόση,  
γιὰ νὰ φημίσω σ' ἄπαντα Ἐβραίαν τὴν Μαρκάδα.

"Lord and Master Christ, who has given me life, the gift of soul, strength to my body, I pray with all my heart, give me light and intelligence, strength in my hands, sufficient goodness of heart that I may write this and bring fame everywhere to the Jewess Markada."

The similarity in the formulaic diction and technique in these two prologues, whose dates of composition differ by over one hundred years, throws light on the traditional techniques which a poet uses in the practice of his art. Our Cretan poet and the Homeric poet, *mutatis mutandis*, both have need of formulas and traditional techniques in order to compose, the Cretan poet less so however because, as Bowra rightly explains,<sup>21</sup> the Greek hexameter is much more exacting and complex than the metres of modern oral poetry. The emphasis in the epilogue on the great memory of the oral poet who composed our Cretan poem gains

For some other formulas with which Cretan poems begin see Φαφούτάκη, *op. cit.*, pp. 66, 68, 79, 87, 89, 91; 64, 77 (end); Αποστολάκη, *op. cit.*, pp. 154-5.

<sup>18</sup> For the meaning of Δάσκαλος, in the sense of *doctus*, see Βαρδίδης, *op. cit.* (above, note 7), p. 4; Δέφνερ, *op. cit.* (above, note 10), p. 154.

<sup>19</sup> Translations from the poem are made sufficiently literal for exact study.

<sup>20</sup> E. Legrand, *Recueil de poèmes historiques*, p. 132. This poem was first printed in Venice in 1668; for variations of this prologue see an epithalamium sung in Rhodes, A. Βροντῆ, Τῆς Ρέδου Παραδόσεις καὶ Τραγούδια (Rhodes, 1930), p. 77; the prologue of a Cypriot ποιητάρης, Ιωσήφ Α. Μιχαήλ, Τὸ τραγούδι τῆς Αγίας Μαρίνας (Leukosia, 1949), p. 8.

<sup>21</sup> Bowra, *loc. cit.*, p. 187.

significance, even as does Μνημοσύνη in the ancient oral poet, when it is related to the formulaic diction and traditional techniques which must be acquired through memory.<sup>22</sup>

A comparison of the prologue of this version of Daskaloyannes with other versions of the poem as they survive<sup>23</sup> shows that the poet of this version possessed the same formulas as the rest but that he was able to use them more skillfully. It is not surprising, therefore, that the versions of the other poets of this song are much shorter and inferior in technique and dramatic power. The prologue with its full-bodied statement of inspiration and the theme of the poem is in itself evidence of the superiority of this poet, whose praise fills the lines of the epilogue written by a friend and fellow-poet. A study of the variants of this poem therefore attests to the validity of the tribute to our oral poet.

Our prologue shows similarity to Homer in other ways than formulaic diction. It serves in the main the same purpose as those in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*: (1) the invocation to a higher being upon whom the poet is dependent for inspiration;<sup>24</sup> (2) the announcement of the hero and of the theme of the poem, combining, as it were, the ἄνδρα of the *Odyssey* and the μῆνιν of the *Iliad*. Both oral poets seek the attention of the audience, but our Cretan poet shows a more sympathetic attunement with his audience, most of whom were actors in the historical revolt which is the theme of the poem. He is deeply moved by his theme and asks for a "heart like a boiling cauldron," a most apt image for the woes of Sphakia. The inspiration asked by the poet from his Christian God, who now inherits the role of the Muse or Apollo (cf. *Od.*, VIII, 488), takes the form of illumination, for the poet is but an untutored cheese-maker; he asks for qualities of mind essential in understanding the tale and in binding him with the heart strings of the audience. Even as Demodocus

<sup>22</sup> J. A. Notopoulos, "Mnemosyne in Oral Literature," *T. A. P. A.*, LXIX (1938), pp. 465 ff.

<sup>23</sup> See the versions listed in note 7 above and cf. Laourdas, Τὸ Τραγοῦδι τοῦ Δασκαλογιάννη, pp. 14, 50. That we have here a standard prologue is evident from the beginning of Τὸ Τραγοῦδι τοῦ Ἀληδάκη (see Φαρούτακη, Συλλογὴ Ἡρωικῶν Κρητικῶν Ἀσμάτων, p. 44) and of Κρητικὸς Πόλεμος ('Α. Ξηρούχακη, 'Ο Κρητικὸς πόλεμος [1645-1669] ἡ συλλογὴ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν ποιημάτων Ἀνθίμου Διακρούση, Μαρίνον Τζάνε [Trieste, 1908]).

<sup>24</sup> For the poet's divine inspiration in Homer cf. *Od.*, I, 1, 10; VIII, 44-5, 63, 479-81; 488; XXII, 347-8; cf. also Hesiod, *Theogony*, 93-103.

affects Odysseus by singing unwittingly of the episodes in which Odysseus is the hero, so our Cretan poet achieves the requisite mood of interest and sympathy by singing a tale which sprang from the very men whose κλέα ἀρδρῶν he sings.

The epilogue continues for us the subject of the prologue, the portrait of the oral poet. Its content, as seen in the text and its analysis, is of importance to the study of comparative oral literature.

- 991    'Εγώ Ἀναγνώστης τοῦ Παπᾶ ὁ Σήφης τοῦ Σκορδίλη,  
αὐτὰ ποὺ σᾶς δηγήθηκα μὲ γράμμα, μὲ κοντίλι.  
'Αρχίνηξα καὶ τά γραφα λιγάκι κάθε μέρα  
κ' εἰς τὴν Παπούρα κάθονμουν στὸ Γκίβερτ' ἀπὸ πέρα.
- 995    Εἰς τὴν Παπούρα κάθομον, γιατ' ἥμουν γκαλονόμος,  
καὶ μὲ τὸν μπάρμπα — Παντζέλιο, ἀπὸ τὸν τυροκόμος.  
'Εγώ ἐκράθιον τὸ χαρτὶ κι ἐκράθιον καὶ τῇ μπένα,  
κι' ἔκεινος μοῦ δηγάτονε καὶ τά γραφα ἔνα—ἔνα.  
Τὰ μάθια τον δακρύζονσι, σὰν τὸ ἀναθιβάλει,  
1000    ὅντες μοῦ τὸ δηγάτονε τοῦ Δάσκαλον τὸ χάλι.  
'Η γι-διμιλιά τον κόβγεται, συλλογιασμοὶ τὸν πιάνου  
καὶ μαύρους ἀναστεναμὸς τὰ σωθικά τον βγάνου.  
Πόσα καὶ πόσα βάσανα, πόσες καὶ πόσες λύπες  
τοῦ ρχονταν στὸ συλλογιασμό, πόσοι καῦμοὶ καὶ πρίκες.
- 1005    Ν' ἀναστοράται μονομιᾶς τοῦ Καστελιοῦ τοῦ ἀθρώπους,  
τσοὶ χωριανούς τον καὶ δικοὺς, τσοὶ φίλους καὶ συντρόφους,  
ν' ἀναστοράται τὰ Σφακιά, τοῦ ἄντρες καὶ τὰ καλά-ν-των,  
τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ χάλια των καὶ τ' ἀποδόματά-ν-των.  
Τραγουδιχτὰ μοῦ τά 'λεγε γιατ' εἶναι ριμαδόρος,
- 1010    γιατὶ ἔχει κι ἀπὸν τὸ Θεὸ τὸ πλιὰ μεγάλο δῶρο.  
"Οσα δὲν εἶδε ἐκάτεχε, κι ὅσα εἶδε δὲν τὰ ξέχνα,  
γιατὶ ἔχει καὶ θυμητικὸ πλιώτερ' ἀπὸ κιανένα.  
Καὶ ποιὸς μπορεῖ νὰ δηγηθεῖ ἔκεινα ποὺ θυμᾶται,  
μὲ τὸ τραγούδι νὰ τὰ εἴπει, ἔκεινα ποὺ δηγᾶται;
- 1015    Πολλὰ τὰ μάθια τον εἴδασι κι ἀκούσασι τ' αὐθιά τον,  
βάσανα, πάθη καὶ καῦμοὶ ἀσπρίσαν τὰ μαλλιά τον.  
Στὰ χίλια ἑφτακόσια ὁγδοήκοντα ἔξε ἔτος,  
ποὺ τοῦ Δασκάλου τὸν καιρὸ δεκάξε χρόνια ὁφέτος,  
1020    ποὺ βάστουν στὸ σακκούλι μου μπένα, χαρτί, μελάνι  
καὶ τὸ τραγούδι τό γραψα τοῦ Δάσκαλου τοῦ Γιάννη.  
Μ' ἄν εἰν' τὰ γράμματα σφαλτά, τὰ λόγια δίχως χάρη,

σὰν τυροκόμου μάθησῃ καὶ μπένα μιτατάρη,  
 ἀν' εἶν' τὰ γράμματα σφαλτά, τὰ λόγια μπερδεμένα,  
 συμπάθιο ὅσοι τ' ἀκούετε· δὲν εἶναι κι ἀπὸ 'μένα.  
 1025 Σὰν αἰγιδάρης ὁ φτωχὸς 'πον κατ' ἀποὺ τὸν πρίνο,  
 τὸ 'γραψα σὰν ἐκάτεχα· τῶν γνωστικῶν τ' ἀφίνω.  
 Νὰ τραγουδοῦσι θλιβιερά, οὐλοὶ, μικιοὶ, μεγάλοι,  
 νὰν τόνε κλαῖν τὸ Δάσκαλο καὶ τῷ Σφακιῷ τὸ χάλι.  
 Καὶ νὰ μὴ λέει καὶ κιανεῖς γιὰ τὰ γραφόμενά μου,  
 1030 γιατὶ ἄλλοι τὰ δηγήθηκαν πολὺ πρωτήτερά μου,  
 κι αὐτὸς ὁ μπάρπα-Παντζελίος, ἐδὲ στὰ γερατειά του,  
 'πον τὰ εἴδασι τὰ μάθια του καὶ τ' ἀκουσαν τ' αὐθιά του,  
 κι είχε καὶ πιθυμά πολλῆ, πάντα νὰ τὰ δηγᾶται,  
 σὰν τὸ ψαλτήρι ὁ δάσκαλος, π' ἀπ' ὅξω τὸ θυμᾶται.

I, Anagnostes Sephes, son of the priest Skordiles, the tale which I told you with letters and with stilius, I began and I was writing down, little every day, and I was sitting at Papoura, beyond Ghiberti.<sup>25</sup> I was sitting at Papoura, because I was a shepherd and with Barba-Pantzelyo who was a cheese-maker. I was holding the paper, and I was holding the pen, and he was reciting the tale and I was writing it down, one by one. There are tears in his eyes, as he called to memory in his tale the grief of Daskalos. His words break off, thoughts seize him and dark groans rise from his depths. How many, how many tortures, how many, how many sorrows, how many bitter woes came to his mind; to recall all together in the same moment the men of Kastelyo, his fellow-villagers, his relatives, friends and companions, to recall Sphakia, its men and their fortunes, their sufferings, their woes, and their end. He sang as he dictated, because he is a poet, because he has from God by far the greatest gift. What he did not see, he knew, and all that he saw he never forgot, because he has a memory greater than any. For who can tell the things that he remembers and tell in song the stories that he narrates? Many were the things his eyes saw and his ears heard—sorrows, woes, and sufferings had turned his hair to white. It was in 1786, this year is the sixteenth from the time of Daskalos, when I had in my bag pen, paper, and ink, and I took down the song of Daskaloyannes. But if the spelling is poor and the words without grace—as one might expect from the knowledge of a cheesemaker and from the pen of a worker in the

<sup>25</sup> A village near Mouri in a ravine of Sphakia. For the location of these villages and ravines see the appendix and a map of Sphakia by Lassithiotakis attached to Laourdas' edition of the poem.

cheese dairy—if the spelling is poor and the words confused, have sympathy all you who hear.<sup>26</sup> It is not my fault. I, hapless one, like a goatherd, under a holm-oak, wrote down the words according to my knowledge. I leave them to the learned ones—to sing the tale sadly, all, both young and old, to lament Daskalos and the woe of Sphakia. And let no one have words about my tale (i. e., criticize), because others have told it long before me, even Barba-Pantzelyos himself, in his old age, all that his eyes saw and his ears heard, and he had great desire to recite the whole story, as the school teacher the psalm-book which he knows by heart.

The addition of these lines at the end of a tale is unusual. Most oral heroic poetry is anonymous; the poet keeps his silence in the Homeric poems and we hear of Homer only through external tradition. The addition of the epilogue, technically known as a *σφραγίς*, is quite a regular feature in Cretan poetry, as may be seen in our collections. The same feature is found in the paintings of the Cretan-Venetian school in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; El Greco has signatures on his paintings even as our Cretan oral poets in their poems. The main function of the *σφραγίς* is to reveal the name of the author as may be seen at the conclusion of the *'Ερωτόκριτος*, the *Συμφορὰ τῆς Κρήτης*, *Κρητικὸς Πόλεμος*, and the poem on Hagios Menas.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>26</sup> Cf. a similar sentiment in the concluding lines of the *'Ερωτόκριτος* and in lines 894-900 of *Ποίημα Παύλου Πρεσβυτέρου* (*Βενέρης Τιμοθ. Αρχιμ.*, “*Ποίημα Παύλου Πρεσβυτέρου περὶ τοῦ ἐν Ἱρακλείῳ ναοῦ τοῦ Ἀγίου Μηνᾶ*,” *Χριστιανικὴ Κρήτη*, *Περιοδικὸν τῆς Ιερᾶς Μητροπόλεως Κρήτης [Ηράκλειον]*, I [1912], pp. 379-419).

<sup>27</sup> For a study of the literary *σφραγίς* in classical Greek poetry cf. Holger Thesleff, “Some Remarks on Literary Sphragis in Greek Poetry,” *Eranos*, XLVII (1949), pp. 116-28. For some interesting remarks on the literary *σφραγίς* in Cretan poetry cf. N. Πολίτη, *Δαογραφία*, I (1909), pp. 19 ff.; N. Τωμαδάκη, *Ἐλληνικά*, VI (1932), pp. 104-5. For a list of parallels to the *σφραγίς* in the poem of Daskaloyannes cf. the endings of *'Ερωτόκριτος*, lines 1525 ff.; Τὸ Τραγοῦδι τοῦ Ἀληδάκη, lines 529-30; *Ἀνδραγαθίας τοῦ Μιχαήλ Βοεδόδα*, lines 1301-12 (LeGrand, *Recueil de poèmes historiques*, p. 126); *Φαφοντάκη*, op. cit., p. 113, lines 163-4; *Συμφορὰ τῆς Κρήτης*, lines 279-80 (Wagner, *Carmina Graeca Medii Aevi* [Leipzig, 1874], p. 61); *Ποίημα Παύλου Πρεσβυτέρου*, lines 888-906 (see above, note 26); *Ιστορία ἐβραιοπόλιας τῆς Μαρκάδας*, lines 771-2 (LeGrand, *Recueil de poèmes historiques*, p. 188); *Τραγοῦδι τοῦ Ἀρκαλοχωρίτη*, lines 127-8 ('Επειηρὶς *Ἐπαιρέλας Κρητικῶν Σπουδῶν*, III [1940],

Yet this *σφραγίς* is unusual in many ways; the recording poet Sephes, who is the author of the epilogue, has expanded the *σφραγίς* from usually a line or two to thirty-four lines and in addition to the name gives us the circumstances of the composition and a description of his poet friend who dictated the poem to him under the holm-oak. The expansion of the *σφραγίς* into a little poem in itself makes the *Song of Daskaloyannes* unique in heroic poetry and accounts for its importance in the study of comparative oral poetry.

The portrait of the Cretan oral poet is such that it readily finds parallels in the description which Homer gives of Demodocus and Phemius. The first point of comparison, which continues from the prologue into the epilogue, is the conception of poetry as the greatest gift of god to the poet. Our poet Barba-Pantzelyo, a *ρήμαδόρος*, composes,

*γιατὶ ἔχει κι ἀπὸν τὸ Θεὸν τὸ πλιὰ μεγάλο δῶρο*  
because he has from God by far the greatest gift.<sup>28</sup>

Odysseus acknowledges the preeminence of Demodocus who is *λαοῖσι τετιμένος* (VIII, 472) for the same reason,

*Δημόδοκ' ἔξοχα δὴ σε βροτῶν αἰνίζομ' ἀπάντων*  
*ἢ σέ γε Μοῦσ' ἐδίδαξε, Διὸς πάτης, ἢ σε γ' Ἀπόλλων*<sup>29</sup>

and refers to him just before this

*πᾶσι γὰρ ἀνθρώποισιν ἐπιχθονίοισιν ἀοιδοί*  
*τιμῆς ἐμμορού εἴσι καὶ αἰδοῦς, οὗνεκ' ὅρα σφέας*  
*οὕμας Μοῦσ' ἐδίδαξε, φίλησε δὲ φῦλον ἀοιδῶν.*<sup>30</sup>

The divine aura that surrounds the poet is such a Homeric commonplace that *θεῖος ἀοιδός* and *ἀοιδός ἀειδε περίκλυτος* are Homeric noun-epithet formulas.<sup>31</sup> We find the same attitude toward the poet in his inspired capacity and prestige because of the gift of song in Hesiod as well who says,

pp. 412-16); *'Αναγνώστη Ντουνάκη*, *Oι ἥρωες τοῦ 1866 ἐν Κρήτῃ* (Athens, 1877), p. 15. For the *σφραγίς* in Russian oral poetry see Y. M. Sokolov, *Russian Folklore* (New York, 1950), pp. 10-11.

<sup>28</sup> Τὸ Τραγοῦδι τοῦ Δασκαλογιάννη, line 1010.

<sup>29</sup> *Odyssey*, VIII, 487-8.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, VIII, 479-81.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 325, IV, 17, VIII, 43, 47, 83, 367, 521.

ολά τε Μουσάων ἵερὴ δόσις ἀνθρώποισιν  
ἐκ γὰρ Μουσάων καὶ ἔκγρβολον Ἀπόλλωνος  
ἄνδρες ἀοιδὸν ἔασιν ἐπὶ χθόνα καὶ κιθαρισταί·  
ἐκ δὲ Διὸς βασιλῆς· ὁ δὲ δλβιος ὄντινα Μοῦσαι  
φιλῶνται· γλυκερή οἱ ἀπὸ στόματος ρέει αὐδῆ.<sup>32</sup>

The inclusion of the Cretan oral poet in such company and for similar reasons by his society is not a classical influence, for Homer was long forgotten in Crete, but simply a cognate expression of the unique position of poets in oral societies as may be seen in Radlov's Kara-Kirghiz minstrel who attributed his powers of song to god.<sup>33</sup>

The occasion of the oral recitation in Cretan society furnishes us with another Homeric parallel. In the *Odyssey* the circumstance is given in the formula,

αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ πόσιος καὶ ἐδητύος ἔξ ἔρον ἔντο  
Μοῦσ' ἄρ' ἀοιδὸν ἀνῆκεν ἀειδέμεναι κλέα ἀνδρῶν.<sup>34</sup>

Likewise in the Homeric *Hymn to Apollo* the poet speaks of the Delian maidens who

μηησάμεναι ἀνδρῶν τε παλαιῶν ἡδὲ γυναικῶν  
νῦνον ἀείδουσιν, θέλγουσι δὲ φῦλ' ἀνθρώπων.<sup>35</sup>

In the description of the way of life which was destroyed by the Turks at Sphakia the poet gives us a similar picture,

καὶ γέρους ἀσπρομάλληδες νὰ κάθονται στὴν τάβλα,  
νὰ τρῶσι καὶ νὰ πίνουσι, νὰ τραγούσοῦν μεγάλα  
νὰ λέν τραγούδια τοῦ σκαμνιοῦ καὶ τοῦ πολέμου βάλη  
κι ἡ τάβλα ἀπὸν τὴν μιὰ μερὲ ν' ἀντιλαλεῖ ὃς τὴν ἄλλη,<sup>36</sup>

"and white-haired old men to sit by the table, to eat and drink, to sing with strong voices, and tell of heroic deeds, and the woes of war, and the table to echo from one side to the other."

Though the poem of Barba-Pantzelyo was dictated under a holm-oak, the social occasion of the recitation as described in the above lines finds a parallel in the Homeric contest of singing.

<sup>32</sup> *Theogony*, 93-7.

<sup>33</sup> Bowra, *loc. cit.*, p. 186.

<sup>34</sup> *Odyssey*, VIII, 72-3.

<sup>35</sup> *Homeric Hymns*, III, 160-1.

<sup>36</sup> Τὸ τραγοῦδι τοῦ Δασκαλογιάννη, lines 919-22; for the influence of these lines on the Cretans after the failure of the revolt of 1866 see Πρεβελάκη, Παντέρμη Κρήτη, pp. 226-7.

To this we must add the similarity in manner of recitation. Homer has his Demodocus and Phemius sing to the accompaniment of the lyre and we still find to this day the Cretan λυράρης singing his fifteen-syllable rhymed couplets to the accompaniment of the λύρα.<sup>37</sup> The social picture of the Cretan poet has some similarities with the court poet of Homer. The Cretan λυράρης is usually poor, old, disabled, and goes from one village to the other singing his verses during religious festivals (*πανηγύρια*) on the invitation of the ἀρχοντες of the aristocracy. In his note on lines 935 ff. of the *Song of Daskaloyannes* Laourdas in speaking of the aristocracy of Sphakia says, "The families which are referred to here constituted at Sphakia a closed aristocracy based on the type of the aristocracy of the archaic period in Greece. Their distinction from the rest of the Sphakians was both material and moral. Wealthy and noble at the same time they constituted in reality a leading social class in every village and gathering of the district of Sphakia."<sup>38</sup>

Our Cretan poet is a cheese-maker who could also say with Hesiod's poet that the Muses who are ἀρτιέπειαι<sup>39</sup>

ἐνέπνευσαν δέ μοι αὐδῆν  
Θέσπιν, ἵνα κλέοιμι . . . τὰ πρὸ τ' ἔοντα.<sup>40</sup>

As we would expect of such a person he is like Phemius αὐτοδίδακτος for he was not able to read or write. Like the oral poet in Homer who had to have a good memory in order to keep in mind the vast and complicated metrical formulas so essential for spontaneous oral creation,<sup>41</sup> Barba-Pantzelyo had by far the best memory of all. Line 1011 in our Cretan poem reads

ὅσα δὲν εἶδε ἐκάτεχε, κι ὅσα εἶδε δὲν τὰ ξέχνα  
what he did not see he knew, and all that  
he saw he never forgot.

He was thus a master of the historical past in which he took no part and that in which he did. Here once more we can recall

<sup>37</sup> For pictures of Cretan λυράρης see *En Grèce, Edition du Secrétariat Général au Tourisme Athènes*, Fascicule VIII, Crète, Automne 1948: Les Joueurs de Lyre Créois.

<sup>38</sup> Laourdas, note on lines 935 ff.

<sup>39</sup> Possibly a reference to the formulaic diction of the oral poet as well as a reference to inspiration.

<sup>40</sup> *Theogony*, 31-2.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Notopoulos (above, note 22).

Homer's words about Demodocus, who sings of the woes of the Achaeans,

ὦς τέ πον ἡ αὐτὸς παρεὼν ἡ ἄλλου ἀκούσας.<sup>42</sup>

This brings up the problem of the kind of song Barba-Pantzelyo composes. When we compare the poem that he dictated to Sephes in 1786 with the time of the event in the poem, 1770, we find an interesting illumination for Homer's lines,

τὴν γὰρ ἀοιδὴν μᾶλλον ἐπικλείουσ<sup>3</sup> ἀνθρωποι  
ἡ τις ἀκούντεσσι νεωτάτη ἀμφιπέληται.<sup>43</sup>

Even as Demodocus sings for Odysseus episodes in the Trojan war and in the *vōstos*, so fresh in Odysseus' personal memory, so Barba-Pantzelyo sings of an event which took place only sixteen years before and was still living in the memories of his audience. How intimate is the relation of the poet to his audience is seen not only in his choice of song but in other ways. The Cretan poet is deeply moved as he recalls a world gone by; the poem rises to its greatest heights as he describes the beauty and grandeur of the Sphakian society and civilization, so rudely shattered after the failure of the revolt.<sup>44</sup> This is shown not only by the explicit statements in the prologue and epilogue on the emotional effect of the story on the oral poet but also in the descriptive beauty and dramatic power with which the poet describes the world which his audience can now live in only through the magic artistry of the poet's winged words. The human craving for immortality and the poet's capacity to transcend the transiencies which are the heart's inevitable lot constitute one of the deepest bonds that bind our poet to his audience. The audience is ever present in the poet's mind. He turns away from the story and says

κι ὅσοι ὅτε ἀπ' τὴν Ἀράδενα, πάντα νὰ τὴ θυμᾶστε  
and ye who come from Aradena, may you  
remember the evil hour.<sup>45</sup>

<sup>42</sup> *Odyssey*, VIII, 491.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 351-2.

<sup>44</sup> See also the beautiful description of the Cretan villages in the *Κρητικὸς Πόλεμος* (ed. Ξηρουχάκις, Trieste, 1908), p. 570. The poet writes after the villages had been destroyed by the Turks during the war of 1645-1669.

<sup>45</sup> Line 416; cf. line 1024: "have sympathy all you who hear."

Such lines illustrate the intimate bonds of common experience which bind the poet and his audience. The Cretan poet, as Apostolakes remarks, sings to his contemporaries of experiences which both the poet and his audience have seen and felt. He sings to them of events both known and unknown which stir and bring back to the audience's memory the original event itself.<sup>46</sup> The audience silently guides the Cretan poet in his choice of themes—for example, the audience's delight in hearing once more the names of the aristocratic families of each and every village of Sphakia accounts for the poet's inclusion at the end of the catalogue of Sphakian families and the qualities in which each excelled;<sup>47</sup> the description of the dress of the first ladies and young girls, the vivid kaleidoscope of the movements of the Cretan dance,<sup>48</sup> the religious festivals<sup>49</sup> and the skillful way in which the poet adds description of each and every pleasure to suit young and old of both sexes, of all ages in his audience are only explicable by the effect of the physical presence of the audience on the poet who is their sensitive instrument, endowed “by God with the greatest gift of all”—to touch the heart with gladness even in the midst of sorrow, as Hesiod truly describes the effect of epic poetry.<sup>50</sup> A study of the ways in which the physical presence of the audience affects the poet will account not only for some of the parataxis found in oral poetry, but also the choice of the material, the inner reason why a poet plastically shapes a plot in obedience with the dictates of the artistic illusion in an oral recitation and not with standards of historical truth. The plot of our Cretan poet, its deviation from history, even in so short an interval of sixteen years after the event, the parataxis

<sup>46</sup> Γιάννη Αποστολάκη, “Το Κλέφτικο Τραγούδι” (Athens, 1950), p. 97. His remarks on the characteristics of the Cretan poetry, its concentration on circumstances, its inorganic and stringy parataxis are worth noting. For an appraisal of Αποστολάκης and his important work on folk poetry see Β. Λαούδας, “Ο ποιητής καὶ δὲ Ἐρμηνευτής,” Νέα Εστία (1947), pp. 188-203.

<sup>47</sup> Some of the verses containing the names of the families are later additions because some of the names mentioned in the poem are well known in the middle of the nineteenth century and afterwards but not earlier.

<sup>48</sup> For the Cretan dance see bibliography in Σπυριδάκη, *op. cit.* (above, note 7), pp. 58-9.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. Πρεβελάκης, *op. cit.* (above, note 12), II, pp. 9-26.

<sup>50</sup> *Theogony*, 98-103.

of style and of the narrative, the lamentation scene and the catalogue of great families are all explicable by the polar attraction of the poet to his audience in oral composition. It is in just such ways the study of Cretan oral poetry can be of help in understanding the structure of the Homeric poems by showing how important an actor the audience is in the selection and shaping of the material.

Several matters of importance remain in the epilogue before we can proceed to the tale itself. One of these is the light which the epilogue throws on that phase of an oral literature where details are most needed, the transition from oral to written literature. The recorder Sephes is the son of a priest Skordèles and no doubt acquired his literacy in order to assist his father in the liturgy; otherwise an oral poet is quite independent of letters in the practice of his art. Like Theocritus' and Virgil's shepherds, Barba-Pantzelyo and Sephes,<sup>51</sup> one a cheese-maker, the other a shepherd, are sitting under a holm-oak in Papoura near Mouri, in the heart of Sphakia. The description of the elder poet recalls Euripides' lines,

ἔτι τοι γέρων ἀοι-  
δὸς κελαδεῖ Μυαμοσύναν.<sup>52</sup>

The recitation for the recording was slow and continued for many days, a rate of dictation somewhat slow in view of the fact that the poem is only 990 lines in its narrative portion. The recitation was in song (*τραγουδιχτά*) and the recorder takes the time in the epilogue to pay tribute to the excellence of his poet friend and enumerate the qualities which constitute his excellence. The recorder then gives us the year of the transcription and its chronological relation to the event in the poem. The statement of the two dates reveals a respect for historical accuracy though, as will be shown later, it is not scrupulously maintained in the transmutation of history to poetry. In his lumbering attempt to have the reader forgive the recorder for

<sup>51</sup> Φαφοντάκης states in his introduction to the poem and in a note to line 989 that the poet is the maternal uncle of the recorder. Skordiles is a great and old (Byzantine) family in Crete. See Στέφ. Ξανθούδη, "Τὸ δίπλωμα (προβελέγιον) τῶν Σκορδιλῶν Κρήτης," *'Επειηρίς ἐταιρειας Κρητικῶν σπουδῶν*, II (1939), pp. 298-312. See also E. Gerland, *Histoire de la noblesse Crétioise au moyen âge* (Paris, 1907) pp. 26 ff.

<sup>52</sup> *Herakles*, 678-80.

poor spelling, confusion in the words, etc., he makes a statement of great importance for our purpose. "And let no one have words about (i. e., criticize) my tale because others have told it long before me, even Barba-Pantzelyo himself, in his old age, all that his eyes saw and his ears heard, and he had a great desire to recite the whole story, as the school teacher the psalm-book which he knows by heart."<sup>53</sup> This statement is in part obscure but its meaning has been given clearly by Laourdas in his note on these lines. "The meaning of these verses is as follows: let no one say that my tale is far-fetched, because others have told it long before me . . . it is evident that Sephes simply took down all the verses which he heard sung by Barba-Pantzelyo. The concluding verses 991-1034 are his own and not those of Barba-Pantzelyo. Consequently he himself had the gift of poetic creation. Did he or did he not give aid to Barba-Pantzelyo, did he work over what he took down, did he add verses of his own, all these are questions which we cannot answer on the evidence of the poem."<sup>54</sup> Just who these oral poets are who told the poem before Sephes is not certain. A comparison of the versions of the Daskaloyannes poem shows that our poem is not derived from other versions; it is original with the exception perhaps, suggested by Laourdas,<sup>55</sup> of lines 301-318, which describe the

<sup>53</sup> Cf. the following lines from the *Ποίημα Παύλου τοῦ Πρεσβυτέρου* (see above, note 26):

Λαιπὸν οἱ ἀναγνώσαντες τούτην τὴν ιστορίαν  
ὅλους σας σᾶς παρακαλῶ μὲ ταπεινὴν καρδίαν  
'Ανενὶ καὶ βρῆτε σφάλματα, εἰς τ' ἄναι δῶ γραμμένα  
δχι, κιανεῖς μὴ μὲ μηνσθῇ μὲ πάθος η̄ ζελεία  
γιατὶ κι' ἔγώ σᾶς προσκυνῶ μὲ ταπεινὴν καρδία  
καὶ τ' ὅνομά μου γράφω το, δὲν θέλω νᾶν' κρυμμένο  
γιὰ νὰ τοῦ συχωρήσετε, όπου αὐτὸ δάνημένω.  
Δὲ γράφομαι γιὰ ποιητής, μόνον γιὰ δουλευτής σας  
καὶ ὅλους σᾶς παρακαλῶ, δόστε μου τὴν εὐχήν σας (894-902).

"I beg with humble heart all you who have read my tale, if you have found fault in the writing above, let none of you find fault with me through feeling or jealousy, for I bow to you with humble heart. I write my name, I do not wish to hide it, for you to forgive me, that is what I expect. I do not sign myself as poet but only as your servant, and I beg all of you to give me your blessing."

<sup>54</sup> Laourdas, *op. cit.*, pp. 49-50.

<sup>55</sup> Laourdas, *per litt.* For the Venetian occupation of Crete (1204-1645) and for the numerous revolts of the people of Sphakia against

fight between the Venetians and the Cretans. Laourdas is perhaps right in his suggestion that these lines are a summary of an old poem, now lost, telling of the fight against the Venetians. Sephes' reference to the other poets could be, as Laourdas now suggests, to the *Τραγοῦδι τοῦ Ἀληδάκη*, another Cretan oral poem of 529 lines, of unknown authorship, composed in 1774, twelve years before the *Song of Daskaloyannes*.<sup>56</sup> This poem devotes lines 35-120, by way of an introduction to the poem, to the revolt of Daskaloyannes.

One final comparison remains between our Cretan poet and Demodocus and Phemius. The length of the poem which Barba-Pantzelyo sings is 990 lines, a little longer than the long books of the *Iliad*, a length commensurate with an evening's entertainment in song and accompaniment.<sup>57</sup> It will be noticed that the length of the Cretan poem fits in well with the lays of Demodocus and Phemius, which are stories within a story, episodes rather than epics. The words of Penelope,

Φήμε, πολλὰ γὰρ ἀλλα βροτῶν θελκτήρια οἶδας  
ἔργ' ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε, τὰ τε κλείοντις ἀοιδοῖ·  
τῶν ἐν γέ σφιν ἀειδε παρήμενος,<sup>58</sup>

as further illustrated by Demodocus' story of the quarrel of Odysseus and Achilles (*Od.*, VIII, 75-82) and of the episode of the Trojan horse (*Od.*, VIII, 492-520) give us ample evidence of the flexible and paratactic repertoire of the Homeric poet. It is evident that we have in both instances poets of the parts, the very material from which Homer created a larger pattern of unity. If we take away the epilogue added by the recorder poet we have in the Cretan poem a miniature epic containing, as in the Homeric poems, a prelude with an invocation and a state-

the Venetians cf. Στέφ. Ξανθουδίδη, 'Η Ἐνετοκρατία ἐν Κρήτῃ καὶ οἱ κατὰ τῶν Ἐνετῶν ἀγῶνες τῶν Κρητῶν (Athens, 1939). For interpolations in Cretan oral poetry cf. Ἀποστολάκη, Τὸ Κλέφτικο Τραγοῦδι (Athens, 1950), p. 97.

<sup>56</sup> For the *Τραγοῦδι τοῦ Ἀληδάκη* see Legrand, *Recueil de poèmes historiques*, pp. 259-61; Φαφοντάκη, *op. cit.*, p. 44; Δέφνερ, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-8, and the brief article about it by N. Θεοδωρακάκος in the magazine, 'Ο Αλώνας μας, April, 1948.

<sup>57</sup> In connection with this see A. B. Lord, "Homer and Huso I: The Singer's Rests in Greek and Southslavic Heroic Song," *T. A. P. A.*, LXVII (1936), pp. 106-13.

<sup>58</sup> *Odysscy*, I, 337-9.

ment of a theme, followed in the narrative by actions and dramatic speeches which elaborate the theme stated in the prologue.

The narrative portion of *The Song of Daskaloyannes* deals with the revolt of Daskaloyannes in 1770,<sup>59</sup> its failure, and the ensuing vengeance of the Turks upon the Cretan hero and the people of Sphakia. As the poem opens the hero Daskaloyannes, "outstanding for his wealth and reputation," tells the priest of his plan to free Crete with the aid of Russia<sup>60</sup> and to make it safe for its Christians. The priest then tries to stop him from this foolish venture, pointing out that the mountaineers of Sphakia, who alone of all Cretans enjoy freedom from occupation and taxation, will lose these privileges and be enslaved like the rest of the low-landers. Daskaloyannes, in chiastic irony with the priest whose vision is limited, vows his determination to set the Cross at the gates of Candia, come what may. Sphakia has men,<sup>61</sup>

<sup>59</sup> For this episode in Cretan history see E. Legrand, 'Ο Δασκαλογιάννης, *Collection de monuments de la langue Néo-Hell.* (Athens, 1876), pp. 98-102, *Annuaire de l'association pour l'encouragement des études grecques en France* (1879), and *Recueil de poèmes historiques*, pp. 237-9; G. Perrot, *L'île de Crète* (Paris, 1867), p. 190; Γρηγορίου Παπαδόπετράκη, 'Ιστορία τῶν Σφακιῶν (Athens, 1888), pp. 115-50, a work which is partial and as Laourdas has shown (see note 15, above) inaccurate in details; Βασιλείου Ψιλάκη, 'Ιστορία τῆς Κρήτης (Canea, 1909), III, pp. 99-146; Ιωάννου Μουρέλλου, 'Ιστορία τῆς Κρήτης (Herakleion, 1931), I, pp. 121-2; N. Γ. Βαΐγακης, "Ο Δασκαλογιάννης (Σφακιών)," *Προμηθεύς ὁ Συρφόρος*, Περιοδικὸν δεκαπενθ. ἐν 'Ρεθύμνῃ (1930), no. 128; Δέψνερ, *op. cit.* (see above, note 10), pp. 153-8; Laourdas, *loc. cit.* (see note 15, above); for an engraving of Daskaloyannes see Φαφουτάκης, Συλλογὴ Ἡμερικῶν Κρητικῶν Ἀσμάτων and for his family see 'Επετηρὶς Ἐταιρείας Κρητικῶν Σπουδῶν, III (1940), pp. 308-9. A few years ago the Cretans erected a bust of Daskaloyannes in the central square in Candia, Crete, near the place where he suffered the martyrdom.

<sup>60</sup> The documents published by Laourdas prove that the Russians deceived the Cretans. For other details about the war of 1770 (between Russians and Turks in Greece) see also: Π. Κοντογιάννη, Οἱ Ἑλλῆνες κατὰ τὸν πρῶτον ἐπὶ Αιγαίουρνης Β' ῥωσοτουρκικὸν πόλεμον (1768-1774) (Athens, 1903), and Ἀπ. Βακαλοπούλου, Άι ἐν ἔτει 1770 ναυμαχήται μεταξὺ ῥωτικοῦ καὶ Τουρκικοῦ στόλου εἰς τὴν λαϊκὴν μας πόλησιν, 'Ελληνικά, XI (1939), pp. 109-14.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. the other famous Sphakian phrase, ἄντρες τὰ δρέπουν τὰ Σφακιά, "men are ruling Sphakia." See also the dialogue between two Sphakians seated on the top of a mountain and looking at the valley: "—Do the people in the valleys have a soul?

worthy warriors to "push Turkey in the sea to be devoured by fish." Then he reads the letters he has received from the leaders of Morea and Vlahia. They urge him to join in the revolt, telling him of the help that is coming from Russia. The priest who is unconvinced pleads with him to come to his senses and points out that before the ships of the Russians arrive Sphakia will be in ruins, its brave lads lost in vain, its widows and orphans left desolate. The priest then leaves for his church to perform vesper service and pray to Mary for the Sphakians. Stirred by the news that the Russian fleet is nearing Morea, Daskaloyannes calls an assembly of the elders and chieftains and in Homeric fashion asks for their decision. They vote to join the revolt and choose Daskaloyannes as their leader. He orders them to prepare for war and sends an ultimatum to the Sultan to free Crete. The local Pasha, on hearing that the Cretans have raised the flag of revolution, writes to the Sultan for a directive, to burn Sphakia to the ground or leave it alone. The Sultan replies that he should wait for a while and ascertain the cause of the revolt; if the Sphakians do not listen, then attack them with all the Turkish might and burn their villages.

Without waiting for a reply from the Sultan the Sphakians unfurl their banners at Krape<sup>62</sup> and attack the Turks in the plains, most of whom seek refuge in the fortified cities. A storm prevents the Turkish fleet of reinforcements from landing at Lutro on the south coast of Crete and they disembark instead at Suda. Their forces, so numerous that they darken the plains, set out for Sphakia from three places. In the ensuing battles the brave but outnumbered Sphakians take to the mountain heights. The Turks enter Sphakia and start spreading destruction with fire and death in various villages. The poet selects a few of the places destroyed and gives vivid details of the utter destruction such as at Ombros Yalo. The Sphakians assemble

—I doubt it. But if they have, it should be like the soul of a bird." This is well known all over Crete, see Πρεβελάκη, Παντέρμη Κρήτη, p. 232. For the bird and modern Greek oral poetry see 'Αποστολάκη, Τὸ Κλέφτικο Τραγοῦδι, pp. 155-7.

<sup>62</sup> For the place names in the poem see Laourdas, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-5 and the map at the end of the book; the travel book of Δέφνερ (see above, note 10) contains many pictures and descriptions of the villages, mountains, and topography mentioned in the poem.

at Krouisia at the order of Daskaloyannes, of whom the poet gives a vivid description. Seeing the beginning of the end Daskaloyannes rises to great heights of heroism by offering himself, whom the Sultan wants alive above all else, as a scapegoat to the Turks. He tells them, "The Pasha has written us to see him, give up our arms, and become friends. I will go alone to meet him first, and if he lets me live I shall return. If he does not let me bring back the news, hasten all to the forests and the caves. Weep for me in the ravines of Sphakia; I leave my children now in your hands and ask you for the sake of my name to take thought of my poor family." Up rises Bounatoyannes and chides him for wishing to bow down before the Pasha when the purpose of the revolt is to fight him. At this point the poet throws into sharp contrast a character who rises above the epic conception of *κῦδος* and *ἀρετὴ* into the Christian self-sacrifice for others and one whose conception is that of Homeric honor. Bounatoyannes' speech is approved by all the warriors and reinforced by letters which arrive from Mania, a situation which serves to isolate and set in stark relief Daskaloyannes in his Christian grandeur.

Daskaloyannes now sends for all the leaders of the warriors scattered throughout the mountain peaks to assemble before dawn at Pharagga. Letters are sent to the Pasha giving him a modern version of the Spartan *μολὼν λαβέ* with respect to their arms: "let him come and take them." The messenger of these tidings is beheaded by the Pasha for his lofty tone in answering the Pasha's questions as to the number and intent of the Sphakians. The Pasha assembles his forces in the plains of Anopolis for muster, exhortation, and promise of rewards. Then the battle begins which the poet describes in detail, giving the places of the engagements, names and numbers of Sphakians who fell in battle. He tells of the Turkish burning of homes, destruction of vineyards, and olive groves, of the mourning of mothers for their children, a fate which does not escape even Daskaloyannes himself who mourns the captivity of his two daughters. The Sphakians meet the Turks in the sheer precipices of Xyloskalo and the poet describes the dislodgement of the Turks from this and other heights.

Once again the Pasha writes to Daskaloyannes urging him to come and see him, to cease the slaughter of the brave lads of

Sphakia, and be friends. But Daskaloyannes' captive brother, who is forced to write to his brother asking him to come to terms, indicates by means of three marks in the letter the Pasha's true intent of murder. On reading this letter with tears in his eyes Daskaloyannes says, "I shall go to the Pasha, would that he choke me, lest he destroy Sphakia and make vanish all from sight. And if I be cause of the destruction of the rest, let them hang me; this is the consent of even my God. My death shall bring much good to Sphakia, for winter is coming and summer is going. Let not all the Sphakians be lost in the snows,"<sup>63</sup> because the time is coming when they shall take vengeance. Come, brave lads, a kiss of farewell, for the cruel hour of separation is nigh." With a final exhortation to have no faith in the Turk, even as their fathers, he prepares to go alone, despite the offers of others who are deeply moved. Then the poet describes in stirring words the Hector and Andromache scene of farewell between Daskaloyannes and his wife, a scene of great beauty and art. He arrives with seventy other Sphakians who join him in self-sacrifice at Frangocastello and gives himself up to the Pasha. The band which was cruelly tortured on the way is put in prison at Castro,<sup>64</sup> where the people gathered "like trampled grass." The Pasha welcomes Daskaloyannes, "foremost of corsairs, foremost of fame," orders food and wine, pipe and coffee and asks him what was the cause of the revolt: the Sphakians were never forced to pay tribute or taxes and if they had grievances a word to the friendly Sultan would have brought results. Then he accuses his prisoner of stirring up the revolt, in which so many people were killed, merely to enhance his own reputation. Daskaloyannes' reply is that though the Sphakians have been well treated the Cretans as a whole have been treated as animals, not men; as for the reasons which led him to revolt he gives three, "first for my country, second for my faith, and third for the rest of the Christians in Crete, for even though I a Sphakian be, I am a child of Crete, and for me to behold the woes of Crete is pain enough." The Pasha contains his anger, promising to make Daskaloyannes a prince in Sphakia; he asks

<sup>63</sup> Sphakia is notorious for the severe winters; snow covers the mountain peaks of Λευκά "Ορη during the entire year.

<sup>64</sup> In the mountains of Sphakia the people still sing a song composed by the prisoners in the Castro; cf. Laourdas, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

who were his friends in the Morea and Mane, hoping thereby to discover the causes of the revolt in which the Sphakians were deceived by Russia. Daskaloyannes will hear no more and replies in a gnomic line, "Silence, Pasha, you waste your breath, your net is cut and the fish have escaped." Knowing full well that he will die, he asks for a friend to go to his wife to tell her "to wear black, to cut her golden hair, to cover her neck, for never shall she see again her lord." The Pasha smiles, shakes his head, and tells his prisoner that he has a score to settle. Daskaloyannes replies that he cares not for himself but that his grief is for Sphakia, for its orphaned families, and for all his fellow prisoners who did not listen to him but came into the Pasha's hands for butchery. The Pasha, enraged at Daskaloyannes' vow of vengeance on the part of the Sphakians, orders him to be flayed. Without letting him finish his coffee and pipe they rush him to the torture chamber.

The remainder of the poem deals with the sorrowful sights in Sphakia which met the eyes of those few Sphakians among Daskaloyannes' companions who escaped from prison and after many harrowing experiences reached home. This portion of the poem is a lament, expressed with richness of vocabulary, variety, and detail, over a beautiful world and way of life lost forever, only to live in the poet's words. As they walk amid the ruins, no longer do their eyes behold the men and women who made Sphakia renowned, neither its brave warriors, its aged counsellors, its ladies and their handiwork, "girls like cool waters and cool winds, who danced on holiday like lambs, and leaving their handiwork and tasks went to church like mountain lilies"; they lament the loss of their ships<sup>65</sup> and sailors renowned in Venice and Constantinople, who dared the storms of the sea and the monsters of the deep. No longer do they behold the ladies of Sphakia clad in beauteous raiment, nor young lads, tall, wasp-waisted, leaping and gyrating in the choral dance, nor old men gathered at the feast signing of far-off things and battles long ago. Then the poet's eye turns to the great families of Sphakia and in Homeric catalogue fashion lists the names, and as he repeats the formula *ποῦ εἰστε* "where are you?", like the beat

<sup>65</sup> Daskaloyannes himself was a shipowner and had money coined with his own name upon it. People in Sphakia still remember the place where Daskaloyannes used to coin his own money.

of a funeral march, he makes us see before our eyes the passing of a brave and beautiful world, a description reminding us of the ancient Greek cities. Those who survived its destruction are a pitiful lot, their thoughts are far away, numb their desire to overthrow the Turk, they merely brood on the treachery of the Russians, the folly of the revolt, and bethink them of the fable of the ant which God in his anger turns into a fly; he gives it wings to fly, it leaves its nest only to have a bird discover and swallow it. With this fable the narrative ends, followed by the epilogue discussed above.

The structure of the poem throws valuable light on the relation of parataxis and the technique of oral composition. The poem is permeated with parataxis both in the language and the arrangement of the parts in relation to the whole. Line after line, scene after scene, all follow paratactically. The unity is furnished mostly by the prologue, foreshadowing, and the central action of the hero. The poem's parataxis is largely accountable for by the oral technique of composition which for Cretan poetry is described thus by Apostolakes: "the poet sticks the distichs in a row—there is no fear that the external continuity shall fail, no uneasiness lest the poet stop in the middle. He opens his eyes a little, he stretches his heart and the feelings and impressions run like water—in the end memory of other songs helps. For there exist in Cretan song sufficient commonplace topics."<sup>66</sup> Then he proceeds to point out that there is no strong sense of organic unity in the Cretan oral poet for whom the whole is nothing but the collection of parts in a loosely strung external parataxis. Such a parataxis and its origins in the technique of oral composition are of value in our understanding of the parataxis which is so large a feature of Homer and the early Greek mentality.<sup>67</sup> Besides parataxis there are some contradictions and blurred transitions which reveal that the Cretan oral poet like Homer sometimes nods. As in Homer the poem blends narrative with dramatic speeches. Of the 884 lines which constitute the actual story 367 lines or 41.5% are devoted to speeches which make the story dramatic. This percentage compares with Homer

<sup>66</sup> Ἀποστολάκη, *loc. cit.* (see above, note 46), pp. 96-7.

<sup>67</sup> Notopoulos, *loc. cit.* (see above, note 5).

where, as Bassett points out, three-fifths of the poems consists of speeches.<sup>68</sup>

The poem can also throw an interesting light on the function of similes in Homer. The similes and metaphors of the Cretan poem reveal the beauty of nature, but in addition to giving relief from the narrative and making for vividness they serve as a framework of eternal nature against which the poet sets the transiency of mortality. So also with Homer who sets the coming death of Achilles and the death of Hector against the background of the eternal beauty of nature depicted in the Shield of Achilles. The poem, furthermore, reveals a humanistic outlook on life akin to Homer's; it is free from the primitive supernaturalism which characterizes so much of modern oral literatures. There passes before our eyes a historical event, but the poet has so shaped the plot that the eternal human problem and emotions rise into high relief. The hero Daskaloyannes strives for Homeric *areté*, but he achieves it through Christian as well as Homeric ideals. Our hero, who achieves the *κλέα ἀνδρῶν* through the Christian ideal of thinking of others first, shapes the action by a strong will which, as in Aeschylus' *Suppliants*, is based on the right of a human being to be treated as a human being at all times. The eternal conflict of freedom versus slavery is depicted not through rhetoric but through the picture of the beautiful civilization of his native Sphakia crumbling before our eyes, of a world which goes down fighting with issues expressed in the eternal language of poetry. In this poem the poet not only has succeeded in giving us an interesting picture of an oral poet creating for a heroic society but he has also managed to penetrate into the larger world of Homer's humanism as seen through the epic mentality of action, a world which is a picture of

. . . τά τ' ἔοντα τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἔοντα.

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<sup>68</sup> S. E. Bassett, *The Poetry of Homer* (Berkeley, 1938), pp. 59 ff.

## THRASYMACHUS, THEOPHRASTUS, AND DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS.

We all know Thrasymachus of Chalcedon as the tough and violent apostle of the doctrine that might is right in the first book of Plato's *Republic*, the man who defined the right as the advantage of the stronger and who maintained that it is "natural" for the individual to do as he pleases and to ignore all social restraints, if only he is strong enough to get away with it. For this side of Thrasymachus we have only Plato's authority, but it is sufficient and the unforgettable picture has remained unchallenged.

Thrasymachus was also a famous teacher of rhetoric; his name was associated with that of Gorgias as the first theorists of the art of speaking (and writing) in Greece. Gorgias is depicted by Plato as morally more responsible; he deliberately cultivated poetic diction in prose and the development of antithesis seems to have been particularly his; we have enough fragments of his writings to give us some idea of his style. Of Thrasymachus we have practically nothing; we know that he developed the conscious use of rhythm in prose and that he was a vigorous, emotional speaker; modern scholars have also credited him, on the alleged authority of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (and, through him, of Theophrastus) with being the originator of the periodic sentence-structure and of the "middle style."<sup>1</sup> The

<sup>1</sup> See F. Blass, *Attische Beredsamkeit* (2nd ed., Leipzig, 1887), I, pp. 244-58; E. Norden, *Die Antike Kunstprosa* (Leipzig and Berlin, 1909), I, pp. 41-50; Rhys Roberts, *Demetrius on Style* (Cambridge, 1902), pp. 5-6, 16; A. Mayer, *Theophrasti περὶ λέξεως Fragmenta* (Leipzig, 1910), pp. 1-50; J. F. Dobson, *The Greek Orators* (London, 1919), pp. 50-2; J. D. Meerwaldt, *Studio ad Generum Dicendi Historiam Pertinentia*, Pars I (Amsterdam diss., 1920), pp. 26-66; J. W. H. Atkins, *Literary Criticism in Antiquity* (Cambridge, 1934), I, p. 156; S. F. Bonner, *The Literary Treatises of Dionysius of Halicarnassus* (Cambridge, 1939), pp. 44 and 71. G. L. Hendrickson, in "The Peripatetic Mean of Style and The Three Stylistic Characters," *A.J.P.*, XXV (1904), pp. 125-46, does not refer the theory of the three styles back to Theophrastus, but believes that Dionysius does so in error; and substantially the same view is taken by J. Stroux, *De Theophrasti Virtutibus Dicendi* (Leipzig, 1912), pp. 88-126, and especially 119-20. The new *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (1950) also credits Theophrastus with "the building of periods."

purpose of this paper is to show that such authority does not exist and that, if the passages in Dionysius are rightly interpreted, no such claims can be made: further, it will follow that, contrary to the accepted view, Dionysius does *not* say that the notorious formula of the three styles was found in Theophrastus, and rarely, if indeed ever, makes use of it himself. On the other hand, Thrasymachus may be credited with an attempt to develop a diction suitable for prose (presumably in opposition to Gorgias) and with a gift for the organization and structure of his material.

Those who would attribute to Thrasymachus the discovery of the period repeat a statement of Suidas to this effect.<sup>2</sup> This is not in itself authoritative but, apart from the reference in Dionysius to be discussed below, the claim is also supported by attempting to read such a meaning into the references to Thrasymachus found in Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero.

Plato does not give much help. In *Phaedrus* 266C-7D, he makes a distinction between the dialecticians, who define their subject, and those who concentrate merely upon the craft of words, *ἡ λόγων τέχνη*. Lysias and Thrasymachus are among the latter, and this second group is then criticized as mainly occupied with finding labels for the different parts of a speech. Plato continues:

The mighty Chalcedonian's skill seems to have mastered those speeches that stir us to pity for age and poverty; then too he is clever at rousing the many to anger, and at soothing them again by his incantations, as he said. He was most able at slandering, and, somehow, at dissipating slander.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Θρασύμαχος, Χαλκηδόνιος σοφιστής, τῆς ἐν Βιθυνίᾳ Χαλκήδονος, δι πρώτων περιόδον καὶ κῶλον κατέδειξε καὶ τὸν νῦν τῆς ῥητορικῆς τρόπον εἰσηγήσατο, μαθητὴς Πλάτωνος τοῦ φιλοσόφου καὶ Ἰσοκράτους τοῦ ῥήτορος. ἔγραψε συμβουλευτικούς, τέχνην ῥητορικήν, παιγνια, ἀφορμὰς ῥητορικάς. This statement is generally connected with the passage from Dionysius' *Lysias* quoted *infra*, and the supposed quotation from Theophrastus, because of some verbal correspondence. In any case the error can have arisen in any number of ways.

<sup>3</sup> τῶν γε μὴν οἰκτρογόνων ἐπὶ γῆρας καὶ πενίαν ἐλκομένων λόγων κεκρατηκέναι τέχνη μοι φαίνεται τὸ τοῦ Χαλκηδονίου σθένος, δργίσαι τε αὐτὸν πολλοὺς ἄμα δεινὸς ἀνὴρ γέγονεν, καὶ πάλιν ὀργισμένοις ἐπάδων κηλεῖν, ὡς ἔφη· κτλ. Norden (p. 43) regards this as a parody of Thrasymachus, and indeed

This proves that Thrasymachus was able to play on the emotions of an audience. There is support for this in Aristotle where he says (*Rhet.*, III, 1, 7) that the art of delivery has much in common with acting and that some have written on this subject, for example Thrasymachus in his *ἔλεοι*, presumably a treatise on how to excite pity.

In another passage which discusses rhythm in prose (*Rhet.*, III, 8, 4), Aristotle, after rejecting a number of different feet as unsuitable, says: "That leaves the paeon, of which writers have made use since Thrasymachus, but they cannot explain its nature."<sup>4</sup> Obviously, Thrasymachus used the paeon freely. It is necessary to insist that this passage says nothing of periodic structure, and that rhythm and the period are two quite different subjects.<sup>5</sup> They are treated separately by Aristotle and

it does seem to fall into rhythmic commata, but the rhythm seems cretic and choriambic rather than paeonic. On the other hand, Norden finds no trace of parody in *Republic* I, where one might expect it.

<sup>4</sup> What Aristotle probably means by the phrase "they could not explain its nature" is convincingly explained by Hendrickson (p. 131): "it implies not only that Thrasymachus did not recognize the superiority of the paeon, but that subsequent theorists had failed to grasp the nature of its excellence. In short, Aristotle claims for himself the merit of interpreting the paeon as a mean between other available forms, and of thus referring its excellence to a reasoned principle." In *Rhet.*, III 11, 13, Aristotle quotes a saying of Thrasymachus: he called Niceratus who was rather unkempt and had just been defeated in a rhapsodes' contest by Pratys, "a Philoctetes bitten by Pratys." This seems to show the same kind of brutal pithiness that we find in the *Republic*.

<sup>5</sup> While the word period does not occur in this passage, we may note here a recurring confusion in our authorities, both ancient and modern, due to the double meaning of the words period and *περίοδος*. The Oxford English dictionary explains the word period as "A complete sentence. Usually applied to a sentence consisting of several clauses, grammatically connected and rhetorically constructed." For the first meaning reference is made to Aristotle's *Rhetorio*, III, 9, 1, but Aristotle is more specific: his *κατεστραμμένη λέξις*, as contrasted with *επρομένη λέξις*, refers to a sentence which contains a completed thought, where sense and sentence are completed at the same time. Such a "period" may consist of only one clause, *περίοδος δὲ ἡ μὲν ἐν κώλοις, ἡ δὲ ἀφελῆς . . . ἀφελῆ δὲ λέγω τὴν μονόκωλον . . .* (III, 9, 5). There is no doubt, however, that the usual meaning is more common, i. e. what Aristotle calls *ἡ ἐν κώλοις*; here also the sense and the sentence must be completed simultaneously and, moreover, some part of the main clause (usually the

other Greek critics. True, the period is apt to have rhythm, and any theory of periodic structure must consider it. The reverse, however, is not true: you can have very definite rhythm in very short clauses and sentences, and we shall see that this is precisely what is said of Thrasymachus by Cicero. It is absurd to argue that this reference to rhythm in Thrasymachus implies the development of the period as well.<sup>6</sup>

In two passages which discuss the periodic style of Isocrates, with special reference to rhythm, Cicero links him with his predecessors, Thrasymachus, Gorgias, and Theodorus of Byzantium. The main contrast is between all three of these on the one hand and Isocrates on the other. Isocrates, we are told, was the first to amplify the sentence, to lengthen his clauses *mollioribus numeris*, while Thrasymachus and Gorgias *traduntur arte quadam verba iunxisse*. No one would of course deny that these two rhetoricians took considerable pains with the structure of their sentences, but that does not mean that they wrote periods in the technical sense, which Gorgias certainly did not. Where Thrasymachus' work is distinguished from the others, it is said to have been broken up into short rhythmic clauses, *concisis minutis numeris*, and this is quite consistent with what Aristotle told us. Later, Cicero says that Thrasymachus was the inventor of prose-rhythm and repeats the charge that he overdid it.<sup>7</sup>

verb) is delayed until the end as a rule, so that the sense of that clause is complete only when the sentence has, as it were, gone full circle. This is the etymological and probably the original meaning as is shown also by the Latin equivalents: *circumductus*, *ambitus*, etc. The one-clause period was probably an Aristotelian addition, carefully defined, to emphasize the importance of the relation between sense and sentence. I use the word in the "usual" sense and no commentator uses it in any other when discussing the passage of Dionysius which concerns us here. But our references should be used with care, especially Demetrius who, in the first chapter of the *Περὶ ἐπηγρεῖς*, deliberately follows Aristotle. A sentence can, of course, have been carefully constructed without being a period. Gorgias is an obvious example and, if we may believe Cicero, Thrasymachus was another.

<sup>6</sup> Norden (p. 42) says explicitly: "denn periodisierte und rhythmische Rede sind nach antike Vorstellung identisch." See also Hendrickson, pp. 131-2. This confusion may have ultimately led to the statement of Suidas quoted in n. 2, *supra*:

<sup>7</sup> In *Orator*, 39, after discussing the greater freedom with which rhythm and balance can be used in epideictic oratory, Cicero mentions Isocrates as an example, for he did not have to persuade a jury and

I do not think anyone would have imported notions of the periodic style in Thrasymachus into these passages, were it not that Dionysius had previously been interpreted to say, on the authority of Theophrastus, that Thrasymachus was the originator of the period. The passage in question occurs in the *Lysias* (c. 6, *init.*) : μετὰ ταύτας ἀρετὴν εὐρίσκω παρὰ Λυσίᾳ πάνι θαυμαστήν, ἡς Θεόφραστος μέν φησιν ἄρξαι Θρασύμαχον, ἐγὼ δὲ ἡγοῦμαι Λυσίαν. Dionysius goes on to say that he believes Lysias to have written earlier in any case, and then defines the quality referred to : τίς δὲ ἔστιν ἣν φημι ἀρετήν ; η συντρέφοντα τὰ νοήματα καὶ στρογγύλως ἐκφέροντα, λέξις οἰκεία πάνι καὶ ἀναγκαῖα τοῖς δικανικοῖς λόγοις καὶ πάντι ἀληθεῖ ἀγῶνι . . . . And he continues : “ Few have imitated it ; Demosthenes surpassed Lysias except that he did not display this quality as clearly and simply, but more elaborately and pungently.” It is this virtue which has been interpreted to mean the periodic style.<sup>8</sup>

could write merely to please. *Haec tractasse Thrasymachum Chalcedonium et Leontinum ferunt Gorgiam, Theodorum inde Byzantium multosque alios quos λογοδαιδάλους appellat in Phaedro Socrates; QUORUM SATIS ARGUTA MULTA, SED UT MODO PRIMUMQUE NASCENTIA MINUTA ET VERSICULORUM SIMILIA QUAEDAM NIMIUMQUE DEPICTA.* This does not sound as if he would credit Thrasymachus with any periodic style; *haec* at the beginning of the sentence obviously refers to rhythm, and perhaps also to writing merely to please. After a reference to Herodotus and Thucydides, he returns to the merits of Isocrates. *Nam cum CONCISUS EI THRASYMACHUS MINUTIS NUMERIS VIDERETUR, et Gorgias, qui tamen primi traduntur arte quadam verba iunwisse, Theodorus autem prae fractior neo satis, ut ita dicam, rotundus, primus (Isocrates) instituit dilatata verbis et mollioribus numeris explere sententias.* The other passage is *Orat.*, 174-5, where Cicero says that the admirers of Isocrates praise him as the first to use rhythm, but that in this they are only partly right. *Nam neminem in eo genere scientius versatum confitendum est, sed PRINCEPS INVENIENDI THRASYMACHUS, CUIUS OMNIA NIMIS ETIAM EXTANT NUMEROSE.* He then attributes to Gorgias the discovery of balanced and antithetic clauses, *QUAE SUA SPONTE . . . CADUNT PLERUMQUE NUMEROSE.* It is true that in this discussion Cicero does not make any clear distinction between rhythm and periodic structure, but the references to Thrasymachus are explicitly about rhythm, and the words used to describe his work seem to preclude periods.

<sup>8</sup> On the basis of this passage, Blass says: “ er ist Empfnder der für praktische Rede passenden Periode. . . .” See also Hendrickson, p. 138; Mayer, p. 6.

Such an interpretation raises a great many difficulties. First of all, ἀρετή is a technical word in criticism. Dionysius has a well established list of such virtues, but the periodic style is never one of them. Why should Theophrastus make such a surprising claim for Thrasymachus when Cicero's explicit description of Thrasymachus' style is the very opposite of periodic. Why indeed should Dionysius make the same claim, almost equally surprising, for Lysias? Above all, how can we account for the statement that "few imitated it," and the jump from Lysias to Demosthenes? How can Isocrates, to mention no others, be thus ignored in a matter which as Dionysius makes clear elsewhere and all critics agree, was the very essence of his style? Moreover, periodic structure is *not* essential to forensic oratory, which this quality is said to be. To these questions no answer is given; they have apparently not been raised.

No reference to periods can here, in my opinion, be got out of the Greek; to do so involves a misunderstanding of three words: *συστρέφουσα*, *στρογγύλως*, and *λέξις*. It also means closing our eyes to the significant object of the verb, *νοήματα*, for this obviously refers to a quality in the field of *πραγματικόν*, not *λεκτικόν*. *Συστρέφειν* means to roll up, to gather together; in literary criticism it means to make compact or pithy.<sup>9</sup> *Στρογγύλος*

<sup>9</sup> The meaning of *συστρέφειν* is really quite clear. Liddell-Scott-Jones give plenty of examples both classical and post-classical. It means "to roll up into a compact body, to gather together"; see *συστρέψας* έαντὸν ὡς θηρίον in *Rep.*, 336D and *συνεστραμμένη χεῖρ* of the clenched fist. In literary criticism it means to make compact and distinct. It can be applied to periods, but only when a period of more compact and distinct shape is contrasted with periods of another and looser kind. This is precisely the point in Demetrius, 20, which Hendrickson quotes to support the meaning periodic here: τῆς δὲ ρητορικῆς περιόδου συνεστραμμένον τὸ εἶδος καὶ κυκλικὸν καὶ δεόμενον στρογγύλου στόματος. So *συνεστραμμένη λέξις* is compact and pithy in contrast with *λέξις διηρημένη*. It indicates a quality in which Isocrates is deficient as compared with Lysias, at *Isocrates*, 11, where Dionysius uses terminology remarkably similar to that before us: ἐν τῷ συστρέφειν τὰ νοήματα καὶ στρογγύλως ἔκφέρειν ὡς πρὸς ἀληθινοὺς ἀγῶνας ἐπιτίθειν Λυσίαν ἀπεδεχόμην. So in *Demosthenes*, 18, *συστροφή* is said to be lacking in Isocrates. It seems then to mean in this passage "to gather ideas and give them a distinct, separate shape."

here means the thing that is rolled up, that is distinct from other things and stands out.<sup>10</sup>

*Δέξις* can indeed refer to style in the most general sense, the manner of speaking or writing. It can also be used in discussing any quality of style, be it diction, composition, presenta-

<sup>10</sup> *στρογγύλος* is perhaps a more difficult word, but we may note at once that it does not apply to the periodic style as such either. See the *Isocr.*, 11 (quoted in the last note) where *στρογγύλως ἐκφέρειν* is something Isocrates could not do. We find the same said of him in *Dem.*, 4: διώκει δ' ἐκ πάντου τρόπου τὴν περίοδον οὐδὲ ταύτην στρογγύλην καὶ πυκνήν ἀλλ' ὑπαγωγικήν τινα καὶ πλατεῖαν. . . and compare *Isocr.*, 2 where is said of his *λέξις*: *στρογγύλῃ* δὲ οὐκ ἔστι. The meanings of this word in criticism are given by both Liddell-Scott-Jones and Rhys Roberts in his glossaries as “well-rounded, compact, terse,” which seems contradictory if we are thinking of the well-rounded period, which, as we have seen, is not *στρογγύλη* at all, yet these meanings are reasonably consistent (though still misleading) if we forget about periods and go back to the essential meaning. It refers to things compact, well-rounded, with a distinct shape of their own, and is very naturally used of pebbles and atoms. It goes very well with *συστρέψειν* for it refers to the thing that is gathered up, made distinct and compact. The whole phrase then means that each *νόημα* will stand out from the others with a shape of its own, distinct, one might almost say in bold relief, each set out clearly before we proceed to the next. That certainly is a quality which is useful in addressing a jury in court. At the same time, there is no necessary reference to brevity, and it is here that the translations “terse,” “compact” are still somewhat misleading. What Dionysius means by the word, and that it does not refer to periods except when specifically stated, and then only to a certain kind, should be made clear by his re-writing a sentence of Isocrates at *Dem.*, 20 in order to make it, as he explicitly tells us, more *στρογγύλη*:

Isocrates

τοσοῦτον δὲ χείρους ἐσμὲν τῶν προγόνων οὐ μόνον τῶν εὐδοκιμησάντων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν μισθέντων, δονοὶ ἐκεῖνοι μὲν εἰ πολεμεῖν πρὸς τινα ψηφίσαντο, μεστῆς οὐσῆς ἀργυρίου καὶ χρυσίου τῆς ἀκροπόλεως ὅμως ὑπὲρ τῶν δοξάντων τοῖς ἁντων σώμασιν ὥντο δεῖν κινδυνεύειν, ἡμεῖς δ' εἰς τοσαύτην ἀπορίαν ἐληλυθότες καὶ τοσοῦτοι τὸ πλῆθος ὅντες, ὕσπερ βασιλεὺς δὲ μέγας μισθωτοῖς χρώμεθα τοῖς στρατοπέδοις.

Re-written by Dionysius

ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἵσως χείρους ἐσμὲν τῶν προγόνων, τὰ δ' ἄλλα βελτίους, οὐ λέγω τῶν εὐδοκιμησάντων, πόθεν γάρ; ἀλλὰ τῶν μισθέντων. καὶ τίς οὐκ οἰδειν, δτι ἐκεῖνοι μὲν πλείστων ποτὲ πληρώσαντες χρημάτων τὴν ἀκρόπολιν οὐ κατεμισθοφόρουν τὸν κοινὸν πλοῦτον εἰς τοὺς πολεμίους, ἀλλὰ ἀπὸ τῶν λδίων εἰσφέροντες ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ τοῖς ἁντων σώμασιν κινδυνεύειν ἥξουν; ἡμεῖς δὲ οὕτως ὅντες ἀποροι καὶ τοσοῦτοι τὸ πλῆθος μισθοφόρους τοῖς στρατεύμασι πολεμοῦμεν ὕσπερ καὶ βασιλεὺς δὲ μέγας.

tion of material, or any subdivision of these, as we might say: "his writing shows . . ." At the same time the word very frequently refers to diction, in contrast both to composition and to the handling of material. Its meaning must therefore be determined by the context.<sup>11</sup>

It is by looking at the structure of the *Lysias* as a whole that we shall see without difficulty what the subject of discussion is in this sixth chapter, for Dionysius in this treatise uses all four of his customary critical formulae.<sup>12</sup> We have an introductory

<sup>11</sup> All these meanings are found in the following chapters. In c. 7 where Dionysius discusses ἐνάργεια, we find the phrase ἡ Λυσίου λέξις used in the quite general sense of style. In c. 8 ἡθοποία is said to appear in three distinct aspects: τρῶν τε ὄντων ἐν οἷς . . . διανοᾶς τε καὶ λέξεως καὶ τρίτης τῆς συνθέσεως . . . i.e. the thought (i.e. πραγματικόν), the diction, and the composition. So also in the following sentence λέξις means diction ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν λέξιν ἀποδίδωσι τοῖς ἥθεσιν οἰκεῖαν . . . τὴν σαφῆ καὶ κυρίαν καὶ κοινὴν καὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις συνηθεστάτην. On the other hand in the following sentence, which refers to composition, we find ὅρῶν ὅτι οὐκ ἐν τῇ περιόδῳ καὶ τοῖς ῥύθμοις ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ διαλελυμένῃ λέξει γίνεται τὸ ἥθος, where διαλελυμένη λέξις is the continuous type of composition. The meaning diction is prevalent in the *Epitome*, where perhaps the most relevant examples are in II, 11 on Sophocles and Euripides: καὶ ὁ μὲν ποιητικός ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς ὄντμασι, καὶ πολλάκις ἐκ τοῦ πολλοῦ τοῦ μεγέθους εἰς διάκενον κόμπον ἐκπίπτων, οἷον εἰς ἰδιωτικὴν ταπεινότητα κατέρχεται ὁ δ' Εὐριπίδης οὕτε ὑψηλός ἔστι οὔτε μὴν λιτός, ἀλλὰ κεκραμένη τῇ λέξεως μεσότητη κέχρηται and with this last expression we may compare the passage on the philosophers: μεγαλοπρεπεῖς γὰρ τῇ λέξει καὶ ποιητικοί, καὶ οὐδὲ παραλείπουσι τὴν σαφήνειαν, ἀλλὰ κεκραμένη τῇ διαλέκτῳ χρώμενοι . . . , i.e. though they use noble and poetic language, yet they do not abandon lucidity, but use a middle type of diction (as Plato is said to do in the *Demosthenes* and elsewhere). See also *Dem.*, 18 on the diction of Isocrates and *Dem.*, 4 on that of Lysias.

<sup>12</sup> The most common formula is a general division into two main areas of criticism: 1) τὸ λεκτικόν and 2) τὸ πραγματικόν, i.e. into style and the handling of material. The first of these is then subdivided into a) ἐκλογὴ ὀνομάτων and b) σύνθεσις, that is, into diction and composition. These divisions occur frequently in Dionysius and are most clearly stated in the first chapter of the *Composition*, where we may note that πραγματικόν is also called τὸ περὶ τὰ νόηματα. For the three kinds of composition which we find in the *Demosthenes*, 37, see also *Comp.*, 21. τὸ πρακτικόν also has a number of subdivisions, the full list of which is given in the *Letter to Pompey*, 3. The first is the choice of subject; this naturally occurs in the criticisms of historians, and is mentioned also in *Isocrates*, 4, but generally omitted when dealing with

chapter first; the next chapters (cc. 2-4) deal with τὸ λεκτικόν and, whether because the composition of Lysias is less remarkable or because Dionysius himself had not fully developed his theory of composition, he deals mainly with diction. In this connection he deals with the three essential virtues first: purity and simplicity of diction (cc. 2 and 3), then lucidity and brevity (c. 4). He then tells us explicitly that he is going on to the handling of material (*ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι*, c. 5 *init.*). Of the

court oratory, and so is the second: where to begin and where to end. Then comes εὑρεσίς, the thinking out of arguments, and κρίσις, judging what to include and what to omit. These last two are not always carefully distinguished and it is mainly the latter that is dealt with in *Lysias*, 5, though εὑρεσίς is taken up again in 15 (see next note). The next subdivision is τάξις, or ὀργανωτία, the arrangement, organization, and presentation of the material to be included. *This is the subject of Lys.*, 6. A last subdivision, διάθεσίς, the attitude of the speaker or writer to his subject, important for the historian, is also omitted in Dionysius' criticisms of orators. So that, in his works on orators, Dionysius usually restricts himself to three of the six possible subdivisions of πρακτικόν, namely εὑρεσίς, κρίσις, and τάξις; the first two are not always clearly separated. When dealing with Isocrates and epideictic rhetoric the choice of subject may also be considered.

The second formula is that of qualities, also clearly given in the *To Pompey*, 3, and used in the *Epitome* as well as elsewhere. Three of these qualities are essential: καθαρὰ διάλεκτος, σαφήνεια, συντομία, that is, purity of diction, lucidity, and brevity. It is Dionysius' custom to discuss these three qualities (and sometimes others) under ἐκλογή at the very beginning of a discussion. Cf. in this respect *Lys.*, 2-4 with *Isocr.*, 2, *Isaeus*, 3 and *To Pompey*, 3. The remaining, and non-essential virtues are: (iv) ἐνάργεια, vividness; (v) τῶν ἡθῶν καὶ παθῶν μίμησις, to write in character; (vi) τὸ μέγα καὶ θαυμαστόν; (vii) ἴσχυς καὶ τόνος, (viii) ἡδονὴ καὶ πειθώ; (ix) τὸ πρέπον. The whole list is not used every time, but Dionysius selects those qualities for which his subject is remarkable. The sixth and seventh are omitted in *Lysias*, but the reasons for these omissions are made clear in c. 15 where a general appraisal is made, for it is not our critic's way to hide faults of which he is aware.

The third formula, quite clearly stated in *Lys.*, 17-19 (and said to be adopted from the school of Isocrates) is that which considers an author's capacities in the different parts of a speech, namely the exordium, the statement of the case, the narration, and the proofs.

The fourth and last formula is simply Aristotle's old distinction between three kinds of rhetoric: courtroom rhetoric, deliberative or political rhetoric, and display rhetoric, as given in *Lys.*, 16.

whole series of subdivisions under this head he omits the choice of general subject and the choice of the right beginning and end, presumably because in actual trials the subject-matter is given. We then proceed to the next point: the discovery and use of arguments (*εὑρεσις*, c. 5). This is expressed in very similar words to those quoted from the next chapter: *συνέστραπται δὲ εἰ τις ἄλλος καὶ πεπύκνωται τοῖς νοήμασι*, and can be translated, with the words that follow:

He, if anyone, organizes his thought so well and so compactly, he is so far from saying anything irrelevant that he might seem even to leave out many useful things. He does this not through weakness of invention, far from it, but because of the span of time within which the speech must be made.”

Our knowledge of Dionysius' rhetorical formulae tells us what to expect next: *the arrangement of this subject matter, and that is precisely the subject of discussion in the sixth chapter*. It is with this one well-recognized aspect of style that this chapter deals, and we now see that the *ἀρετή* which Theophrastus is quoted as saying that Thrasymachus displayed first, the quality which Dionysius claims for Lysias (he does not really press the point of precedence) is not any particular style and certainly not the periodic structure, but the organization of subject-matter, the structure of the speech from the point of view of content. The key-sentence quoted above: *ἡ συστρέφουσα τὰ νοήματα καὶ στρογγύλως ἐκφέρουσα λέξις κτλ.* should then be translated: “A manner of writing (or speaking) which gathers up its ideas compactly and brings them out in bold relief. This is a virtue which particularly belongs, and indeed is essential to, the courtroom and every actual trial.” This refers, I repeat, not to any periodic style, but to the organization and structure of one's material, a most important quality in any good writing or speaking, especially the forensic.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>13</sup> It should be added that the formal scheme continues throughout the rest of the *Lysias*. Having now dealt with the two relevant parts of *τὰ πραγματικά* namely *εὑρεσις* in c. 5 and *τάξις* in 6, Dionysius proceeds to such of the remaining virtues as are found in Lysias. C. 7 deals with vividness, c. 8 with *ἡθοροΐα*, writing in character, c. 9 with *πρέπων*; cc. 10 and 11 with *πειθώ* and *ἡδονή*; c. 13 then gives a recapitulation and makes clear why *μέγα καὶ θαυμαστόν* as well as *ἰσχυς*

We shall now be less surprised also to find, at the end of the *Isaeus*, where Dionysius excuses himself from dealing in detail with any other orators before Demosthenes, that Thrasymachus is classed with Lysias as preferring the "more exact" manner of speaking of the law-courts, as against the poetic elaboration of Isocrates who is in the opposite category. Certainly, if Thrasymachus had been the discoverer of the period, and the fact noted by Dionysius, we should have expected to find him less often contrasted with Isocrates. At this point he is described as *καθαρὸς καὶ λεπτὸς καὶ δεινὸς εὑρεῖν τε καὶ εἰπεῖν στρογγύλως καὶ περίττως ἢ βούλεται*, i. e. "pure and precise"<sup>14</sup> in diction, an adept at finding the right arguments and expressing with extraordinary compactness what he wants to say," so that here again we find a reference to the arrangement and structure of material.

We meet Theophrastus and Thrasymachus together again in another and even more important passage of Dionysius at the beginning of the third chapter of the *Demosthenes*, where we are told, on the authority of Theophrastus, that Thrasymachus was the originator of a third and mixed kind of *λέξις*. This is interpreted as the third or middle style, and this is used as a key passage in the history of the formula of the three styles, which is then, on this basis, traced back to Theophrastus.

*καὶ τόνος* were omitted; they are qualities which Lysias did not possess. C. 14 is a digression on the problem: what possessed Theophrastus to condemn Lysias for irrelevance and vulgarity on the basis of a speech that is not genuine? C. 15 is repetitive, and reverts to *τὸ παργματικόν* (there is some confusion and reduplication here) and praises Lysias again for invention (only partially dealt with in 5), judgment, *κρίσις*, and *τάξις*; c. 16 approaches the subject by the formula of the three kinds of oratory and shows Lysias to be good at them all; cc. 17-19 follow the formula of the parts of speech: proem, statement, narration, and proofs. The rest, cc. 20-34, gives illustrative passages from Lysias' speeches. The structure is very clear and, except for the partial reduplication of c. 15, is carried through adequately; while at the same time it is not too painfully obvious. It should be noted that in c. 15 Dionysius says that Lysias is weak in *oikoupolia*. This seems to contradict what is said in c. 6, until we realize that he is dealing with a different aspect of *oikoupolia*. In c. 6 Lysias and Thrasymachus are praised for bringing out ideas clearly; in c. 15 Lysias is said to be weak in the elaboration of them and the use of figures.

<sup>14</sup> *λεπτός* is another adjective which Dionysius habitually applies to mean simple or ordinary diction. Its main meaning is thin or lean. See *To Pompey*, 2.

My previous warning as to the possible uses of  $\lambdaέξις$  needs to be repeated here; and here also we should look at the plan and structure of the whole treatise. It deals with  $\tauό λέκτικόν$ , and the consideration of  $\tauό πραγματικόν$ , Demosthenes' manner of handling his material, is reserved for another occasion, though a number of comments in the extant treatise would seem to us to come under that heading. The *Demosthenes* falls into two main divisions, explicitly indicated. The second of these, from c. 35 on, deals with  $\sigmaύνθεσις$  or composition. The first part then obviously deals in the main with the other aspect of style, language or the choice of words, diction and its results. Three kinds of composition are classified and described in the second part (cc. 35-7); so three kinds of diction ( $\lambdaέξις$ ) are described in the first. In this theoretical exposition,  $\lambdaέξις$  does not include  $\sigmaύνθεσις$  or composition, and therefore does not mean style in the wider sense. It means diction or language.<sup>15</sup> The two classifications are not parallel, and cannot be telescoped. Demos-

<sup>15</sup> Those who interpret the expression  $\eta\ μικτή\ λέξις$  in *Dem.*, 3 as the mixed or third kind of style make complete nonsense of the structure of the whole treatise which deals with diction first and then with composition, each being divided into three different categories. "Style" as used in the three-style formula includes both diction and composition, and indeed a good deal more besides. To meet this difficulty, with the never-to-be-defeated ingenuity so often displayed by even the best scholars (but so rarely to be commended) the theory has been put forward that the *Demosthenes* should be split in two. Cc. 1-34 were then written first, after which Dionysius took time off to write his *Composition* and then later wrote the remainder of the *Demosthenes*. This is then made to account for a completely different method in the second part. For this theory see R. H. Tuckey's "The Composition of the De Oratoribus Antiquis of Dionysius" in *C. P.*, IV (1909), pp. 390-404 and S. F. Bonner (note 1 *supra*), pp. 60-71. For such a theory there is no evidence, nor does anyone explain why Dionysius should have bothered to link together two essays which might make sense apart, but together make nonsense. Scholars have often had no high opinion of Dionysius (e.g. Norden, on p. 79 says: "so muss ich doch bekennen dass mir der von vielen bewunderte Kritikus Dionys ein äusserst bornierter Kopf zu sein scheint") and he has his limitations, but the one thing about which he seems careful, even if he wanders here and there, is the overall structure of his works. The critical skeleton is always there, sometimes indeed only too obviously there. So much so that I am inclined to consider any interpretation which makes nonsense of the essential structure of a Dionysian treatise as more likely to be itself nonsense.

thenes occupies a middle position in both, but Isocrates, for example, has the middle diction but the elegant composition, which is one of the extremes. When *λέξις* is thus used to signify diction, it is synonymous with *διάλεκτος* which is always, and *φράσις* which is also very frequently, used in this sense.<sup>16</sup>

The beginning of the *Demosthenes* is obscured by lacunae, and we have no general statement to put us straight, but enough remains to make it abundantly clear that what we have is a classification of three kinds of diction or language. The first, of which "the norm and canon is Thucydides," is "unusual, peculiar, elaborate, full of all kinds of ornamental additions"; it is also that of Gorgias. The second, that of Lysias, is "diction that is simple and straightforward and seems to derive its strength and elaboration from its relation to common language." The third is that of Thrasymachus among others (c. 3):

The third kind of diction (*λέξις*) was the mixed kind, compounded of both. Whether the first man to compose in it and to bring it to its present fashion was Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, as Theophrastus thinks, or someone else I cannot say. Those who accepted it, developed, and well-nigh perfected it were Isocrates the Athenian among the orators, among the philosophers Plato the Socratic. It is hard to find any others but these, outside Demosthenes, who practised its useful and essential features or who have better displayed *beauty in words* and superadded ornamentation. If then the diction of Thrasymachus was the real source of this mean, he seems to have made a choice in itself of considerable importance, for this diction is somehow well mixed and has adopted what is of real use in each of the other two. Thrasymachus' capacity, however, was not equal to his purpose.<sup>17</sup> Here is an example from one of his public speeches. . . .

There follows the longest, almost the only, fragment of Thrasymachus we possess, how fairly chosen we cannot tell. The text is in poor condition and it is in any case insufficient to allow any serious judgment on his style. We may perhaps see some-

<sup>16</sup> See note 11, *supra*.

<sup>17</sup> The text of this sentence is uncertain. Blass (I, pp. 251, 252, and 254) interprets the passage to mean: "Er (Thrasymachus) ist der Begründer der mittleren Gattung des Stils, nach Theophrastus. . ." See also the references in note 1, *supra*, and for a study of the text, Meerwaldt (p. 43, note 1).

thing here of the rather brutal emotional appeal Plato leads us to expect; there are a number of almost Gorgian, though more moderate, antitheses, and obvious care has been taken with sentence-structure.<sup>18</sup> There are, however, no conspicuous rhythmical clauses, paeonic or other, and the sentences can hardly be called periodic in any significant sense. The diction seems undistinguished.

In the passage quoted Dionysius obviously does not refer to the same characteristic of Thrasymachus which we saw him discussing in the *Lysis*. There Theophrastus claimed for Thrasymachus a virtue which Dionysius himself claimed for Lysias; here the *λέξις* in question is sharply contrasted with that of Lysias. The reference is clearly to another passage of Theophrastus, and I suggest that it is concerned with the middle kind of *diction*, the subject of this chapter. There is one more relevant sentence at the end of the quotation from Thrasymachus, namely: "Thrasymachus' diction (*έρμηνεία*)<sup>19</sup> then was something like this, a mean between the other two, and tending to each of the others as occasion demanded."

We should note here that Dionysius and other critics, when they discuss diction, naturally mention many qualities of style depending on the choice of words, which, however, are also affected by composition, the use of figures, and even the handling of material. These can as legitimately be discussed under diction as under the other headings, in the first part of the *Demosthenes*, for example, as well as in the second, and this naturally leads to a good deal of repetition. This is a natural result of rhetorical and critical formulae which separate things artificially. Diction includes not only the use of poetic or prosaic, grand or humble, metaphorical or straightforward, unusual or common words, but also the use of language that is clear or obscure, vague or precise, elaborate or simple, intense or relaxed, pleasant or abrupt (in sound or association), of archaisms or new coinages,

<sup>18</sup> Blass (I, p. 255) analyzes the structure of the sentence in some detail. There is a succession of clauses in each sentence, but they are not tied together in any periodic structure.

<sup>19</sup> *έρμηνεία* is just as vague a word as *λέξις*; it too can be used in relation to any quality of style and any department of criticism. For another passage where it must refer to diction see *Isocrates*, 11: *πρώτην μὲν τοινυν ἔφη δρετὴν εἶναι λόγων τὴν καθαρὰν έρμηνείαν*. . . .

of words that are or are not in character, that arouse or soothe the emotions, and the results of all this. Modern researches into semantics should have taught us all over again to understand the tremendous power over any audience of what the Greeks called ἐκλογὴ ὁνομάτων.

*Λέξις* continues to be used mainly in the sense of diction and language through the following chapters of the *Demosthenes*, certainly wherever Dionysius speaks of χαρακτῆρες λέξεως. The first eight chapters are about diction exclusively, except where, in c. 2 and c. 4, first about Lysias and then about Isocrates, allusion is made to other conclusions in previous works on those orators, and here we seem to move for a moment beyond the province of diction. But it is the language of Plato that is criticized in cc. 6 and 7, and the main criticism is of his unfortunate habit, as Dionysius believes it to be, of indulging in over-elaborate and over-poetical language. So the epithets piled up in c. 8 refer explicitly to the diction, *φράσις* or *διάλεκτος*, of Demosthenes. Admittedly, it is difficult to separate the effects of language from those of composition and other aspects of style; besides, Dionysius does not possess the logical mind of an Aristotle and finds it hard to keep within the strict limits of his own formulae. So in the second part of the work there are a number of phrases and criticisms which seem to us to refer to diction rather than composition, but the main subject under discussion is clear in both cases; the first eight chapters at any rate are clearly concerned mainly with diction, and this is especially clear in the first three, the context of the reference to Thrasymachus and Theophrastus.

When, in c. 9, Dionysius passes on to illustrate his conclusions by a comparison of passages from Demosthenes on the one hand and from Thucydides, Lysias, Isocrates, and Plato on the other, he does begin to lose sight of his own categories and his comments move beyond the stylistic results of diction. It should, however, be noted that such comparative illustrations are not repeated in the second part of the work, so that these chapters, in a sense, do double duty (10-31). Diction is indeed not forgotten, but it is only one aspect of style here considered. In c. 32 Dionysius seems to pull himself up; he reviews the results of diction again as the main subject, before he goes on, in c. 35, to a more theoretical discussion of that other aspect of τὸ λεκτικόν

which is composition, and to indicate Demosthenes' superiority also in this department. With that part of the treatise we are not concerned here. For our present purpose it is sufficient to establish that λέξις means diction in the first eight, indeed in the first three chapters.

If this interpretation is correct, we have no evidence to attribute to Thrasymachus any conception of a "middle style" but the development of a mean or middle diction, that is, the development of a prose vocabulary. Furthermore, this passage gives no authority at all for referring back to Theophrastus any conception of a "middle style," or any formula of three styles.<sup>20</sup>

Where does that leave Thrasymachus? We know that, along with Gorgias, he was the first to develop oratory as a conscious art among the Greeks, that he developed the technical rhythms in prose and probably had some theories of prose rhythm, that his sentences were apt to break up into short, too rhythmical clauses. We know, if the above interpretation of the passage in

<sup>20</sup> Those who would do so can find very little except this passage to support their theory, as will be seen by referring to the authorities mentioned in note 1, *supra*. Mayer indeed relies also on *Isocrates*, 3, but what Dionysius quotes from Theophrastus there is a quite different critical formula, namely that a writer's excellence may be judged by reference to three things: his choice of words, his composition, and his use of figures: καθόλον τριῶν δυτῶν, ὡς φησι Θεόφραστος, ἐξ ᾧ γίγνεται τὸ μέγα καὶ σεμνὸν καὶ περιττὸν ἐν λέξει, τῆς τε ἐκλογῆς τῶν δυομάτων καὶ τῆς ἐκ τούτων ἀρμονίας καὶ τῶν περιλαμβανόντων αὐτὰ σχημάτων. . . . The words μέγα, σεμνόν, περιττόν have here nothing to do with the grand style, which in this context would be completely irrelevant, but are used in a general sense of distinction or excellence in a writer. If they are a direct quotation from Theophrastus, then the very fact that he uses them in this general sense tells against the idea of his having any theory of three styles of which the grand would be one. As for Demetrius, 41 in this connection, that is adequately dealt with by Hendrickson, pp. 137-8. Hendrickson's own contention that there is a fundamental opposition between Theophrastus' Peripatetic views and any theory of the three styles is entirely convincing, and so is Stroux' discussion of the whole subject. However, it is not necessary to suppose, as they do, that Dionysius does attribute the three styles to Theophrastus in error. Such an error is in any case very unlikely, for Dionysius is fully aware of this distinction between the Peripatetic mean and the notion of a third or mixed style of diction or composition, and it is therefore improbable that he would misrepresent Theophrastus on this point (see *Composition*, 21).

the *Lysias* is correct, that Theophrastus claimed he was endowed with a quality vital to all good writing: the clear and striking organization of his material and that, again on the authority of Theophrastus, he attempted to find the right vocabulary for prose, a middle diction between the colloquial language of a Lysias and the poetic diction of Gorgias. Plato tells us that he was a master of emotional appeal and represents him as a powerful and violent speaker. All this amounts to a very considerable achievement, even if we cannot now consider him as the originator of the periodic structure or of an all-round middle style.

Enough has probably also been said to make us more cautious in attributing to the major Greek critics the rather meaningless formula of the three styles. It is doubtful if the best Greek critics ever use it. Dionysius speaks of three types of composition and three types of diction; it is doubtful whether he ever used a single formula to cover both at the same time. Demetrius, the author of Περὶ ἐρμηνείας discusses four main kinds of writing, but he nowhere classifies authors under these and he tells us himself that all these kinds except the grand and the plain can be mixed in various ways. Longinus has moved entirely beyond any formula classifying styles. It is all the more important that we should not be led, by an unfortunate misunderstanding of two passages in Dionysius, to attribute such a rigid and unimaginative formula to Theophrastus who may well have been the greatest critic of them all.

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## ACCIUS AND THE *FAENERATRIX* OF PLAUTUS.

The investigation which led to this article had its origin in a passing remark of Eduard Norden.<sup>1</sup> He suggested that Varro might have been using Accius as his source when mentioning *Plauti Feneratricem* in a passage of the *De Lingua Latina* (VII, 96), since it is certain that Accius composed an index of Plautus' plays. Because of the importance of Accius in the history of Roman literary scholarship and the very limited knowledge which we have of his activities, Norden's suggestion appeared to deserve further investigation. But after the first steps had been taken in this direction, it became evident that the approach to the problem which promised the most fruitful results was through a study of all the evidence bearing on the *Faeneratrix* of Plautus.

This play is now lost to us with the exception of four verses,<sup>2</sup> too few, of course, to allow us to make any independent judgment regarding its authenticity. But like all plays attributed to Plautus, the *Faeneratrix* was subject to the scrutiny and pronouncements of Plautine critics. As the scholar closest to Plautus' generation, Accius' judgment is probably the most important that we have and it will be our chief concern in this investigation. But in the course of it, we shall also learn something about the opinions of Aelius Stilo and Marcus Terentius Varro so that our general understanding of the thorny problem of Plautine *traditio* in antiquity will be somewhat increased.

Most of the information which we have about the Plautine studies of L. Accius comes to us from two passages in the same chapter of Aulus Gellius' *Attic Nights*.<sup>3</sup> The more important contains the words of Accius himself which Gellius found quoted, as he tells us expressly, in the *De Comoediis Plautinis* of M. Terentius Varro. They read as follows (§9): *Nam nec Geminei Lenones nec Condalium nec Plauti Anus nec Bis Compressa nec Boeotia umquam fuit neque adeo Agroecus neque Commorientes Macci Titi.*

<sup>1</sup> *Rh. Mus.*, XLVIII (1893), p. 535, n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Published among the *Fragmenta* in Lindsay's Oxford edition.

<sup>3</sup> III, 3. On the chapter as a whole, see Ritschl, *Parerga*, pp. 73 ff.; Leo, *Plautinische Forschungen*, pp. 18 ff.; and more recently, Evelyn H. Clift, *Latin Pseudepigrapha* (Baltimore, 1945), pp. 40 ff.

Leo<sup>4</sup> has proposed a plausible explanation of the two forms in which Plautus' name appears: *Plauti* and *Macci Titi*. In the edition of the plays used by Accius, the name of the author appeared as *Plauti* in the prologues of the *Gemini Lenones*, *Condalium* and *Anus*, as *Macci Titi* in those of the *Agroecus* and *Commorientes*. The prologues of the *Boeotia* and *Bis Compressa*, if these plays had prologues, did not contain the author's name.

In the second passage (§1), Gellius mentions *indices* of Plautus' plays composed by six Roman scholars of the Republic of whom Accius is one. Although Gellius does not cite the source of this notice, it has long been recognized that it also was taken from the *De Comoediis Plautinis* of Varro and that Gellius had not consulted the *index* of Accius at first hand or that of any other scholar whom he mentions in close connection with him.<sup>5</sup>

Now the two passages are obviously parts of a discussion of Plautine authenticity which Varro probably found in Accius' *Didascalica*.<sup>6</sup> In the first, Accius appears to be laying the foundations for the selection of authentic plays by eliminating those which seemed unauthentic to him. He is telling his reader that he is well aware that the plays in question were generally attributed to Plautus and that some of them, in fact, had his name in their prologues. Yet, he firmly denies their authenticity.

We may ask ourselves if these were the only plays attributed to Plautus in the time of Accius which he did not consider to be genuine. The answer, I think, must be affirmative. His list as we have it has continuity and no good reason appears why Varro should have omitted any titles. Moreover, it seems complete because the three kinds of plays which are mentioned cover all the documented evidence or lack of evidence which Accius could have found in the plays themselves: plays in the prologues

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 34, n. 1.

<sup>5</sup> See Ritschl, *op. cit.*, p. 92, who makes a possible exception of Servius Claudius. In this he is followed by Mercklin, *Jahrb. f. d. class. Phil.*, Suppl. III (1860), pp. 643 f. But the exception is unnecessary; cf. Leo, *op. cit.*, p. 34, and J. Kretzschmer, *De Auctoribus A. Gelli Grammaticis*<sup>2</sup>, pp. 54 f.

<sup>6</sup> Kretzschmer, *op. cit.*, p. 40; Norden, *Rh. Mus.*, XLVIII (1893), pp. 531, 535, n. 1; Leo, *Gesch. d. röm. Lit.*, p. 388; Schanz-Hosius, *Gesch. d. röm. Lit.*, I<sup>4</sup>, p. 135.

of which Plautus was mentioned by one or another of his names and plays in which he was not mentioned at all. Finally, the passage gives us a conception of the nature of Accius' list. He does not seem to have given the reasons for his conclusions at any length as Varro apparently did in the *De Comoediis Plautinis*. It was rather a blunt statement of the conclusion that such and such plays were not genuine. And we can assume that the corresponding affirmative statement was written in the same vein.

This does not mean, of course, that Accius did not reach his final opinions through study and reasoning. Nor is it difficult to discern the criteria with which he worked. Apart from his refusal to accept certain plays which were apparently guaranteed as authentic by Plautus' name, it is unlikely, to say the least, that Accius as a dramatist and literary critic did not know that Terence considered the *Commorientes* a play of Plautus.<sup>7</sup> Nevertheless, he pronounced it unauthentic; so little, then, was he influenced by predecessors and tradition. Hence, it must have been considerations of style and language which influenced him the most, a field in which his own great poetic ability and feeling could function freely. We may think of him working along the same lines which Varro was later to adopt in attributing plays to Plautus over and above the twenty-one *Varronianae*. As Gellius tells us (§3), Varro was *adductus filo atque facetia sermonis Plauto congruentis*.

The history in later times of the seven plays which Accius condemned need not concern us here. It has been set forth fully and precisely by Evelyn H. Clift within recent years.<sup>8</sup> Rather, it is the positive side of the question about which we would like to know more. What plays did Accius consider to be authentic?

We may assume, first of all, that they included the twenty-one *Varronianae* which have come down to us (the *Vidularia* belongs to this corpus although its present condition is fragmentary). Varro chose these plays, as Gellius tells us (§3) *quoniam dubiosae non erant, set consensu omnium Plauti esse censebantur*. Surely Accius, as the oldest scholar known to have worked on the authenticity of plays attributed to Plautus, must have been one of the *omnes*. We may safely assume that the others were

<sup>7</sup> *Ad.* 7.

<sup>8</sup> *Op. cit.* (note 3, above), pp. 48 ff.

those who are mentioned by Gellius (§1) as authors of lists, although Gellius, as we have seen above,<sup>9</sup> knew of their works only through Varro. But is this all that we can learn from existing evidence?

The *Faeneratrix* of Plautus is mentioned thrice in antiquity by Varro,<sup>10</sup> Festus<sup>11</sup> and Diomedes.<sup>12</sup> Let us look first at the passage in Festus. In it the proverb *Vapula Papiria* is discussed. It begins with an explanation given by Sinnius Capito. This is followed by a quotation from Plautus in *Feneratrice*. Next we have the words *Aelius hoc loco vapula posic<sup>tum esse</sup> ait pro dole, Varro pro peri, teste Terentio* and a quotation from the *Phormio* (850). The passage terminates with a quotation from Plautus' *Curculio* (566) in which *vapula* occurs (the Plautine manuscripts have the reading *vapulare*).

So the first person to be cited is Sinnius Capito.<sup>13</sup> Verrius Flaccus, whose work Festus reproduced, was familiar with the writings of Capito and quoted from them in his fifth book, as Festus tells us expressly.<sup>14</sup> On the basis of other evidence in Festus, Hertz has shown that Capito probably made a collection of Latin proverbs, the meanings of which he illustrated by quotations from the earlier Latin authors including Plautus.<sup>15</sup> Hence, we may assume that Verrius copied his verses from the *Faeneratrix* out of Capito's book.

With regard to Aelius Stilo's comment on the word *vapula* as it appeared in the *Faeneratrix*, we cannot say where it occurred originally. Stilo does not appear to have written commentaries

<sup>9</sup> See note 5, above.

<sup>10</sup> *L. L.*, VII, 96.

<sup>11</sup> *S. v. Vapula Papiria*, p. 512 (pages refer to Lindsay's Teubner edition published in 1933). In treating this passage, I share the view of Reitzenstein, Goetz and others who believe that both strata of Festus' work and hence this passage derive from Verrius Flaccus; cf. Schanz-Hosius, *op. cit.*, II<sup>4</sup>, p. 364.

<sup>12</sup> *G. L.*, I, p. 401, 4 Keil.

<sup>13</sup> On Capito's life and writings, see M. Hertz, *Sinnius Capito*, and Funaioli, *G. R. F.*, pp. 457 ff.

<sup>14</sup> Festus, *s. v. Salva res <est dum cantat> senex*, pp. 436 f. The part of the passage which goes back to Sinnius may have come either from his *Libri Spectaculorum*, or from the assumed collection of proverbs; cf. Hertz, *op. cit.*, pp. 20 ff.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Hertz, *op. cit.*, p. 22 and, in greater detail, *Phil.*, I (1846), pp. 610 ff.; also, Reitzenstein, *Verrianiische Forschungen*, p. 23.

on the plays of Plautus<sup>16</sup> and it is difficult to see how a comment such as this could have found an appropriate place in his list of Plautine plays.<sup>17</sup> By its very nature it belongs to a lexicographical work of the kind which is indicated by many of the fragments.<sup>18</sup> As for the reference to Varro, I take it to mean that he also commented on the meaning of *vapula* in the same line of the *Faeneratrix* and that he cited the line from the *Phormio* of Terence to illustrate his explanation. The *Quaestiones Plautinae* comes readily to mind as the source of his comment, for to judge from its fragments part of this work, at least, was devoted to such explanations.<sup>18a</sup>

The question may now be asked whether Verrius Flaccus cited Stilo and Varro after Capito or independently. Unfortunately the evidence is inconclusive. It is generally agreed that Gellius found all the material for his discussion of the word *pluria* (V, 21) in a letter of Capito addressed to Pacuvius Labeo (§9).<sup>19</sup> If he did so, and I believe he did, Capito was accustomed to cite from Stilo and Varro. On the other hand, in the passages in Festus where Capito is mentioned by name as the authority for an explanation of a proverb, there is not one, to my knowledge, apart from the *Vapula Papiria*, in which the authors of other views are named, although other views are given in such a way as to make it possible that they came from Capito's book.<sup>20</sup> If the explanation of *Sus Minervam* (Festus, p. 408) actually comes from Capito as believed by Reitzenstein,<sup>21</sup> and the mention of the involved explanations of Varro and Euhemerus was not added by Verrius Flaccus, as is quite possible,<sup>22</sup> then we have some positive evidence. But as it stands, it is problematical. Thus we shall have to confess that we do not know whether Verrius Flaccus found the references to Aelius Stilo and Varro in Sinnius Capito under *Vapula Papiria* or added them himself.

<sup>16</sup> Ritschl, *op. cit.*, p. 357.

<sup>17</sup> See below, p. 273.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Mentz, *De Lucio Aelio Stilone, Comm. Phil. Ienenses*, IV (1890), pp. 20 f.; Schanz-Hosius, *op. cit.*, I<sup>4</sup>, p. 233.

<sup>18a</sup> G. R. F., pp. 207 f.

<sup>19</sup> Hertz, *Sinnius*, p. 12; Mercklin, *op. cit.*, p. 644; Kretzschmer, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

<sup>20</sup> Festus, *s. v. Manius Egerius*, p. 128; *Quot servi, tot hostes*, p. 314; *Sexagenarios <de ponte>*, p. 450.

<sup>21</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 23.

<sup>22</sup> Hertz, *Phil.*, p. 612.

But questions of source apart, we do have the valuable information that Stilo cited the *Faeneratrix* in commenting on the word *vapula*. We learn from our same chapter of Gellius (III, 3, 12) that Stilo considered only twenty-five of the plays circulating under Plautus' name to be authentic. Twenty-one of these must have been the *Varronianae* which we have. In attempting to fill up the gap of four plays which is left, Miss Clift<sup>23</sup> starts with the assumption that Stilo would not have cited from plays which he did not hold to be genuine, although she suggests that Stilo like Varro may have had two lists, one of "genuine plays" and the other of "probably genuine."

At this point we must be careful about our terminology. It is clear that Varro drew up two lists. One contained the twenty-one *Varronianae* which we have mentioned above; the other, plays which Varro attributed to Plautus on stylistic grounds. The *Boeotia*, for example, was not accepted by all scholars before Varro, and hence was not included in the twenty-one. Moreover, it circulated under the name of another author. *Nihil tamen Varro dubitavit quin Plauti foret* (Gellius III, 3, 3-4). The words *nihil dubitavit* are unequivocal. Varro did not have the slightest doubt about the authenticity of the *Boeotia*. Varro also tells us, again through Gellius (§14), that Plautus wrote the *Saturnio* and *Addictus* while working in a mill. Here Varro had historical reasons for believing these plays to be genuine. Yet because they had not been accepted in earlier lists, they were not included among the twenty-one. I see, therefore, no reason to conclude that Varro considered one list more "genuine" than another. We may, if we wish, place greater reliance on the *consensus omnium* than on Varro's own considerations and in view of the survival of the twenty-one, this is clearly what was done in antiquity. But we are hardly justified in speaking as if Varro had thought in terms of "genuine" and "probably genuine" plays.

To return to Aelius Stilo, there is no good reason to believe that he did more than draw up a list of twenty-five plays which he believed to be authentic. Like Accius, he may have begun by eliminating those which he considered to be unauthentic. But unlike Varro he did not have a relatively large number of previous studies to consider. The moment for summarizing the

<sup>23</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 53 ff.

problem in the light of earlier conclusions had not yet arrived. The task was solely to separate the true from the false.

This does not mean, however, that Stilo may not have been influenced by the work of Accius. We cannot well imagine a man of his learning and interests ignoring it. As we have seen, he cites from the *Faeneratrix* and we may assume with Miss Clift that if he did so he considered it to be genuine. Thus, with the elimination of a "probable" list, the *Faeneratrix* must have had a place in his list of twenty-five. Did Accius also have it in his?

This brings us to the passage of Varro (*L. L.*, VII, 96) in which the *Faeneratrix* is mentioned. It reads as follows in the Goetz-Schoell edition:

Apud Matium: 'obsceni interpres funestique ominis auctor.' obscenum dictum ab scena; eam ut †Graeci aut Accius scribit sc<a>ena. (in pluribus verbis A ante E alii ponunt, alii non, ut quod partim dicunt <scaeptrum, partim> sceptrum, alii Plauti Faeneratricem, alii Feneratricem; sic faenisicia ac f[o]enisicia, ac rustici pappum M[a]esium, non Maesium, a quo Lucilius scribit: 'Cecilius <pretor> ne rusticus fiat'): quare turpe ideo obscaenum, quod nisi in scaena[m] palam dici non debet.

First of all, a few words about the text. At the beginning I would prefer to read *ea*<m> (*ea* is the manuscript reading), *ut Graeci <e>t Accius, scribit scena*<m>, understanding Varro to say that Matius wrote *scena*, and hence *obscenum* with a simple *e*.<sup>24</sup> The emending of *aut* to *et* and its interpretation as a simple connective is confirmed to a certain extent by a passage from Varro's *De Origine Linguae Latinae* preserved by Priscian.<sup>25</sup> In it Varro is discussing the *agma* and such words as "aggulus" and "agguilla." He says: *In eius modi <verbis> Graeci et Accius noster bina G scribunt, alii N et G, quod in hoc veritatem videre facile non est. Similiter agceps et agcora.* Here we have a reasonably close parallel to our passage from the *De Lingua Latina*; namely, the Greeks and Accius are mentioned together as using a certain kind of spelling. Other emendations or restorations are imposed by the sense, since spellings with *ae*

<sup>24</sup> This is the reading of Professor Kent in the Loeb edition, I, p. 348. But he places a comma after *Graeci* and thus translates, "this word Accius writes *scena* like the Greeks."

<sup>25</sup> Priscian, *G. L.*, II, p. 30, 15 = *L. L.*, frag. 47, p. 201 G.-S.

must be contrasted throughout with spellings with a simple *e*. The restoration *pretor* is confirmed by Diomedes,<sup>26</sup> who cites the same verse.

Let us now examine the passage of Varro for its contents. Varro tells us that Accius wrote *scena* with a monophthong like the Greeks. In doing so, he was obviously following a principle of transliterating Greek words into Latin with the greatest possible exactitude. We find him treating the endings of Greek proper names in the same way<sup>27</sup> and, as we have seen, he spelled such words as *angulus* and *anguilla* in the Greek manner with two *g*'s. It need not concern us here whether Greek *σκηνή* was first transliterated into Latin as *scena* and later urbanized into *scaena* (apparently by the time of Plautus) or the form *scaena* was the earlier to appear, either through an Etruscan form or directly from the Greek.<sup>28</sup> To Varro, *scena* was an unusual spelling of the *scaena* which prevailed in his time.

He then proceeds to several other words which were written by some with a simple *e*, by others with an *ae*. Here there is no indication of source or authority; but in accordance with Varro's usual procedure we may suspect that he still had Accius in mind until he came to the place where he begins to cite Lucilius. Nevertheless, this can be no more than a suspicion unless it is strengthened by other considerations.

The first of these words is *sceptrum-scaeptrum* from the Greek *σκῆπτρον*. It hardly needs to be observed that the form *sceptrum* belongs in the same class as *scena* from *σκηνή* and that Accius would have written it in this way. This remained the usual form, although we later find it urbanized into *scaeplrum*, possibly under the influence of *scaena*. There can be little doubt that to Varro the spelling *sceptrum* seemed normal.

But where, we may ask ourselves, was Varro likely to have found *sceptrum* in the works of Accius? We can assume that *scena* occurred frequently in the *Didascalica* which we know to have dealt with the drama through its title and fragments. Fortunately we have evidence that in it the costumes and equipment of actors were also discussed. A passage from the eighth book

<sup>26</sup> *G. L.*, I, p. 452, 17.

<sup>27</sup> Varro, *L. L.*, X, 70.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Walde-Hofmann, *Lat. etym. Wörterb.*, s. v. *scaena*, II, p. 485. There is an excellent summary of the problem by Bonfante, *R. E. L.*, XII (1934), pp. 157 ff.

preserved by Nonius reads as follows:<sup>29</sup> *actoribus manuleos, baltea, machaeras*. It is tempting to add the *sceptrum* of tragic kings to these appurtenances. At least, it will be conceded that it would find an appropriate place among them.

We then come to *Faeneratrix-Feneratrix*. How would Plautus himself have written this title? If we can rely on the Ambrosianus which has *faenus* consistently,<sup>30</sup> he would have spelled it with the diphthong. But there were others in the second century B. C. who pronounced it differently. According to Gellius,<sup>31</sup> Varro derived *faenerator* from *faenus* and *faenus* from *fetus*. "And for this reason," Gellius continues, "Varro states that M. Cato and the rest of his generation (*ceteros aetatis eius*) pronounced *fenerator* without an *a* as *fetus* and *fecunditas* are pronounced." That there was an oral tradition about this pronunciation that reached Varro is not impossible. Older men such as Accius himself, to whom Varro dedicated his *De Antiquitate Litterarum*,<sup>32</sup> could have told Varro about it. But it is more likely, I think, that Varro had seen certain manuscripts of Cato and his contemporaries in which *faenus* was spelled *fenus*. Although Accius, according to our reckoning, would be assigned to the generation after Cato, having been born in 170 B. C., he passed the first twenty-one years of his life while Cato was still alive. So speaking in general terms, Varro may have included him among the *ceteri aetatis Catonis*. But I would not labor this point. Suffice it to say that if Cato and his contemporaries said *fenus*, Accius may have spoken and written the word and its derivatives in the same way.

Moreover, Varro knew of two spellings. Possibly these variant spellings appeared in different editions of the play itself. But it is more likely, I think, that Varro found them in the various lists of plays which he consulted. The oldest author of a list is Accius. It would be more probable that he wrote *Feneratrix* without the diphthong than scholars of later generations when the spelling *faenus* was more standardized.

Of far greater weight is the following consideration. Why do

<sup>29</sup> Nonius, I, p. 286 Lindsay = Accius, frag. 7, *G. R. F.*, p. 26.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Lodge, *Lexicon Plautinum*, s. v. *faenus*, and Ritschl's edition of the *Mostellaria*, *app. crit.* on v. 580.

<sup>31</sup> Gellius, XVI, 12, 7-8 = *L. L.*, frag. 57, p. 204.

<sup>32</sup> On the dedication to Accius, see Ritschl, *Opusc.*, III, pp. 469 f. and *G. R. F.*, p. 183.

we have *Plauti Faeneratrix* to illustrate a point of pronunciation? The choice of the word is indeed curious. According to the Thesaurus,<sup>33</sup> it occurs in our classical Latin texts only twice except as a title of Plautus' play: once in Charisius<sup>34</sup> and once in Valerius Maximus.<sup>35</sup> As we have seen above, Varro used the much more common form *faenerator*<sup>36</sup> in informing us that Cato and his contemporaries pronounced it *fenerator*. Instead of *faeneratrix*, we would have expected it or *faenus* as an example. Moreover, why do we have the qualifying *Plauti* indicating the title of a play rather than the word *faeneratrix* alone as a common noun? It would appear that Varro must have had the particular play of Plautus in mind or before his eyes to have used it as an example. Given the fact that Accius had composed an index of Plautus' plays, that Varro begins our passage with a reference to Accius and that his second example, *sceptrum*, may well have been taken from Accius also, it is difficult not to conclude that here too we have the influence of Accius and his *Didascalica* in particular.

With *faenisicia-fenisicia*, however, we seem to have moved away from Accius, since it is not likely that the word occurred in the *Didascalica*. But the train of thought which Varro might have followed in passing from *Faeneratrix* to *faenisicia* can at least be suggested, if he did not find the example in Accius. Since Varro derived *faenerator* from *faenus* and *faenus* in turn from *fetus*, he must have considered that *Faeneratrix* had the same origin. Now Festus derived both *faenus* and *faenum* from *fetus*,<sup>37</sup> and, hence, the derivation *faenum* from *fetus* was circulating at the time of Verrius Flaccus. The frequent agreement of Verrius and Varro in regard to derivations is well known<sup>38</sup> and it is quite possible that Varro shared his opinion about the derivation of *fenum*. If so, in the belief of a common origin of *faenus* and *faenum*, Varro could have moved naturally from a derivative of one, *faeneratrix*, to a compound of another, *faenisicia*.

With Mesius for Maesius we are back in the theatre, for the

<sup>33</sup> *T. L. L.*, VI, col. 475.

<sup>34</sup> *G. L.*, I, p. 41, 16.

<sup>35</sup> VII, 2, 2.

<sup>36</sup> The examples of *fenerator* (the spelling of the Thesaurus) occupy about a column and a half.

<sup>37</sup> P. 76; cf. p. 83.

<sup>38</sup> See Lindsay's preface to his edition of Festus in *Glossaria Latina*, IV, p. 74.

mention of Pappus takes us into the realm of Atellan farces. In them Pappus was the name given to the stock-character of the stupid old man.<sup>39</sup> In discussing the word *cascus* meaning "old," Varro speaks of its Sabine origin and tells us that in some Atellan farces it was used for Pappus, because the Oscans called an old man *casnar*.<sup>40</sup> In the same way *maesius*, a well-attested Oscan word which was used in regard to age in the sense of Latin *maior*,<sup>41</sup> must have been applied by farmers, probably from the Sabine country,<sup>42</sup> to the "old man" in the farces, with the pronunciation *mesius*.<sup>43</sup>

Varro's *rustici* shows that he considered this pronunciation to be characteristic of the country and he contrasts it with the urban *maesius*. He has not, we must note, characterized previous examples of *e* for *ae* as uncouth or rustic. He could hardly do so without disparaging the pronunciation or spelling of Accius or Cato and his contemporaries. Mesius-Pappus, as we have said, takes us again into the realm of the theatre and, given *scaena*, *sceptrum* and *Plauti Faeneratrix*, it is reasonable to conclude that Varro still had Accius' *Didascalica* before him. But it is impossible to say with any certainty whether he found *maesius* or *mesius* there, or both.

Norden, who also accepts Accius as the source, argues that as Accius adopted the form *scena* from the Greek, so he took *mesius* from the *lingua rustica*.<sup>44</sup> But the latter is quite a different thing. In writing *scena*, Accius was transliterating the Greek *σκηνή* as precisely as possible. On the other hand, the Oscan word *maesius* has the *ae* correctly, since it represents a development from *mais* and the suffix *io*.<sup>45</sup> As a *nomen* in Campanian inscriptions it is well attested with the form *Maesius*<sup>46</sup> and

<sup>39</sup> Varro, *L. L.*, VII, 29; cf. Marx, *R.-E.*, II, col. 1919.

<sup>40</sup> Varro, *op. cit.*, VII, 28-29; cf. Festus (Paulus) *s. v. Casnar*, p. 41. The word occurs with this meaning in a Paenitigan inscription reproduced by von Planta, *Grammatik d. oskisch-umbrischen Dialekte*, II, no. 255, p. 547.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Festus (Paulus), *s. v. Maesius*, p. 121; von Planta, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 207 f.

<sup>42</sup> On the Sabine pronunciation of *e* for *ae* see Varro, *L. L.*, V, 97.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. Corssen, *K. Z.*, III (1854), p. 278.

<sup>44</sup> *Rh. Mus.*, XLVIII (1893), p. 536.

<sup>45</sup> Von Planta, *op. cit.*, I, p. 512; II, p. 207; Corssen, *loc. cit.*

<sup>46</sup> See the index to *C.I.L.*, X.

Varro indicates that he considers this the correct pronunciation. Hence, I am inclined to think that this is the form which Accius would have used if he was speaking of the fact alone that Pappus in the Atellan farces was sometimes called *Maezius*. But it is possible, of course, that he also mentioned its rustic pronunciation in passing and that Varro repeated his remark.

Varro next cites a verse from Lucilius which contained two examples, *Cecilius* and *pretor*, of the same kind of rustic pronunciation which we find in *mesius*. Norden argues that Lucilius was making fun of Accius for his opinion regarding the substitution of simple *e* for the diphthong *ae*.<sup>47</sup> This accords with the view advanced by Ritschl that Accius' principles of orthography were later criticised by Lucilius.<sup>48</sup> But as we have seen, it is far from certain that Accius used or advocated the pronunciation *mesius*, the only one of his examples which Varro characterizes as rustic, and to ask with Norden where Lucilius learned that the pronunciation *pretor* was rustic if not from Accius denies to Lucilius the use of his own ears and removes him from an Italy with which he, if anyone, was familiar. Lucilius' verse, as Marx has seen,<sup>49</sup> clearly does not belong to his discussion of orthography in Book IX. He is simply making fun of someone who had a rustic pronunciation. Varro's mind moved naturally from the rustic pronunciation of *mesius* to other examples of the same phenomenon furnished by Lucilius.

To summarize, our investigation has shown that it is very likely that Varro found *Plauti Faeneratrix* in the *Didascalica* of Accius, and since Accius did not include it in his list of unauthentic plays which we discussed at the beginning of this paper, we can assume that he considered it authentic. There can also be little doubt that Aelius Stilo held the same view. As for Varro himself, we have seen above that he explained a word from the *Faeneratrix*, probably in the *Quaestiones Plautinae*. This is an indication that he considered it a genuine play. But of greater importance is this: if he had entertained any doubts about its authenticity, in writing his passage in the *De Lingua Latina* he had only to omit the word *Plauti*. Varro did not follow Accius slavishly. Accius, as we have seen, condemned the

<sup>47</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 534 ff.

<sup>48</sup> *Opusc.*, IV, pp. 142 ff.; cf. Marx, *R.-E.*, I, cols. 146 f.

<sup>49</sup> In his edition of Lucilius on verse 1130, II, pp. 358 ff.

*Boeotia*. By the time of Varro a certain Aquilius was said to be its author. Still Varro, on stylistic grounds, was certain that it came from the pen of Plautus and cites from it in the *De Lingua Latina*.<sup>50</sup>

The *Faeneratrix* was not, however, thought to be genuine by one or several of the other Roman scholars mentioned by Gellius and hence it was not included by Varro among the twenty-one which had obtained the approval of all. It is impossible to say whether it was still extant at the time of Diomedes, who cites a few words from it.<sup>51</sup> Diomedes is illustrating the occurrence of certain verbs in active forms in early writers which usually appeared as deponents at a later period. The example from the *Faeneratrix* is *que ego populabo probe* (*populabo* instead of *populabor*). Other examples are cited from Naevius, Pacuvius and Ennius. It would appear that Diomedes was here following the chapter of some earlier grammar which dealt with the subject and furnished the illustrations. At any rate, after Diomedes we hear no more of the *Faeneratrix*.

Apart from the unlikely discovery of new evidence of a positive nature such as a didascalic notice dated within the period in which we know Plautus to have been writing plays, we shall never know for certain whether the *Faeneratrix* was the product of Plautus' pen. But in closing we may deplore the loss of a play which appeared genuine to Accius, Aelius Stilo and Varro. We are all familiar with the errors that can be made in basing judgments of authenticity on stylistic considerations and we have seen that such playwrights as Terence and Accius could disagree, as they did in regard to the authenticity of the *Commorientes*. Nevertheless, it would be difficult to find more competent judges than these three men, two of whom we know to have worked quite independently. The consensus of their views leads us to suspect that in the *Faeneratrix* we have lost a genuine play of Plautus.

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<sup>50</sup> Gellius III, 3, 4; Varro, *L. L.*, VI, 89. The latter passage is corrupt: *quam comoediam (Boeotiam) alii esse dicunt*. On the basis of Gellius, III, 3, 4, the *alii* has been emended to *A<qui>līi* (Goetz-Schoell). Kent (Loeb edition) reads *alii <Plauti, alii Aquili>*. Although Varro may appear to have entertained doubts here, his belief in the play's authenticity is proved beyond doubt by the passage of Gellius.

<sup>51</sup> *G. L.*, I, p. 401, 5.

## COGNATE ACCUSATIVE RELATIVE CLAUSES IN GREEK.

No grammarian ignores the cognate accusative noun in Greek: there is general reluctance to throw more than a glance at the cognate accusative relative clause, which languishes as a footnote to the syntax of the cognate accusative. It is time that the relative clause be given the examination its artistic merits justify.

The cognate noun would seem to be the proper place to begin such an examination, for with the simplest type of relative clause it appears as antecedent. But our concern with the noun can be limited to a review of its function and effects,<sup>1</sup> which are the same as those of the clause. It was employed, we may assume, not casually but consciously by writers keenly aware of the rhetorical values of alliteration and repetition. We use it in precisely the same way: "I dreamed a dream" is a trifle out of the ordinary, and for that very reason emphatic. It has been claimed<sup>2</sup> that the Greek cognate noun, with its faint flavour of preciousity, is a late development in the history of the accusative case. Even in its barest form, *μάχην . . . ἐμάχοντο* (*Iliad*, XV, 414), it strengthens the noun-idea in the verb. We may consider the result naïve, but we should not dismiss it as tautological.<sup>3</sup>

In most instances, the cognate noun serves to qualify as well as to intensify the verb. This it does by means of its own qualification, whether it be an adjective, as in *ἐνομίζομεν ἀποστήσεσθαι διπλῆν ἀπόστασιν* (Thucydides, III, 13), a genitive or a prepositional phrase like *τὴν Ἰνοῦ στάσιν . . . ἔστανται* (Euripides, *Bacch.*, 925) and *τὸν περὶ ψυχῆς δρόμον δραμεῖν* (Aristophanes, *Wasps*, 375-6), or merely the special meaning of the noun itself,

<sup>1</sup> For full accounts of the cognate accusative noun, see Kühner-Gerth, *Ausführliche Grammatik der gr. Sprache* (Hannover and Leipzig, 1898), II, pp. 303-11; E. Schwyzer, *Gr. Grammatik: Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft* (Munich, 1950), II, pp. 74-8.

<sup>2</sup> D. B. Monro, *A Grammar of the Homeric Dialect* (Oxford, 1891), § 133.

<sup>3</sup> K. W. Krüger, *Gr. Sprachlehre für Schulen* (Leipzig, 1891), II, p. 19. Before we agree with Krüger's condemnation, we might note that the construction was used by no less a writer than Plato (*Laws*, 953E).

as in *τὸς τὴν πομπὴν πέμψαντας* (Thucydides, VI, 56). In brief, then, the function of the cognate noun is to qualify and intensify a verb; or, more particularly, the noun-idea in the verb.

From this short discussion of the noun let us turn to the cognate accusative relative pronoun introducing a subordinate clause. The most elementary form of the construction, which I call Type 1, is that in which the cognate noun appears in the main clause as the antecedent of the relative pronoun,<sup>4</sup> for example:

*τῶν δοξῶν ἂς οἱ ἀνθρωποι δοξάζουσι* (Plato, *Crito*, 46D).

*τὴν δρμῆν ἥνπερ τὸ πρῶτον ὡρμήσαμεν* (Plato, *Rep.*, 451C).

*δουλείας δουλεύειν οἷας οὐδὲ ἀν δοῦλος οὐδείς* (Plato, *Symp.*, 183A).

*τὰς ἵποσχέσεις ἂς οὗτος ἵποσχείτο* (Demosthenes, ed. Blass, 19, 47).

*τῶν ἀγώνων οὐδὲ ὑμεῖς περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἥγωνίζεσθε* (Demosthenes, ed. Blass, 18, 262).

The relative pronoun is often attracted to the case of its antecedent, thereby linking the relative clause yet more closely to what has gone before, as in

*ἀπὸ παιδεύσιος τῆς ἐπεπαίδευτο* (Herodotus, IV, 78).

*τάλαιν' ἐγὼ τῆς ὕβρεος ἡς ὕβρίζομαι* (Aristophanes, *Plutus*, 1044).

*τῆς μὲν ἀρχῆς ἡς ἡρχεν ἵπεύθυνος ἦν* (Demosthenes, ed. Blass, 18, 117).

*τῆς φυγῆς ἡς αὐτοὶ ἔφυγον* (Lysias, 13, 74).

*τῆς καταδουλώσεως ἡς ἐδουλώσαντο αὐτοὺς Μακεδόνες* (Aelian, *V. H.*, XIII, 11).

This relative clause Type 1 is the equivalent of an adjective, qualifying its noun antecedent. The Greeks were partial to subordinate clauses, and such a construction made possible the inclusion of many details—person, number, tense, mood, and the like—which could hardly have been incorporated in an adjectival phrase without woeful clumsiness. Furthermore, they imposed, by the use of a verb of kindred derivation or meaning, a rhetorical emphasis upon the noun. If we feel inclined to lift an eyebrow at such a device, we must remember that it was frequently employed by such masters of prose as Demosthenes

<sup>4</sup> The kinship between noun and verb may be of derivation, or simply of meaning. Examples of the latter type include Hippocrates, *De Partu Octim.*, ed. Lind., I, 176-7; Thucydides, V, 105, and Diodorus Siculus, XI, 82, 261.

and Plato. Its purpose, to intensify and qualify a noun-idea, is precisely the same as that of the cognate noun.

Just as, in a simple sentence, a cognate accusative noun may be replaced by a neuter pronoun,<sup>5</sup> so, in the relative clause Type 1, a pronoun may stand in place of the noun as antecedent. The missing noun may be supplied from the noun-idea inherent in the verb of the relative clause, and the verb thereby assumes greater importance.

For instance, in *τούτων ὅν νῦν ὑμῖν παρακελεύομαι οὐδὲν τοῖς δούλοις προστάττω* (Xenophon, *Cyr.*, VIII, 6, 13) the noun *κελευμάτων* can be supplied from the verb *παρακελεύομαι*. The following quotations illustrate the same construction:<sup>6</sup>

οὐ γὰρ ἀξίως ἐκείνων ὅν ἐνανυμαχήσαμεν  
γηροβοσκούμεσθ' ὑφ' ὑμῶν  
(Aristophanes, *Ach.*, 647).

ἔξει τὰν χάριν ἃ γνὰ ἀντὶ τίνων  
ὅν τὸν κῶρον ἔθρεψε

(Theocritus, ed. Gow, *Ep.* 20).

From such sentences the transition is easy to Type 2, in which the antecedent totally disappears, the clause becomes substantive rather than adjectival, the relative pronoun acts as a pivot, linked both to the principal clause and to the subordinate verb (of which it is the cognate object), and in which, above all, the noun represented by the substantive relative clause is to be supplied from its verb. The verb, then, is decidedly the most important word in a clause of Type 2.

The fact that the relative pronoun in this construction is always a vague plural indicates that there was no thought of a noun-antecedent, as in Type 1, in the mind of the writer. Nor, we may presume, did he consciously think of a demonstrative pronoun as antecedent; the omission of demonstrative antecedents is all too common to permit belief that the pronouns were laboriously supplied on each occasion by the imagination of author or reader. The author wanted a noun, but he thought in terms of verbs, so he used a substantive clause; of all substantive clauses, the cognate accusative relative is the neatest;

<sup>5</sup> E.g., *τοῦτ' ἀφικόμην* (Sophocles, *O. T.*, 1005).

<sup>6</sup> ἀπ' αὐτῶν δὲ ὁν βεβίωκεν ἄρξομαι (Demosthenes, ed. Blass, 18, 130) is not to be included among such examples. Here *αὐτῶν* is an adjective modifying the relative pronoun.

and, so to phrase it, the most substantival, with its special emphasis on the noun-idea in the verb.

Demosthenes was much attached to the cognate accusative relative clause Type 2. Here are a few examples of his use of it. The numbers are those of Blass.

- προσήκει . . . χάριν αὐτοὺς ἔχειν ὃν ἐσώθησαν ὑφ' ἡμῶν* (16, 13).  
*(Θηβαῖοι) οἵς ηύτυχήκεσαν ἐν Δεύκτροις οὐ μετρίως ἐκέχρηντο* (18, 18).  
*ἐν οἷς ἡμάρτανον οἱ ἄλλοι . . . αὐτὸς παρεσκευάζετο* (18, 19).  
*δηλοῖς δὲ καὶ ἐξ ὃν ξῆς* (18, 198).  
*οὐδὲ τὸν ἐξείργοντα . . . τὸ δίκην ὃν ἀν ἡμῶν ἀδικηθῇ τις λαμβάνειν*  
*παρ' αὐτοῦ, ἄλλο τι χρῆ νομίζειν ποιεῖν ή . . .* (21, 124).

Such clauses should, of course, be translated where possible by an English noun-phrase, as: "their rescue at our hands"; "their past success at Leuctra"; "their habitual blunders"; "your way of life"; "our individual injuries, whatever they may have been."

All the quotations above employ intransitive verbs or forms. But there is no objection to using a transitive verb in the same way:

- ἐξ ὃν τὰ σαντοῦ ἐπαινεῖς, τίνι δικαίῳ λόγῳ τοῦ μηχανοποιοῦ καταφρονεῖς;*  
*(Plato, *Gorgias*, 512C).  
 Διογένης ὁ Σινωπεὺς ἐπέπληξεν ὑπὲρ Ἀθηναίων Φιλίππῳ περὶ ὃν  
 Ἡρακλείδης εἶναι φάσκων ἀπώλλυ ὅπλους τοὺς ὑπὲρ ἐκείνων  
 ὅπλα ἡρμένους (Philostratus, *Apoll. Vita*, VII, 2).*

Observe that in these sentences the relative clause has been extended to considerable length: the transitive verb is accompanied by its direct object, the direct object by qualifying phrases. But in spite of these complications the clause remains substantival, and its emphasis still lies on the substantive idea contained in the verb.

Any mood may be used in the relative clause: one example of the subjunctive in Demosthenes has already been offered,<sup>7</sup> here is another from Thucydides: *οὐκ ἐξ ὃν ἀν χαρίζησθε . . . ἀκροῶνται ὑμῶν, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὃν ἀν ισχύι . . . περιγένησθε* (III, 37). The same freedom of choice applies to tense. The Demosthenic examples show the present, the imperfect, the aorist, and the pluperfect.

<sup>7</sup> See above, 21, 124.

A discussion of cognate accusative relative clauses Type 2 must include special mention of the rather uncommon usage of *ἀνθ' ὅν* referring *forward*, such as occurs in the following passage: *δρυιζόμενος γὰρ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀνθ' ὅν ἐπεπόνθει* (Xenophon, *Hell.*, IV, 8, 6). Ordinarily, *ἀνθ' ὅν* refers *back* to the previous clause, which is, in fact, its antecedent. The phrase means, literally, “in return for which things,” and is to be translated “wherefore.”<sup>8</sup> There are, however, cases like the Xenophon passage just quoted, in which *ἀνθ' ὅν* cannot be translated “wherefore” since it refers forward, not back to the preceding clause. When this occurs, annotators are fond of suggesting, as a translation for the phrase, “because” or *propterea quod*. It is a perfectly acceptable translation four times out of five, but one must be careful, in adopting it, not to lose sight of the real significance of the construction. And, unfortunately, it will not always serve. Consider this: *ἔγω . . . ὑπισχνοῦμαι, ἣν ὁ θεός εὗ διδῷ, ἀνθ' ὅν ἀν ἔμοὶ δανείσης ἀλλὰ πλείονος ἀξία εὐεργετήσειν* (Xenophon, *Cyr.*, III, 1, 34). Obviously, “because” would make nonsense here.

Some grammarians have asserted that *ἀνθ' ὅν* referring forward is equivalent to *ἀντὶ τούτων ὅτι*.<sup>9</sup> They fail, however, to produce any example of this phrase in Greek. Matthiae<sup>10</sup> bases his argument on analogy: since the relative pronoun occasionally stands for *ὅτι* to introduce a clause,<sup>11</sup> and since the frequently used *ἐφ' ϕτε* illustrates the fact that the conjunction *ὡστε* may be replaced by a relative and the demonstrative pronoun then omitted—<sup>12</sup> therefore by analogy, he claims, *ἀνθ' ὅν* represents *ἀντὶ τούτων ὅτι*.

However much we may admire this scholarly ingenuity, it is,

<sup>8</sup> The following examples are chosen at random from the numerous instances of this construction: Herodotus, III, 140; Aeschylus, *P. V.*, 30 f.; Sophocles, *O. T.*, 264; *El.*, 575; *O. C.*, 275, 953, 1010; Aristophanes, *Ecc.*, 17; *Clouds*, 613; *Plutus*, 840; Diodorus Siculus, IV, 80.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Liddell and Scott under *ἀντὶ*; and Jebb on Sophocles, *Ant.*, 1068.

<sup>10</sup> A. Matthiae, *Ausführliche griechische Grammatik* (Leipzig, 1807), § 479.

<sup>11</sup> Herodotus, I, 33; Plato, *Rep.*, II, 367D; Xenophon, *Ages.*, I, 36.

<sup>12</sup> Thucydides, III, 114, illustrates the unelided construction, *ξυμμαχίαν ἐποιήσαντο . . . ἐπὶ τοισθε ὡστε . . . βοηθεῖν τῇ ἀλλήλων*; cf. also *δφ' οὐ — ἀπ' ἵκεινον ὅτε* where a relative pronoun supplants a temporal conjunction and the demonstrative is dropped.

after all, needless. *ἀνθ' ὅν* referring forward may be explained, without an omission or a hypothetical *ὅτι*, as introducing a cognate accusative relative clause Type 2. The relative pronoun fulfils all the requirements of such a clause; it has a relationship to the subordinate verb, of which it is the cognate object, it has a link with the principal clause as object of a preposition therein, and it has no antecedent.

Moreover, *ἀντί* suggests a requital, an exchange or a balancing of one thing against another. It *must* be followed by a noun or its equivalent. To translate it by "because" is to make the clause it introduces not substantival but adverbial, providing nothing more than the reason for the action of the principal clause. This is a distortion of the meaning of *ἀντί* which is both unnecessary and unjustified.<sup>13</sup>

Again, if *ἀνθ' ὅν* when it refers forward is simply a substitute for *ὅτι* ("because"), the whole of the relative clause is important; in its entirety it tells why the action of the main clause took place. If, however, as I maintain, *ἀνθ' ὅν* introduces a cognate accusative relative clause, there will be special emphasis on the noun-idea contained in the subordinate verb, as in other examples of Type 2. If we examine instances of *ἀνθ' ὅν* will this theory hold good?

In short sentences, like δίκας ἐκτίσας ἀνθ' ὅν ἀπέδρασεν (Aelian, *V. H.*, XIII, 28) such distinctions matter not at all.<sup>14</sup> In longer clauses they are more evident. In ἀπόδος, φημί, ἀνθ' ὅν σε διεπορθμεύσαμεν (Lucian, XXXVIII, 22, 1), *σε* is obviously unimportant; payment is demanded in requital for the act-of-ferrying, the personal pronoun merely adds qualification.<sup>15</sup>

But it is in long and carefully wrought passages that the full beauty of the idiom becomes apparent. Consider the following lines from Sophocles' *Antigone*, 1067-71:

νέκυν νεκρῶν ἀμοιβὴν ἀγτιδοὺς ἔσει  
ἀνθ' ὅν ἔχεις μὲν τῶν ἄνω βαλῶν κάτω,  
ψυχῆν τ' ἀτίμως ἐν τάφῳ κατώκισας,

<sup>13</sup> G. Hermann, in the notes (§ 33) to his edition of F. Viger, *De praecipuis Graecae dictio[n]is idiotismis liber* (Glasgow, 1813), points out that there is only one meaning for *ἀντί*.

<sup>14</sup> So in Sophocles, *O. C.*, 1489, and Xenophon, *Hell.*, II, 4, 17.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. also Aristophanes, *Plutus*, 434 and *Clouds*, 1309 f. (if *ἀνθ'* *ὅν* is the correct reading); Isocrates, *Helen*, 212A.

ἔχεις δὲ τῶν κάτωθεν ἐνθάδ' αὐτὸν  
ἀμοιρον, ἀκτέριστον, ἀνόστον νέκυν.

In this message of doom spoken by the seer Teiresias to Creon every rhetorical device is used to give weight and emphasis to the sentence. There is balance in the length of the *μέν* and *δέ* clauses, there is repetition of the verb, repetition of the grim *νέκυν* at beginning and end, and the idea of requital is hammered home by *ἀμοιρόν* and *ἀντίδούς* to strengthen the preposition *ἀντί*. That the poet wishes to focus our attention on the verb *ἔχεις* is obvious; not only is its position important, but it appears twice, in the first instance with a participle as a poetic perfect.

Here then we have a markedly balanced construction, with emphasis on the idea of requital and emphasis on the verb. Creon is to be punished in requital for two acts, the act of burying, the act of leaving unburied. The living body and the corpse involved are merely qualifications attached to the action. To translate *ἀνθρώπῳ* here as "because" destroys entirely the effect which Sophocles intended to create.

The following quotation from Plato gives similar evidence of careful construction: *τὰς τε ναῦς περιελόμενοι αὖ ποτ' ἐκείνους ἔσωσαν καὶ τείχη καθελόντες ἀνθρώπῳ ὅν ἡμεῖς τάκεινον ἐκωλύσαμεν πεσεῖν* (*Menex.*, 244C). Here are two balanced participial phrases, both followed by relative clauses. Between participial phrase and relative clause in each section there is contrast: the action of the participle is destruction, against it is set the action of the subordinate verb, preservation or the prevention of overthrow. The balance and the meaning of the sentence surely suggest that emphasis is laid upon the action-words.

Now if *ἀνθρώπῳ* in this passage is rendered "because," the translator is confronted with the extraordinary assertion that the enemy tore down our walls because we preserved theirs. How much better to say that they tore down our walls in a brutal exchange for our own good behaviour to them!

Moreover, in the second relative clause the pronominal subject is expressed. Such expression is emphatic. In what way then can the author retain the primary emphasis on the verb, which, judging by the rest of the sentence, he requires? A cognate accusative relative clause would be precisely what one might expect him to use, since by it the necessary verbal emphasis is secured.

To a student of Greek prose composition this cognate accusative relative clause is a profitable construction to master, since it provides a way of escape from the ubiquitous English abstract noun. It is a commonplace to say that we have a language of nouns and that our verbs, in the main, are colourless copulae. Burke, in the first seventy-two words of his opening speech on the impeachment of Warren Hastings, uses seventeen nouns. The first seventy-two words of Demosthenes' Philippic I contain but six. To turn Burke into Demosthenic Greek, we must turn Burke's nouns, where possible, into verbs. The cognate accusative relative clause Type 2 provides a delightfully idiomatic way of doing so. If we can translate "our past sufferings" by *ά ἐπεπόνθεμεν*, if we can proceed to employ the phrase in a complex sentence such as "our acceptance of his offer was based on our past sufferings at the hands of an enraged enemy," we have begun to think in the Greek manner.

That Greek writers could regard these cognate relative clauses as nouns is demonstrated by a scholiast on the Byzantine historian Agathias, quoted by Schaefer in his edition of Bos' *Ellipses*: *νῦν γὰρ ἀντὶ τῶν ὅν ἐπολιτεύσω καὶ τῆς πρὸς τὴν σωτηρίαν συμβαλλούσης τῆς πόλεως φροντίδος τήδε σοι τὴν εἰκόνα ἀνεστήσαμεν.*<sup>16</sup> The writer has gone so far as to add the definite article to the relative clause, to balance it with a noun phrase *τῆς . . . φροντίδος*! We need not proceed to such lengths, but we are certainly justified in using a clause of this type as a convenient way of avoiding abstract nouns in Greek.

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<sup>16</sup> L. Bos, ed. G. H. Schaefer, *Ellipses Graecae* (London, 1825), p. 254. The epigram by Agathias to which the scholiast refers is no. 94 in *Corpus Scriptorum Hist. Byzant.*, ed. Niebuhr, I, p. 388.

THE COLLEGE OF QUINDECIMVIRI (*SACRIS  
FACIUNDIS*) IN 17 B. C.

The *Acta* of the *Ludi Saeculares* held in 17 B. C. (*C. I. L.*, VI, 32323 = Dessau, 5050) contain several lists of the *quindecimviri sacris faciundis* who were present at the games. These lists follow a fixed order in the arrangement of the names. Since Augustus and Agrippa head the list and since Messalla Messallinus, who was very young and had been recently elected to the college, is at the end, Mommsen in his publication of the *Acta* tentatively suggested that the list is arranged in order of age and honor. Yet certain discrepancies in the order of names led him to believe that the rule was not rigidly applied.<sup>1</sup>

Mommsen's identifications of the men in the list and his suggestion on the basis of arrangement have been generally accepted. But inscriptions which have been discovered subsequently show that in two of his identifications he was mistaken on the date of the consulship.<sup>2</sup> It is also probable that his suggestion that the list was arranged in order of age and honor is incorrect. Membership lists of priestly colleges often were arranged in order of entrance into the college. The *fasti* of the Salii illustrate this type of list, and, as Professor Taylor has convincingly shown, this was the basis of the arrangement of the lists of pontifices given by Cicero and Macrobius.<sup>3</sup> There is

<sup>1</sup> "Commentaria Ludorum Saecularium," *Eph. Epig.*, VIII, pp. 240 f. George Howe (*Fasti Sacerdotum P. R. Publicorum Aetatis Imperatoriaie* [Leipzig, 1904]), rearranges the names, in most cases according to date of consulship. In my dissertation, *The Membership of the Four Major Colleges of Priests from 44 B.C. to 37 A.D.* (available in microfilm [University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan]), I have followed the order in the *Acta*.

<sup>2</sup> See notes 15 and 16 below.

<sup>3</sup> Two types of lists of priests have come down to us in inscriptions, one of which, illustrated by the *fasti* of the Salii (*C. I. L.*, VI, 1978 = Dessau, 5024; 9339), consists of names arranged in order of cooptation. The other consists of the names of those who held a certain place or *decuria*. For the lists of pontifices in Cicero, *De Harusp. Resp.*, 12 and Macrobius, III, 13, 11, see L. R. Taylor, "Caesar's Colleagues in the Pontifical College," *A. J. P.*, LXIII (1942), pp. 385-412.

reason to believe that the lists in the *Acta* are also arranged in order of entrance into the college. It is significant that the last man named, Messalla Messallinus, was elected shortly before 19 B. C.<sup>4</sup> and was therefore in 17 B. C. a comparatively new member of a college of men who served for life.

The following lists are found in the inscription: (lines 150-152) Imp. Caesar; M. Agrippa; Q. Lepidus; Potitus Messalla; C. Stolo; C. Scaevola; C. Sosius; C. Norbanus; M. Cocceius; M. Lollius; C. Sentius; M. Strigo; L. Arruntius; C. Asinius; M. Marcellus; D. Laelius; Q. Tubero; C. Rebilus; Messalla Messallinus; (lines 44-5) M. Agrippa; L. Censorinus; M. Lollius and L. Arruntius; (line 107) Caesar; Agrippa; Scaevola; Sentius; Lollius; Asinius Gallus; Rebilus. In line 154 the name of Potitus Messalla occurs alone. In lines 166-168 there are parts of another list; Imp. Caesar Augustus; M. Agrippa; Cn. Pompeius; C. Stolo; C. S.....; an erasure;<sup>5</sup> M. Mar..... A consideration of these scattered lists shows that with the exception of M. Lollius and C. Sentius, whose names are reversed in order in lines 107 and 150-52, all the names are in the same order. There can be no doubt that the man who made the lists was following a definite order.<sup>6</sup>

The failure to give the full name of each man causes some problems, but the entire list may be arranged and the names identified as follows.<sup>7</sup>

#### 1. Imperator Caesar Augustus, *magister* in 17 B. C.

<sup>4</sup> Messallinus' entrance into the college is commemorated by an elegy of Tibullus (II, 5) written not long before the poet's death in 19 B. C.

<sup>5</sup> The name erased must have been that of Asinius Gallus whose name was erased from many inscriptions. See E. Groag and A. Stein, *Prosopographia Imperii Romani*<sup>2</sup> (*P. I. R.*), I (Berlin and Leipzig, 1933), p. 245, no. 1229.

<sup>6</sup> The list in lines 150-152 giving the men present on the third day is the most complete. But two men named earlier were not present on that occasion. The full membership of the college, which was enlarged as other priestly colleges were under Augustus (Dio Cassius, LI, 20), was probably more than twenty-one, the number listed in the *Acta*. Some of the members may have been away from Rome on official duties.

<sup>7</sup> For dates of consulships I have followed Attilio Degrassi, *Inscriptions Italiae*, XIII, 1 (Rome, 1947). For biographical details see *P. I. R.* and *R.-E.* See Degrassi, XIII, 1, p. 63 = *C. I. L.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 1, p. 29 for the list of *magistri*.

2. M. Vipsanius Agrippa, *cos. ord.* 37 B. C.; 28 B. C.; 27 B. C.
3. L. Marcius Censorinus, *cos. ord.* 39 B. C.
4. Q. Aemilius Lepidus, *cos. ord.* 21 B. C.
5. Potitus Valerius Messalla, *cos. suff.* 29 B. C.
6. Cn. Pompeius, *cos. suff.* 31 B. C.
7. C. Licinius Calvus Stolo.
8. C. (Mucius) Scaevola.
9. C. Sosius, *cos. ord.* 32 B. C.
10. C. Norbanus Flaccus, *cos. ord.* 38 B. C.
11. M. Cocceius Nerva, *cos. ord.* 36 B. C.
12. M. Lollius, *cos. ord.* 21 B. C.
13. C. Sentius Saturninus, *cos. ord.* 19 B. C., *magister* in 17 B. C.
14. M. Fufius Strigo, *magister* in 17 B. C.
15. L. Arruntius, *cos. ord.* 22 B. C.
16. C. Asinius Gallus, *cos. ord.* 8 B. C.
17. M. Claudius Marcellus, *magister* in 17 B. C.
18. D. Laelius Balbus, *cos. ord.* 6 B. C., *magister* in 17 B. C.
19. Q. Aelius Tubero, *cos. ord.* 11 B. C.
20. C. Caninius Rebilus, *cos. suff.* 12 B. C.
21. M. Valerius Messalla Messallinus, *cos. ord.* 3 B. C.

The only men for whom we have certain information on the date of election are Augustus, who was a member by 37 B. C.,<sup>8</sup> C. Sosius, who was elected before 36,<sup>9</sup> and Messalla Messallinus, who, as I have already stated, was elected shortly before 19 B. C.

<sup>8</sup> A coin of Augustus of 37 B. C. (H. A. Grueber, *Coins of the Roman Republic in the British Museum*, II [London, 1910], p. 415) shows the tripod of the quindecimvirate.

<sup>9</sup> Sosius' quindecimvirate is commemorated by a coin of the East (Grueber, II, p. 524) with the head of Apollo on the obverse and a tripod on the reverse. Wissowa (see *Eph. Epig.*, VIII, p. 241) thought the coin referred to the quindecimvirate. Michael Grant (*From Imperium to Auctoritas* [Cambridge, 1946], p. 41) dates the coin between 37/36 and 34 B. C. F. Shipley ("Chronology of the Building Operations in Rome from the Death of Caesar to the Death of Augustus," *M. A. R.*, IX [1931], p. 26) thinks the Apollo tripod type was an old one in the coinage of Zacynthus and does not refer to the quindecimvirate. He connects the coin (p. 27) with the rebuilding of the temple of Apollo in 34 B. C. Since the tripod was the symbol of the quindecimvirate (cf. Grueber, II, p. 56) and the college was connected with Apollo, the coin probably refers to Sosius' quindecimvirate.

Many of the men listed are unknown to us; others are known only by the date of their consulship.<sup>10</sup>

The first eleven names belong to a group of men who, with the exception of Lepidus, seem to have been politically active in the thirties. Although Augustus and Agrippa head the list because of their association in the tribunician power, it is also possible that they were senior members of the college and were in this capacity the proper men to hold the games.<sup>11</sup> If, as I think, C. Julius Caesar was elected *quindecimvir*, Augustus probably assumed the priesthood between 43 and 40 B. C. as part of his inheritance.<sup>12</sup> Agrippa may have become a *quindecimvir* as early as 40 B. C.<sup>13</sup> L. Censorinus, an Antonian, was the descendant of a Marian and therefore could not have obtained a priesthood before 49 when Caesar restored to the sons of the proscribed the right of holding office; it is possible that he became a *quindecimvir* under Caesar or under the triumvirate. Q. Lepidus was consul at a later date, but, since he was a

<sup>10</sup> The priesthood of four other *quindecimviri* is verified by additional evidence which furnishes no positive indication of date of election: for Potitus Valerius Messalla, *C.I.L.*, VI, 37075 = Dessau, 8964; for C. Norbanus Flaccus, see A. Stein's interpretation of a fragmentary inscription from Aquila, *Bursian's Jahresbericht*, CXLIV (1909), p. 282; for Asinius Gallus, Tacitus, *Ann.*, I, 76; for L. Arruntius, perhaps *C.I.L.*, X, 5055 = Dessau, 5349.

<sup>11</sup> *Res Gestae*, XXII: *Pro conlegio XVvirorum magister conlegit collega M. Agrippa ludos saeculares C. Furnio C. Silano cos. feci.* I agree with J. Gagé (*Res Gestae Divi Augusti* [Paris, 1935], p. 120) that *collega* refers to the priesthood and not to the tribunician power.

<sup>12</sup> Dio Cassius (XLII, 51, 4) shows that Caesar was probably a *quindecimvir*; his augurate is shown by Dio Cassius, XLII, 51, 4; Cicero, *Ad Fam.*, XIII, 68; Grueber, I, pp. 549, 552; II, pp. 470, 576. Augustus followed Caesar's policy of cumulation of priesthoods in his own person (cf. *Res Gestae*, VII). Coins (Grueber, II, pp. 398, 404, 491, 493) struck between 42 and 40 B. C. show that by 40 B. C. he had added the augurate to the pontificate he already held. *C.I.L.*, V, 4305 = Dessau, 75, which dates after he became consul in 43, names only the pontificate.

<sup>13</sup> *C.I.L.*, IX, 262 found near Brundisium names him *imp.* and *quindecimvir*; this inscription must be early because neither the consulate nor his tribunician power is mentioned. Since Agrippa did not use the title, *imp.*, it seems likely that it is employed here as an unofficial title or that it records an early victory, perhaps in 40 B. C. before the peace of Brundisium. See M. Reinhold, *Marcus Agrippa* (Geneva, New York, 1933), pp. 62, 104, 153.

patrician and an Aemilius Lepidus, he could, like many other young men of distinguished family, have become a priest while very young.<sup>14</sup> C. Sosius was an Antonian and was elected before his campaigns in the East, probably by the year 38. C. Norbanus was a descendant of a Marian, and a Caesarian; his son was consul in 24 B. C. and could be identified with the *quindecimvir*, but the father is a more likely person because of the men placed near him in the list. M. Cocceius, the consul of 36, was an Antonian and may have received the honor in 38.<sup>15</sup> Potitus Valerius Messalla, the consul of 29,<sup>16</sup> and Cn. Pompeius, the consul of 31, were probably Caesarians but are otherwise unknown. Nothing definite is known about C. Stolo and Scaevola. This group, which includes Antonians as well as Caesarians, was, I suggest, appointed to the college under the triumvirs.

A second group consists of four names: M. Lollius, consul of 21 B. C.; C. Sentius Saturninus, consul of 19 B. C.; the unknown M. Fufius Strigo; and L. Arruntius, the consul of 22 B. C. These men seem to be younger than the previous group. Two, L. Arruntius and C. Sentius Saturninus, were descendants of the proscribed.

A third group consists of men who in 17 B. C. had not yet held the consulship: C. Asinius Gallus, consul of 8 B. C.; M. Claudius Marcellus, usually identified, I believe erroneously, with the consul of 22 B. C.; D. Laelius Balbus, consul of 6 B. C.; Q. Aelius Tubero, consul of 11 B. C.; C. Caninius Rebilus, consul of 12 B. C.; and M. Valerius Messalla Messallinus, consul of 3 B. C. Since all these men except M. Marcellus held the consulship between 12 and 3 B. C., I identify this Marcellus not

<sup>14</sup> C. Bardt (*Die Priester der vier grossen Collegien aus römisch-republikanischer Zeit* [Berlin, 1871], pp. 34-8) found in his study of the membership of the four major colleges during the republic that members of leading families among the nobility were commonly coopted long before attaining the highest magistracy. That this practice continued during the early empire is shown by the early election to a priesthood of the members of the imperial family and of such men as Valerius Messalla Corvinus, elected augur in 36 B. C. (Dio Cassius, XLIX, 16, 1) when he was between twenty-three and twenty-eight and Messalla Messallinus, elected *quindecimvir* when very young. See also Theodor Mommsen, *Römisches Staatsrecht*, 3rd ed., II (Leipzig, 1887), p. 32.

<sup>15</sup> For evidence of Cocceius' consulship see Degrassi, pp. 508 f.

<sup>16</sup> For evidence on Potitus Messalla's consulship see Degrassi, pp. 512 f.

with the consul of 22 but with his son, the husband of Asinius Gallus' sister. He did not reach the consulship, possibly because of early death.<sup>17</sup>

My grouping of these names depends on the identification of this Marcellus with the son of the consul of 22 B. C. and on the identification of Norbanus with the consul of 38 B. C. I have also taken account of new evidence for the consulships of M. Cocceius Nerva and Potitus Valerius Messalla. The list can be divided into three groups of names, the first composed mainly of men who were active under the triumvirate, the second of four men who were active in the late twenties, and the third of six men who had not yet held the consulship. The last man in the list had been elected very recently.

Although it is clear that the older men are named in the early part of the list, the order of names obviously does not follow the order of their consulships. The most plausible explanation is that the names are arranged in order of entrance into the college.<sup>18</sup> Since there is evidence elsewhere that order of entrance was important in the arrangement of other Roman priestly lists, it seems justifiable to conclude that this is the basis of arrangement of the lists in the *Acta*.

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<sup>17</sup> See *P. I. R.*<sup>2</sup>, II, p. 215, no. 927. This Marcellus is not included in *R.-E.*

<sup>18</sup> Since Lollius and Sentius appear next to each other but in different order in two lists, I would suggest that they were elected at the same time.

CATULLUS 55, 9-14.

ta velte sic ipse flagitabam  
Camerium mihi pessimae puellae  
quaedam inquit nudum †reduc. . . .  
en hic in roseis latet papillis  
sed te iam ferre Herculi labos est  
tanto ten fastu negas, amice?

This passage has caused much trouble, partly because of the two *loci desperati* it contains, and partly because its meaning has seemed obscure. The girl's gesture (vs. 11) is perfectly clear, in spite of the textual difficulties.<sup>1</sup> Her words are equally unequivocal; *en hic*, etc. (vs. 12) can mean nothing but "Look! Here (he or it) is!" To interpret them as figurative, or as having some generalized significance, as Ellis does, is to give the passage a labored and insipid tone quite out of harmony with the circumstances of the poem, and inconsistent with Catullus' usual directness and clarity.

Yet until vs. 12 is understood, nothing much can be made of the lines. The source of our puzzlement is easy to see: the girl declares that Camerius "is here," yet obviously he is not. I should like to suggest that Catullus is punning on the name "Camerius," much as Plautus, in the *Menaechmi*, puns on "Peniculus":

*Me.* Quem tu parasitum quaeris, adulescens, meum?

*Cy.* Peniculum. *Me.* eccum in vidulo salvom fero. (285-6)

. . . . .

*Me.* Quo malum parasito? . . .

*Er.* Peniculo. *Me.* Quis istest peniculus? Qui extergentur baxeae? (390-1)

In other words, Catullus has demanded of the girls *Camerium mihi, pessimae puellae* (sc. monstrare). One of them—*ut decuit cinaediorem*—has replied by pulling back her dress and saying "Look, here it (not 'he') is."

If this is the case, then *Camerius* must have some meaning as a common noun, and must designate something which one would naturally expect the girl to have *in papillis*. In this con-

<sup>1</sup> See Merrill *ad loc.*

nection it should be recalled that Latin *camera* is a Greek loan-word, *καμάρα*, and further that Catullus used not the nominative form *Camerius*, but the accusative, *Camerium*. But the natural Latin rendering of *καμάριον*, the diminutive of *καμάρα*, would be *camerium*. Was it then to her *καμάριον* that the girl pointed, and what was this *καμάριον*?

Stephanus, *s. v.* *καμάρα*, quotes the following from Coraes on Strabo, Vol. IV, p. 235: *κεμέρ τῇ Χαλδαίων φωνῇ λέγεται τὸ ζωνόνειν. . . . καὶ νῦν δὲ οἱ Τούρκοι κεμέρ καλοῦσιν οὐ μόνον τὴν καμάραν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ζώνην.* In the “Chaldean” (i. e., probably Persian) language, the word for *ζωνήιν* is *kemer*, and the Turkish word for *ζώνη* is *kemer*. Hesychius gives the two glosses, *καμάραι*: *ξῶναι στρατιωτικά*, and *καμαρίς*: *κοσμάριον γυναικέον*. Boisacq, *s. v.* *καμάρα*, cites the Zend word *kamara* with the meaning “ceinture.” This suggests that a vulgar Greek word *καμάριον* might well have been in use to designate the *subcingulum* or *zonula* which the Greek and Roman woman wore as a support for the breasts. Such a term might be expected to develop in the cities of Asia Minor, where there was a large Oriental population. From there it could have entered Italy, perhaps through the mediation of the very sort of *scorta* of whom Catullus is writing. Or it may be that this girl was herself an Oriental, and made a bilingual pun just to tease Catullus. If the latter guess is correct, there is no need to assume that *camerium* was a familiar Latin, or *καμάριον* a familiar Greek word. The girl’s gesture would have shown Catullus what the word meant, even if he had never heard it before.

On the basis of this hypothesis, the passage can now be further clarified. If the girl, in vs. 12, is pointing to her *zonula*, then vs. 13 may also be assigned to her.<sup>2</sup> *Te* now refers to Catullus, and *ferre* is for *auferre*.<sup>3</sup> The phrase *auferre zonulam* is readily explained by Cat. 2, 13 (*quod zonam soluit diu ligatam*) and 61, 52-53 (*tibi virgines zonula soluunt sinus*). With the brassiness characteristic of her profession, the girl points to her *zonula* and says, “Here it is, but for you to remove it will

<sup>2</sup> For this suggestion I am indebted to my colleague, Professor James E. Dunlap.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Verg., *Aen.*, II, 374: *alii rapiunt incensa feruntque Pergama;* *Ecl.*, 5, 34: *postquam te fata tulerunt.* For that matter, the emendation *iam auferre*, for *iam ferre*, would be easy to defend at this point.

be a labor of Hercules." The reference to Hercules' stealing of Hippolyta's magic girdle is unmistakable, and gives an added fillip to this saucy taunt.<sup>4</sup> Not only does this interpretation give us a remark quite in harmony with the character of the *scortum*; in addition it removes the tastelessness inherent in the line if, as has been traditionally assumed, it is addressed to Camerius. Furthermore, the next line (*tanto ten fastu negas, amice?*) is now really "pointed" in the best Catullan manner, and is an excellent, if somewhat shameless, joke at Camerius' expense.

The thought of these lines may now be reconstructed somewhat after this fashion: Catullus has been looking all over Rome for Camerius. Finally, in Pompey's Portico, he approaches a group of *scorta* and without so much as a by-your-leave, says to them, "Here, you *pessimae puellae*, show me Camerius." One of the girls replies by pulling back her dress, pointing to her *zonula* (*camerium*), and saying, "Look! Here it is! But you'll not get it!" Catullus then addresses Camerius with the pointed line, "Choosy fellow, aren't you? As hard to get at as this girl's *zonula*!" This interpretation enables us to take the lines quite literally, obviates the necessity of torturing an abstruse significance out of a gesture (vs. 11) and words (vs. 12) whose purport can have been only too clear, and makes the whole passage into an example of the sort of *facetiae*, clever and somewhat off-color, which Catullus dearly loved.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Cf. Plaut., *Men.*, 200-1: *meo quidem animo ab Hippolyta subcingulum Hercules haud acque magno umquam abstulit periculo.*

<sup>5</sup> Cf., for example, 17, 21, 36, 39, 44, 94, 105, 115.

## DERIVATION IN *-τερος* FROM GREEK *ι*-STEMS.

In an earlier article<sup>1</sup> dealing with some forms of comparison in Greek, I discussed among other points the reason for the alternation between *-ότερος* and *-ώτερος*, and decided in favour of de Saussure's view that there was a rhythmical law in early Greek which prevented the succession of three short syllables. In this connection it was stated (p. 161) that there were no comparatives from *ι*-stem adjectives. This statement I now wish to withdraw, and instead submit the following examples of derivation in *-τερος* from *ι*-stems of various categories.

### (a) Form *-έτερος*.

*δεξίτερος*, "on the right," stem *δεξι-*: *δεξι-ός*, Skt. *dáksi-na-*. There is no superlative: this is of the ancient type of derivative in *-τερος*, marking a contrast between a pair of concepts. Contrasted with *ἀριστερός*, "on the left." The anomalous accent of both is modelled on *δεξίς*.

*ὑψίτερος*, "higher," from adverbial *ὑψι* (itself based on a more original *ἰντ-*). Probably *-τερος* here too has the contrasting value: it is "what is up," opposed to "what is down." A comparable "down" word is (*ἐ*)*νέρτερος*.

*ρητίτερος* (-*τατος*): *λωτίτερος*. The form *ρητίτερος* (as early as Homer) is probably older than the alternative *ρητίων*.<sup>2</sup> The base of *ρητίτερος* is clearly *ρητ-* (< \**ρρᾶστ-*, Boisacq): *ι*, though not present in *ρᾶ*, is established in the derivatives, in *ρητίδος*, *ρήδοις*, *ράθυμος* and also in *ρητίων* (*ράων*). Doric has the trisyllabic *ράτερος* (Pind., *O.*, 8, 60). In *λωτίτερος* we have what is probably another contrast-form, since there is no corresponding *-τατος*: sense "good," opposed to "bad." Here the formation is more obscure, but the base is most plausibly seen in \**λώιος*, a positive adjective which provided the starting-point for comp. *λωτών* (Schwyzer, *Griech. Gramm.*, I, p. 539, with reff.).

<sup>1</sup> "The morphology of the Greek comparative system: its rhythmical and repetitive features," *A.J.P.*, LXX (1949), pp. 159 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Wackernagel, *Vermischte Beiträge*, p. 11. But Risch, *Wortbildung der homerischen Sprache*, p. 88, would take *ρητίτερος* as secondary, formed after *ρήτορ* on the analogy of *λώιον*: *λωτίτερον*.

*νωΐτερος*, *σφωΐτερος* make a contrast-pair, based on the dual personal pronouns *νωΐ* and *σφωΐ*. In each case the original pronoun was enlarged with “*μι*” “two.”

*δψίτερος* (*-τατος*), which provides a comp. for the adjective *δψιος* (based on the adverb *δψε*), is the earliest of three comp. forms, and occurs in Pindar. The others are *δψιάτερος*, and *-έστερος*. Beside the adverb *δψε* there is also *δψι* (Aeolic): and *δψι-* is used in compounds (*δψιγονος*, etc.). *δψίτερος* stands in the same formal relation to *δψιος* as *δεξίτερός* does to *δεξιός*: in each case the “comparative” is derived from the same base as the adjective, but not from the adj. stem itself.

*πρωΐτερος* (*-τατος*): earliest and regular use as adverbs in *-τερον*, *-τατα*. Base *πρωΐ*, from which also comes the adj. *πρώιος*: thus here too the relation between the adj. and the form in *-τερος* is secondary. The more frequent comp. form is *πρωιάτερος*.

In all these eight cases, the derivation in *-τερος* follows the expected course; and in all the syllable in the stem which precedes *-ι-* is a long one. The forms are, therefore, quite regular under de Saussure’s law, and do not present a succession of four short syllables.<sup>3</sup>

#### (b) Form *-ιστερος*.

Here the syllable in the stem which precedes *-ι-* is a short one, so that a form in *-ιτερος* would make four successive short syllables.

*περιστερά*, “pigeon” (especially the domestic type). This word I have derived from *περί*, with the sense of “that which comes near, or around, the house or other habitation of man.” Derived from the same stem is *περιστέριον* “woman’s ornament,” which I regard as meaning an ornament of an encircling nature, such as a bracelet.<sup>4</sup>

*ἀριστερός*, “on the left.” Clearly the original meaning was “good,” or similar, and the change to “on the left” was prob-

<sup>3</sup> *καλιτερος* in Elean (Schwyzer, *Dial. Graec. Exempla*, no. 412, 3) may be included in this group if the spelling *λ* represents *λλ*; cf. *ἀλάλοις* for *ἀλλάλοις* and *ἄλα* for *ἄλλα* in Schwyzer, *Dial.*, no. 413. In this event, the derivation would be from *καλλι-*, which is the base also of the primary comparative *καλλιών* (see Schwyzer, *Griech. Gramm.*, I, p. 447, note 6 on *καλλι-*).

<sup>4</sup> “The Etymology of *περιστερά* and some allied words,” *C. Q.*, XLIV (1950), pp. 73 ff.

ably euphemistic. It is usually derived from superl. ἄριστος “best,” after Brugmann: but Schwyzer, *Griech. Gramm.*, I, p. 537, divides it as -ισ- and -τερος, where -ισ- would be a weak form of the IE. primary comp. suffix -ie/os-. But we may instead derive it directly from the stem ἄρι- itself (which of course lies at the base of ἄριστος): ἄρι- occurs in many compounds, as ἄριγγωτος, etc.

ὄπιστερος (-τατος) : the comp. is first found in Aratus, but the superl. is earlier, in Homer. The adverbial form ὅπιθε(ν) attests an ι-stem, ὅπι-; and other derivatives, ἀνόπιν, κατόπιν, and μετόπιν, clearly point the same way. It should be noted that there was an alternative stem-form δπισ-, in ὅπισθε(ν), probably secondary but seen already in Homer.<sup>5</sup>

ἄχαριστερος (Homeric). There are three related adj. forms: ἄχαρις, ἄχάριστος, and ἄχάριτος. Of these, ἄχάριστος is a deverbalite, formed from χαρίζομαι, and its own comp. is in -ιστότερος. ἄχάριτος has an ο- suffix, probably -ο- added to the stem ἄχαριτ-, and has the regular superl. in -ιτώτατος. The form ἄχαριστερος must be related to ἄχαρις: but ἄχαρις, like χάρις itself, is a mixture of two stems, one in -ι- and the other in -τ-. So ἄχαριστερος could be either from ἄχαρι-, or from the τ-stem (\*ἄχαρίτ-τερος > -ιστερος).

ἀθεμίστερος. The case is precisely parallel to the last, with three positive forms, ἄθεμις, -ιστος, and -ιτος. We can again look to either an ι- or a τ- stem for the base.

We must now note two forms with -ιστερος, which have a long final syllable preceding -ι- in the stem, and where we might accordingly have expected -ιτερος. These are ἀμφιστερῆ and ψευδίστερος.

ἀμφιστερῆ · καταρχὴ τῶν θυσιῶν. Δάκωνες, Hesychius. This I derive from ἀμφί(s), with the meaning “what is around, on the outside of, the sacrificial victim: the outer cut of the meat” (cf. *C. Q.*, XLIV, p. 75). -τερος has the contrast sense, and with this word may be compared ἔντερον “intestines.” If it is from the original form of the adverb ἀμφί, we should expect \*ἀμφιτερ-: but ἀμφίς is also ancient, and found in composition in ἀμφισβητέω.

<sup>5</sup> Schwyzer, *Griech. Gramm.*, I, p. 628, regards ὅπισθε as after the analogy of δπισσω. Alternatively, the adverbs πρόσθε, ἐκτοσθε, ἔντοσθε may have provided the model. ὅπιθε(ν) was the only adverb in -ιθε(ν) in Homeric, and so was the more likely to yield to such analogy.

$\psi\epsilon\nu\delta\acute{\imath}\sigma\tau\alpha\tau\oslash$ . The comp. is not quoted, but this superl. (found in Aelian and *E. M.*) pre-supposes the existence of  $\psi\epsilon\nu\delta\acute{\imath}\sigma\tau\epsilon\pos$ . It can hardly be derived directly from  $\psi\epsilon\nu\delta\acute{\imath}\$,$  which as a stem in  $-\epsilon\sigma-$  would give  $-\epsilon\sigma\tau\epsilon\pos.$  It would be possible to derive it from an  $\iota$ -stem, since the form  $\psi\epsilon\nu\delta\acute{\imath}$   $-\iota\omega\varsigma$  occurs in Pindar. But we may also look to the existence of a whole class of compp. in  $-\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\pos,$  which was applied to designations of persons of an unfavourable nature, with various stems (cf. Schwyzer, *Griech. Gramm.*, I, p. 535). Starting from cases where  $-\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\pos$  was formally at home ( $\grave{\alpha}\chi\alpha\rho\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\pos$ ,  $\gamma\alpha\sigma\tau\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\pos$  [stem in  $-\iota\delta-$ ]), the formation was widely extended (so  $\grave{\alpha}\rho\pi\alpha\gamma\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\pos$ ,  $\lambda\alpha\lambda\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\pos$ , etc.); and  $\psi\epsilon\nu\delta\acute{\imath}\sigma\tau\epsilon\pos$  may be included here.

These two "contrary" examples do not, in any case, present a stumbling-block such as we should have in a form with  $-\iota\tau\epsilon\pos$  after a short syllable. The rhythmical law is not broken.

To summarize. While  $-\iota\tau\epsilon\pos$  is clearly the form generally used after a long syllable, there is reasonable ground for stating that  $-\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\pos$  is used after a short. The use of  $-\sigma-$  here for making a long syllable may have begun with a form like  $\grave{\alpha}\mu\phi\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\tilde{\eta},$  where  $-\sigma-$  could be part of the stem. Compare the use of  $-\sigma-$  for lengthening in the isolated  $\phi\epsilon\epsilon\sigma\beta\iota\omega\varsigma$  (model  $\phi\epsilon\epsilon\sigma\sigma\alpha\kappa\tilde{\eta}$ ?); and of  $-\nu-$  in  $\iota\theta\acute{\imath}\nu\tau\epsilon\pos$ ,  $\theta\alpha\mu\acute{\imath}\nu\tau\epsilon\pos$  (model  $\kappa\acute{\imath}\nu\tau\epsilon\pos$ ?). This is only one of a number of ways of avoiding too many short syllables.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> On this see further Mahlow, *Neue Wege*, pp. 428-38; Björck, *Das Alpha Impurum und die tragische Kunstsprache*, pp. 120, 346-8.

## REVIEWS.

H. H. SCULLARD. Roman Politics, 220-150 B. C. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1951. Pp. xvi + 325. \$6.00.

Dr. Scullard, already well known for his *History of the Roman World from 753 to 146 B. C.* (London, 1935) and for his *Scipio Africanus in the Second Punic War* (Cambridge, 1930), is concerned in this volume with "the political activities of the men who shaped the destinies of Rome in the half century or so during which she became the dominant power of the Mediterranean World." The main emphasis is on the political groupings of the nobles and on the policies of the various groups.

The first chapter, on the domination of the nobles, deals comprehensively with *gentes* and *familiae*, patronage and clientship, and the power of the nobles in assemblies, in the state religion, and in the control of public opinion. Here and throughout the book Scullard shows himself to be a master of constitutional history. Particularly noteworthy is the lucidity and the conciseness of the section on the assemblies. After a chapter on family groupings before 220, we come to the core of the book, twelve chapters on the groupings in the period 220-150 B. C. There is a brief epilogue and a series of very readable appendices on sources, Cato's speeches, the trials of the Scipios, and a number of minor problems. There follow lists of consuls and praetors, genealogical tables of seven families, and an exhaustive analytical index. The lists of consuls and praetors, and the comments in the text on magistrates and pro-magistrates go over much of the ground covered in a book which appeared a few weeks after Scullard's, Professor T. R. S. Broughton's *Magistrates of the Roman Republic*, Vol. I (New York, 1951) and, in spite of some differences, there is a remarkable measure of agreement between the two scholars on puzzling problems of the lists.

Discussing, as he does, practically every election for the years when Livy's history is preserved (218-167), Scullard has a crowded canvas. Nevertheless, the great figures, not only Scipio and Cato, but Fabius, Flamininus, and Aemilius Paullus, emerge clearly. Particularly welcome is the treatment of Cato. The admirable evaluation in the text of his virtues and his failures as a statesman is supplemented by an appendix much too modestly entitled "Notes on Cato's Speeches." It is an indispensable discussion of the dates, the circumstances, and the political importance of the speeches.

Factional politics is Scullard's subject, and in general he follows the traditions of Friedrich Münzer's epoch-making work. Like Münzer, Scullard discounts the view of Sallust, and apparently of Livy, that from the end of the struggle between the orders to the fall of Carthage intense factionalism was absent from Roman politics. He believes that throughout his period and even in the critical days of the Second Punic War there was bitter struggle for supremacy between rival groups. In determining the composition of the groups he follows Münzer in attributing to the magistrate (consul, dictator, or *interrex*) who conducted the elections great influence on the outcome of the elections, and, though he has a salu-

tary warning in his introduction against carrying the method too far, he assumes perhaps too often that there was political affiliation between immediate successors in the consulship and between men who served as colleagues in a magistracy.

For much of his period Scullard finds three major groups in Roman politics. For the time of the Second Punic War he follows Werner Schur in interpreting political strife as a "triangular contest" (p. 74) among the Fabian, the Claudian-Fulvian, and the Aemilian-Scipionic groups. The first two, in Scullard's view, were conservative, the third liberal. Again, at the beginning of the Second Macedonian War, Scullard finds three groups, the Scipionic, the Claudian-Servilian, and the party of Flamininus which, with much altered policies, is supposed to have included many adherents of Fabius. From about 190 to 180 Scullard holds that the supporters of Scipio and of Cato, allied with Fabian remnants, contended not only with each other but with a middle bloc. Scullard tries to determine the relationship of every prominent individual to the various groups, and to decide which group predominated in the elections of each year.

Although at times, as for instance in the censorial election of 189, candidates are clearly divided into three blocs, there is no ancient evidence for long-term division of the nobles into three groupings, and it may be questioned whether such a division, which usually proves unstable in other political systems, could have lasted at Rome. Each noble had his own party of clients and followers, and he combined from time to time with other nobles to whom he was bound by common interests and relationship of intermarriage or friendship. While there were long-term alliances, like that between the Aemilii and the Cornelii Scipiones, there was throughout the nobility such wide overlapping of interests and relationship (cf. p. 3) that the maintenance of three groups with a fairly consistent policy seems impossible. As in the late republic, when few men stayed permanently in any group, there must have been constant shifting and, even within a group, frequent individual action in which personal relations predominated over the interests of a group. Scullard notes many shifts, and in 200 and again in 190 sees radical reorganization of the groups, but his whole conception seems to me to imply a party program and a party regularity which (I think Scullard would agree) were foreign to Roman politics.

Even the scant records we have, in a period when there is no Cicero to reveal the inside story, show men acting in a way that is inconsistent with Scullard's view of their group affiliation. I illustrate from the Second Punic War, going over from a different standpoint some of the objections to Schur presented by two scholars whose work is discussed by Scullard, Richard M. Haywood (*Studies on Scipio Africanus* [Baltimore, 1933]) and Marcia L. Patterson (*T. A. P. A.*, LXXIII [1942], pp. 319-40). In the opinion of Scullard and Schur, Q. Fabius Maximus Verricosus was a bitter enemy of Q. Fulvius Flaccus and an ally of T. Manlius Torquatus, two men who, like Fabius, had held two consulships and a censorship before the war. The censorship was held by Fulvius and Manlius jointly in 231, and they were removed from office when the college of augurs, of which Fabius was a member, found that they were *vitio creati*

(Patterson, p. 325). Thereupon Fabius was himself made censor. Now it was Manlius' patrician place which Fabius obtained, but in Scullard's opinion Manlius and Fabius continued the alliance which their ancestors had established, and Fulvius, once an associate of the Fabii, was "driven" into the camp of the Claudi (p. 37). He might be said to have been in that camp in 212-11 when the Fabii were in eclipse, but there is no evidence that he and Fabius were enemies. If they had been *inimici* in 216, they probably would not have been coopted together into the pontificate (Cicero, *Fam.*, III, 10, 9). As urban praetor and consul respectively, Fulvius and Fabius cooperated closely in 215 and again in 214 on reelection;<sup>1</sup> in 209 they held a joint consulship, apparently without strife, and both of them, according to Livy, were active in the senate in 205 against Scipio's proposed expedition to Africa. As for Manlius, whom Scullard puts into the Fabian party, he and Fulvius were colleagues both in the ill-fated censorship of 231 and in the consulship of 224 when they conducted a war against the Boii. Manlius was Fulvius' choice in 215 when, as urban praetor, he was directed by the senate to select a commander for Sardinia. Manlius also seems to have had good relations with Scipio. In 209 Manlius was the choice for *princeps senatus* of the censor M. Cornelius Cethagus, whom Scullard, rightly, I think, considers a friend of Scipio. As dictator in 208 Manlius brought to the consulship of 207 not a Fabian, but a Claudio, and a man whom Scullard may be right in associating with Scipio, M. Livius Salinator. Finally, if, as is likely, Manlius is the Torquatus in a fragment usually assigned to Cicero's *De virtutibus* (frg. 12, Ax's text [Teubner, 1949]), he actively supported Scipio's expedition to Africa which Fabius and Fulvius opposed.

Then there is M. Claudius Marcellus, a man who, as the holder of the *spolia opima*, had a dazzling reputation at the outbreak of the war. Scullard considers him a member of the party of Fabius and even assumes that his victory at Syracuse rehabilitated the Fabians (p. 66). It is true that for several years the two men cooperated closely in the war, but Marcellus, to whom, in my opinion, Scullard does not do full justice, was powerful enough to have a strong party of his own. In his election to his last consulship in 208, Scullard, like Schur, sees a defeat of the Claudio-Fulvian party, but he weakens his case (pp. 70 f.) by questioning Schur's theory that Fulvius was behind the tribunitial attack which Marcellus had to ward off before he could present himself to the electorate. Scullard is right in questioning that theory, pointing out that the tribune attacked all the nobility, but he fails to note a pertinent fact. For the year of Marcellus' consulship in 208 Fabius' command was discontinued, but Fulvius, who was placed in charge of Capua, remained a proconsul. It is difficult to see how Fabius' position was reestablished (p. 71).

The overriding common interest of the nobles in survival is not sufficiently emphasized in Scullard's account of politics in the war. That interest, as De Sanctis, as well as Haywood and Patterson, has argued, would have been focused on the election of the best possible men to high office and on the prolongation of commands of

<sup>1</sup> For the evidence in this discussion see Scullard, pp. 39-88 and the references in Broughton, *op. cit.* under each year.

men who had acquitted themselves well in the war. For that reason experienced *consulares* were reelected to the consulship and were made praetors; for that reason the nobles, though they must have been tried by the intrigues of Fabius, which Scullard mercilessly exposes, wisely (cf. p. 61) accepted the Cunctator and his tactics for a time.

The character of the elections in the Second Punic War, if we can trust Livy (as Scullard, in general, does), suggests that the nobles, not without scheming in the background, frequently had made a prearrangement to determine the outcome. On no occasion after Cannae does there seem to have been an untrammeled contest on election day such as was common in the second and first centuries. There were various methods of determining the outcome. One of them was the appointment of a *dictator comitiorum habendorum*, an official who was needed when neither consul could leave his army, but who was also useful because in practice he exercised more influence than the consul on the final vote. Whereas in the century before the war, if we can trust the Capitoline *Fasti*, such dictators were appointed only five times, they were chosen eight times in the sixteen years of the war, and five times they affected the election directly by bringing to the consulship the men they had nominated as masters of horse (p. 62, n. 1). Particularly revealing is the action in 207 when, though both consuls were apparently free to hold the elections (p. 73), Nero named his colleague Livius dictator, and Livius brought his master of horse to the consulship of 206. Once the dictator (Fulvius, for 209),<sup>2</sup> after some protest, had himself elected, and once the dictator and his master of horse (207) secured the election of the two men whom the senate as a whole considered best fitted to meet the threat of Hasdrubal's invasion. Sometimes the people were resistant, and on two such occasions, by an action unparalleled at any other period of Roman republican history, the *comitia* were interrupted and the voters were given an argument on their choice, the first time by Fabius, who eliminated his rivals (214), and the second time by Manlius, who removed himself from the contest (210). When tribunes tried the same method (209) to eliminate Fulvius, who was himself conducting the elections as dictator, he maintained his right to stay in the race, and won. Another indication of agreement on the outcome is the unanimity of all the centuries in the vote on one or both consuls. While there is not a recorded instance of unanimity in Livy's report of the years 200-167, there are four in the Second Punic War, 214, 210, 208, 205. Particularly striking is the uncontested vote for Scipio in the elections for 205. At this time, as in 210 (p. 66; Haywood pp. 47 ff.), when he was apparently the only candidate for command in Spain, there must have been general agreement on his fitness to take a prominent part in the war.

But there can be no doubt about the opposition of Fabius and other conservatives to Scipio's strategy and his power in the later years of the war. On the opposition of the Servilii to Scipio in 203-02 I agree with Scullard (p. 277) in his argument against Haywood, and I suspect that the Servilii had something to do with

<sup>2</sup> I give regularly the dates of the consulships, not of the elections.

Scipio's failure to be elected to one of the great colleges of priests. The absence of the most distinguished name of the age from the lists of the great priests<sup>3</sup> can only be explained by the presence of personal enemies in the priesthoods. In the days when the priesthoods were self-perpetuating bodies it seems not to have been customary to coopt into a college a man who was an *inimicus* of a member. Now in the augurate there were, as Scullard shows (p. 80, n. 5), several men who were opposed to Scipio, including the Servilius who was consul in 202. But the pontifices after the death of Fabius in 203 included several men whom Scullard, rightly, I think, lists as friends of Scipio. Yet Scipio was passed over then and on several later occasions when patrician places became vacant. His rejection may mean that he had become an *inimicus* of the two Servilii, the patrician and plebeian consuls of 203, members of the college who outlived Scipio.<sup>4</sup> Incidentally, it may be suggested that a study of the elections to the colleges of priests might reveal something on the friendships and enmities among the nobility.

But it should be stated that Scullard has not failed to consider the political attitudes of the priests. There is, as far as I am aware, no available evidence for political relationships which he has neglected. His analyses are illuminating, even if the reader is skeptical about the Claudian-Fulvians and the three blocs in general. There is a wealth of detail, clearly and accurately presented, and a disarming tentativeness in the hypothetical interpretations. In support of those interpretations there is always some evidence, and at times more than the author has taken space to cite. The book is thorough and stimulating, and it is important. Henceforth no one can study Roman politics in this period without having Scullard at hand.

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<sup>3</sup> Scipio was a Salius, a priesthood he would have had to relinquish if he had been elected to one of the great colleges (Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*<sup>2</sup> [Munich, 1912], p. 494), but we cannot doubt that he would have been as ready as other nobles were to give up the Saliate for the prestige of a major priesthood.

<sup>4</sup> Besides the Servilii, the pontifices after the death of Fabius included T. Manlius Torquatus, whose relations with Scipio I have discussed above, and the following friends of Scipio: the *pontifex maximus* P. Licinius Crassus, M. Cornelius Cethegus, and Q. Caecilius Metellus. Another was C. Livius Salinator, son of the consul of 207 who seems to have supported the Servilii at this time (Scullard, p. 78). The other member of the college was either Q. Fulvius Flaccus, who died at some time after 205, or C. Sempronius Tuditanus (Broughton, p. 338). For the power of the Servilii in the college it is significant that Fabius and Manlius, who died in 202, were succeeded by two members of the Sulpicii Galbae, perhaps a brother and a son of P. Sulpicius Galba, who was a close associate of the Servilii at this time. As Scullard suggests (p. 87, n. 3), it was probably through their influence, combined with that of the Servilii and of C. Livius Salinator, that P. Galba in his second consulship in 200 succeeded in obtaining from the college a reversal of an action of the *pontifex maximus*, Scipio's friend Licinius Crassus. Later, as Scullard points out (p. 93, n. 6), after Scipio's cousin, the young Cn. Cornelius Scipio Hispallus, had been elected, Scipio's influence in the college may have been stronger.

MARIO ATTILIO LEVI. *Nerone e i suoi tempi*. Milano-Varese, Istituto Editoriale Cisalpino, 1949. Pp. 234. 1000 lire. (*Biblioteca Storica Universitaria, Serie II, Monografie*, I.)

This stimulating book consists of an introduction concerning the sources; five chapters dealing with the political ideals of the time, the beginnings of Nero's principate, the end of the *concordia ordinum*, the foreign policy, the crisis of the *auctoritas*; and an appendix on religious conditions. Probably we should not take too seriously the publisher's claim that Professor Levi has aimed at studying Nero's reign as the center of a society cleft by contrasting interests and ideologies rather than from the political or constitutional angle. If this were the real purpose, it may be fair to ask whether the conventional approach, apparent from the above titles, has not hindered rather than helped its realization.

The gist of Levi's ideas on the historiographical character of the sources is that, but for minor discrepancies, these are unanimous in condemning Nero as a degenerate ruler, bent on replacing the *mos maiorum* with Hellenistic usages. This central concordance is not affected by the fact that, while Suetonius and Aurelius Victor are aware of an initial period of good government, Tacitus and Cassius Dio are not. The suggestion is made once that, were sections 9-19 of the Suetonian biography by some conceivable accident our sole information about Nero, he would be regarded today as one of the best Roman emperors. Levi has wisely refrained from searching for that perennial will-o'-the-wisp, the lost hypothetical source from which the existing ones have descended.

The most original part of the book is the first chapter where the author examines Seneca's *Apocolocyntosis* and Lucan's *Pharsalia*, then glances over at Persius, Petronius, Calpurnius Siculus, and the Einsiedeln fragments. In the *Apocolocyntosis* he sees a barometer of what he calls the moral climate at the death of Claudius. He claims agreement and harmony between Seneca's political attitude, his theories of literary criticism, and the cultural tendency of the day. The philosopher-satirist represents for him both the old *nobilitas* and a reaction against Hellenistic culture. He takes us back to the early days of the principate to show that, despite his revolutionary program, Augustus had preserved the status of the *nobilitas* and safeguarded their interests. The East had sided with Pompey against his adoptive father, then with Brutus and Cassius, and finally with Marc Antony against himself—all this while its influence on Roman culture was strongest. The victory of Actium reestablished the political supremacy of Italy soon to be followed by an end of its cultural subservience. But during the Claudian period Hellenistic influence staged a comeback, culturally through men of letters, artists, teachers, and astrologers; in the economic field

by heavy exports to the detriment of Italian and western prosperity; in the political field from the ascendancy of Orientals in the government. The Romans, or rather certain Roman groups, were in no mood to tolerate this new invasion.

Although not altogether novel, these ideas are all the more challenging because Professor Levi is a scholar of stature. His many and distinguished works testify to his profound knowledge of Roman history. His anti-Hellenistic thesis seems to this reviewer well-founded, but in its present form supported by insufficient proofs. A few examples should show why we regard it as tentative only.

The alleged damage from Hellenistic exports to Italian and western prosperity is a statement occupying only three lines, although its paternity is assigned to Rostovtzeff.

The view that Seneca was the spokesman of the *nobilitas*—re-emphasized in the next chapter where it is added that this class was pleased with his closeness to young Nero—should perhaps be qualified in the sense that theirs was a marriage of convenience, for he was the son of a civil servant knighted by Augustus, a provincial immigrant, and a parvenu. Claudius' plea for admitting a few Gallie chieftains into the Senate, the conservatives' protest that Italy had not run out of senatorial timber, and the testimony from the *Apocolocyntosis* itself that Claudius had a mania for diluting the privileged position of Italy would show how difficult it was in Rome for an outsider to be taken in.

Seneca was very likely a participant in an anti-Hellenistic literary movement, but whether such a movement was actually existent, and whether Seneca had a part in it, is for the moment not the point at issue. The point is that no valid pronouncement may be made of his stand solely from a reading of the *Apocolocyntosis*. One should examine his entire literary output, at least that portion produced after 54 A. D. when the philosopher allegedly became the exponent in the field of politics of the anti-Oriental attitude of the *nobilitas*.

The statement that the *nobilitas* resented the presence of Orientals "in the direction of the government," is only half true. That the resentment was an actual fact is clear from the sources. But that the freedmen had "the direction of the government" is something else again. Recent studies have shown the falsity of this assumption in so far as the reign of Claudius is concerned. The peculiar nature of this problem makes it incumbent upon historians to use more than ordinary care in handling their sources.

The argument for the anti-Hellenism of Lucan is more cogent. Levi finds his chief proof in the very theme of the *Pharsalia*, an episode from Roman history. No gods intervene; "the heroes are men, and act like men." Instead of supernatural beings, the poet introduces an "ultrasensible world" of dreams, prodigies, and witchcraft from the native Italian repertory. He is at his best when he borrows most heavily from this fund of ancient beliefs, especially when he deals with the awe-inspiring phenomena of nature, the horrible, and the mysterious, in short, when he adopts a kind of "romanticism" punctuated with popular motifs and interspersed with hints against the classical tradition, or against recent imperial policies.

The invocation to Nero in the first book is viewed as a subtle rebuke to the emperor and a warning not "to shift the Empire's center of gravity" to the East. The invective of book ten against Alexander the Great, especially the description of the conqueror as a barbarous tyrant and a "fortunate brigand" madly bent on subjugating the whole world, is construed as a polemic against Caligula only in appearance, but really against Nero whose nature and whose aims Lucan had come to know better in the years between the composition of the first book and that of the tenth. Levi takes notice of the poet's fervent exhortation to Rome not to remain behind little Pella in regard to the conquest of Parthia. Yet he is not bothered by the discrepancy between this passage and the alleged warning to Nero, then at war with Parthia, not to emulate Alexander's warlike career. He justly observes that Lucan's anti-Neronian polemic contains also the warning not to depart from the Augustan-Pompeian concept of government, that is, one founded on collaboration with the *nobilitas* and kept clear of Oriental despotism. Thus the poet's disapproval of the Hellenistic type of monarchy parallels his dislike of Hellenism in literature and the arts.

Persius too is introduced as harking back to Latin models (Lucilius and Horace) and the old Latin-Stoic ideals of human dignity. His romantic lyricism is derived from nativistic roots in protest against a hackneyed imitation of Hellenistic devices especially in respect to mythological conventions. Petronius' ideas on education are similar to those held by Persius and Lucan. Petronius, it is added, criticizes the Hellenizing or academic school which in the Neronian age sought to write like Virgil, that is, Calpurnius Siculus, the author of the Einsiedeln fragments, and Nero himself. He is represented as including in this criticism possibly even Virgil. In sum, Levi sees two cultures in that age, one "official," centering around the emperor, the other "free," born of "Stoic inspiration and hostile to the Caesars."

Whatever disagreements there may be with Levi are only in matters of detail and can in no way detract from the fundamental value of this pioneering work. No other comparable book of Roman history studies the political scene against the backdrop of culture with the same directness and zest. A fine example has been given of the large possibilities in this field. As the age of Mommsen dealt chiefly with constitutional and political questions, and that of Rostovtzeff accentuated social and economic problems, the next fifty years will in this reviewer's opinion show increasing interest in the history of ideas and the changing cultural scene. It is only in the sense of opportunities missed that Levi's work is only a beginning. He mentions only one inscription, that of Koritza recording Nero's speech to the Greeks on restoring their liberty, and only one monument, the column of Mainz. He makes no attempt to reap from the rich field of numismatics or from that of law. He looks into the field of religion only in the appendix, but with such competence that we are sorry he has given us only six instead of sixty pages. His timely insistence on a definite interdependence of politics and culture under

Nero, an interdependence which, as he says, "was neither casual nor superficial," would carry more weight if he had examined the culture of that period in *all* its manifestations. The literary taste of Lucan and his friends is only a part of the culture of that day.

In discussing the beginnings of Nero's principate (chapter two) Levi shows a penetrating insight into the complex interests and aspirations of the social classes and groups in Rome and throughout the Empire centering around the young emperor. It is a social and cultural sketch of great skill—not demonstrative or dealing with facts, but interpretive and imaginative in the best sense of the word. But again he departs here and there from the evidence, for example, when he says that Claudius granted citizenship to individuals only, and always as an exception, whereas actually he elevated at least nine cities to the rank of *municipia* and some fifteen to that of *coloniae*. The enfranchisement of the Anauni and other Alpine tribes, to mention only one case, has now been known eighty years. The view that the principate was a monarchy, at least in the time of Nero, comes easy to a European who has lived under kings. For Americans familiar with the tremendous range of powers of the President, especially a four-term President, it is easier to appreciate the complexities of the office of the Roman President-for-life without necessarily thinking of him as king or of the institution as monarchy.

According to Levi (chapter three), friendly relations between the princeps and the Senate (*concordia ordinum*) came to an end when Nero tried unsuccessfully to impose a tax on Italian real estate (58 A. D.). The claim is made that the young emperor was an idealistic ruler who wished to place the principate above the interests of parties. Actually the picture that comes out is that of a politician who saw profit to himself in paying the army handsomely and in ameliorating the economic conditions of the provincials and the proletariat of the city of Rome. These were the classes on whose loyalty the power of the principate rested as against the *nobilitas* of whose collaboration no emperor was ever sure. Nero would relieve of their fiscal burdens the provincials and the proletariat by substituting for the indirect taxes which fell chiefly on them a direct tax which was to be paid by owners of Italian real estate, that is, primarily the senatorial class whose investments were almost entirely in land. The Senate fought him to a standstill, and since he acknowledged its constitutional right to pass on fiscal matters, he wisely refrained from going over their heads. But he neither forgave nor forgot, for (we are also told) he conceived of senatorial collaboration in terms of surrender to his will. At any rate, rather than precipitate a constitutional crisis, Nero sought additional revenues in dangerous foreign adventures.

Since Levi makes the rejection of the fiscal bill a turning point in the reign of Nero, it might have been appropriate to probe the nature of the bill more thoroughly. But such is not the case. He states that the indirect taxes went to the *aerarium* (if so they would have been beyond the control of the emperor) whereas they went partly to the fiscus and partly to the *aerarium militare*. Such phrases in regard to Italy as "an increase in direct taxes" (p. 143) and "new direct

"taxes" (p. 144) create the impression that Italian real estate was taxed before Nero's accession. The sketch of the economic losses of the senatorial class if the bill had been approved, and of the damage to Nero's prestige inflicted by its rejection, is well drawn, but no connection has been seen between the fiscal bill and Seneca's ideas on social justice. This is a pity, especially since at this time the philosopher was still Nero's chief counsellor, and it is no secret that he deplored the extremes of poverty and wealth. Nor has Levi examined the alternatives to the fiscal bill which the imperial administration must have considered if it had a real desire to alleviate poverty among the masses. Public works, larger imports of wheat for the benefit of the City proletariat, administrative reforms in the collection of revenues, and inflation receive a little attention in the last chapter, but from a different angle: as the attempts of a discredited and increasingly isolated emperor to capture the support of the masses as a counter to the alienation of the Senate. The undertaking of public works appears as the outcome of an accident, the fire of 64 A. D. Except for the cutting of the isthmus of Corinth, there is no mention of a building program in Italy or the provinces. There is a reference to the debasement of the currency, but no discussion of its purpose. When Nero is shown as contriving to get forty-five *denarii* from one aureus as against the forty which were standard under the late Republic, no consideration is given to the fact that Augustus had already abandoned that standard by inflating it to forty-two *denarii*.

In discussing the foreign policy (chapter four), Levi interprets Nero's philhellenism as well as the war with Parthia as other methods of restoring the prestige he had lost by the failure of his fiscal reform. The emperor's admiration for Greece, we are told, caused neither an increase of Oriental personnel in the administration, nor important concessions of the franchise to the East, nor even any appreciable accentuation of the imperial cult. His chief interest was to bring to Rome a new ideal of human dignity, one based on intellectual and physical accomplishments (hence the promotion of athletic, gymnastic, musical, and poetic contests) as against the old-fashioned emphasis on the "moral qualities of devotion to the gods, duty to country and parents, honesty, courage, temperance and self-control." This new model of mentality and morality was to produce "the future collaborators of the monarch," the more willing to serve him because he was the highest exponent of their own ideals. The section on the Parthian policy, cast in the narrative form, clarifies certain problems in strategy, particularly Corbulo's adaptation of plans realistically developed in the face of changing conditions, not only in Armenia and Parthia, but also in Hyrcania.

Events in Germany, Britain, and the regions of the Euxine are dealt with in the chapter, "Crisis of the *Auctoritas*." Tiridates' visit to Rome is interpreted as a show staged by Nero to dazzle the masses with pomp and circumstance, again in order that he might recapture some of his lost prestige. The emperor's protracted stay in Greece had for Levi the purpose of dramatizing to Italy three ideas, namely that Roman morals and mores should be recast in a Greek mould, that the East was politically not inferior to the West, and that the empire could be governed as well from the provinces. In

other words Nero aimed at adding to his support by the masses that of the army and the provinces.

The book closes with a good index which is not often found in Italian publications and an index, with page and footnote reference, of the principal modern writers consulted. American and English scholars might well adopt this latter feature as a practical tool to reveal at a glance to the reader more or less familiar with the field the range and up-to-dateness of their information.

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LOUIS NOUGARET. *Traité de métrique latine classique*. Paris, Klincksieck, 1948. Pp. xii + 134.

This brief treatise is designed for students most of whom are not required to learn Greek (p. vii), and, of course, it is written from the point of view of the "French school" of Latin metrics. As such, it is in general well done. Two basic criticisms may be made. First, the author is occasionally dogmatic about controversial matters. In such a work, brevity is imperative; but still, a distinction should be clearly made between what is universally held and what is widely disputed. Secondly, generalizations are occasionally inaccurate. It is extremely difficult and sometimes impossible, of course, to reduce intricate data to those simple generalizations which are pedagogically desirable. But accuracy must be given precedence over convenience, and where accuracy cannot be achieved within brief compass, one should frankly say so.

This is not the place to debate the merits of the "French school" at length. There is much in their theories that is admirable. Thus, Nougaret's treatment of the hexameter shows delicate sensitivity to the niceties of Vergilian verse. Still, one can hardly fail to deplore the extremes to which this school is willing to go and their utter imperviousness to decades of incisive criticism. For instance, Nougaret insists that the accent of Latin had no "nuance d'intensité" (p. 4) and that it was "sans influence ni sur la phonétique ni sur la versification" (p. 122). If the position were taken that pitch was dominant and stress secondary (but distinctly more important than in Greek), then universal agreement might be reached; but such an extreme position as this leaves one without any explanation for syncope and iambic shortening in the Latin language.

True, Nougaret does mention iambic shortening, but he intimates that it is purely a metrical matter (p. 79): "le poète a la liberté de recourir à elle ou de la négliger suivant les commodités ou les exigences de la métrique . . . dēō, dōm̄, dēōs, dōm̄s, tēn̄, tēn̄s. . ." Now enough data have been collected to demonstrate that something more than metrical considerations are present in regard to iambic shortening. Imperative forms such as *tene* are almost invariably shortened in dialogue verse in Plautus, but forms such as *tenes* almost

never.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, the divergence is so radical that it is misleading for Nougaret indiscriminately to include both types in his list. Furthermore, the fact that forms such as *deos* are usually reduced, but those such as *domos* hardly ever, suggests that *deos* is reduced not by iambic shortening, as Nougaret intimates, but by a fusion of the two vowels.<sup>2</sup> Again, Nougaret (p. 80) lists among other cases of iambic shortening *férantur* (without citing any specific passage; the form occurs not at all in Plautus and in Terence only *Hecyra* 612, where it is not shortened). Many scholars deny that such accented syllables are ever shortened; certainly this word is not precisely analogous to *voluptates* and the other words here cited. In these instances, then, the evidence presented to illustrate the theory is lacking in accuracy.

In dealing with the dialogue verse of Latin drama, Nougaret presents a vast array of elaborate and obscure rules, by which in metrical terms he states—but offers no explanation for—certain of the striking divergences from Greek practice. Something of a paradox is reached in summarizing these rules (p. 76): “en latin, quand le temps marqué tombe sur une finale longue, le demi-pied précédent est, suivant les cas, ou bien obligatoirement pur, ou bien obligatoirement condensé.” Such paradox would seem to suggest that these phenomena have not been classified in the proper terms; that is, that they are not purely metrical. Certain it is that these rules do not cover the phenomena adequately; specifically, for instance, they do not cover the exclusion of a tribrach word-foot from iambic verse. In short, statements in terms of pure and impure feet are not adequate, since some types of pure feet are excluded where others are accepted.

“Les coupes” (both caesura and diaeresis), of course, receive detailed treatment. This phenomenon is said to have consisted, at least originally, of a light pause in pronunciation (p. 10), and this pause is cited (pp. 49-50) to account for short syllables serving for long ones at “la coupe.” Under the heading “Syllables allongées à la coupe,” Nougaret (pp. 49-50) points out that *servāt* (Ennius, *An.*, 80 Vahlen) and *sorōr* (41 V) show quantities that may possibly have been current, but that the case is different with *cōquīt* (336 V; an error)<sup>3</sup> and *horridiūs* (170 V). It seems misleading, especially in other passages in the book (e.g., p. 77), to include these quite different types both under this heading. In Plautus, long finals in such

<sup>1</sup> Hermann Leppermann, *De correptione vocabulorum iambicorum, quae apud Plautum in senariis atque septenariis iambicis et trochaicis inveniuntur* (Diss. Münster, 1890), pp. 78, 82. [Verb forms such as *tenes* are shortened 13 times, not shortened 285 times.]

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* [Declension forms such as *deos* are reduced 157 times, not reduced 54; declension forms such as *domos* are reduced 11 times, not reduced 217 times.]

<sup>3</sup> Ennius, *An.*, 336 V is the second line of the famous quotation with which Cicero opens his *De Senectute*:

quae nunc te coquit et versat in pectore fixa

Here, of course, both syllables of *cōquīt* are short and Vahlen lists no other occurrence of this word in his *index sermonis*.

words as *servat* and *soror* occur elsewhere in the line and are considered certainly to have been current.<sup>4</sup>

Nougaret (p. 32) finds caesurae after each of the first two words in the following verse (Vergil, *Georg.*, IV, 336):

Drymoque Xanthoque Ligeaque Phyllodoceque

Now if the first *-que* is long here because it is pronounced as a closed syllable, then there is no pause. Again, in presenting the "Greek" theory of the Saturnian, a theory which Nougaret himself (pp. 21-2) finds difficult to accept but which is consistent with the French view of the Latin accent, he cites a line of Naevius<sup>5</sup> in which *deinde* is counted either as a spondaic foot (as I would judge from his text) or as a trochaic foot in what here is considered an iambic meter (as I would judge from his metrical scheme), and then he says that some similar phenomena are found in dramatic verse and in the hexameter. He adds cross references, but these do not lead one to any phenomena that are significantly similar, for, of course, in conventional quantitative Latin verse neither is *deinde* ever a spondee nor is a trochaic foot allowed in iambic verse. Finally, we note with alarm that in this theory of the Saturnian, *fauni vatesque* versify with anacrusis and various other metrical claptrap.

Such, then, are the heroic jousts which Nougaret, ignoring the acrid odor of Teutonic gunpowder, undertakes in behalf of the Gallie point of view, and he succeeds as well as anyone so heavily encuirassed could.

A few minor points may be mentioned. In verse, the "e" of *atqu' ego* is short, and so this phenomenon does not, as Nougaret intimates (p. 4), bear significant resemblance to *deero* and *deesse* becoming *déro* and *désse*. The treatment of hiatus is too brief, especially for Plautus. The *Annales* of Ennius are described by Nougaret (p. 25) as "le premier en date des poèmes nationaux latins." Most critics grant this honor to Naevius for his *Bellum Punicum*, which certainly antedated the *Annales*. In regard to the elegiac couplet, Nougaret (p. 58) says that in imitation of the Greeks, Catullus terminates the pentameter with words of various length, and that Tibullus, Propertius (I, II, III), Martial, Rutilius, Ausonius, etc., do the same. This statement is essentially untrue, for the practice of Tibullus is very different from that of Catullus, and the third book of Propertius is closer to the fourth than it is to the first or second in this regard.<sup>6</sup>

Speaking of Greek dramatic verse, Nougaret (p. 61) says: "Les pieds impairs des vers trochaïques, et les pieds pairs des iambiques

<sup>4</sup> W. M. Lindsay, *Early Latin Verse* (Oxford, 1922), pp. 118-37. Cf. Manu Leumann in Stoltz-Schmalz, *Lat. Gram.*<sup>5</sup> (Munich, 1928), p. 103.

<sup>5</sup> Naevius, *Bell. Pun.*, 30 Morel [Morel accepts Merula's emendation (?) of *dein.*].

<sup>6</sup> "As compared with Catullus, the work of Tibullus shows an enormous increase in favour of the dissyllable," Kirby Flower Smith, *The Elegies of Albius Tibullus* (New York, 1913), p. 98. Cf. A. Cartault, *Le Distique Élégiaque chez Tibulle, Sulpicia, Lygdamus* (Paris, 1911), pp. 134-51. On Propertius, see H. E. Butler and E. A. Barber, *The Elegies of Propertius* (Oxford, 1933), p. xvi; Karl Hosius, *Sext. Propertii Elegiarum Libri IV<sup>a</sup>* (Leipzig, 1932), p. 179.

sont obligatoirement purs . . ." Later (p. 71), schemes are given which are similarly misleading. Anapestic feet in the even positions of the trimeter are frequent in Greek comedy, and since Latin comedy is naturally the main concern of these sections, it is a mistake to ignore them. Indeed, even in the last plays of Euripides, the number of anapests in even feet is not negligible.<sup>7</sup> Nougaret (p. 80), as others of the "French school,"<sup>8</sup> states that *nescio* was not yet felt to be a true compound [in Plautus and Terence] but was taken as *ne + sciō*. But *nescio quid*, etc., occur in Horace's hexameters (*Ser.*, I, 9, 2, 10, 67), and the explanation of Lindsay (word-group) seems preferable.<sup>9</sup> Again, in considering iambic verse in Classical Latin, Nougaret says (p. 93): "Dès Catulle les pieds s'organisent deux par deux: le temps marqué pair doit être précédé d'un demi-pied pur, le temps marqué impair d'un demi-pied condensé." This, of course, is not true despite the qualifications which Nougaret later makes, for even in Seneca the first and third feet are often pure.

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PIERRE COURCELLE. *Les Lettres grecques en Occident: de Macrobe à Cassiodore*. Paris, E. de Boccard, 1948. Pp. xvi + 440. (*Bibliothèque des écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome*, Fase. 159.)

This important work heroically produced during the Nazi occupation was first published in 1943. The revised edition, except for a few pages of bibliography, is essentially a reprint of the first. The section dealing with Boethius is substantially the same as the author's "Boëce et l'école d'Alexandrie" in *Mélanges de l'École française de Rome*, III (1935), pp. 185-223.

M. Courcelle's intention is to go beneath the surface of the conventional history of cultural decline in the later Roman empire of the west and to uncover the facts about the Latin West's knowledge of Greek letters. The results of this quest are impressive and, to a certain extent, sensational. The title of the work is, perhaps, misleading, because the work is rather a series of special essays than "un ouvrage de synthèse" and the author's concern is not primarily with the West's acquaintance with Greek literature proper but with the West's scholarship in the fields of philosophy and doctrine. Courcelle's special interest is the history of later Neoplatonism and his book must be regarded as a brilliant contribution to our knowledge of the channels through which that philosophy spread in the Latin half of the later Roman empire.

<sup>7</sup> J. Descroix, *Le trimètre iambique . . .* (Macon, 1931), pp. 114-15 [unnumbered].

<sup>8</sup> Cf. J. Marouau, *Terence*, . . . (Paris, 1912), p. 210, on *tertia*, 73: "C'est dans ce poème que l'on peut voir une fois de plus l'usage de la négation pour faire une question qui ne se peut pas poser en un contexte où *nescio* chantez en contexte où no interrogeative indefinite suit.

Courcelle takes up two questions: (1) precisely what did it mean to be a Hellenist in the later empire; (2) did the undeniable decline of learning from the time of Macrobius to that of Cassiodorus proceed at a steady or a fitful pace? In answer to the second question, he finds that Greek learning of a sort was still considerable at the close of the fourth century, that the fifth saw a sharp decline, that a rebirth of Greek studies took place in the reign of Theodoric the Ostrogoth as western scholars turned to Alexandria and Constantinople for fresh inspiration, but that the final slump had come before Cassiodorus retired to his monastery. And what did it mean to be a Hellenist in the late empire? Courcelle's conclusions regarding the actual nature of the Greek learning of the Roman writers of his period produce something of the shock of scandal. That the Latin west gradually forgot its Greek, is hardly a novel thesis. One is accustomed to think of the late empire as the period of compilations, epitomes, and Latin translations from the Greek, but one is also accustomed to assume that the real scholars of the day could and did still read the authors and steep themselves in Greek science at the source. The truth, Courcelle concludes from a close study of texts of St. Jerome, Macrobius, Augustine, Boethius, and others, is that some scholars could have read widely in Greek literature but did not do so and did not wish to do so. Many read Greek right enough but they studied not the authors themselves but the commentaries. These are Courcelle's words:

. . . Les Romains n'ont une idée du siècle de Periclès et de l'ancienne littérature grecque qu'à travers Cicéron, Varron ou Plutarque. Le goût de la compilation érudite fait négliger de se reporter aux sources: Macrobe ne connaît le théâtre grecque que par Didyme Chalcétoire, et celui-ci par Serenus Sammonicus. Saint Jérôme ne lit guère les Pères des deux premières siècles qu'à travers Eusèbe et Origène. Les manuscrits des auteurs anciens étaient-ils donc si rares? Je ne le crois pas. Jérôme possède Hérodote et Xénophon; s'il les lit, c'est à titre exceptionnel, parce qu'ils sont indispensables pour le commentaire historique de l'Écriture; mais il ne prend pas intérêt au *Timée* qu'il possède également. Les latins les plus férus de Platon ou d'Aristote, un Macrobe, un Augustin, un Boëce, ne connaissent le texte ancien qu'à travers le commentaire le plus récent et ne peuvent détacher l'un de l'autre. Cette absence d'un contact avec les chefs-d'œuvre classiques, ce défaut de perspective, ce manque de sens historique est l'un des signes les plus graves de la décadence; les meilleurs esprits ne s'y peuvent soustraire; ils réfléchissent, non sur les textes, mais sur les commentaires qu'ils commentent à leur tour; de commentaire en commentaire, la pensée s'affadit et dégénère . . . (p. 393).

Courcelle presents his case against the intellectuals of the late empire with great skill and effectiveness. As one recovers, however, from the initial impact of Courcelle's eloquence, he is tempted to ask whether his conclusions are not too drastic and too sweeping. In every age of scholarship the *auctores* have been read through the eyes of contemporary teachers and commentators; and students have

naturally absorbed and exploited the second-hand erudition that generations of teachers have wrapped around the original text. Courcelle has without question demonstrated that the late imperial writers made great use of this traditional learning and paraded it on occasion with no small amount of pretentiousness. Must one necessarily conclude, however, because a writer can be shown to have utilized the latest commentary or the latest work of scholarship in his field, that he cannot have made or probably did not make some independent study of the authors to whom the commentaries were devoted? Such an assumption would be dangerous in the case of writers even very much later than those with whom Courcelle is here concerned. One would hesitate, for example, to maintain that the extensive study of Servius in the Middle Ages was carried on by students who had little interest in the text of Vergil. Just as dangerous, to the present reviewer, is the conclusion that a writer can have known only such Greek authors as he has occasion to cite or quote. Must we decide that a St. Jerome's curiosity with regard to Greek letters cannot have extended beyond the quarrying of illustrative material for his exegetical writings? There can obviously be no definite answer to such a question, but, in defense of the later Roman scholars of the calibre of St. Jerome, it seems fair to protest that Courcelle has applied the *argumentum ex silentio* with excessive rigor.

*Les Lettres grecques en Occident* would have more the character of *un ouvrage de synthèse* if Courcelle had called more witnesses in his inquiry into this still perplexing question of late Roman knowledge of Greek literature. One misses an account of St. Ambrose in this volume, but we are promised that in a forthcoming *Les Lettres grecques de Plotin à St. Ambroise*. It has already been remarked that Courcelle's primary interest is the history of scholarship in the fields of philosophy and doctrine. This has very probably restricted the scope of the present work and affected the analysis of the authors that are discussed in it. The student of general literature will regret that no historian receives any attention at all. Ammianus Marcellinus may have been passed over on the ground that he *was* Greek and consequently not a suitable witness to call. Like historians, poets have been either ignored—Prudentius is briefly mentioned in a footnote—or, as in the case of Claudian, not really examined on their knowledge of Greek literature.

Courcelle's treatment of Claudian is a good illustration of both the strength of his book and what must be considered its limitation. The six pages in which his name constantly appears (pp. 119-24) are not really devoted to Claudian himself or his knowledge of Greek literature. The poems are treated as historical documents, from which Courcelle first extracts material for a brief sketch of the political situation in the empire during the reign of Honorius. Claudian is next called upon to testify to the continued prestige of Greek culture in the western empire in the face of bitter anti-Greek political sentiment. With scarcely a glance at the external facts of Claudian's career and no examination of his poetry as such, Courcelle turns to dredging the poems for material on Claudian the philosopher. The poet not surprisingly is discovered to be no signifi-

eant philosophical figure himself, but he appears to be valuable for the light that he throws on one Manlius Theodorus, described by Courcelle as "l'un des plus grands philosophes contemporains." By a comparative study of Claudian's panegyric on this worthy and texts of Augustine, who was at one time an admirer of Theodorus, Courcelle succeeds in reconstructing a table of contents of Theodorus' lost manual of Greek philosophy. Among other facts brought to light during this study are indications that Claudian in his philosophical studies made use of, at least, one lost Neoplatonist commentary on Plato. All this is interesting, but the general student of literature would like to be told something about the Greek poems that have been ascribed to Claudian and would like to know whether, in his Latin poems, Claudian shows a wide acquaintance with the older Greek literature. In this the reader is doomed to disappointment, for all that Courcelle says on this score is contained in a single tantalizing sentence: "Même ses poésies latines sont pleines de reminiscences des anciens philosophes et surtout des poètes grecs." Courcelle appears to have no time for purely literary problems but, in a footnote, refers the curious to the list of Claudian's reminiscences of Greek authors collected by Birt in his edition. He adds the warning: "cette liste demanderait un contrôle sévère." Thus the student of literature, although he cannot fail to admire the ingenious sleuthing of Courcelle (who always gets his man—usually *un commentateur grec*), must needs conduct his own literary investigation (exercising, of course, un contrôle sévère).

While on the subject of literature, I venture to add a footnote to Courcelle's masterly and convincing study of the philosophical background of Boethius' *Consolatio*. Rightly dismissing as absurd the old controversy over Boethius' Christianity, Courcelle, like most previous students of Boethius, feels called upon to account for the seemingly strange paradox that Boethius the theologian and philosophical Christian should have written his theodicey in the form of a dialogue in which the argument is purely philosophical and such authorities as are cited are exclusively Greek and Roman pagans. The explanation, Courcelle believes, is to be found in the fact that Boethius the philosopher remains severely aloof from Boethius the believing Christian and does not allow the matter of faith and the questions of philosophy and reason to mingle. This explanation is undoubtedly true, as far as it goes. May it not be completed by a consideration of the facts of Roman literary tradition? The *Consolatio* is not an esoteric work like Boethius' translations and commentaries or even his *opuscula sacra* but a literary treatment of basic philosophical problems dedicated to and intended to be read by Boethius' senatorial friends. Ever since Cicero had popularized philosophy for Roman gentlemen, it had been presented to them in various modifications of the Platonic dialogue embellished with poetic quotations and all the ornaments of rhetoric. Furthermore, the Christian philosophical dialogue from Minucius Felix to the early dialogues of Augustine regularly drew its arguments and illustrations from the armory of the ancient philosophers. The *Consolatio* obviously belongs to this tradition. Quite apart from any scruples that Boethius may have had about mingling the matter of reason and that of faith, artistic considerations undoubtedly prompted him

to employ the dialogue form, of which the "Menippean" prose and verse were simply the "modern dress." By way of a further footnote, I still venture to suggest that Boethius in the *Consolatio* is the literary kinsman of Augustine in the dialogues written at Cassiciacum; I repeat this suggestion in all modesty in the face of Courcelle's objection that there is no demonstrable philosophical relationship between the two works.

As already remarked, whether or not *Les Lettres grecques en Occident* will satisfy all students of the Greco-Roman cultural tradition, there can be no doubt of its excellence within the field to which it properly belongs. Courcelle's great contribution, it seems to me, is his demonstration of the vital importance, in any attempt to reconstruct intellectual history, of discovering the immediate sources of a given writer's information. In discovering the channels through which so much later Greek scholarship reached the authors of the later Roman empire in the west, Courcelle has gone a long way towards supplying the history of Latin Neoplatonism, the want of which he laments in the preface to his book. The chapter on St. Augustine's Greek, the study of Macrobius, the already familiar section on Boethius, and the fascinating inquiry into the vexed question of Cassiodorus' library command respect for the learning that they represent and will unquestionably stimulate further study of these questions, for all that Courcelle writes fairly bristles with provocative hypotheses and new ideas.

Since the matter of the west's losing its contact with Greek culture is inseparably bound up with the whole question of Rome's cultural decline, *Les Lettres grecques* will prove to be an invaluable supplement to works like Henri-Irénée Marrou's *St. Augustin et la Fin de la Culture antique* (1939).

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EDUARD SCHWYZER. Griechische Grammatik. Zweiter Band: Syntax und syntaktische Stilistik, vervollständigt und herausgegeben von ALBERT DEBRUNNER. München, C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1950. Pp. xxiii + 714. (*Müller's Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft*, II, I, II.)

The first volume of Schwyzer's *Griechische Grammatik* was published more than a decade ago, the phonology appearing in 1934 and the morphology in 1939. The task of finishing the syntax, which was not fully completed at the time of the author's death in 1943, was carried out by Albert Debrunner. The size alone of Schwyzer's work is about twice that of the Brugmann-Thumb grammar, its forerunner in the series. Only the revision of Kühner's grammar by Blass and Gerth can compare with it in abundance of citations, and for some time Kühner has failed to satisfy the need for a Greek grammar incorporating the results of recent comparative and historical investigation. When the second volume appeared, therefore, it was a welcome addition to the library of any student of ancient Greek and Dorian Greek dialect, its compositions of their European and non-European material, and its combination of original thought

and sane judgment are all taken into account, it is safe to predict that it will be the leading work in its field for many years to come.

The four principal divisions of the work now under review are the introduction; the analytic part, dealing with the value of the various grammatical categories; the synthetic part, dealing with sentence construction or syntax in the narrower sense; and finally the section on syntactical stylistic. Some overlapping between the second and third portions is inevitable. For example, the moods are treated in the analytic portion from the viewpoint of their own inherent value and again in the synthetic portion as components of the various types of subordinate clauses; but both sections are adequately provided with cross-references. The short and unpretentious section on syntactical stylistic deals with certain speech-habits, mostly popular and largely unconscious, which may be distinguished, though not too sharply, from the more conscious artistry of individual writers.

Although Schwyzer's work is based on that of Brugmann-Thumb, it is for all practical purposes an independent work, and recent investigations whose results have been incorporated into it include a number of important studies by Schwyzer himself, especially the series published in the *Abhandlungen* of the Berlin Academy during the early forties. From among the enormous mass of material covered in the Syntax I have selected a few isolated details for discussion, especially in matters where the views presented diverge from those of Brugmann and other scholars of the recent past. In the difficult problem of the origin of grammatical gender Schwyzer inclines to favor Grimm's theory of primitive imagination and discards Brugmann's view that feminine gender was mechanically assigned to *ā*-stems by association with *gʷenā* (pp. 33, 35). In this, as in some other matters (e.g. case of comparison, p. 99, voices of the verb, p. 239, parataxis and hypotaxis, p. 635, general relative + anaphoric, p. 645) more use is made of non-Indo-European constructions as a psychological basis for comparison than in the works of the earlier generation of Junggrammatiker. On p. 37 he deals with the correspondence of masculine singular and neuter plural but does not mention the converse type with neuter singular and masculine plural, of which, however, *στάδιον* : *στάδιοι* appears to be the only example. Wackernagel's elliptic dual, which has been treated by most authorities with varying degrees of skepticism, is regarded as probable (p. 50). The syntax of cases takes up about one hundred and twenty pages and includes a careful account of syncretism and of the fate of the case-system in Modern Greek, but only a few remarks can be made here. The so-called nominative absolute is rightly recognized (p. 66) as a type of anacoluthon. The distinction between the two types of comparison (ablative genitive or *η*) appears not to be explained either on p. 99 or in B V 3 b 16, to which cross-reference is made. Benveniste's *Noms d'agent et noms d'action* (Paris, 1948), which deals in part with this matter, is mentioned in the *Nachträge* but is too recent for its results to be included in the syntax; and in any case the distinction in question was rather one of origin than of actual living usage. In the treatment of the partitive genitive earlier grammars, with the exception of Humbert's *Syntaxe grecque*, have not adequately emphasized the fact that it

may replace not only the accusative but also certain nominative or dative constructions when the substantive in question shares in the action only in part. Schwyzer's thorough and penetrating treatment of this matter greatly facilitates the understanding of certain troublesome passages such as Ar., *Vesp.*, 352 πάντα πέφαρκται κούκ  
ἔστων ὄπῆς οὐδὲ εἰ σέρφῳ διαδύναι. The section on the case-construction with ἀμείβω and similar verbs (p. 127.2) gives a more abundant list of citations than any other grammar, not even excepting Kühner-Gerth, but no attempt is made to separate the type with accusative of the thing given and genitive of the thing received (e.g. the *locus classicus*, Z 236 πρὸς Τυδείδην Διομῆδεα τεύχε' ἀμείβει / χρύσεα χαλκείων ἐκατόμβοι' ἐννεαβολῶν) from the opposite type with accusative of the thing received and genitive of the thing given. In general even the smaller Latin grammars give more attention than most standard Greek grammars to this twofold usage with verbs of exchange. Among Schwyzer's examples Pind., *Paean*, IV, 16, Aesch., *Prom.*, 967, and Dem., VI, 10, belong to the former type, and Solon, IV, 11, Soph., *Tr.*, 737, Eur., *Med.*, 967 f., I. T., 397, Antiphon, V, 79, Plat., *Symp.*, 219 A (echoing Z 236, but used of spiritual goods taken in exchange for material goods), and Plut., *Mor.*, 607 e, to the latter. On p. 165, n. 1, dealing with αὐτοῖς ἵπποις, he rejects on chronological grounds Brugmann-Thumb's theory of derivation by haplology from αὐτοὶ τοῖς ἵπποις. In his treatment of pronouns he takes the occasional reference of ἔαυτοῦ, etc., to the first and second persons (p. 198) as a relic of the Indo-European use of the reflexive \*se for any person or number. In this again he differs from Brugmann-Thumb, and since the phenomenon in question is chiefly Attic it constitutes one of his evidences for the rather archaic character of Attic syntax. In the verb the section dealing with tense and aspects presents several novel features. The term *Aktionsart*, employed in most German works in place of *aspect*, is here given a wider range and made to include the distinction of transitive and intransitive verbs as well as iteratives, while *Aspekt* is mainly restricted to the *infektive* and *konfektive* categories (p. 252, with references to earlier studies on which this distinction between *Aktionsart* and *Aspekt* is partly based). The difference of aspect formerly believed to exist between the future middle with passive value and the future derived from the aorist passive stem (e.g. τιμήσομαι 'I shall be held in honor' but τιμηθήσομαι 'I shall be awarded an honor') is condemned (pp. 238, n. 1; 265, n. 2) as lacking in adequate support. This distinction, which was affirmed as early as the eighteenth century and upheld by Blass, Gerth, and Brugmann-Thumb, seems first to have fallen into disfavor with Stahl and Wackernagel; Humbert ignores it, although he maintains a similar distinction between ξώ and σχήσω. The usual explanation of the gnomic aorist as showing the past event which forms the basis of judgment is rejected in favor of the view that we have here a survival of the aorist indicative in a timeless sense, with the augment serving to mark the actuality, not the time. In several debatable points of usage he upholds a conservative attitude toward the traditional texts: thus (p. 325) he defends the omission of ἄν with the potential optative in a number of passages from Attic tragedy and prose where Kühner-Gerth, Stahl, and edi-

tors favor emendation. Similarly (p. 352) he defends ἄν with the future indicative in certain passages which form a residue after others have been explained away; and on p. 686 he defends the type of conditional sentence with *ei* + past indicative of unreality in the protasis and optative with ἄν in the apodosis. For the construction which consists of verb and object with infinitive in final position, e. g. Xen., *An.*, V, 4, 9 τί ἡμῶν δεήσεσθε χρήσασθαι, he cites without comment the usual explanation that the object properly belonging to the infinitive is attracted to the verb by a sort of anticipation; probably we have here rather a survival of the earlier construction in which the noun and infinitive each depended directly on the verb (so E. Adelaide Hahn, *T. A. P. A.*, LXXIV (1943), p. 281, with special reference to the evidence of Sanskrit, Latin, and Hittite). On p. 473 ἐπίτριτος is included among a list of prepositional compounds of the class known as hypostases. I should prefer to regard it as of the *bahuvrīhi* class: 'having one-third in addition,' and should apply the same treatment to παράστος and παρουάτος on p. 498. For πρίν with conjunctival value he sees the starting-point in its employment to introduce an imperative infinitive after a negative principal verb (e. g. χ 63 f. οὐδέ κεν ὡς ἔτι χέρας ἐμὰς λήξαιμι φόνοιο, / πρὶν πᾶσαν μνηστῆρας ὑπερβασίην ἀποτεῖσαι), here following Brugmann-Thumb against Delbrück's view that πρίν imitated the use of πάρος with an originally ablative infinitive.

The extreme thoroughness with which Schwyzer has surveyed the modern literature on Greek syntax has enabled him to point out certain problems still awaiting fuller investigation. A few of these are: Aristophanes' use of interjections (p. 600, n. 3); non-observance of the attributive position in non-partitive genitive (p. 692, n. 4); word-order in exclamatory and interrogative sentences (p. 695, γ).

Despite an apologetic remark in the preface for imperfections of typography and citation, the errors that have come to my notice are neither numerous nor serious. On p. 27 i) "engl. *one*" is evidently meant for the indefinite article *a*, *an*. On p. 67, bottom, for *prājā*, *pati* (divided between lines) read *prājā-pati*. On p. 89, middle, for "die bei Verb und Normen steht" read "die bei Verb und Nomen steht." On p. 135, top, in Ar., *Eq.*, 822 read *με* between *πολύν* and *χρόνον*. On p. 147, top, in O 258 for *ἐλαυνέ*; *μεν* (divided between lines) read *ἐλαυνέ-μεν*. On p. 199.2 the cross-reference C IV 5 b δ should read C IV 5 b ε, which deals with *σφεῖς*. On p. 337, last line, for "dem Konjunktiv" read "dem Indikativ," since it is here a question of variation with the *oblique* optative. On p. 374, top, the words "λέγω σοι λέβαι . . . durch den a. e. i." should be read only once. On p. 500, bottom, in o 60 f. for *χιτῶνι* read *χιτῶνα*, the locative dative being *χροί*. On p. 621, top, in Thuc., I, 109, 3 for *προχώρει* read *προυχώρει*. The index now in preparation has not become available to me during the time that I have had the grammar under review. Its appearance will increase still further the usefulness of this superb work.

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HERMANN BENGTSON. *Einführung in die Alte Geschichte*. Munich, Biederstein (formerly Beck), 1949. Pp. viii + 185. \$3.00.

In a notice in *A. H. R.*, LVI (1951), pp. 850-1, the undersigned has attempted to characterize this book and to compare it with its curiously distinctive French and British counterparts. The additional, more detailed notes which follow look to an eventual second edition, and meantime may be of interest to those who use the first.

This *Einführung* is pretty nearly a *must* for ancient historians of all ages, and for scholars who use Ancient History. Moreover, although it is Germanic in the best sense, through and through, it is brief, readable, and light to hold. The yellow, easily soiled bindingcurls. The letterpress is almost flawless: correct D. R. Stuart (p. 96), J. E. Sandys (p. 128).

The volume was written in the war years, then added to since 1946. G. Klaffenbach assisted in this, and additions were made down into the year of publication, so that the omissions due to the war are fewer than might have been feared. There is, however, a heavy preponderance of German works.

Various kinds of Introductions to Ancient History could be imagined, ranging from a compressed narrative, through sample instances of problem and solution (much needed; modern history has some; for archaeology see R. Carpenter, *Humanistic Value of Archaeology*, pp. 3-34), and books of advice (M. Cary, *Documentary Sources of Greek History*) to formal surveys of those disciplines which together make up Ancient History. Bengtson's is of this latter type. It is like being shown around a select private library arranged neatly according to disciplines—but without pauses long enough to open the volumes and to read in them.

Bengtson has not failed to consider larger aspects of his subject. In the 1870's, he says, the monopoly of *Philologie* in classical studies was broken, at least in enlightened German universities; eighty years later, the news has not reached some quarters in the U. S. A., although today it is actually archaeology which dominates in important phases of Homeric scholarship. But this book shows that among well-informed scholars, there is no rivalry of disciplines; the image is not of business monopolies but of a contented family. *Alte Geschichte* has for brothers *Klassische Philologie*, *Archäologie*, and *Orientalistik*. There is and should be plenty of overlapping. Each of these big fields is subdivided into aspects and disciplines. Hence to each of these aspects and disciplines in turn the *Einführung* is an introduction: the history of *Forschung*; Chronology, Geography, a vague and broad Anthropology; *die Ueberlieferung*; Archaeology (the only weak chapter); Epigraphy, Papyrology, Numismatics; neighboring disciplines; *Hilfsmittel* (could be fuller); bibliography.

Bengtson believes in and writes political history. No topic has the same permanent fascination and claim on interest as the story of human power over humans; the time has come to say so, and to recognize that those who have tried to push political history entirely into the shade have done various kinds of service to "social" and "economic" history, at the expense of confusion to history as a

whole. This too will be news to some in the U. S. A., such as the zealots who think the Peloponnesian War should be dismissed with brief notice, or that Thucydides was primarily a rhetorician, juggler of notions, and/or subconscious or conscious dramatist. Yet such branches of history as Economic History, the History of Cults, and the old established histories of cultural doings—of philosophy, of literature, and of art—are legitimate, and are specialized, historical studies. They seem to be omitted in Bengtson's scheme: oddly, because evidently he appreciates their importance. They are omitted from the *Einführung* except for the bibliography at the end, where, for instance, a few German works on *Kultur* are listed, plus Tarn; surely when beauty is omitted from the history of Egypt and of Hellas, some of the sparkle is lost. To treat all of these subjects in the *Einführung*, along with *Epigraphik* and the rest, would have been, perhaps, too much of a job; and again no sensible person recognizes conflicts among these disciplines.

For scholars the value of the work is in its pages of neatly-arranged *Literatur* at the end of each chapter. In many instances these are the best brief bibliographies in print, e.g. for *Volkskrankheiten* (p. 57); perhaps the readable H. Zinsser, *Rats, Lice, and History* could be added. Specialists may even learn a little about their specialties, but naturally the volume is most useful as an introduction to other specialties. Its usefulness would certainly be much more than doubled if its size were doubled; as it is, the text gives a few leading books, and perhaps a hint about the present state of the subject. There should be more detail, more critical discussion of problems, more of the inwardness of the subjects, more of the innumerable opportunities for interesting research.

For students also it would seem that precisely this latter element would be valuable, both as providing an idea of how to go at research, and as indicating what to do research in. There is such a thing as making a subject look too formidable to beginners. B. G. Niebuhr, the founder of critical Ancient History, was born in 1776 and died 120 years ago: what can a beginner add to a subject ceaselessly cultivated by hundreds of good minds during so long a period? Is not the array of finished studies, as Bengtson lines them up, more forbidding than inviting to a beginner? A beginner would hardly guess that some of the most crucially important questions that could be put to the record have hardly been formulated, and that scores of lesser matters await critical investigation.

It is a tribute to the book that to find fault with it, one must criticise it for not being what it does not attempt to be, because little can be said against it as it is. But there is a little that should be said. Thus one may ask, Does no one in Germany read G. P. Gooch's wonderful *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century*, 1913; latest reprint New York, 1949), which reflects, and goes beyond, Lord Acton's mastery of the topic? Greek archaeology is slighted. Prosopography is an essential for all scholars, but no one could learn from pp. 140-1 how to deal with a new or old name; Pape-Benseler, Bechtel, Graindor, and the *Hesperia Index* (1946; for necessary cautions see *A. J. A.*, LIV [1950], pp. 54-7) are all omitted. If, oddly, all other general classical bibliographies had to be left out,

at least J. A. Nairn's *Classical Hand-List* (2nd ed., Oxford, 1939; also the Byzantine counterpart) could have gone in. The best semi-popular book on Greece, Sir Alfred Zimmern's *The Greek Commonwealth*, is in its 5th edition (Oxford, 1931): correct the *Einführung*, p. 160. Tenney Frank gets much less than his due. J. D. S. Pendlebury's *Archaeology of Crete* (London, 1939) and V. M. Scramuzza's *Claudius* (Cambridge, Mass., 1940) are surprising omissions, and though it is less strongly historical, J. Whatmough's *Foundations of Roman Italy* (London, 1937) is also indispensable. L. R. Angel's articles on Greek skeletal remains are more important than any of the *Anthropologie* given. Recent Homeric researches, also largely American, are unknown. Not all of these omissions can be blamed on the war.

It remains an astonishing volume, and a heartening one, aloof from the cosmic histories, though I am not sure that something definite and valuable, even in the narrowest sense, cannot be learned from Spengler, Kroeber, and especially Toynbee. It is a greater comfort to find none of the wild aberrations—actually lazy, and politically inspired—of the General and Integrated Liberal Educators, which have begun to infect American scholarship. Bengtson turns back (pp. 6-21) with piety to our predecessors, whose work it is our task to forward. Of Niebuhr we are all pupils, said Mommsen; Droysen looms larger, Beloch smaller than might have been expected; Eduard Meyer was a titan, but weak in Assyriology; Grote is heartily and justly appreciated.

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ROBERT AUBRETON. *Démétrius Triclinius et les recensions médiévales de Sophocle*. Paris, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1949. Pp. 291. (*Collection d'Études Anciennes publiée sous le patronage de l'Association Guillaume Budé*.)

It is an event in the classical world when one of the great scholarly problems begins to yield before a concerted scientific effort, and it is doubly so when the work in question presents both theoretical acumen and levelheaded restraint. M. Aubreton's new study of the medieval manuscript tradition of Sophocles is a brilliant piece of virtuosity, but at the same time it exhibits the moderate judgment and simple attention to fact which one associates with the best French scholarship. For many years it has seemed an almost impossible task to set the existing manuscripts of Sophocles in their proper relation to each other, to answer such questions as whether or not the great Paris manuscript (A, Bibl. Nat. gr. 2712) represents the same tradition as the Laurentian (L, Bibl. Med. Lor. 32, 9), or to distinguish the editorial contributions of that formidable triad of Byzantine learning, Moschopoulos, Thomas Magister, and Triclinius. With patience, skill, and modesty, Aubreton attacks these problems and emerges with enlightened and convincing results. Most of the book is devoted to the discovery and description of the work of Triclinius himself; yet, as the title implies, a larger purpose is also involved, namely,

the clarification of the whole medieval picture, in which Triclinius was a focal and extremely influential figure, who dominated Sophoclean scholarship until at least the time of Brunck's edition (1786), and to some extent till that of Dindorf (1832).

This book is not without its methodological predecessors. In 1912 Thomas Höpfner attempted to distinguish the work of the three great Byzantines, by studying all the scholia attributed to them in the editions of various authors.<sup>1</sup> His criteria were mainly stylistic, always a dubious business, and, though to some degree corroborated by Aubreton, scarcely final. Alexander Turyn's terse and rigorous study of the same problem in regard to the manuscripts of Aeschylus offered a far more viable method on the basis of external criteria.<sup>2</sup> Finally, Turyn's compilation of a complete descriptive catalogue of the existing Sophoclean manuscripts formed an indispensable prelude to the present study.<sup>3</sup> Aubreton builds discreetly and without undue positivism on the work of Turyn, combining therewith his years of study under M. A. Dain in the École des Hautes Études.

Taking as his primary source the MS T (Paris, Bibl. Nat., gr. 2711), long and for the most part rightly supposed to be the basis of the edition of Turnebus (1553), the author proceeds to show why this codex must indeed be the famous *Ranconetus*, which Turnebus claimed as his chief exemplar, and in which he recognized a Triclinian recension. This part of the study consists chiefly in confirming, by methods far too complex to summarize, the supposition of most previous scholars. The value of this book rests on precisely this: that the numerous, and often misguided suppositions of previous critics about Triclinius are called strictly to account, with the result that it is now possible to know with fair certitude exactly what is and what is not Triclinian in MS T. A further comparison of T with the edition of Turnebus reveals that the latter did not follow the *Ranconetus* exclusively, but took other readings, chiefly from the Aldine edition of 1502, which represents the tradition of A and the *Venetus graecus* 467.

The more original and adventurous part of the work begins with the study of the scholia. Dindorf's classification of these undergoes considerable, if gently phrased, criticism. On the basis of the metrical appendices identified as Triclinian in T and other manuscripts, and of the characteristic black initial which marks the metrical scholia in T, Aubreton is able to separate the scholia written by Triclinius himself from those which he borrowed from his predecessors, Thomas and Moschopoulos. Some of these metrical scholia bear the signature of Triclinius, and it is the author's contention that all which have the black initial are therefore Triclinian.

One may be allowed some doubts at this point: if Triclinius signed some of the black initialed scholia, why must they all be his?

<sup>1</sup> Th. Höpfner, "Thomas Magister, Demetrios Triklinios, Manuel Moschopoulos, Eine Studie über ihren Sprachgebrauch in dem Scholien zu Aischylos, Sophokles, Euripides, Aristophanes, Hesiod, Pindar und Theokrit," *Wien. Sitzungsber.*, CLXXII (1912), Abh. 3.

<sup>2</sup> A. Turyn, *The Manuscript Tradition of the Tragedies of Aeschylus* (New York, 1943).

<sup>3</sup> A. Turyn, "The Manuscripts of Sophocles," *Traditio*. II (1944).

Yet some faith must be placed in the intuition of a methodologist as painstaking as Aubreton, and indeed it must be admitted that the application of this hypothesis leads to an extraordinarily clear picture; one manuscript after another falls into place, and the theory seems well justified by the results it produces. One remarkable confirmation appears, for instance, in the Dresden MS (Da 21), which offers Moschopoulean and Thoman scholia for the *Ajax*, *Electra*, and *Oedipus Rex* (the only plays known to Moschopoulos), Thoman scholia for the *Antigone*, and Triclinian scholia, all of a metrical nature, for all four plays. This situation had already been noted in Turyn's catalogue description of Da 21; here it forms another item in the vast array of evidence leading to the conclusion that Demetrius Triclinius was primarily a metrist, the first *sospitator* of ancient metrics. If his theory, derived as it was exclusively from Hephaestion, was wrong, the very fact that he attempted to apply a theory, and the mistakes he necessarily made, were constructive in that they aroused attention to meter and emphasized its importance in determining a poetic text. Thus it appears that all the metrical scholia to Sophocles are attributable to Triclinius, together with the metrical appendices and all the other black initialed scholia. As to scholia with red initials, Aubreton is more guarded, though he suggests that they are probably the work of Thomas Magister.

But the book is not confined to the scholia. Triclinius' devotion to Hephaestion, and the principles of responsion between strophe and antistrophe which he learned from his first-century preceptor, led him to adopt a series of characteristic readings which Aubreton has been able to identify in several of the fifty-one manuscripts which form the basis of his research. Once the nature of Triclinius' work has been defined, it becomes possible to see, to a far greater degree than ever before, the interrelationship of the codices in the tradition. Triclinius' edition of Sophocles as represented by T (or rather, his last edition, for Aubreton distinguishes three phases, against Turyn's two), rests upon a scholarly recension of several older manuscripts, including one closely related to A (*Parisinus gr. 2712*), and L (Laurentian 32, 9), or an earlier relative thereof. It is quite convincingly shown that A cannot be a copy of L (p. 133), and that O (*Parisinus gr. 2795*) doubtless represents the latest unfinished edition of Thomas Magister. Other sources for T are B (*Parisinus gr. 2787*), E (*Parisinus gr. 2884*) and Z (*Vaticanus gr. 1333*). This whole part of the book is a most exciting paleographical *πραγματεία*, and the *stemma* with which it concludes (p. 160) is of sufficient complexity to explain why it has been a long time coming.

It remains to be seen what editors of Sophocles will make of these remarkable findings. The science of paleography has its own excellence, yet it exists primarily for the betterment of ancient texts. The historian of classical scholarship will undoubtedly rejoice in this lucid presentation of the work of Triclinius; as for the textual critic, it is not yet easy to say whether he will find herein the way to more precise readings, or whether he will be tempted to ask with Juvenal, *stemmata quid faciunt?* It seems clear, however, that the mere determination of A as a tradition separate from L must bear some fruit, and that the nature of Triclinius' perversions of text in favor

of meter may lead to a fuller comprehension of errors of this sort, which have their genesis in the late Byzantine period. Moreover, the tendency, since Brunck, to condemn rather than to use Triclinius doubtless needed a corrective, which is herewith supplied.

One or two points might be questioned. The author's careful distinction between *scholies metriques* and *scholia περὶ μέτρων* is perhaps a little oversystematized, and slightly confusing. Moreover, it may be asked why H. W. Smyth is designated on page 274 as a *philologue anglais*. But these are very minor matters. In general, one must recognize in this volume an extraordinary contribution to Sophoclean scholarship, a clear, careful, and—except for a slight repetitiousness toward the end—succinct presentation of an extremely complex piece of research. The author deserves much credit for not attempting to exalt unduly the central personage of his studies. He is content to explain Triclinius with a judicious moderation. As a result, he has achieved a real historical picture, not only of Triclinius himself, but of Byzantine scholarship in general in the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries.

A few misprints are here noted: page 28, *for* 1599 *read* 1559; page 30, *for* -u *read* u- (line 2 of quoted Epitome) and *for* uu *read* uu- (line 3 second paragraph of quoted Epitome); page 39, *for* και *read* καὶ; page 283 *for* Mischopoulos *read* Moschopoulos; page 162, *for* Anligone *read* Antigone (second line from bottom); page 174, *ad fin.*—ἀχαλῶν (one breathing is enough); page 249, period missing after antérieures (line 13); Bibliography, *Unterguchung* should be *Untersuchung* (under *Lehrs*); Wilamowitz items mislisted; under Höpfner, *read* Scholien *for* Schölien; Gallarotti items should be listed together; under Smyth, *Harvard Studies in (not of) Classical Philology* (not classical); also page 21, note 1, *for* Sophocles *read* Aeschylus.

CEDRIC H. WHITMAN.

ANNA GRANVILLE HATCHER. *Modern English Word-Formation and Neo-Latin. A Study of the Origins of English (French, Italian, German) Copulative Compounds.* Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1951. Pp. ix + 226. \$4.25.

I do not know why this book bears the title that it does. It has nothing to say about the vast acres of the field of English derivatives from Neo-Latin. Nor does it cover even the ample pastures of the multiple-base compounds that have come to English from Neo-Latin. Miss Hatcher cultivates a small garden: her subject is the copulative compound, that type of multiple-base compound in which neither element is subordinate to the other but both are of equal weight, as in *space-time*, *parent-teacher*, *secretary-stenographer*. Furthermore, since the subtitle apparently cannot make up its mind on the point, I must add that Miss Hatcher has very definitely not limited herself to the development of this type of compound in English. She has traced it, with infinite care and research, in Greek and Latin, in Mediaeval and Neo-Latin, in English, French, Italian, and German.

A much more appropriate title for the book, one that has less grandeur but more accurately reflects the contents, would be "A Study of the Neo-Latin Copulative Compound and its Subsequent Development."

Of this field Miss Hatcher has explored every square inch. The mass of documentation offered is evidence of hours and hours of exacting research. I can only give the bare outlines of the picture that is unfolded, without doing justice to the wealth of illustrative detail supplied or the careful distinctions worked out.

Copulative compounds in English go back to *Beowulf* which contains a pair or so which apparently had been cast up by a general Indo-European wave of such compounds (p. 2). A few are next found in the Elizabethan poets, such as Shakespeare's *giant-dwarf* and *foolish-happy* (p. 11), but the great mass in English entered in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. They can be broken down into four general categories (pp. 28-42): 1. those used of professions and roles (*prophet-preacher*, *producer-director*, *secretary-stenographer*), 2. those used of inanimate objects (*space-time*, *fighter-bomber*), 3. proper names (*Waldorf-Astoria*, *Winston-Salem*), 4. attributives used in scholarly or technical references (*Meuse-Argonne* sector, *Hawley-Smoot* tariff law, *farmer-labor* party).

In order to trace the history of copulative compounds Miss Hatcher distinguishes those that are ethnic or onomastic (e. g. *Anglo-Russian*) from the others. Turning first to the ethnics, she refutes the theory that they were formed by analogy with *Anglo-Saxon* (pp. 58-9). The first true ethnic copulative compound in Neo-Latin is *Gallo-Belgicus* "in France and Belgium," found in 1592 in the title of a review of current events that was the prototype of the modern newspaper, *Mercurius Gallo-Belgicus sive rerum in Gallia, Belgio, Hispania . . . gestarum Nuncius* (pp. 61, 65-6). A compound like this was made possible by a long development that goes back to such Classical Latin compounds (but not copulative compounds) as *Celtiberi* "Gauls migrating to Iberia," and *Gallo-Graeci*. A compound of this type was used in the sixteenth century in the titles of bilingual dictionaries, namely (*Lexicon*) *Graeco-Latinum* "a Greek vocabulary translated into Latin," a use which lead to the concept that is genuinely copulative "both Greek and Latin" (pp. 60-5). The appellative compounds, it appears, go back to a Neo-Latin *comico-tragicus*, attested in 1540, which was created under the influence of *tragicomedia*, a *hapax* found in Plautus' *Amphitruo* (p. 71). Neo-Latin copulative compounds were very quickly coined in ever increasing numbers, especially among the Germans (pp. 82-4).

In the modern languages Italian offers the earliest copulative compound, namely *chiaroscuro* which is attested in 1550 (p. 138). The earliest in French is *tragicomique*, attested in 1597 (p. 135). The Germans, although the first to experiment with such compounds in Neo-Latin, were the last to introduce them into their own language; few entered before the beginning of the eighteenth century but, by the end of that century, they were flooding in and at present German has outstripped all other languages in their formation (pp. 141-2). In English *tragicomical* is attested in 1567 (p. 133). Scientific copulative compounds made no headway in our language until

the nineteenth century although they had existed in Neo-Latin since the seventeenth; the probable explanation is that the Latin words themselves were used, that medical writers preferred to say *linea naso-labialis* rather than *naso-labial line* (pp. 144-5). In the second half of the seventeenth century English began to construct fully Anglicized copulative compounds, e. g. *historical-political* alongside *historico-political*, *plane-convex* alongside *plano-convex* (p. 146). This tendency has steadily increased and today fully Anglicized forms are replacing the learned forms in -o in all fields (p. 148).

Onomastic copulative compounds entered the modern languages (except German) later than the type just discussed (p. 151). The earliest in Italian is *Italo-Siciliano* (1742), in French *anglo-prussien* (before 1796), in English *Indo-European* (1814).

Copulative compounds composed of noun-elements came later, formed from, or by analogy with, the compounds made from adjectives. Thus *space-time* was made from *spatio-temporal* and *air-sea* by analogy with the former (p. 159). Analogy is responsible for the numerous geographic compounds such as *New York-Chicago* run, *Rome-Berlin* express (p. 167).

All the above is given in great detail and documented at every point with a mass of evidence. As a matter of fact, the story could have been told in fewer words and in far simpler ones. Miss Hatcher, it is clear, has gone through hundreds of books and catalogues and built up exhaustive files. We hope that from this unique material that she commands she will give us many future studies, of wider scope. And next time may we please have an *index verborum*.

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A. CANTARELLA. Aristofane. *Le Commedie*. Volume primo, Prolegomeni. Milan, Istituto Editoriale Italiano, 1949. Pp. 199. (*Classici Greci e Latini*.)

Students of Aristophanes and of Old Comedy will be truly grateful to the editor of this small volume. It brings together material for which it has always been necessary to consult numerous separate volumes, many of which are now out of print or otherwise not readily available.

Section A (pp. 14-62) contains all the treatises and excerpts on comedy to be found in Dübner's edition of the Scholia on Aristophanes, in Bergk's Teubner edition of Aristophanes, in Kaibel's *Comicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*, and in van Leeuwen's *Prolegomena ad Aristophanem*, plus brief excerpts from Isidore and the Latin Glossaries. Not only are we here given more than is to be found in any one of these earlier collections, but the texts have been based on the best and most recent critical editions available and have, in several instances, as is notably the case with the *Tractatus Coislinianus*, been carefully reedited by Cantarella.

Section B, the *Testimonia* (pp. 65-187), is divided into four chapters as follows: I, *De Graecorum ludis comicis cum sacris tum profanis*; II, *De comoedia*; III, *De poetis Atticis*; IV, *De Aristophanis vita fabulis poesi*. This section too, as a whole, gives a collection of texts unique in its kind. The first two chapters provide the materials for the history of the origin and development of comedy. Chapter III begins with an alphabetical list of the poets of Attic comedy keyed by number to the following chronologically arranged list of poets. In the second list each poet's name is followed by a reference to the *Prosopographia Attica*, a reference to *I.G.* for the didascalic information pertaining to him and an indication of the number of his victories at the Dionysia and the Lenaean. A second paragraph gives the biography from Suidas if there is one, and cross references to places in Section A where the poet is mentioned. A separate paragraph indicates the total number of fragments to be found in Kock, with page references, plus the number of newer fragments in Demianejuk's *Supplementum Comicum*, and finally, for those still more recent, reference is made to E. Reggers, *Catalogus van de grieksche letterkundige Papyrusteksten* (Louvain, 1942) and to L. Giabbani, *Testi letterari greci di provenienza egiziana* (1920-45) (Florence, 1947). This is followed in turn by a statement of the number of titles of plays known for the poet and a list of the titles not already mentioned. Lastly reference is made to the pertinent article in the *Realencyklopädie* and to Schmid-Stählin, I, 4 (1946). Thus this chapter is a sort of bibliographical locator file for Attic comic poets and their plays.

Chapter IV is, of course, the most elaborate of all; a collection of the testimonia on Aristophanes and his comedies. Part  $\alpha$  (*vita*) contains the biographical material, including the  $\gamma\epsilon\rho\sigma$ s and alphabetical catalogue of the comedies from the Ambrosian and Vatican manuscripts based on a new collation. As throughout the volume, so here too copious use is made of cross reference to save space and avoid repetition. Part  $\beta$  (*opera*) follows the same general pattern of arrangement as that used in chapter III. The comedies are first listed in an alphabetical index which states the number of fragments preserved from each of the lost plays. The chronological index gives the year, or approximate year, in which the play was given and the festival at which it was presented, if that is known, along with reference to the evidence for these data and discussion of the evidence, particularly in Schmid-Stählin and in Geissler's *Chronologie der altattischen Komödie*. Part  $\gamma$  (*poesis*) presents first, excerpts from Aristophanes pertaining to his art, and then critical opinions of his poetry expressed by contemporaries and by later Greek and Roman authors.

The volume is completed by an *index fontium* and a table of contents. The whole work is excellently planned and it is difficult to find any fault within the execution of the plan. An index of the commonest abbreviations would have been helpful for the casual user, who will not easily locate cross references to full citations of the titles of some of the modern works. The painstaking care with which such an unwieldy mass of material has been assembled deserves the highest commendation. I have dutifully checked numer-

ous passages and found amazingly few slips such as  $\mu\alpha\nu\theta\alpha\nu\tau\epsilon s$  for  $\mu\alpha\theta\alpha\nu\tau\epsilon s$  (p. 70, line 28). The proof reading of such copy is a task one does not like to contemplate, but the reader may be assured that few errors have been allowed to creep in. I note only *IC(GIA)* for *IG(CIA)* on p. 125, line 5, *IGSI* 1440 for *IGSI* 1140 (if this equals *IG* 14, 1140) on p. 144, line 5, and  $\dot{\eta}\theta\eta\lambda\epsilon$  for  $\dot{\eta}\theta\epsilon\lambda\epsilon$  on p. 176, line 27.

The author is to be congratulated upon the completion of a piece of work that will be most useful to students of Aristophanes. It is to be hoped that a critical acumen to match the scrupulous attention to detail of this volume of prolegomena will attend the speedy completion of the subsequent volumes here heralded. They will be awaited with much interest.

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H. R. BUTTS. *The Glorification of Athens in Greek Drama*. Iowa City, Iowa, 1947. Pp. 247. (*Iowa Studies in Classical Philology*, XI.) Paper-bound copies at \$4.00 each may be obtained by addressing the author at 305 East Park Street, Vandalia, Missouri.

This work is a doctoral dissertation, submitted in May 1942 to the Faculty of the Graduate College of the State University of Iowa. It was prepared under the direction of the late Professor Roy C. Flickinger. Exigencies of World War II delayed the publication of the dissertation until August, 1947. During the intervening years no attempt was made to bring the work up to date.

It is a matter of common knowledge that the Athenian dramatists often praised their native city in their plays. There has been some controversy as to the motives which may have led the dramatists to glorify Athens in this fashion. Some scholars, especially in more recent years, have supposed that these praises of Athens were motivated primarily by the desire of the playwrights to win the prize in the dramatic contest, and that the poets employed laudatory motifs and wrote complimentary passages and epithets in the hope that their plays might be favorably considered for the prize. Opposition to this point of view has been expressed by other scholars, who do not believe that the tragic poets, at least, were influenced by materialistic or chauvinistic considerations, and who think that the poets would have been false to their artistic ideals if they had been actuated by motives of this sort.

The position of Dr. Butts in this controversy may be seen from the concluding sentence of his dissertation, p. 227: "This monograph has shown that with conscious effort and without impairing the artistry of their plots the Athenian dramatists made a studied practice of glorifying and gratifying their audiences by using definite techniques of praise and that this was done with the design of attracting and sustaining the attention of their audiences in order that they and their plays would not be forgotten when the prize was awarded."

Butts groups under several definite headings those passages in the dramas which glorify Athens. For the three tragic poets the headings are as follows: I. Myth and legend, II. Trilogies and festivals, III. Complimentary epithets, IV. Choral odes, V. Athena and Theseus, VI. Political references, VII. Summary of evidence. The heading "Trilogies and festivals," not being applicable to Aristophanes, is replaced in his case by a group of several types of glorification not found in tragedy. The types or categories of praise, susceptible to this grouping, are seen by Butts as indications of definite laudatory techniques, which began to appear in Aeschylus and reached a culmination in Euripides, and were used by Aristophanes as well. These techniques, Butts believes, were consciously adopted by the dramatists in order to improve their chances of winning the prize.

It cannot be denied that Butts has assembled an impressive number of laudatory passages. His scheme of presentation, however, has led him into some repetitiousness. It happens more than once that a single laudatory passage receives a listing under several different headings, as illustrating several different laudatory techniques. For example, Eur., *Tro.*, 208-9, stating the preference of the Chorus for Athens as a place of exile, is cited on p. 125 under heading I, again on p. 150 under heading III, again on p. 153 under heading IV, and again on p. 163 under heading VI.

I believe that Butts is justified, in a general way, in his conclusions that the poets were eager to win the prize, and that they glorified Athens in the hope that by so doing they would win favorable consideration for their plays. But I think that Butts has drawn a rather oversimplified picture when he supposes, as he seems to do, that the dramatists followed this practice and acted from this motive with an absolutely unvarying consistency.

Consider, for instance, the character of Theseus in the drama. Butts regards the frequent introduction of this Athenian hero, especially in a gallant and sympathetic role, as a definite laudatory technique. Is not Butts' position here weakened to a considerable degree by the fact that Theseus is a most unattractive character in the *Hippolytus* of Euripides?

I am not convinced that Euripides was a consistent and uncritical panegyrist of Athens during his entire career. Much has been written on the significance of the *Trojan Women*. Grube, in *The Dramas of Euripides* (London, Methuen, 1941), p. 280, argues that this play "is not an attack on Athens"; that it "is not even an attack on war in the pacifist sense"; that it has a wider significance in presenting "a picture of the inevitable doom which war brings upon both victors and vanquished." Admitting fully this wider significance of the play, I still see it also as an indictment of aggressive war in general, and of Athenian aggression in particular. I am convinced that it was intended to be, and that it must have been viewed as a condemnation of the policies and actions of the ascendant war-party. The Athens which Euripides praises in the play I believe to be an Athens existing as an ideal in the poet's mind. Euripides, in my opinion, was willing to jeopardize his chance of winning the prize, in order to bring a message of condemnation which he felt obliged to convey.

The frequent criticisms of Athens and of Athenian practices made by Aristophanes in no way weaken Butts' thesis. It is entirely reasonable to suppose, with Butts, that these criticisms were taken in good part by the audience, and that Aristophanes was "both Athens' critic and glorifier, and the two were so artistically combined in the poet that his comedies became compliments rather than censures," p. 177.

Butts has done a useful service in bringing together a great quantity of pertinent material. His dissertation will be a point of departure for those who may wish to pursue the subject. His reading has been wide and thorough. The chapters on the four dramatists conclude with concise summaries of their contents which add to the usefulness of the monograph as a work of reference. The work is by no means free from typographical errors. Two disturbing anglicizations occur: Bdelycleon, p. 185, and Cudoimus, p. 186. The bibliography is extensive. There is no index.

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## TIMAEUS, AND DIODORUS' ELEVENTH BOOK.

Whatever one may think of Timaeus as a historian, and he does not lack detractors both ancient and modern,<sup>1</sup> his influence can be felt on all later writers who deal with Sicily. At first there is a temptation to compare Timaeus with Hieronymus of Cardia, whose dead hand still reaches out across the centuries controlling our grouping of events after the death of the great Alexander.<sup>2</sup> With only 19 attested fragments, and one of them regarded by Jacoby as "doubtful,"<sup>3</sup> it has nevertheless been possible to rescue a great deal of Hieronymus by comparing the various extant accounts of the period and arriving at a lowest common denominator.<sup>4</sup> The methods that have been so successful might seem to promise even more satisfactory results with Timaeus for whom we have 164 fragments, some of considerable

<sup>1</sup> While the learned Polemon felt that Istrus ought to be drowned in his namesake (*Ath.*, IX, 387 F), the two men seem not to have disagreed about Timaeus, whom each attacked in a separate work. Some eight fragments of Polemon's *Tὰ πρὸς Τίμαιον* still survive (Müller, *F. H. G.*, III, pp. 126 ff.). But the harshest criticism of Timaeus comes from Polybius (see *F. H. G.*, I, pp. liv-lvi). For varying modern judgments cf. George Grote, *History of Greece*, rev. ed., Vol. I (1869), p. 395; W. W. Tarn and G. T. Griffith, *Hellenistic Civilisation* (3rd ed., 1952), p. 283; E. A. Barber in *C. A. H.*, VII, p. 258; K. J. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*, III, 2 (1923), p. 43; G. L. Barber in *O. C. D.*, "Timaeus" (2).

<sup>2</sup> For references and discussion see T. S. Brown, "Hieronymus of Cardia," *A. H. R.*, LII (1947), pp. 684 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Jacoby, *F. Gr. H.*, II B, pp. 830-5.

<sup>4</sup> See Brown, *loc. cit.*, p. 692.

length.<sup>5</sup> The attempt in fact has been made, but before discussing the results of Laqueur's detailed study<sup>6</sup> it will be well first to consider the differences between the Hieronymus problem and the Timaeus problem.

Hieronymus wrote contemporary history. He was the first to create a pattern of events for the period of his narrative. In doing so he relied, like Thucydides, on official sources of information and on his own experience. Both were lacking for the men who wrote after him so that they necessarily depended on his pioneer work. Had Thucydides' history been lost his grouping of events could still be reconstructed, like that of Hieronymus, by a careful analysis of later accounts of the Peloponnesian War. But Timaeus was an utterly different kind of person. He belongs to the despised fraternity of armchair historians. His father was probably the tyrant of Tauromenium,<sup>7</sup> and Timaeus may have had some political experience in his younger days, but the essential distinction to keep in mind is that he wrote his history, or most of it, during fifty years of exile in Athens, far away from the scenes he described.<sup>8</sup> Then, too, the sweep of his history puts it in the Herodotean tradition, containing as it did an account of Sicilian events from the beginnings of Greek settlement in the west and bringing them down to his own day.<sup>9</sup> His information, however supplemented by local traditions, came primarily from books, and it speaks well for the libraries of Athens that he was able to write such a detailed account of Sicily and the west *in absentia*. Nor, unlike Thucydides and Hieronymus, does he restrict himself to a coherent narrative of events. Mythological stories,<sup>10</sup> cult practices,<sup>11</sup> peculiar social

<sup>5</sup> For fragments see Jacoby, *F. Gr. H.*, III B, pp. 592-658, esp. frs. 12, 22, 50, 85, 93. Polybius, despite his antagonism, preserves more of Timaeus than anyone else.

<sup>6</sup> Richard Laqueur, "Timaios" (3) in *R.-E.*, XI (1936), cols. 1076-1203, hereafter cited simply as Laqueur.

<sup>7</sup> See Diodorus Siculus, XVI, 7.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Polybius, XII, 25, i; Plut., *De exilio*, 14.

<sup>9</sup> Polybius, I, 5, 1, tells us he brought his history down to the 129th Olympiad (i.e. to 264 B.C.). He also dealt with the earliest period. See F. Jacoby, *Attis* (Oxford, 1949), p. 118.

<sup>10</sup> See frs. 53, 82, 83, 85, 88, 89, etc.

<sup>11</sup> See frs. 35, 59, 147.

customs,<sup>12</sup> natural phenomena,<sup>13</sup> plant and animal life,<sup>14</sup> lives of philosophers,<sup>15</sup> strictures on other writers,<sup>16</sup> all found a place in his rambling account. His method was discursive, punctuated with anecdote and antiquarian lore, so that the task of working out the overall plan and structure of his work is as difficult as it would be to restore Herodotus' *History* from 164 scattered notices.<sup>17</sup> Granting that Timaeus was an omnivorous reader and that he gathered his information from a great variety of authors, it would still be possible to reconstruct much of his work if we knew that his success, like that of Livy, had been such as to eclipse all his predecessors. Unfortunately our evidence shows that other writers on Sicily continued to be known at a later date, writers like Antiochus of Syracuse and Philistus,<sup>18</sup> not to mention Ephorus and Duris of Samos, who devoted considerable though not exclusive attention to Sicilian affairs.<sup>19</sup> However, Timaeus remained the most voluminous

<sup>12</sup> See frs. 20, 50, 55, 56a, 64, 140, 144.

<sup>13</sup> E. g. frs. 41bc, 57, 58, 73.

<sup>14</sup> See frs. 3, 64, 81.

<sup>15</sup> See frs. 13-15, 26b, 30, 131, 134.

<sup>16</sup> See frs. 11, 12, 92, 110, 130, 156. His biting remarks about other writers won him the sobriquet of 'Ἐπιτίμαος' (Suidas, s. v. Τίμαος), while his habit of picking up trivial scraps of information or gossip won him the name of Γρασσύλλεκτρια (*ibid.*).

<sup>17</sup> In his introduction to Book V Diodorus praises the chronological accuracy and diligence of Timaeus, but upbraids him for long, untimely, and vituperative digressions. He goes on, by way of contrast, to speak gratefully about the clear organization of Ephorus. Cf. Laqueur, col. 1181.

<sup>18</sup> Antiochus was the founder of Sicilian history whose *floruit* is given by Müller as a little earlier than that of Thucydides (*F. H. G.*, I, p. xlvi). Unfortunately we have only 13 skimpy fragments (Jacoby, *F. Gr. H.*, III B, pp. 543-51). Philistus is better known because of his relations with the Elder and the Younger Dionysius, and 77 of his fragments remain (*ibid.*, pp. 558-67). Dionysius of Halicarnassus, a younger contemporary of Diodorus, seems to have consulted Antiochus' work while in Rome (cf. *A. R.*, I, 7; 12).

<sup>19</sup> For Ephorus this is clearly shown by his fragments. See Jacoby, *F. Gr. H.*, II A, No. 70, frs. 66, 68, 91, 136-8, 186, 201-4, 219-21. Duris wrote a separate work on Agathocles as well as a general history and an account of Samos. For some of the widely differing opinions about him, cf.: Jacoby, *F. Gr. H.*, II C, pp. 115-17; Beloch, *Griech. Gesch.*, rev.

writer on Sicily and Magna Graecia. His reputation endured despite the heroic attempts of Polybius to discredit it.<sup>20</sup> Directly or indirectly our extant writers—men like Diodorus Siculus, Justin the epitomizer of Pompeius Trogus, Strabo, Plutarch, the unknown author of the pseudo-Aristotelian *De mirabilibus auscultationibus*, and Pausanias all remain in his debt.<sup>21</sup> But their debt not being confined to Timaeus, the scholar faces the difficult task of delimiting their sources. The obvious approach to this problem lies through the attested fragments of our author and the statements made about him by other ancient writers. But such is not the method of Richard Laqueur.<sup>22</sup>

Finding the path from the fragments to our extant accounts an unsatisfactory one, Laqueur prefers to begin at the other end, with the accounts. Far and away the most detailed source we still have on Sicily is the *Historical Library* of Diodorus Siculus. Knowing that Diodorus did make use of Timaeus, Laqueur sets out to examine everything Diodorus says about Sicily with a view to separating out the Timaeian layer from the rest.<sup>23</sup> This method, even at the outset, however, presupposes a knowledge of just how Diodorus went about compiling his exasperating though invaluable history. We are asked to accept the view that Diodorus first made a paraphrase of one author, summarizing his whole account of a period, then later inserted passages of varying length from other writers to enliven or correct his narrative.<sup>24</sup> It is assumed that for many of the books with which we are concerned his main source was Ephorus,<sup>25</sup> but that Timaeus was his second most-used author.<sup>26</sup> This scissors

ed. IV, 1, pp. 479 f.; IV, 2, pp. 1-10; Müller, *F. H. G.*, II, pp. 466-9; F. Susemihl, *Geschichte der griechischen Litteratur in der Alexandrinerzeit*, I, pp. 585-92; Paul Wendland as revised by Max Pohlenz in Gericke-Norden, III, pp. 127-8; Christ-Schmid-Stählin, *Gesch. der griech. Lit.*, 6 ed., II, 1, pp. 208 f.; F. Walbank in *O. C. D.*

<sup>20</sup> Discussed by Müller, *F. H. G.*, I, pp. liv-lv.

<sup>21</sup> See Laqueur, cols. 1188-90.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 1076, where he complains that the fragments do not offer a basis for evaluating Timaeus.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 1083.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 1082, and again see col. 1182.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 1082.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*

and paste interpretation saves one the inconvenience of allowing for any ideas of Diodorus himself. But can we ever be sure that an author who draws on his own experience while in Egypt may not also make a personal contribution on Sicily, his native land?<sup>27</sup> W. W. Tarn, who once referred to Diodorus rather slightly as a "conduit pipe,"<sup>28</sup> came to a different conclusion after examining the XVIIth book in detail.<sup>29</sup> Nor should we utterly disregard what Diodorus tells us in his general preface—that he spent thirty years on his work, travelling far and wide to examine the places he describes (like a latter-day Polybius), learning Latin and residing for a considerable time in Rome.<sup>30</sup> To be sure there is a conventional quality about his preface that reminds one forcibly of his near contemporaries, Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Strabo;<sup>31</sup> nevertheless, he has an idea of what a historian ought to do, and may be assumed to have carried out his own precepts to the limit of his ability. The Diodorus question cannot safely be reduced to a formula. In his narrative of events in Greece and in Asia in Books XVIII-XX he relied mainly on Hieronymus,<sup>32</sup> while Book XVII, as Tarn says: ". . . is a very complex piece of work, every passage has to be taken on its merits, and often enough the source cannot now be detected."<sup>33</sup> Bearing these facts in mind, let us see if we can which method Diodorus used in writing about Sicily in Book XI.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>27</sup> See I, 22, 4; 83, 8-9. Laqueur does admit that the remarks about Agyrium in XVI, 83, 3 may be Diodorus' own contribution. See Laqueur, col. 1161.

<sup>28</sup> *Hell. Civ.* (2nd ed., 1930), p. 253. In the 3rd ed. this phrase has been deleted.

<sup>29</sup> W. W. Tarn, *Alexander the Great*, II, *Sources and Studies* (1948), p. 63.

<sup>30</sup> I, 4, 1-5.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Dionys., *A. R.*, I, 7; Strabo, *Geog.*, I, 23; II, 5, 11.

<sup>32</sup> This is accepted also by his most recent editor, R. M. Geer (Loeb ed., vol. IX, p. vii); Tarn also agrees (*Alex.*, II, p. 63).

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 86.

<sup>34</sup> Alois Scherr, a student of Laqueur's, published his Tübingen dissertation (*Diodors XI. Buch, Kompositions- u. Quellenstudien*) in 1933. He has less to say about Sicily and the West, but he does believe that Diodorus worked out his account from Timaeus and Ephorus, chiefly from the former (p. 26). Laqueur takes Scherr's study as the starting

Of the ninety-two chapters in this book, twenty-five are primarily occupied with Sicily and the west (viz. 20-26; 38; 48-49; 51-53; 66-68; 72-73; 76; 86-87; 89-92), while one chapter is fairly evenly divided between east and west (c. 88). In one or two instances we find comparisons between east and west, e. g. Syracusan "petalism" with Athenian ostracism (c. 87); the achievements of Gelon in the west with those of Themistocles in the east (c. 23). The rest of Book XI is chiefly concerned with the Greek east, with an occasional digression on Persia.<sup>35</sup> It has long been felt that Ephorus lies behind this narrative as a whole.<sup>36</sup> On the other hand we are confronted by complete reticence on the part of Diodorus. Not once in Book XI does he so much as mention the name of Ephorus.<sup>37</sup> On the contrary, the only historian he cites by name is Herodotus, whose work he says ended with the siege of Sestos (c. 37), clearly implying he has been using him as a source. Fortunately we still have Herodotus, and it is hard to see how Diodorus unassisted could have produced his garbled version of the Persian War. That Ephorus is at least partly responsible cannot be denied when we read Diodorus' story of the betrayal at Ther-

point for his own more detailed analysis (col. 1083), but the conclusions he arrives at are not identical. It is only fair to note that Scherr regards Diodorus as less of a nonentity than most modern scholars do (p. vii), but his own analysis seldom bears out his preface.

<sup>35</sup> E. g. c. 69 where Ctesias may be the source, directly or indirectly.

<sup>36</sup> Grote seems to have been moving in this direction. See his *Hist. of Greece*, rev. ed., Vol. V (1870), p. 114, n. 1, where he says: "... Diodorus (XI, 50) who evidently did not here copy Thucydides, but probably had Ephorus for his guide." G. L. Barber in the *O. C. D.* does not hesitate to write: "Our knowledge of E. largely depends on the fact that he was the chief source of Diodorus bks. 11-16, whose abridgment follows him very closely."

<sup>37</sup> Tarn (*Alex.*, II, p. 87) regards Diodorus' failure to name writers in Book XVII as evidence that the book "was a tolerably complex work," and he contrasts this with "the frequent references in XVIII and XIX to Hieronymus." However, these references (XVIII, 42, 1; 50, 4; XIX, 44, 3; 100, 1-3) are all connected with Hieronymus' own participation in the political events of his day. In XX, where he was still the chief source, Diodorus fails to mention his name. This suggests that Diodorus mentioned Hieronymus only when Hieronymus mentioned himself. If that be true, Diodorus' failure to mention Ephorus in XI or, for that matter, Clitarchus in XVII is irrelevant.

mopylae. In Herodotus, Ephialtes the traitor is high-lighted, while in Diodorus the traitor is merely an anonymous Trachinian and our attention is riveted on the patriotic Tyrrhastiadas, unknown to Herodotus, whose home like that of Ephorus is in Cyme, and who warns the Spartans that they have been betrayed.<sup>38</sup>

Granted that Diodorus used Ephorus in Book XI, did he use him the way he did Hieronymus in Books XVIII-XX or as he used Clitarchus in Book XVII? The latter view is preferable if only because of the fact that Book XI is such a miserable narrative of events, so inconsequential, so carelessly thought out. Such faults do not suggest a single literary source like Ephorus,<sup>39</sup> particularly when we see what Diodorus could do when he got hold of an author and stayed with him.<sup>40</sup>

In this connection much is made of Ephorus' fragment 191.<sup>41</sup> However, Ephorus' name does not appear in the document, and identification is made solely on resemblances to the text of Diodorus. All this proves is that Diodorus and fragment 191 have a common source, not that Ephorus is that source. Incidentally, we do get rather a pathetic glimpse of Diodorus at work timidly adding a touch of what he must have regarded as color to the narrative. In speaking of Cimon's naval victory, both fragment 191 and the inscription later quoted by Diodorus say that Cimon captured 100 ships and their crews.<sup>42</sup> Diodorus adds  $\pi\lambda\epsilon\acute{\iota}\text{ous}$  δέ—“more than” 100 ships with their crews!<sup>43</sup>

Evidently no argument based on the content of Diodorus XI-XVI rather than on the attested fragments can be valid to determine the general characteristics of Ephorus' work.<sup>44</sup> In

<sup>38</sup> XI, 8, 5. Cf. Herod., VII, 213-18.

<sup>39</sup> We are unusually fortunate in having enough passages directly quoted from Ephorus to give some idea of his style. See esp. frs. 20, 30b, 63, 71, 96 (*F. Gr. H.*, II A, No. 70).

<sup>40</sup> E. g. Euhemerus in V, 42-6; Iambulus in II, 55-60; or Hieronymus in XVIII-XX.

<sup>41</sup> In *F. Gr. H.*, II A, p. 96 from papyrus fragments found at Oxyrhynchus.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 97, line 18; cf. Diod., XI, 62, 3.

<sup>43</sup> Diod., XI, 60, 6.

<sup>44</sup> Yet G. L. Barber implies the opposite. See above, n. 36. However, he relies on fr. 191, *lacunae* in which have been industriously filled by borrowing from the text of Diodorus.

Book XI such a procedure is especially unsound because most of Diodorus' statements about Greek affairs have such a clear Athenian bias as to presuppose an *Atthis* in the background—Hellanicus or some later writer.<sup>45</sup> We simply do not know whether Diodorus used an *Atthis* to supplement what he got from Ephorus, or some other writer who used an *Atthis*, or Ephorus alone.

As we come to examine the "western" parts of Book XI we are on even more uncertain ground. The use of Ephorus has been inferred because Diodorus, like Ephorus, links the Persian invasion of Xerxes with the Carthaginian attack on Sicily.<sup>46</sup> Herodotus, who had a special interest in the west, and who is aware of differing accounts of the struggle,<sup>47</sup> would certainly have mentioned this connection had he heard of it; but he is silent. Therefore this combination is the work of a later writer, either Ephorus or someone used by Ephorus.<sup>48</sup> However, there are no verbal resemblances between Ephorus' fragment and the passages in Diodorus.<sup>49</sup> Is Ephorus the only writer used by Diodorus who linked the two invasions? That is not at all likely. An invention which continues to fascinate modern scholars, who ought to know better,<sup>50</sup> is not apt to have seemed unattractive in antiquity. The connection between the two wars would have appealed to the eulogists of Athens as obviously as it did to the Sicilian historians. From the Sicilian point of view

<sup>45</sup> This is shown by the anecdotal character of the treatment of Themistocles (XI, 39, 4-40, 4; 41, 1-43, 3), Myronides (XI, 81, 4-83, 4), and Tolmides (XI, 84, 2-85, 2).

<sup>46</sup> Cf. *F. Gr. H.*, II A, No. 70 (Ephorus), fr. 186; Diod., XI, 1, 4; 20, 1. See also *F. Gr. H.*, II C, p. 88 for Jacoby's comments on fr. 186. Scherr (*Diodors XI. Buch*, p. 2) does not even consider the possibility that Ephorus found this combination in an earlier writer.

<sup>47</sup> E. g. VII, 165 for a Sicilian version differing from Herodotus' main account.

<sup>48</sup> Jacoby rightly mentions Antiochus of Syracuse in this connection. See *F. Gr. H.*, II C, p. 88, lines 32-5.

<sup>49</sup> I. e. Ephorus, fr. 186 and Diod., XI, 1, 4; 20, 1.

<sup>50</sup> The roster includes Theodor Mommsen (*Römische Geschichte*, 9 ed., I, p. 321) and Eduard Meyer (cited by Jacoby, *F. Gr. H.*, II C, p. 88, line 32), but not K. J. Beloch (*Griech. Gesch.*, rev. ed., II, 1, p. 72, n. 2) or R. Hackforth (*C. A. H.*, IV, p. 378).

their victory at Himera was won in the common cause of Hellenism; from the Athenian view Xerxes' appeal to Carthage was one more proof of his machiavellian plot against Athens. The most that can be said on the basis of this and other fragments of Ephorus is that he interested himself in western history, and that, as Diodorus occasionally used Ephorus on the west in later books, he may also have done so in Book XI.<sup>51</sup>

However, we cannot possibly stretch the Ephorus theory to account for all the information on Sicily in Book XI. Certain passages can only be derived from a Sicilian historian.<sup>52</sup> At least a part of this must come from Timaeus, but what part?<sup>53</sup> Had Diodorus only been as transparent in his methods as we could have wished, he would simply have used Timaeus to supplement Ephorus, then have continued with Timaeus all the way down to 264 B. C.<sup>54</sup> But he does cite Philistus and Duris of Samos,<sup>55</sup> which proves that his local Sicilian information came from more than one source. Can it be seriously argued that he failed to consult the celebrated Antiochus of Syracuse,

<sup>51</sup> Jacoby believes Ephorus' history was organized on a regional basis, the four great divisions being Greece, the East, the West, and Macedonia. Such fragments as we have from Books VII (frs. 57 and perhaps 132-9); XII (fr. 66); XVI (frs. 68, 69, and perhaps 201-4); XXVIII-XXIX (frs. 89-92 and perhaps 218-21) are exclusively concerned with the West (*F. Gr. H.*, II C, p. 26). The proof that Diodorus used Ephorus on the west is confined to four references (frs. 201-4), in each of which a comparison is made by Diodorus between figures given by Ephorus with those given by Timaeus. These comparisons may have been found ready-made in Diodorus' source. Conceivably they may have been given by Timaeus, who went out of his way to criticize Ephorus. See e.g. Ephorus, fr. 111 from Polybius, XII, 28, 8-12.

<sup>52</sup> E. g. XI, 25, 2-5; 26, 3; 38, 4-5, etc.

<sup>53</sup> For references and discussion see Laqueur, cols., 1083-94.

<sup>54</sup> This is where Timaeus ends and Polybius begins (*Polyb.*, I, 5, 1). We have no right, with Laqueur, to brush aside this statement on the ground that while 264 is a good beginning it is a bad ending (Laqueur, col. 1082). Timaeus anticipated Polybius in attaching great significance to Roman-Carthaginian relations if we are to judge by fr. 60 (*F. Gr. H.*, III B, p. 619, from Dionys., *A. R.*, I, 74 init.), where he asserts that Rome and Carthage were founded the same year.

<sup>55</sup> Viz. Duris in XV, 60, 6; XXI, 6 (*F. Gr. H.*, II A, No. 76, T 5 and F 56a); Philistus in V, 6 (*F. Gr. H.*, III B, p. 563, fr. 45).

he being a Sicilian, when Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Strabo, both outsiders, did so? <sup>56</sup>

Chapters 20-26 constitute the longest section on Sicily in Book XI, and they give us the narrative of the Carthaginian invasion of 480 B. C.<sup>57</sup> This campaign was necessarily described by all the authors in question, *viz.* Ephorus, Antiochus, Philistus, and Timaeus. Felix Jacoby, usually so circumspect, attributes the narrative to Timaeus, apparently by the simple process of subtracting Ephorus and obtaining Timaeus as a remainder.<sup>58</sup> Four passages have been used in such a way as to suggest that Diodorus first followed Ephorus, then deserted him for Timaeus. They are: Diodorus, XI, 1, 4; Ephorus' fragment 186; Herodotus, VII, 158; and Diodorus, XI, 21, 1. The first two, already discussed in part, merely prove that both Diodorus' source and Ephorus (or *his* source!) linked the two invasions. The Ephorus fragment goes on to say that Gelon had gathered together 200 ships, 2000 cavalry, and 10,000 infantry when he learned of the Carthaginian expedition against Sicily. Herodotus says that Gelon had been willing to promise 200 triremes, 20,000 hoplites, 2000 cavalry, 2000 bowmen, 2000 slingers, and 2000 light cavalry (*ιπποδρόμοι*) to aid the Greeks. The fourth passage says that when Gelon left Syracuse to help Himera he took with him no less than 50,000 infantry and more than 5000 cavalry. In other words Jacoby appears to believe that the two Diodorus passages are in conflict, that in the first he is following Ephorus, in the second someone else, *ergo* Timaeus. But Diodorus does not tell us how many men Gelon *promised*. His account of the Greek appeal to Gelon was in Book X, now lost except for fragments.<sup>59</sup> It may or may not have agreed with Ephorus'

<sup>56</sup> For Strabo see *ibid.*, Antiochus frs. 3a, 7-13; for Dionysius, *ibid.*, frs. 2, 4-6.

<sup>57</sup> For doubts about the dating of Himera in 480, cf. Beloch, *Griech. Gesch.*, rev. ed., II, 2, pp. 165 f., and T. J. Dunbabin, *The Western Greeks* (Oxford, 1948), p. 422.

<sup>58</sup> This appears to be Jacoby's procedure. See his comments on Ephorus, fr. 186 (*F. Gr. H.*, II C, p. 88).

<sup>59</sup> The fragments indicate that while Gelon's promised aid was very tempting his price was too high. See Loeb ed. (vol. IV, C. H. Oldfather), X, 33-4 and also preface to XI.

fragment 186. Nor does Herodotus help. Jacoby says Herodotus' figures were the basis of Ephorus' account, and even suggests we correct the figures of the fragment to correspond.<sup>60</sup> This is reckless indeed, when we note that Herodotus gives no figures for Gelon's forces at Himera—merely for troops he offered to send to Greece under certain conditions—and also when we note that the Ephorus fragment refers to a still different situation—the troops Gelon had assembled (presumably for aid to Greece despite their rejection of his terms) at the time he heard of the Carthaginian attack. The number of troops Gelon actually led against the Carthaginians would naturally be much larger than the number of troops he promised to send or had actually collected to send overseas. Even the assumption that if there were a discrepancy Timaeus' figures would be larger is belied by the fact that on four separate occasions in Books XIII-XIV Diodorus cites such discrepancies, and that on each occasion Timaeus' figures are more conservative than those of Ephorus.<sup>61</sup>

Returning now to the scissors and paste theory of Laqueur, we find that he distinguishes two narratives unskilfully woven together for the Himera campaign, each distinct from the other, both at variance with Herodotus.<sup>62</sup> The basic account he accepts as that of Ephorus on the inconclusive testimony of fragment 186 already discussed, but he finds discrepancies with this account which he explains as insertions from another source—Timaeus.<sup>63</sup>

Chapter 20 begins by reminding us that the Carthaginians have agreed to attack Sicily when the Persians attack the Greeks. Hamilcar is to lead an expedition comprising no less than 300,000 infantry, more than 2000 warships, and also over 3000 supply ships. Here we may look back to chapter 1 where we read that after three years of preparation Carthage succeeded in assembling *more than* 300,000 men but only 200 ships.<sup>64</sup> Chapter 1 is much more explicit in that it distinguishes between

<sup>60</sup> *F. Gr. H.*, II C, p. 88, line 22.

<sup>61</sup> *Viz.* Diod., XIII, 54, 5; 60, 5; 80, 5; XIV, 54, 4.

<sup>62</sup> See Laqueur, cols. 1083-6.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, esp. col. 1085.

<sup>64</sup> Diodorus is at it again. Cf. XI, 60, 6.

the regular troops recruited from all parts of Libya and from Carthage, and the mercenaries obtained in Italy, Liguria, Gaul, and Iberia. Herodotus' more succinct account also gives us a total of 300,000 men consisting of Phoenicians, Libyans, Iberians, Ligurians, Elisycae, Sardinians, and Corsicans,<sup>65</sup> but he says nothing about *ships*. It is worth noting that Herodotus refers to Hamilcar as Ἀμίλκας; chapter 1 does not mention him by name; chapter 20 calls him Ἀμίλκων; and other references in Diodorus are to Ἀμίλκας.<sup>66</sup> Herodotus' omission of the fleet can be excused because of the brevity of his account, and the fact that he is concerned only with Himera. His listing of the Carthaginian troops is reasonably close to that of chapter 1. And the 200 ships of chapter 1 is also a reasonable number of warships to protect an expedition planned to strike at Sicily on the ground. But in chapter 20 we evidently have a different source, the object of which is to exaggerate the Carthaginian effort, thus doing greater honor to Sicilian resistance. This point of view coincides with that of chapter 23 where we read:

Therefore many writers compare this battle (i. e. Himera) with that of the Greeks at Plataea, and Gelon's stratagem with the machinations of Themistocles. The greatest excellence being displayed on both occasions, some assign the primacy to one, some to the other. But although before the battle there was consternation both in Sicily and in Greece because of the numbers of barbarians, the Sicilians prevailed first and the knowledge of Gelon's victory put new heart into the Greeks at home. In both places the struggle was for the rule of the whole country, but the Persian king escaped and many myriads with him, while the Carthaginians not only lost their general but also those who were with him. It was even said that not a man escaped as a messenger to Carthage. Furthermore, of the two most famous leaders of the Greeks, Pausanias and Themistocles, the former was put to death by his fellow citizens for rapacity and treason, while the latter was driven out of Greece entirely, into the hands of his worst enemy Xerxes, with whom he remained the rest of his days. But Gelon increased in reputation among the Syracusans after the

<sup>65</sup> VII, 165.

<sup>66</sup> *Viz.* XI, 21, 4 (twice); 21, 5 (twice); 22, 1.

battle, grew old in the kingship and died an honored man. So strong was the good will felt towards him by his fellow-countrymen that the rule remained under three members of the same house.

This passage is muddled in that comparisons between Plataea and Himera are confused with comparisons between Himera and Salamis, as Scherr demonstrates.<sup>67</sup> Unfortunately, historical anachronisms are not proof of dual authorship, and their presence here need not mean that Diodorus was introducing *επανοι* of his own into the narrative<sup>68</sup> unless we find evidence of two distinct points of view. Laqueur, apparently realizing this, suggests that we have here two sources, one of which keeps the balance even between Plataea and Himera.<sup>69</sup> But such a conclusion is not warranted by the text. The anonymity of the "many writers who compare the battle" is a transparent literary device enhancing the value of the pro-Sicilian interpretation by making it appear to emerge as the result of a careful weighing of pro's and con's. But this brings us back to the 2000 warships and 3000 supply vessels of chapter 20. Surely they derive from the same source, being invented for the sole purpose of surpassing Herodotus' figures for the fleet of Xerxes.<sup>70</sup>

Assuming that chapters 20 and 23 are both from the same mould, we may, for lack of a better name, call their original the 'Αμίλκων source. The same tendency may be observed in at least one part of chapter 58 where, as in chapter 23, we get a favorable judgment on Themistocles emerging as a result of conflicting opinions, and where, precisely as in chapter 23, Themistocles is said to have been hunted down by his fellow Greeks and paradoxically to have been saved by his worst enemy. Very interesting is the statement with which chapter 24 begins:

<sup>67</sup> Diodors XI. Buch, pp. 12-13.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>69</sup> Laqueur, col. 1085.

<sup>70</sup> C. H. Oldfather (Loeb ed.) has accepted Dindorf's emendation (XI, 20, 2) of διακοσίων instead of the MS δισχιλίων for the number of warships. This is evidently done to make Diodorus consistent with himself (cf. XI, 1, 5) but "c'est là son moindre défaut!" Diodorus was following different sources, and even the emendation fails to take into account the 3000 supply ships. Herodotus had 1207 warships (VII, 89) and 3000 other vessels (VII, 97).

It happened that on the very day Gelon won his victory Leonidas and his men were contending with Xerxes at Thermopylae, as though some god appropriately devised that the most splendid victory and the most glorious defeat should take place at the same time.

Why change the Herodotean synchronism of Himera and Salamis?<sup>71</sup> Obviously the object is to give the Sicilian Greeks the priority claimed for them in chapter 23.<sup>72</sup> The *'Αμίλκων* writer apparently carried out a fairly elaborate comparison between events on the two fronts. However, he has created a further difficulty for himself by pushing back Himera. If Gelon had already won his war, why was he absent at Salamis?<sup>73</sup> There is evidence in Pindar of a previously unexplained naval triumph.<sup>74</sup> There is also the puzzle as to the activities of Carthage's ally, Anaxilas of Rhegium, whose fleet must have kept Gelon's fleet from sailing through the straits.<sup>75</sup> May we not infer that the *'Αμίλκων* author described Syracusan naval operations following Himera, no doubt comparing them with the Greeks at Salamis? Such an account would have been written early because its background suggests knowledge of the military realities of 480 B. C. Such a writer would not have remarked, as Diodorus later does, that the Carthaginians feared an invasion by the triumphant Greeks!<sup>76</sup> But it might have occurred to Timaeus who knew all about the invasion attempt of Agathocles. The *'Αμίλκων* source cannot have been Timaeus because Timaeus

<sup>71</sup> Herod., VII, 166.

<sup>72</sup> Scherr fails to note that this change was unnecessary to explain the priority of Himera over Plataea. Its real object is to show that Himera was the first clear-cut victory over the barbarians (cf. Scherr, p. 13).

<sup>73</sup> The Corecyraeans blamed the Etesian winds for their own failure to reach Salamis in time (Herod., VII, 168). The Cretans were even more resourceful. They finally convinced themselves and perhaps Plato (*Laws*, IV, 707 B-C) that they *had* fought at Salamis. See H. van Effenterre, *La Crète et le Monde Grec* (Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, Paris, 1948), p. 36.

<sup>74</sup> For references and discussion see Dunbabin, *Western Greeks*, pp. 425-6.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.* See also Hackforth in *C. A. H.*, IV, p. 379.

<sup>76</sup> XI, 24, 4.

avoided fantastic figures for Carthaginian armaments, as noted above.<sup>77</sup> But the existence of this source serves to put us on our guard against over-simplifying the Diodorus problem.

Returning to chapter 20 we note that Hamilcar crossed over the Libyan Sea and reached Panormus, but not without losing the transports bringing *cavalry*<sup>78</sup> and chariots in a storm. This storm, unknown to Herodotus, looks like a doublet for the storm that whittled down Xerxes' fleet because the god wished to make the contest more equal.<sup>79</sup> We have already met this same thoughtful deity arranging an appropriate date for Himera. Continuing, we find that Hamilcar, like his partner Xerxes, is contemptuous of his opponents. Weathering the storm and reaching port he announces that the war is already won. He had only feared that the ocean might rob him of victory!<sup>80</sup> Resting his men for three days and repairing the fleet, Hamilcar proceeded overland towards Himera, while the fleet sailed alongside. Arrived before Himera he proceeded to fortify a double camp, one for the fleet which was hauled up on shore, the other for the army, facing Himera. The whole fortified area blocked off Himera on the west all the way from the hills above the town to the sea. Unloading his cargo ships Hamilcar sent them off to Libya and to Sardinia for further supplies. In the assault which immediately followed the Himerans were roughly handled in battle before the city, and Theron sent off to Gelon for help.

The concluding chapters of Diodorus on Himera (chapters 21-22) are the result of combining at least two sources, but Laqueur's efforts to separate them appear arbitrary and unconvincing. This follows from his insistence throughout that our two sources must be Ephorus and Timaeus, and that Diodorus is a complete nonentity. Diodorus tells us that when Gelon heard of the trouble in Himera he promptly led his army of 50,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry out of Syracuse. Drawing near

<sup>77</sup> As shown by the passages cited above, n. 61.

<sup>78</sup> C. H. Oldfather (Loeb ed.) renders *τοὺς ἵππεις καὶ τὰ ἀρματα* (XI, 20, 2) as "the horses and chariots," perhaps influenced by Hackforth, *C. A. H.*, IV, p. 379.

<sup>79</sup> Herod., VIII, 13.

<sup>80</sup> Anyone who has entered the modern harbor of Palermo (Panormus) with the north wind blowing will appreciate Hamilcar's feelings.

the city after a rapid march (*διανύσας δὲ ταχέως τὴν ὕδον καὶ πλησιάσας τῇ πόλει* (21, 1) he gave heart to the Himerans who had been dismayed (*καταπεπληγμένους*) at the Carthaginian numbers. He pitched camp in a suitable spot near the city, and fortified it, meanwhile sending out his cavalry to attack the enemy. Taking them by surprise, scattered over the country-side as they were, the cavalry captured as many prisoners as they could manage, and brought more than 10,000 of them into the city. In this way Gelon won great credit and the Himerans came to despise the enemy. Gelon then unstopped the gates previously barricaded by Theron, and even made new entrances to be used if needed.

This account is quite clear, even logical, and it fits the previous chapter admirably. Theron's inadequacy, hinted at before, is now emphasized by the detail about the gates. The source is still the *'Αμίλκων* source. The Himerans were *καταπεπληγμένοι* at the size of the Carthaginian army, just as the Greeks both in Greece and in Sicily are said to have been at the size of the barbarian armies, in chapter 23. But now the great man has come and everything is transformed. The Carthaginians are rounded up like sheep by the Sicilian cavalry and a good round number taken captive. The defenselessness of these men against a cavalry attack fits in admirably with Hamilcar's loss of his cavalry at sea.<sup>81</sup> Laqueur, however, with one snip of the shears cuts out everything which follows *πλησιάσας τῇ πόλει* (21, 1),<sup>82</sup> completing this mutilated sentence with another snipping beginning with the words *εὐθὺς ἔξηται* (21, 3)! Could anything be more unreasonable or unnecessary?

The first real break comes in 21, 3 where Diodorus telegraphs his intentions by the obvious transitional phrase: *Καθόλον δὲ Γέλων στρατηγίᾳ καὶ συνέσει διαφέρων εὐθὺς ἔξηται κτλ.* And we are well-launched on the famous story of how Gelon intercepted the message from Selinus to Hamilcar and learned all about the enemy plan to receive a contingent of allied Greek cavalry. The whole story of victory by introducing Syracusan cavalry masquerading as friends of Carthage is very different from the less

<sup>81</sup> See above and n. 78.

<sup>82</sup> Laqueur, cols. 1083 f.

theatrical narrative we have been following. Incidentally, the text bristles with references to Hamilcar, this time as Ἀμίλκας.<sup>83</sup> The source here may well be Timaeus. An improbable device like that of the intercepted messenger suggests an armchair historian. But Timaeus must have had some material to work with. It is likely, despite Herodotus' silence, that Gelon may have got spies into the Carthaginian camp and created a diversion by setting fire to the fleet. Also Gelon's new gates for Himera must have had some significance in the battle.

With chapter 22, 4 Diodorus seems to have gone back to the Ἀμίλκων source. It includes a statement on casualties, 150,000 slain with all survivors taken prisoner, of which our author could make good use in comparing the two wars. The praise of Gelon for his brilliant στρατήγημα does not refer to the interception of the messenger any more than the same word does in chapter 23. The messenger episode is referred to as a matter of chance (*συνεβάλετο δὲ καὶ τὸ αὐτόματον* 21, 3). The Gelon of the Ἀμίλκων source makes his own opportunities—like his great rival Themistocles.

Whether the Ἀμίλκων source be identified with Antiochus<sup>84</sup> or with some other unknown Sicilian writer, the fact that Diodorus was using more than two authors can hardly be disputed, and with the acceptance of that fact much of the elaborate reconstruction of Laqueur falls to the ground. This does not mean that important sections of Timaeus are not embedded in the *Historical Library*; it does suggest that we cannot simply subtract Ephorus to obtain Timaeus. Book XI, the starting point of Scherr and Laqueur,<sup>85</sup> is a particularly poor place to begin, and that for several reasons. Not only is this book one in which Diodorus fails to cite his sources, but also it deals with a period in which Timaeus' personal prejudices have less scope.

<sup>83</sup> For the references to Ἀμίλκας see above, n. 66. The Ἀμίλκων source prefers not to repeat the proper name. Instead we find οὗτος (20, 2) or αὗτός (20, 5). Usually his name is merely assumed as the subject of the verb. This suggests different authorship even if the form Ἀμίλκων crept in by scribal error.

<sup>84</sup> Jacoby's statement that Antiochus "intended from the first to supplement Herodotus' work of universal history in regard to the west" (*Athis*, p. 118) would certainly fit such an identification.

<sup>85</sup> See above, n. 34.

Gelon is an historical figure whose victory at Himera ensured him of favorable treatment by later writers, both by Timaeus and those on whom Timaeus relied for his information. The nearer we approach Timaeus' own day, the more likely are Timaeus' views to have diverged from those of other writers. This is demonstrably true of the age of Dionysius<sup>86</sup> and even more likely when we come to the time of Agathocles.<sup>87</sup> Furthermore, in the later period we have the great advantage of being able to use Plutarch to supplement Diodorus.<sup>88</sup> Laqueur is of course aware of this, but by the time he comes to deal with the later books he has already worked out his criteria for distinguishing Timaeus, from the much more conjectural material in Book XI. His determination to identify every borrowing has led him to make very arbitrary distinctions. Three examples may serve as illustrations.

Laqueur tells us that Timaeus was fond of the phrase, ἀναλαβὼν τὸν στρατώρας.<sup>89</sup> Is there any valid distinction between this and the expression so often used by Diodorus in Book XVII, where he cannot have been following Timaeus, of ἀναλαβὼν τὴν δύναμιν?<sup>90</sup> Then he pounces on the phrase Ἐλλήνων πρὸς Ἐλλῆνας, "Greek against Greek,"<sup>91</sup> which reappears eight books later as "Ἐλλῆνες καθ' Ἐλλήνων."<sup>92</sup> We are asked to accept this as an inven-

<sup>86</sup> See Timaeus, frs. 107, 108, 110, 114, 117 (*F. Gr. H.*, III B, pp. 632 ff.).

<sup>87</sup> Wilhelm Nitsche, *König Philipp's Brief an die Athener und Hieronymos von Kardia* (Berlin, 1876), p. 6, argues for attributing substantial portions of Diodorus' account of Agathocles to Duris of Samos. Beloch sees both Timaeus and Duris in Diodorus' account, though he believes Diodorus used an intermediary source (*Griech. Gesch.*, 2 ed., IV, 2, p. 8). Since Diodorus' account of Agathocles shows two interpretations and since Timaeus had been forced into exile by Agathocles it is natural to see in Timaeus the source of the more unfavorable version. Even Thucydides had no charity for Cleon.

<sup>88</sup> This applies particularly to his *Dion* and his *Timoleon*. For an estimate of Plutarch's special usefulness, see Piero Treves in "Historiography, Greek," *O. C. D.*, paragraph 7.

<sup>89</sup> Laqueur, col. 1085. It is anything but reassuring to find virtually the same expression (Diod., XIII, 75, 2) attributed to Ephorus (Laqueur, col. 1112)!

<sup>90</sup> Diod., XVII, 21 *ad fin.*; 83; 104.

<sup>91</sup> Diod., XI, 53, 4. See Laqueur, col. 1089.

<sup>92</sup> XIX, 7, 4.

tion of Timaeus. Even more questionable is the selection of a single word, *κατακληρουχοῦν*.<sup>93</sup> The practice which it describes was common in Sicily in the period<sup>94</sup> and the word could hardly be avoided by any historian. In fact we find this same expression in the "eastern" part of Book XI, where Diodorus is presumably following Ephorus.<sup>95</sup>

It would be as fruitless as it is unnecessary to continue further this analysis of the text of Diodorus' eleventh book. Enough has already been said to demonstrate that this is not a satisfactory method for recovering lost passages of Timaeus. We must be content to accept the fact that the *Historical Library* is a complex, from which we can separate out the contributions of any one author only by using the attested fragments of that author as a touchstone. Only after a careful evaluation of the fragments of Timaeus can we approach the text of Diodorus, Strabo, Plutarch, or some other late writer with any hope of extending our knowledge of his sources.<sup>96</sup> Even identifications should be made on the basis of correspondence in thought rather than similarities in vocabulary or style. The latter method is valid only if we have a fragment which contains a direct quotation from an author, of substantial length to serve as a model. No such fragment has yet been recovered from the *Sicilian History* of Timaeus.

<sup>93</sup> Laqueur, col. 1093. Later he assigns a passage to Timaeus on the basis of *κατακληρουχῆσαι* (col. 1099), found in Diod., XIII, 30, 2.

<sup>94</sup> See Hackforth, *C. A. H.*, IV, p. 372; V, p. 154.

<sup>95</sup> XI, 60, 2, describing Cimon's treatment of Scyros.

<sup>96</sup> It may be doubted whether this method can ever yield for Timaeus the 180 printed pages of Diodorus' text claimed for him by Laqueur (col. 1190), but what we do obtain can be relied on. It is also worth noting that on the same evidence Laqueur decides that Ephorus is the main source for the "western" parts of Book XI, while Scherr argues for Timaeus (*Diodors XI. Buch*, p. 26). The strong possibility of intermediary sources for Diodorus should also be kept in mind. See Alberto Gitti, *Alessandro Magno all'Oasi di Siwah, Il Problema delle Fonti* (Bari, 1951), p. 43.

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## THE CHALCIDIANS IN THRACE.

The aims of this paper are twofold: (I) to show that the Chalcidians in Thrace were colonists of Euboic Chaleis, and not, as suggested by E. Harrison,<sup>1</sup> a northern Greek tribe like their neighbors, the Bottiaeai, and (II) to determine which of the Thracian towns were Chalcidic. These two problems are, in a sense, separate, but they both are intensified by the vagueness and diffusion of the ancient evidence. The early date of these colonies,<sup>2</sup> their subsequent formation into the Chalcidic League under Olynthus with its accompanying partial synoecismus, and the destruction of the League by Philip of Macedon all combine to make the evidence difficult.<sup>3</sup>

### I

In searching for the origin of the Thracian Chalcidians we must first set forth the pertinent literary evidence in chronological order. These people are mentioned earliest by Herodotus, who lists them (VII, 185, 2), as τὸ Χαλκιδικὸν γένος, among those who supplied troops to Xerxes. He also states (VIII, 127) that in 479 B. C. the retreating Persians took Olynthus from the Bottiaeai and handed it over to the Chalcidians under Critobulus of Torone. Thucydides often speaks of *οἱ ἐπὶ Θράκης Χαλκιδεῖς* and seems to take their origin from Euboea for granted, but he specifically names only Torone and Olynthus<sup>4</sup> as Chalcidic. We know, however, from Herodotus that the latter city

<sup>1</sup> "Chalkidike," *C. Q.*, VI (1912), pp. 93-103, 165-78.

<sup>2</sup> See below, pp. 378-80.

<sup>3</sup> The difficulty is usually glossed over with general statements; see, e. g., K. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*, II<sup>2</sup>, I (Strassburg, 1912), p. 253: "eine lange Reihe griechischer Pflanzstädte, die zum grossen Teil von Chalkis gegründet waren, wie namentlich Torone und die übrigen Städte auf Sithonia." Cf. also G. Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte*, II<sup>2</sup> (Gotha, 1893), pp. 452-4; F. Geyer, *Topographie und Geschichte der Insel Euboia*, I (Berlin, 1903), pp. 41-2.

<sup>4</sup> IV, 110, 1: Τορώνην τὴν Χαλκιδικήν; IV, 4, 1: "Ολυνθον τὴν Χαλκιδικήν.  
See below, pp. 360-1.

was not colonized direct from Chalcis but belonged to the Bottiaeai until 479.<sup>5</sup>

Aristotle<sup>6</sup> tells us of a Chalcidian from Thrace coming to the aid of Euboic Chalcis in the Lelantine War, and the obvious inference is that it was kinship which brought this help. He further mentions<sup>7</sup> that Androdamus of Rhegium, a colony of Chalcis, was a lawgiver to the Chalcidians of Thrace. Polybius, however, in a passing remark,<sup>8</sup> is the earliest author from whom we have a definite statement that the Chalcidians in Thrace were colonists of Chalcis. Diodorus calls Torone a Chalcidic colony, but his information undoubtedly came from Thucydides.<sup>9</sup>

Strabo, the next author who speaks of the Chalcidians, is very explicit.<sup>10</sup> In X, 1, 8 he says of Chalcis and Eretria: "These cities, having grown, sent out to Macedonia noteworthy colonies. For Eretria settled the cities around Pallene and Athos; Chalcis settled those under Olynthus, which Philip maltreated."<sup>11</sup> In

<sup>5</sup> B. V. Head, *Historia Numorum*<sup>2</sup> (Oxford, 1911), p. 207, states that Olynthus was a colony of Chalcis before being taken over by the Bottiaeai, but he cites no evidence. The obvious implication in Herodotus, that the Chalcidians first obtained the town in 479, has been confirmed by excavation. The pottery of the pre-Bottic period seems to be related to early Macedonian ware; see G. E. Mylonas, *Excavations at Olynthus*, V (Johns Hopkins Press, 1933), pp. 60-3.

<sup>6</sup> Frag. 98, from Plutarch, *Amatorius*, 17.

<sup>7</sup> *Politica*, II, 1274b.

<sup>8</sup> IX, 28, 2: ήν τι σύστημα τῶν ἐπὶ Θράκης Ἑλλήνων, οὐδὲ ἀπόκισαν Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Χαλκιδῆς.

<sup>9</sup> XII, 68, 6: ἀποικον μὲν Χαλκιδέων. We cannot be sure whether Diodorus himself or Ephorus, his immediate source, changed Thucydides' Τορώνην τὴν Χαλκιδικήν. For the derivation from Thucydides, through Ephorus, of Diodorus' account of this period see G. L. Barber, *The Historian Ephorus* (Cambridge, 1935), pp. 108-9.

<sup>10</sup> Harrison, *op. cit.*, p. 93, says that "the testimony of Strabo refutes itself," but he never justifies the statement. In his discussion of Strabo, pp. 166-7, he finds only minor errors, dealing with the Eretrians.

<sup>11</sup> The phrase used for these cities is *rās ὑπὸ Ολύνθῳ*, which seems to mean those towns which were subject to Olynthus in the Chalcidic League. See Harrison, *op. cit.*, p. 166, and A. B. West, *History of the Chalkidic League* (Madison, 1918), p. 6, note 5. The above passage continues, "And there are many settlements of the Chalcidians in Italy and Sicily. These colonies were sent out, as Aristotle said, when the government of the Hippobotac, so-called, was in power." It is uncertain

VII, frag. 11 (ed. A. Meineke [Leipzig, 1915]), he writes: "The Chalcidians from Euboea went into the land of the Sithonians and settled there about thirty cities, from which most of them were later expelled and came together into one city, Olynthus. They were called the Chalcidians in Thrace." After Strabo there are several references which connect Chalcis directly with the Chalcidians in Thrace, but these have little independent value.<sup>12</sup>

It has been necessary to review the above evidence because Harrison challenges the founding by Chalcis of the Chalcidic towns in Thrace. His main theses are (1), that the Thracian Chalcidians were a northern Greek tribe like their neighbors, the Bottiaeai, and (2), that the name Chalcidice did not, to the ancients, include the whole peninsula, as it does in modern times, but was confined to its central prong and part of the interior. Harrison himself does not think that he has proved the first of these theories,<sup>13</sup> but his success in developing the second has led to the rash acceptance of the whole,<sup>14</sup> even though the proof of one point implies nothing as to the truth of the other.

whether the statement from Aristotle refers to the northern as well as the western colonies; in any case the passage does not show that colonists to both areas were sent out at about the same time, despite Beloch, *op. cit.*, p. 253.

<sup>12</sup> Appian, *Bell. Civ.*, IV, 102; scholia (ed. C. Hude [Teubner, 1927]) to Thuc., I, 57, 5; scholia to Aristophanes, *Equites*, 237; Libanius, *Hypothesis to the First Olynthiac*, 1.

<sup>13</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 93: "Further enquiry, though it has strengthened these suspicions, has not established them beyond doubt; but it seems to me worth while to set out the evidence, in hope that others may throw light on a question of some importance for the history of Greece. At least I may expect that in the future 'Chalkidike' and 'Chalkidians' will be used with care."

<sup>14</sup> E.g., M. Gude, *A History of Olynthus* (Johns Hopkins Press, 1933), p. 4, note 11; A. Gwynn, "The Character of Greek Colonisation," *J. H. S.*, XXXVIII (1918), p. 121; U. Kahrstedt, "Chalcidic Studies," *A. J. P.*, LVII (1936), pp. 416-44, especially p. 416, note 1. Kahrstedt's statement that D. M. Robinson, *Excavations at Olynthus*, V, pp. 15-63, treats "the Chalcidians, Bottiaeans, and Macedonians as kindred north Greek tribes" is in error; there is no such treatment of the Chalcidians in the chapter referred to ("Pre-Persian Pottery"), which was written

As may be seen from the above review of the evidence, there is no statement, or even obvious implication, in ancient sources which would suggest that the Thracian Chalcidians were a northern Greek tribe. Therefore Harrison's argument is based primarily on two points: (1) the fact that only relatively late authors specifically connect the Thracian Chalcidians with Euboic Chalcis, and (2) the use by Herodotus and Thucydides of phrases (*τὸ Χαλκιδικὸν γένος, Τορώνην τὴν Χαλκιδικήν*) which, he argues, imply that their authors thought of these Chalcidians as a separate tribe. Although Harrison reviews all the rest of the ancient evidence, it is important to realize that in each case his arguments are negative; he is trying to discredit every reference and show that it does not make his theory entirely untenable. At times he is successful in casting doubt on individual references,<sup>15</sup> thanks to the vagueness of the tradition; nevertheless, the accumulated weight of the evidence and the fact that he has to rule out so much of it remain against him.

Harrison's argument based on the lack of any definite statement connecting the Thracian and Euboic Chalcidians in any author earlier than Strabo bears little weight; if anything, this lack points to a Euboic origin for the Thracian Chalcidians. For it would be natural to equate the two Χαλκιδεῖς, and a precise statement of origin is more to be expected if they were different races. Of course the argument from silence cannot be pressed,

by G. E. Mylonas and deals only with the period before 479 when the Bottiaeи still held Olynthus; see below, p. 364. M. Cary, in *The Cambridge Ancient History*, III, p. 618, tries to combine Harrison's theory with the traditional view by speaking of Chalcidians and Eretrians emigrating "to the peninsula of Chalcidice in Macedonia, where a Greek-speaking tribe with the name of Chalcideis was already established in the interior." In the same volume, pp. 652-3, J. L. Myres does not adopt Harrison's theory; neither was it accepted by West, *op. cit.*, p. 7, note 9; p. 8, note 14.

<sup>15</sup> E.g., p. 165, where he attacks a fragment from Heracleides concerning Chalcidians at Cleonae. Sometimes he goes much too far, as when he suggests that an Aristoteles the Chalcidian was Plutarch's source (*Amatorius*, 17) for the story of Cleomachus. Harrison himself admits (p. 167) that Plutarch thought that his source was the philosopher Aristotle, and since we have three other fragments from an *Eroticus* of Aristotle (frags. 95-7), such a conjecture is worthless.

but it is strengthened by the fact that in II, 99, 3, in a discussion of the rise of Macedonian power, Thucydides tells of the fate of the northern tribes which were evicted. The Bottiaeи, Harrison's analogy for the Chalcidians, are mentioned, but not the Chalcidians themselves. Herodotus (VIII, 127) also reports the expulsion of the Bottiaeи from Macedonia.

Harrison argues that Herodotus, by using the phrase *τὸ Χαλκιδικὸν γένος*, and Thucydides, by using *Τορώνην τὴν Χαλκιδικήν*, show that they thought of the Chalcidians as a separate tribe. The use of *τὸ Χαλκιδικὸν γένος*, however, may be explained as an attempt to avoid the word *Χαλκιδεῖς*, which might more easily be confused in a reader's mind with Euboic Chalcis. And it certainly is a simple way of describing as a group the inhabitants of several towns, related and acting together, whether these be Chalcidic colonists or not.<sup>16</sup> So there is in the phrase no evidence one way or the other. Even weaker is Harrison's attempt to draw a tendentious inference from Thucydides, based on that author's customary use of *ἀποικία* or *ἀποικοί* to describe a colony or its inhabitants, as in *Στάγειρος Ἀνδρίων ἀποικία*,<sup>17</sup> while the adjectival form, according to Harrison, usually denotes only race or location, as in *Σπάρτωλον τὴν Βοττικήν* and *Πάνορμον τὸν Ἀρχαικόν*.<sup>18</sup> At first glance and by a comparison of *Τορώνην τὴν Χαλκιδικήν* with *Σπάρτωλον τὴν Βοττικήν* and *Στάγειρος Ἀνδρίων ἀποικία*, the employment of *Χαλκιδική* appears to show a distinction in the mind of Thucydides between the Chalcidians and regular colonists. But when we look further we discover that he describes two western cities, Naxus in Sicily and Cumae in

<sup>16</sup> Cf. West, *op. cit.*, p. 7, note 9. Furthermore, Harrison's rendition of the phrase as "the Chalkidic tribe" (pp. 94 and 95) is misleading, because it gives in English a notion of primitiveness not present in the Greek. "Race" is a better translation. The point of Harrison's argument (*op. cit.*, pp. 94-5) is vague when he compares the two passages of Herodotus (VII, 122-3 and 185) which list the troops Xerxes got from Thrace. There is nothing to prevent the same town from being called, in one list, a Greek town in Thrace furnishing ships, and, in the other, Chalcidic and furnishing troops, especially since several definitely Chalcidic towns, including Torone, are said to have furnished both.

<sup>17</sup> IV, 88, 2; see also IV, 84, 1, and 109, 3.

<sup>18</sup> II, 79, 2, and 86, 1.

Italy, in the same way;<sup>19</sup> both of these were certainly colonies of Euboic Chalcis.<sup>20</sup> In the face of this evidence there is no reason to assume that Χαλκιδική, when applied to Torone, does not mean a Chalcidic colony.

Harrison also discusses the evidence of language and coinage on the question. In his argument based on a comparison of the languages of Euboea and of the Thracian Chalcidians, he hesitantly comes to the conclusion that evidence from the north points "not to Chalkis, nor to Euboea at large, but to Eretria, although the Olynthian inscription lacks the most striking feature of the Eretrian, which appears also at Oropos, the rhotacism of the intervocalic *o*."<sup>21</sup> He had for the northern Chalcidic language only two inscriptions,<sup>22</sup> one a treaty of the Chalcidic League with Amyntas of Macedonia in the early fourth century and the other a decree of banishment from Amphipolis of about 357, by which time that city was predominantly Chalcidic. But the paucity of evidence which he had for his analysis does not damage this part of his argument, for later finds have substantiated his conclusions. The points upon which he lays the most stress, namely, the Ionic vowel changes and the use of *elv* for *elvai*, are supported by inscriptions found at Olynthus during the excavations conducted there between 1928 and 1938 by the Johns Hopkins University.<sup>23</sup> Although these inscriptions

<sup>19</sup> IV, 25, 7: Νάξον τὴν Χαλκιδικήν. VI, 4, 5: Κύμης τῆς ἐν Ὀπικῇ Χαλκιδικῆς πόλεως.

<sup>20</sup> Thucydides himself states this of Naxus (VI, 3, 1). For Cumae see Strabo, V, 4, 4; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Ant. Rom.*, VII, 3, 1; Livy, VIII, 22, 5-6.

<sup>21</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 170. The lack of rhotacism in the northern Chalcidic dialect does not affect this question, since that change did not take place in Eretria until after the middle of the fifth century, long after the founding of the northern colonies. Cf. H. W. Smyth, *Sounds and Inflections of the Greek Dialects—Ionic* (Oxford, 1894), p. 288.

<sup>22</sup> W. Dittenberger, *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum*, I<sup>a</sup> (Leipzig, 1915), nos. 135 and 194.

<sup>23</sup> The inscriptions have been published by D. M. Robinson, "A Deed of Sale at Olynthus," *T. A. P. A.*, LIX (1928), pp. 225-32; "New Inscriptions from Olynthus and Environs," *T. A. P. A.*, LXII (1931), pp. 40-56; "Inscriptions from Olynthus, 1934," *T. A. P. A.*, LXV (1934), pp. 103-37; "Inscriptions from Macedonia, 1938," *T. A. P. A.*, LXIX (1938), pp. 43-76.

are of the fourth century, except for two early Corinthian dedications predating the Chalcidic occupation, and were inscribed in the Eastern alphabet,<sup>24</sup> their language is "the Western Ionic of Euboea, as found in Chalcis and her colonies,"<sup>25</sup> and the texts show two examples of the main peculiarity which Harrison had previously noted, the use of *ēv* for *ēvai*.<sup>26</sup> Nevertheless, his conclusion that the evidence points to Eretria, not Chalcis, cannot stand, for there is in reality little basis for comparison because of the lack of inscriptional evidence from Chalcis itself. We have from that city one inscription of the sixth century,<sup>27</sup> two of the fifth,<sup>28</sup> and six short dedicatory inscriptions from the fourth.<sup>29</sup> Of all those of any length and continuity,<sup>30</sup> one, no. 909, is of the third century and the others are later. Thus we have in effect no evidence at all for the early dialect of Chalcis. Attempts to uncover it have been based on inscriptions from the northern and western colonies and in a general grouping of all Euboic dialects as West Ionic.<sup>31</sup> Smyth's conclusion<sup>32</sup> is enlightening: "Until we come into possession of documents of an antiquity sufficient to free their phonetical and inflectional system from the suspicion of Atticism, we are not in a position to hold that there are sharply marked differences in speech between the Chalcidians, Eretrians, and Styrians." We may conclude, then, only that the language of the northern Chalcidians is Ionic and points to Euboea in general. In view of the *prima facie* connection with Chalcis, we may assume it points there.

As regards coinage, Harrison's arguments are again negative, in his attempt to break down an apparent connection between the early coinages of Olynthus and Chalcis. The earliest

<sup>24</sup> Robinson, *T. A. P. A.*, LXII (1931), p. 48. This alphabet was used at Chalcis itself by the fourth century (*I. G.*, XII, 9, 935 and 1073).

<sup>25</sup> Robinson, *T. A. P. A.*, LXV (1934), p. 108.

<sup>26</sup> Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 105: *āvāθeīv* (line 8); *ēxeīv* (line 10).

<sup>27</sup> *I. G.*, XII, 9, 922: *Eύφημος ἀνέθ[η]κεν*.

<sup>28</sup> *I. G.*, XII, 9, 923 and 957.

<sup>29</sup> *I. G.*, XII, 9, 935, 1073, 1109, 1166, 1167, 1171.

<sup>30</sup> *I. G.*, XII, 9, 898-911.

<sup>31</sup> C. D. Buck, *Greek Dialects* (New York, 1928), pp. 8 and 171; Smyth, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-13.

<sup>32</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 12.

Olynthiac coins had various designs of horses and chariots on the obverse, with irregular patterns on the reverse; later coins, with the same obverse types, have on the reverse a flying eagle, a type common in the coins of Chalcis.<sup>33</sup> It is generally supposed that this change occurred after 479 and reflects the taking over of the town by the Chalcidians. Harrison, however, attempts to discredit the alleged borrowing from Chalcis by calling the eagle "an agonistic type," occurring on the coins of Elis, "which makes it unnecessary to suppose such a loan."<sup>34</sup> But, as West pointed out,<sup>35</sup> this evidence from the coins by itself might be weak, yet when viewed in conjunction with the other testimony it cannot be cast aside lightly as a coincidence. Harrison also ignored one Olynthiac coin<sup>36</sup> of the fifth century which carries the inscription ΔΑΛΚ, with early Chalcidic letter forms. This coin has on one side a cantering horse and on the other an eagle and is similar in type to later coins bearing the inscription ΟΔVN.<sup>37</sup> The use in this early coin of the Chalcidic alphabet, particularly the form Δ, points directly to Euboic Chalcis.<sup>38</sup> This evidence makes it almost certain that we have

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Head, *Historia Numorum*<sup>2</sup>, pp. 208 (for Olynthus) and 358 (for Chalcis).

<sup>34</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 171.

<sup>35</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 8, note 14.

<sup>36</sup> Head, *op. cit.*, p. 208; West, *loc. cit.*

<sup>37</sup> These were struck on the Phoenician standard, whereas the earlier were on the Euboic. The change was probably caused by the anti-Athenian rebellion in Thrace in 432; H. Gähler, *Die Antiken Münzen Nord-Griechenlands*, III<sup>2</sup> (Berlin, 1935), p. 87.

<sup>38</sup> The coin has been attributed on these grounds to Chalcis instead of Olynthus by Gähler, *loc. cit.*, and "Zur Münzkunde Makedoniens VI," *Zeitschrift für Numismatik*, XXXV (1925), pp. 201-2. But Gähler dates it in the first half of the fifth century and says that it is the archetype of the Olynthiac coinage after 432. There are, however, no examples of coins from Chalcis between its defeat by Athens in 507 and the fourth century and it is unlikely that Chalcis struck money in this interval. Furthermore, the horse type is otherwise unknown to Chalcis, but is common on Olynthiac coins. D. M. Robinson and P. A. Clement (*Excavations at Olynthus*, IX, p. 293) leave this coin's attribution unassigned. Yet, even if Gähler is right, the fact that Olynthus copies so closely the coinage of Chalcis implies that the latter was her mother city.

in all these coins settlers<sup>39</sup> adopting the coinage of their mother city.<sup>40</sup> In the case of Olynthus it is easy to see why this copying was done; common descent from Chalcis was the closest bond among the Chalcidians who took over the town from the Bottiae.

The recent excavations at Olynthus have uncovered, in both the pottery and the names of the Olynthiac months, evidence which, although perhaps not definitive in itself, strengthens greatly the case against Harrison's theory and seems to make certain a Euboic origin for the Thracian Chalcidians. In the pottery,<sup>41</sup> a clear break was found after the destruction of the city by the Persians in 479. Before this date, which is marked by a burned layer, most of the pottery was a native ware, related to early Macedonian pottery and influenced by quasi-Mycenaean designs, probably from Asia Minor. This undoubtedly was made by the Bottiae. But after the Chalcidians took over the town in 479, Attic red-figure ware predominates. This shows, of course, only that the Chalcidians were a more advanced people, which might possibly be explained by their coastal position which facilitated communication with the outside world. A more likely explanation is that they were regular Greek colonists, for, if they had been a tribe like the Bottiae, we should naturally expect to find them making some similar, rather primitive pottery.

It is, however, in the names of the months that we find our most conclusive proof of the Euboic origin of the Thracian Chalcidians. From inscriptions at Olynthus bearing deeds of sale<sup>42</sup> we know seven of the twelve months. Of these, five (*Καλαμαών*, *Ἀρτεμισών*, *Δημαών*, *Ἀπατονυρών*, *Ταργηλιών*) are common Ionic months, the last three of which occur in Chalcis,

<sup>39</sup> Much has been made by Gäßler (*loc. cit.*) of Head's error (*op. cit.*, p. 207) in calling Olynthus a colony of Chalcis originally. But since all the coins with the Chalcidic eagle come after those without this symbol, Head's error does not affect our conclusions.

<sup>40</sup> Just as Dicaea and Neapolis, both Eretrian colonies, copied the octopus and gorgoneion devices of their mother city; Gäßler, *Ant. Münz. Nord-Gr.*, III<sup>2</sup>, pp. 57 and 79.

<sup>41</sup> D. M. Robinson, *Excavations at Olynthus*, V, especially the chapter "Pre-Persian Pottery," by G. E. Mylonas, pp. 15-63. I summarize his results here.

<sup>42</sup> See above, p. 361, note 23.

from which city we know four names.<sup>43</sup> Furthermore, the form Ταργηλῶν for the usual Θαργηλῶν was used at Chalcis, as well as at Tenos.<sup>44</sup> Of the other two Olynthiac months, Ἰππιῶν is known at Eretria and, in the form Ἰππιος, at Rhegium, a colony of Chalcis; the other, Πανθεῶν, is known only from Naples, also a Chalcidic colony. Robinson, in a poorly preserved painted inscription, restores Ἡράκ[λεος] as the name of the month.<sup>45</sup> Such a month is known only from Delphi, Halicarnassus, Antiocheia, and Bithynia, and its non-Ionic form looks suspicious when compared to the regular Ionic of the other seven months. On the plate, at least, this part of the inscription is illegible, and, since the restoration is so dubious, it should not be admitted as evidence. Thus we may safely say that all the known months at Olynthus are Ionic; three of them (Δημαῶν, Ἀπατούριῶν, Ταργηλῶν) actually occur in Chalcis, two (Ἰππιῶν, Πανθεῶν) point directly to Chalcis through her colonies, and the spelling of Ταργηλῶν is significant. Yet if the Thracian Chalcidians were, as Harrison claims, a native tribe like the Bottiaeai, we should expect month names resembling those of Thessaly or Macedonia,<sup>46</sup> which vary greatly from the Ionic. For the names of the months, with their religious significance, did not lend themselves to change and their form certainly indicates the

<sup>43</sup> For the calendar I have used the article by E. Bischoff, *s. v.* Kalender, in *R-E.*, XX, cols. 1568-1602. He gives a month Ὁλυνθῶν for Chalcis, taken from *I. G.*, XII, 9, 900b. On the stone all that we have is Ολυ[...]ῶν, and A. Wilhelm's restoration (*Eph. Arch.*, 1904, p. 103) Ολυ[μπι]ῶν seems better. We know that Zeus Olympius was worshiped at Chalcis (*I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 39, lines 61-2), and it is very difficult to connect the name of the town Olynthus, which was originally Bottic, with Chalcis and use this as evidence for the name of a Chalcidic month.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. *I. G.*, XII, 5, 872, line 69, and XII, 9, 900c, line 1. There is one example of this spelling at Delos (*I. G.*, XI, 2, 287, A, line 55), but it seems to be simply a misspelling of the stonemason. There are many examples there of the common spelling. (I am indebted to J. H. Kent for this observation.)

<sup>45</sup> *T. A. P. A.*, LXIX (1938), p. 56 and plate VII, fig. 9.

<sup>46</sup> No names of the months used among the Bottiaeai are preserved. But since they came from Macedonia (*Thuc.*, II, 99, 3), it is reasonable to assume that their months would be reminiscent of northern Greece. At least they would not be Ionic.

race of those who use them. Thus we may conclude that the Chalcidians in Olynthus (after 479 B. C.) were Ionians; and once this is established, it can hardly be denied that Chalcis was their mother city.

## II

It is still no easy task, however, to determine exactly which cities of those in the Chalcidice were founded by Chalcis. Of the ancient references dealing with the actual colonization the least vague are the two general statements by Strabo,<sup>47</sup> one to the effect that Chalcis founded the cities under Olynthus,<sup>48</sup> the other that the Chalcidians established about thirty towns after coming into the land of the Sithonians. Besides these we have scattered references citing various towns as Chalcidic. These references, however, must be handled with care, because of the expansion of the meaning of the term Chalcidice. It is safe to assume that in a writer of the fifth or fourth century this word would be applied only to Chalcidic towns, but in later authors the term came to mean the whole peninsula, the sense which it retains today, and it was used to refer to any town in that geographical area.<sup>49</sup> Also, much evidence can be gleaned from the tribute quota lists<sup>50</sup> of the Athenian Empire both for the location of towns and for the extent of the revolt of 432 by the Chalcidians and the Bottiaeai against Athens.<sup>51</sup> The Thracian

<sup>47</sup> X, 1, 8; VII, frag. 11 (see above, pp. 357-8).

<sup>48</sup> This probably is a general reference to the hegemony of Olynthus in the Chalcidic League. But membership cannot be used as a strict test for the Chalcidic character of any particular town, since in the fourth century the League expanded and took in non-Chalcidic communities such as Potidaea and Scione; West, *op. cit.*, pp. 97-102.

<sup>49</sup> Harrison's arguments (*op. cit.*) against attributing this modern idea to early writers seem conclusive.

<sup>50</sup> Published by B. D. Meritt, H. T. Wade-Gery, and M. F. McGregor, *The Athenian Tribute Lists*, I (Harvard Univ. Press, 1939); II (Princeton, 1949); III (Princeton, 1950). All of the information concerning tribute on the following pages is taken from this work (hereafter cited as *A.T.L.*) and may be found conveniently arranged there under the various towns in the Register (I, pp. 215-441; II, pp. 79-83) and the Gazetteer (I, pp. 461-566; II, pp. 84-7).

<sup>51</sup> Thuc., I, 58.

panels for the years 432/1 and 430/29 survive intact and the absence of a town which formerly had paid is cogent evidence for its participation in the revolt. But it must be remembered that by itself this participation does not prove that a community was Chalcidic, since the Bottiaeи and the towns at the head of the Thermaic Gulf near Macedon also revolted; when combined with the literary sources, however, the evidence of the tribute lists is of great importance.

Our first task is to examine the Greek towns in Sithonia, the area said by Strabo to have been colonized by the Chalcidians. In VII, 121 Herodotus, while describing the route of the fleet of Xerxes, gives a list of the cities along the coast of this peninsula. In geographical order, from the head of the Singaean Gulf, the towns are Assa,<sup>52</sup> Pilorus, Singus, and Sarte on the east coast; Torone, Galepus,<sup>53</sup> Sermylia, Mecyberna, and Olynthus on the west. Further investigations of the individual towns confirm Strabo's statement and make it certain that all of them were Chalcidic colonies, except, in a sense, Olynthus, which we know was not Chalcidic until 479.<sup>54</sup> For three of the towns, Assa (Assera),<sup>55</sup> Torone,<sup>56</sup> and Sermylia,<sup>57</sup> we have ancient references which specifically call them Chalcidic. Furthermore, all but Torone and Sarte joined the revolt and stopped paying their tribute. The reason for the continued payment by these two cities was undoubtedly an Athenian garrison at Torone which remained until the arrival of Brasidas in 424/3.<sup>58</sup> For Singus, Gale, and Mecyberna we have further confirmation in the fact that they not only revolted but also participated in the withdrawal to Olynthus which was urged on the Chalcidic towns near the coast by Perdiccas.<sup>59</sup> This is shown by the clause in the Peace of Nicias directing the inhabitants to return to

<sup>52</sup> The Assa of Herodotus is the Assera of the tribute records.

<sup>53</sup> Herodotus' Galepus is represented by the Galaei (from Gale) of the tribute lists; see *A. T. L.*, I, p. 477.

<sup>54</sup> See above, pp. 356-7.

<sup>55</sup> Theopompos, frag. 174 (Jacoby) : πόλις Χαλκιδέων.

<sup>56</sup> Thuc., IV, 110, 1: Τορώνην τὴν Χαλκιδικήν.

<sup>57</sup> Scholia to Thuc., I, 65, 2: Χαλκιδικὴ πόλις.

<sup>58</sup> Thuc., IV, 110-16. There is no mention of a garrison in Sarte, but it was situated near enough to Torone to be controlled from there.

<sup>59</sup> Thuc., I, 58, 2.

their former homes and by the marked decrease in their assessed tribute to only 10 drachmae each in 425/4 and 421/0.<sup>60</sup> Thus we have, for seven of the eight towns, independent evidence<sup>61</sup> supporting Strabo's statement, and so we can accept it as a whole and call all of the towns on Sithonia colonies of Chalcis.<sup>62</sup>

Of Chalcidic towns located inland to the northwest of the peninsula of Sithonia, we have direct ancient evidence for three, Arnae,<sup>63</sup> Stolus,<sup>64</sup> and Polichne.<sup>65</sup> Of these towns, Stolus stopped

<sup>60</sup> For this interpretation of Thuc., V, 18, 6 and the emendation Γαλαῖον for Σαραῖον see the convincing arguments of A. B. West, "Thucydides V, 18, 6," *A.J.P.*, LVIII (1937), pp. 166-73; for the assessment see A 9, IV, 109-11, and A 10, V, 22-4, in *A.T.L.*, I, pp. 156 and 158.

<sup>61</sup> There may be additional evidence for Sarte in that she seems to have shared to a limited degree in the withdrawal of the Chalcidians to the interior. For down through 429/8 she regularly paid a tribute of 1500 drachmae; in her next appearance, in 421, the payment is only 100 drachmae. The reason for such a reduction, at a time when quotas were generally being raised, may lie in a withdrawal of much of the population to Olynthus during the year between the freeing of Torone by Brasidas (424/3) and its recapture (423/2). Thus the reduction would be a modified parallel to that granted Gale, Mecyberna, and Singus. Such an explanation seems preferable to supposing that Sarte remained loyal of its own accord and that the reduction in tribute was a reward for that loyalty. If such was the case, we should expect the reduction earlier, as in the case of Sane, whose tribute was reduced from one talent in 432/1 to 750 drachmae in 430/29.

<sup>62</sup> The only question might be whether Mecyberna, the port of Olynthus, was an original Chalcidic colony or was taken over along with Olynthus in 479. Its position on the coast would point to its Greek character. For a preliminary report on the excavations carried out at Mecyberna in 1934 and 1938 see G. E. Mylonas, "Excavations at Mecyberna 1934, 1938," *A.J.A.*, XLVIII (1943), pp. 78-87. He mentions the pre-Persian settlement only briefly and does not state whether there was a discernible break in the pottery in 479 as there was at Olynthus.

<sup>63</sup> Thuc., IV, 103, 1: ἐξ Ἀρνῶν τῆς Χαλκιδικῆς. Stephanus has Ἀρνη τῆς Ἐρασινίων πρὸς τῇ Θράκῃ. K. Böhnecke (*Demosthenes, Hypereides, Lykourgos* [Berlin, 1864], p. 389) emends Ἐρασινίων to Ἐρμιλίων. Arnae does not appear in the tribute lists and probably was one of the συντακτεῖς of Sermylia.

<sup>64</sup> Steph. Byz., s. v. Στῶλος· πόλις μία τῶν ἐν Θράκῃ βαρβαρικῶν ἀσμετήνεγκαν ἐκ τῶν Ἰδωνῶν οἱ Χαλκιδεῖς εἰς τὰς αὐτῶν πόλεις. In Thuc., V, 18, 5, the town is called Σκῶλος and is one of those left autonomous

paying tribute in 432/1; the other two do not appear in the lists in the years preceding. For Arnae we have further evidence in a fourth century coin<sup>66</sup> which bears the head of Apollo and a lyre, the types of the coinage of the Chalcidic League, and the inscription A P N.

There are ancient references calling three other Thracian towns Chalcidic. Two of these, Tinde<sup>67</sup> and Scapsa,<sup>68</sup> are located in the area called Crusis, which extended along the coast of the Thermaic Gulf above Potidaea to Aenea. In a description of this district, which he calls Crossaea, Herodotus<sup>69</sup> names the towns from south to north: Lipaxus, Combreia, Haesa,<sup>70</sup> Gigonus, Scapsa, Smilla, and Aenea. Although Tinde does not appear in this list we know that it was in the same district from a syntelic payment in the tribute record for 434/3 and the assessment of 421/0. Under the heading *Poles Krossidos* are grouped Tinde, Cithas, Smilla, Gigonus, and Haesa, which combined to pay 3000 drachmae. Scapsa paid 1000 drachmae by herself from 452/1 to 433/2. All of the cities of Crusis, with the exception of Aenea, joined the revolt<sup>71</sup> and defaulted. This

but tributary by the Peace of Nicias. For its position to the east of Olynthus see West, "Thucydides V, 18, 5," *A.J.P.*, LVIII (1937), pp. 157-65.

<sup>66</sup> Known only from the tribute lists; it paid with Mecyberna and Stolus in 454/3, by itself in 453/2, and is absent thereafter until the assessment of 425/4. There the ethnic, Πολ. [χνίται] παρὰ Σ[τῶλοι], establishes its location. It seems to have been a town almost as important as Stolus, judging from its tribute. Although the exact amount of its payment in 453/2 is unknown, the total paid by Polichne, Mecyberna, and Stolus in 454/3 was approximately 2½ talents. After the apotaxis, Mecyberna paid one talent and Stolus ⅔ of a talent. This leaves for Polichne about ⅓ of a talent, the same amount as for Stolus.

<sup>67</sup> B. V. Head, *Catalogue of Greek Coins in the British Museum, Macedonia, etc.* (London, 1879), p. 62.

<sup>68</sup> Steph. Byz., s. v. Τίνδη. Θράκης Χαλκιδική πόλις.

<sup>69</sup> Steph. Byz., s. v. Κάψα. πόλις Χαλκιδικῆς χώρας κατὰ Παλλήνην, δμορούσα τῷ Θερμαϊῳ Κολπῷ. Scapsa is the form given by the tribute lists; it is the same town as the Capsa of Stephanus and the Campsa of Herodotus.

<sup>70</sup> VII, 123, 2.

<sup>71</sup> The text of Herodotus has Lisae, but this probably is a corruption of the Haesa known from the tribute lists; *A.T.L.*, I, p. 466.

<sup>72</sup> See Thuc., II, 79, 3-4, where peltasts from Crusis are found aiding

fact and the two references from Stephanus mentioned above are the only evidence we have for the nationality of these cities;<sup>72</sup> as far as it goes, it points to a Chalcidic origin.<sup>73</sup> But since we do not know what sources Stephanus used,<sup>74</sup> we can only say that probably the towns of Crusis, except Aenea, were colonies of Chalcis.<sup>75</sup> That they were separated from the other Chalcidic colonies may be explained by the coming of the Bottiae in the seventh or sixth century, which was later than the Chalcidic colonization in Thrace.<sup>76</sup> Pressure from the Bot-

the Chalcidians and Bottiae against the Athenians: καὶ οἱ μὲν ὀπλῖται τῶν Χαλκιδέων καὶ ἐπίκουροι τίνες μετ' αὐτῶν νικῶνται ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἀναχωροῦσιν ἐς τὴν Σπάρτων, οἱ δὲ ἵππης τῶν Χαλκιδέων καὶ ψιλοὶ νικῶσι τοὺς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἵππεας καὶ ψιλούς. εἰχον δέ τινας οὐ πολλοὺς πελαστὰς ἐξ τῆς Κρουνίδος γῆς καλούμενης. The subject of εἰχον is not clear, but the whole tenor of the passage inclines one to believe that it is οἱ Χαλκιδεῖς. That these cities stopped paying tribute makes that interpretation certain.

<sup>72</sup> Stephanus calls Haesa, Smilla, Gigonus, and Lipaxus simply πόλεις Θράκης. Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Ant. Rom.*, I, 47 and 49) says that the inhabitants were Thracian, but he is speaking of the time that Aeneas visited the area. The founding of Aenea is lost in the Aeneas story, but apparently it was not Ionic. Its earliest coins have the non-Ionic form *Alneas* and *Alneiatow*, which later became Ionic *Alneētaw*; Gähler, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-7, nos. 1, 5, 8, and 10.

<sup>73</sup> The authors of *A.T.L.* (III, p. 317) call Crusis "the Bottic coast or Bottike" and so seem to be thinking of its inhabitants as Bottiae; but elsewhere (III, p. 217) they make a distinction between the two districts. It seems to me that an ethnical difference is the most logical reason for two contiguous areas having different names.

<sup>74</sup> If the source was Theopompus, as Kahrstedt (*op. cit.*, pp. 441-2) thinks it was for most of Stephanus' information regarding the Thracian cities, we could be almost sure that the towns were Chalcidic. But the possibility remains that the source was a late one which applied the word Chalcidice to any town on the peninsula.

<sup>75</sup> It seems justifiable to consider all of the towns, except Aenea, the same ethnically, because of their syntelic payments of tribute and their joint action in the revolt. Aenea, which was the northern boundary of Crusis (*A.T.L.*, I, pp. 464-5), apparently remained loyal to Athens of her own accord; her tribute was reduced from three talents in 432/1 to 1000 drachmae in 430/29. That Aenea, a non-Ionic city (see above, note 72), alone of the cities of Crusis remained loyal may be indicative of the nationality of the revolting towns.

<sup>76</sup> See E. Oberhummer, *s.v.* Bottia, in *R-E.*, V, col. 794.

tiaeī would also explain why these towns remained relatively unimportant.

The other Thracian city called Chalcidic is Miltorus, which is so named by Theopompus.<sup>77</sup> Such a citation from the fourth century seems to assure the nationality of the town, but there is some question as to its location. The authors of *A. T. L.*, because of a similarity of tribute records, put Miltorus in a group with Othorus, Chedrolus, and Pharbelus, located "in the interior of the Chalcidic peninsula."<sup>78</sup> However, there is some doubt as to whether Miltorus belongs with the other three cities. All of these towns seem to have joined the revolt, but we have no direct evidence for their location. We do know, however, that Pharbelus was a colony of Eretria.<sup>79</sup> The only other Eretrian colony in the revolt, while that city's more important foundations on Pallene remained loyal to Athens, was Dicaea, which was probably situated just north of Aenea.<sup>80</sup> It is natural to look for Pharbelus in that general area, perhaps a bit inland. From their tribute records Othorus and Chedrolus would belong in the same district as Pharbelus.<sup>81</sup> Miltorus may possibly have been there too, but it is not necessary to insist upon it. For along with these four towns, in the rubrics which influenced the authors of *A. T. L.* to group them, is Gale, if, as seems probable, the restoration is correct.<sup>82</sup> Now we know that Gale was situated in Sithonia, and furthermore the tribute record of Miltorus is closer to Gale's than to that of Othorus, Chedrolus, and Pharbelus. For the latter towns had all paid tribute at an earlier period before they appear in the special rubric, whereas both Miltorus and Gale appear for the first time in the rubric. Therefore it is very possible that Miltorus was located inland near Sithonia and was not close to the other three towns.

<sup>77</sup> Steph. Byz., s. v. Μίλτωρος· Χαλκιδικὴ πόλις ἐν Θράκη . . . Θεόπομπος κε' Φιλιππικῶν (Theopompus, frag. 152 [Jacoby]).

<sup>78</sup> *A. T. L.*, III, p. 82.

<sup>79</sup> Steph. Byz., s. v.: πόλις Ἐρετριέων.

<sup>80</sup> See *A. T. L.*, I, pp. 482-3. Dicaea is absent from the full Thracian panel in 432/1, but in 430/29 and 429/8 she appears with Methone and Haeson in a special rubric as having paid only the quota. This seems to indicate an Athenian concession to regain her loyalty.

<sup>81</sup> See *A. T. L.*, III, pp. 61-3 and 81-7.

<sup>82</sup> *A. T. L.*, III, p. 80.

There are thirteen other towns in the Thracian Chalcidice which we know, from the tribute lists, revolted in 432/1; but participation in the revolt is in itself not sufficient to show that a town was Chalcidic, for the Bottiae, as well as the cities at the head of the Thermaic Gulf, were also concerned. In looking for Chalcidic cities among the thirteen towns we may eliminate from consideration Spartolus, Aeoleion, Pleume, and Sinus, which were Bottic.<sup>83</sup> There are six cities which seem to have been located at or near the head of the Thermaic Gulf. Members of this group, regardless of their nationality, were undoubtedly forced into the revolt by their exposure to the power of Perdiccas. Such is probably the explanation for the surprising appearance of two Eretrian colonies, Dicaea and Pharbelus,<sup>84</sup> among the rebels, even though the more important Eretrian colonies on Pallene remained loyal to Athens. We have seen that Othorus and Chedrolus belong in the same district as Pharbelus,<sup>85</sup> and they too may have been Eretrian. The other two cities at the head of the gulf were Strepsa and Serme, for the nationality of which we have no evidence.<sup>86</sup>

The other three rebels in 432, Pistasus, Phegetus, and Scabla, are still to be accounted for. We cannot even approximate the position of Pistasus, as it appears only in the list for 434/3 and in the assessment of 421/0. It may have been Chalcidic,

<sup>83</sup> For Spartolus, Aeoleion, and Pleume, see *A.T.L.*, I, Gazetteer, s.vv.; Pleume is considered Bottic because of the similarity of its tribute record with that of Aeoleion. For Sinus see C. F. Edson, "Notes on the Thracian 'Phoros,'" *C.P.*, XLII (1947), pp. 104-5, and *A.T.L.*, II, p. 87.

<sup>84</sup> See above, notes 79 and 80.

<sup>85</sup> See above, p. 371.

<sup>86</sup> See the Gazetteer in *A.T.L.*, I, pp. 546 and 550-1. The location of these towns and the equation of Serme with Therme have been attacked (A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, I [Oxford, 1945], pp. 213-18; Edson, *op. cit.*, pp. 100-4), but the editors of *A.T.L.* seem to have defended successfully their original proposals (*A.T.L.*, III, pp. 220-1 and 314-16). As for the nationality of these towns, the only bit of evidence we have is the statement of Eudoxus (below, p. 375, note 103) that the Thermaic Gulf was also called Chalcis. If we could trust this, we should expect some of the cities in this area to be Chalcidic.

Bottic, or of some other race if it was located near Macedonia.<sup>87</sup> The location of Phegetus is likewise uncertain, although it usually appears in the tribute lists with the peoples of the Chalcidice. West<sup>88</sup> suggested that the town was situated in the district of Olynthus, Scabla, and Assera. If this is so, it probably was Chalcidic, but there is no proof.<sup>89</sup>

Scabla presents a special problem. It paid tribute with Olynthus and Assera in 454/3 and thereafter by itself until 432/1. Its grouping with Olynthus and Assera places it somewhere to the north of the peninsula of Sithonia.<sup>90</sup> It has commonly been equated with Σκάβαλα, χώρα Ἐρετριέων, quoted from Theopompus<sup>91</sup> by Stephanus, and so considered an Eretrian colony.<sup>92</sup> No one, however, has pointed out the difficulty involved in explaining the existence of an Eretrian colony in Sithonia, an area otherwise exclusively Chalcidic, its participation in the revolt of 432, and its syntelic payment with two Chalcidic cities. A glance at the fragments of Book XXIV of Theopompus<sup>93</sup> casts further doubt on the identity of Scabala and Scabla. Of the six fragments the first two mention cities in Macedonia and Thrace, the third speaks of a χωρίον Εύβοιας, the fourth mentions fighting in Euboea near Eretria, the fifth names a χωρίον Ἐρετριέων, and the last calls Scabala a χώρα Ἐρετριέων.<sup>94</sup> It is clear that the book dealt with fighting in

<sup>87</sup> Steph. Byz., s. v. Πίστιρος: ἐμπόριον Θράκης, may refer to Pistasus. If so, an ἐμπόριον was more likely to have been on the coast, and therefore not Bottic.

<sup>88</sup> Cf. Gude, *op. cit.*, p. 9, note 7.

<sup>89</sup> See A. T. L., I, p. 560, where its position is left uncertain.

<sup>90</sup> See A. T. L., I, p. 549.

<sup>91</sup> Frag. 151 (Jacoby).

<sup>92</sup> Geyer, *op. cit.*, p. 12; West, *History of the Chalcidic League*, p. 7, note 6; A. T. L., I, p. 549. I. Svoronos, *Journ. Int. d'Arch. Num.*, XV (1913), pp. 233-4, ignores the evidence of the tribute lists and places Scabla near Neapolis far to the east on the Thracian coast, basing his argument on the analogy of its name with that of the modern town of Kavalla.

<sup>93</sup> Frags. 146-51 (Jacoby).

<sup>94</sup> Frag. 146: Βαίτιον· πόλις Μακεδονίας. Frag. 147: "Ασσηρα· οὐδετέρως· πόλις Χαλκιδέων. Frag. 148: "Αρης· "Αρητος . . . χωρίον Εύβοιας. Frag. 149: ἀποστήσας δὲ τοὺς ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ περιουσίᾳ τῶν Ἐρετριέων ἐστράτευσεν ἐπὶ πόλιν Δίστον. Frag. 150: "Οκαλον· χωρίον Ἐρετριέων. Frag. 151: Σκάβαλα· χώρα Ἐρετριέων.

Euboea (represented by frags. 148-9) as well as with events in Thrace (frags. 146-7); and it is much more likely that the last two citations are from the section which concerned Euboea. Χώρα and χωρίον are strange words to apply to colonies,<sup>95</sup> but they are not surprising in a detailed description of military operations in the vicinity of Eretria. On this supposition there is in the fragment of Theopompus no evidence for Scabala as an Eretrian colony; it merely testifies that there was a district or a town with a similar name near Eretria. On the other hand, the evidence that the northern Scabla was Chalcidic, namely, its position, its participation in the revolt, and especially its tribute payment along with Olynthus and Assera, is stronger than any similarity of names. West,<sup>96</sup> although elsewhere<sup>97</sup> he considers Scabla to be Eretrian, makes the plausible suggestion that the joint payment in 454/3 shows an incipient union of the Chalcidians, while the individual payments by the same towns in 453/2 reflect an Athenian policy of breaking up such combinations. With this dissolution he connects the change of the legend on Olynthiac coins from ΔΑΛΚ to ΟΔVN.<sup>98</sup> If this theory is correct, Scabla must have been Chalcidic, for certainly no Eretrian city would join in a political union with Chalcidic towns and use a common coinage so marked. But even if this interpretation of the Olynthiac coinage is not accepted,<sup>99</sup> the weight of the evidence points to Scabla as a colony of Chalcis.

Finally, there are three towns, appearing in the tribute lists only in the assessments, which may have been Chalcidic. One of these, Zereia, was probably mentioned by Diodorus<sup>100</sup> as a fort taken by Philip when he was attacking the Chalcidians. Another, Thestorus, is mentioned by Theopompus<sup>101</sup> in a book which described the beginning of the war between Philip and

<sup>95</sup> We should expect πόλις. Stephanus uses this word for Pharbelus, which was probably smaller than Scabla. It paid a tribute of only 1000 drachmae as compared to Scabla's 3000.

<sup>96</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 12-13.

<sup>97</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 7, note 6.

<sup>98</sup> See above, p. 363.

<sup>99</sup> See above, p. 363, note 38.

<sup>100</sup> XVI, 52, 9. See *A. T. L.*, I, pp. 488-9.

<sup>101</sup> Frag. 142 (Jacoby), from Book XXII of the *Philippica*.

the Chalcidians. And the third, Cossaea, was assessed along with the cities of the Chalcidice in 425/4.<sup>102</sup>

This completes the list of towns in Thrace for which we have any evidence of Chalcidic origin.<sup>103</sup> In summary, we have twelve cities which were certainly Chalcidic: Torone, Assera, Pilorus, Singus, Gale, Mecyberna, Sarte, Sermylia, Arnae, Stolus, Polichne, and Miltorus; a group of thirteen which were probably Chalcidic: Tinde, Scapsa, Cithas, Smilla, Gigonus, Haesa, Lipaxus, Combreia, Phegetus, Scabla, Pistasus, Zereia, and Thestorus; and five for which we have no evidence of origin, some of which may have been Chalcidic: Cossaea, Strepsa, Serme, Chedrolus, and Othorus.

Undoubtedly all of these towns, especially those inland, were not founded directly from Chalcis; many were settled from the original colonies.<sup>104</sup> Although there is no direct evidence to

<sup>102</sup> A9, III, 172, in *A.T.L.*, I, p. 120. The town is called Θράκης πολίχνιαν by Stephanus, *s. v.*

<sup>103</sup> There are, however, two others which have erroneously been called Chalcidic. The Διακρεῖς ἀπὸ Χαλκιδέων of the tribute lists are referred to the Thracian region by Kahrstedt (*op. cit.*, pp. 421-3). However, he is undoubtedly wrong, since they appear in the Insular panel in the assessment of 425/4; see A 9, I, 83-4, in *A.T.L.*, I, p. 156, and the geographical discussion, pp. 480-1.

Stephanus (*s. v. Χαλκίς*) speaks of a city called Chalcis on Athos: ἔστι καὶ ἐν Ἀθῷ ἀλλη Χαλκίς, ὡς Εὔδοξος τετάρτῳ “μετὰ δὲ τὸν Ἀθω μέχρι Παλλήνης, ἡ ἐπὶ θάτερα πεπόληκε κόλπον βαθὺν καὶ πλατύν Χαλκίδα ἐπονομαζόμενον.” How Stephanus found a reference to a city on Athos in this quotation is impossible to explain, and it is most probable that no such city existed, since both Herodotus (VII, 22, 3) and Thueydides (IV, 109, 3) give lists of the cities on Athos, in which Chalcis does not appear. In the quotation from Eudoxus, Chalcis is surely the name of a gulf, but which gulf is meant is not certain. Oberhummer (*s. v. Chalkis*, 9, *R.-E.*, VI, cols. 2089-90) thinks it includes both the Toronic and Singic Gulfs, while F. Gisinger (*Die Erdbeschreibung des Eudoxos von Knidos* [Berlin, 1921], pp. 79-80) refers it to both the Toronic and Thermaic. But since the first section of the quotation, μετὰ δὲ τὸν Ἀθω μέχρι Παλλήνης, seems to have been lifted from its context, it shows us only that the description is being given from east to west, and in this case it must refer to the western side of Pallene and so to the Thermaic Gulf only.

<sup>104</sup> This was the case in the West, where Chalcidians from Naxus founded Leontini and Catana; Thuc., VI, 3.

indicate which were the original foundations, it seems obvious that they would be Torone and the other cities near the coast, both on Sithonia and in the area north of Pallene. Torone was the leading Chalcidic town in Thrace until the rise of Olynthiac power in the fourth century, as is shown by the fact that the leader of the Chalcidic founders of Olynthus was one of her citizens,<sup>105</sup> and by the amount of her regular tribute, which was six talents, as compared to two for Olynthus. Chalcidic expansion inland was probably gradual and accomplished first by expelling the native Sithonians and Edonians.<sup>106</sup> We know too that the Chalcidians penetrated to a certain degree into the peninsula of Athos, which, except for the Andrian-Chalcidian colony of Sane, had been populated mostly by barbarians.<sup>107</sup> The center of these Chalcidians in Athos, who came directly from Euboea, must have been Cleonae, since we learn from Heraclides Ponticus that the town was settled by Chalcidians from Elymnion, which we know was an island near, or a district in, Euboea.<sup>108</sup> Probably the number of barbarians on Athos, driven

<sup>105</sup> Herodotus, VIII, 127.

<sup>106</sup> See Steph. Byz., s. v. Στράλος (quoted above, note 64).

<sup>107</sup> Thuc., IV, 109, 3.

<sup>108</sup> Frag. 31 (Müller): κατώκισαν δὲ καὶ Κλεωπὰς Χαλκιδεῖς ἐν τῷ Ἀθῷ, ἔξαναστάντες ἐξ Ἐλυμνίου, ὡς μυθολογοῦσιν, ὑπὸ μνῶν, οἱ τὰ τ' ἄλλα κατήσθιον αὐτῶν καὶ τὸν σιδηρὸν. All the manuscripts except A, C, and d read Χαλκιδεῖς οἱ ἐν τῷ Ἀθῷ, but all except A, C, and p (*in marg.*) omit the section ἔξαναστάντες . . . μυθολογοῦσιν. Although he does not seem to have investigated the manuscripts very carefully, Müller (*F. G. H.*, II, p. 201) states that A and C are among the best and he accepts the reading given above (*op. cit.*, p. 222). The *οἱ* probably came into the text after the loss of the following phrase; we can draw no conclusions on the basis of grammatical neatness in an excerpt of this kind. For Ἐλύμνιον Stephanus (*s. v.*) gives νῆσος Εὐβόλας πόλιν ἔχονσα, and a scholiast to Aristophanes (*Pax*, 1126) says: Καλλιστρατός φησι τόπον Εὐβόλας τὸ Ἐλύμνιον. Ἀπολλάνιος δὲ ναὸν φησι εἶναι πλησίον Εὐβοίας. . . . μέμνηται καὶ Σοφοκλῆς “πρὸς πέτραις Ἐλύμνιαις” καὶ ἐν Ναυπλίῳ “νυμφικὸν Ἐλύμνιον.” It could have been either an island or a district near Chalcis, and there is no inconsistency in the story of Chalcidians coming from there. However, on the ground that Pomponius Mela (II, 2, 30) mentions a town Echinia near Acanthus, it has been common to emend (e.g., Harrison, *op. cit.*, p. 165; West, *op. cit.*, p. 6, note 5) the text of Heraclides to read Ἐχυμνίου, thus making the Chalcidians come to Cleonae from Thrace, not Euboea. Although this emendation may not be

there from the rest of Thrace, prevented Cleonae from becoming an exclusively Chalcidic town, as it did not join the rest of the Chalcidic colonies in the revolt of 432.

We know the Chalcidians had a hand in settling three more cities in Thrace, but in these cases they went out under the official leadership of Andros. The three colonies were Sane, Acanthus, and Stageirus, situated to the north of Athos along the east coast of the Chalcidic peninsula. We know from Thucydides<sup>109</sup> that these were all officially Andrian, but Plutarch<sup>110</sup> tells of the joint capture of Sane from the barbarians by Andrians and Chalcidians and of their seizure of deserted Acanthus. A dispute over the ownership of the latter city arose because a Chalcidian had reached the city first but had been beaten by an Andrian spear hurled into the gate. The city was awarded to the Andrians by a board of arbitration, with Samos and Erythrae supporting Andros, while Paros sided with Chalcis. There is no reason to doubt the essential details of the story,<sup>111</sup> which is given credence by the fact that the states involved in it are known from other sources to have been on friendly terms earlier in the seventh century—a condition implied both by the joint colonization and the arbitration.<sup>112</sup> For Chalcidians in Stageirus we have only one ancient reference; Dionysius of Halicarnassus<sup>113</sup> states that Aristotle's mother was a descendant of one of those who led colonists to that city from Chalcis.

too difficult palaeographically, it is certainly unwarranted when made only to fit a preconceived notion that these Chalcidians should have come from Thrace and when the existence of Elymnion in Euboea is better attested than that of Echymnion in Thrace.

<sup>109</sup> IV, 84, 1 (for Acanthus); 88, 2 (for Stageirus); 109, 3 (for Sane).

<sup>110</sup> *Aetia Graeca*, 30.

<sup>111</sup> See W. R. Halliday, *The Greek Questions of Plutarch* (Oxford, 1928), p. 140. Gwynn, *op. cit.*, p. 102, speaks of Eretrians and Andrians settling in these two cities, but he cites as evidence "Plut. Qu. Gr. 57," which deals with Megara and Samos; 57 must be a misprint for 30. He later mentions Eretria's domination of Andros (Strabo, X, 1, 10) and probably had this in mind.

<sup>112</sup> For the evidence on the alignment of the Greek states in the first half of the seventh century, see my article, "The Lelantine War and Pheidon of Argos," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXVIII (1947), pp. 230-4.

<sup>113</sup> Ηρόδος "Αμματον," 5.

Since, according to Eusebius,<sup>114</sup> Acanthus and Stageirus were founded in the same year, these two cities and Sane must have been the result of the same joint expedition. Another indication of Chalcidian activity in the same region is the town near Lake Bolbe named Arethusa,<sup>115</sup> probably after the famous fountain in Chalcis.<sup>116</sup> The date given by Eusebius for the founding of Acanthus and Stageirus is Ol. 31, 2 (655/4).<sup>117</sup> We cannot rely on this, however, since the chronology of Eusebius was probably based on a forty-year generation, as Burn has pointed out,<sup>118</sup> and so was inflated. It is likely that the date of the founding of the two cities should be placed about twenty years later, ca. 635.

For the date of the strictly Chalcidian colonies in Thrace we have no direct ancient evidence. The dates mentioned above for the joint Andrian-Chalcidian settlements do not help, for these towns, judging from their position, would be the last settled in the Chalcidice, and the subordinate position of the Chalcidians in their founding clearly points to a different era from that of direct colonization from Chalcis. We are forced, then, to fall back on the probabilities<sup>119</sup> and bits of contributory evidence, on the basis of which the most likely period for the settlements in Thrace is early in the eighth century. Now we know that in the last third of this century, after the founding of Sicilian Naxus about 736, Chalcis was engaged in much colonizing activity in the West.<sup>120</sup> It is most improbable that

<sup>114</sup> In the Latin version of Hieronymus, edited by J. K. Fotheringham (London, 1923), p. 167.

<sup>115</sup> Strabo, VII, frag. 36; Steph. Byz., s. v.; Ammianus Marcellinus, XXVII, 4, 8.

<sup>116</sup> Ion of Chios, frag. 17 (Müller); Strabo, X, 1, 13; Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, IV, 12, 21; Athenaeus, VII, 278e; Steph. Byz., s. v.

<sup>117</sup> See above, note 114.

<sup>118</sup> A. R. Burn, "Dates in Early Greek History," *J. H. S.*, LV (1935), p. 141.

<sup>119</sup> No one, of course, can claim that these probabilities will always give us the right answer, but they will be correct most of the time and we are forced to fall back on them when we have no other evidence. For a discussion of the problem, see R. M. Cook, "Ionia and Greece, 800-600 B. C.," *J. H. S.*, LXVI (1946), pp. 70-4.

<sup>120</sup> See Thucydides' account of the western colonization in VI, 3-5. The dating of these cities is based on computations made from Thucydides' account and depends ultimately on his statement (VI, 4, 2) that Megara

colonists would be sent both north and west concurrently, and it is reasonable to assume that the Thraceward region, being nearer Greece proper, was settled first.<sup>121</sup> This would place the Thracian colonies some time before 736, but we know, too, that the Chalcidians founded Cumae in Italy even earlier than this.<sup>122</sup> Cumae can be dated only by the archaeological finds, which prove that it was earlier than Naxus, but which can place it only roughly in the second quarter of the eighth century. If it was founded late in this period, that is, about 750, that would push the Thracian colonies back before that date. If it was earlier, about 775, the continued sending of colonists to Thrace might be the explanation of this rather long lapse between the opening of the West and the extensive colonization there. But

Hyblaea stood 245 years before its destruction by Gelon. The date is only approximate because we do not know the exact year of either the founding or destruction of Megara Hyblaea. For a complete discussion of the question see G. Busolt, "Bemerkungen über die Gründungsdata der Griechischen Colonien in Sizilien und Unteritalien," *Rh. Mus.*, XL (1885), pp. 466-9. The chronology of the archaeological finds in the West also rests on Thucydides' account, which has been accepted as trustworthy by B. Schweitzer, "Geometrische Stile in Griechenland," *Ath. Mitt.*, XLIII (1918), pp. 6-49; K. Johansen, *Las Vases Sicyoniens* (Paris, 1923), pp. 179-85; H. Payne, *Necrocorinthia* (Oxford, 1931), pp. 21-7; and K. M. T. Atkinson, "Two Tomb-Groups from Selinus," *P. B. S. R.*, XIV (1938), pp. 115-46.

<sup>121</sup> Cook, *op. cit.*, p. 71, argues the opposite, that "it is possible that the two streams of Chalcidian emigration were not contemporary, and the settlement in Chalcidice did not begin till settlement in the West had stopped." His reasoning is that "since the West was much more promising than Chalcidice, one would expect her (Chalcis) to have concentrated there as long as she could." But on this same assumption, one could better argue that the Thracian colonies were earlier, since Chalcis would continue settling the more promising West once she had started there; there was no lack of sites to make her turn to the North.

<sup>122</sup> Strabo, V, 4, 4; Thuc., VI, 4, 5; Livy, VIII, 22, 5-6. The traditional date, given by Eusebius, about 1050 B.C., cannot stand; it is obviously a confusion with the founding date of Aeolic Cumae. For the dating of Cumae in the second quarter of the eighth century from the archaeological finds, see A. Blakeway, "Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Commerce with the West, 800-600 B.C.," *B. S. A.*, XXXIII (1932-1933), p. 200, note 3. It should be noted that the exact dating is only relative and depends on Thucydides' chronology for the founding of the western colonies.

it seems more likely that the Chalcidians turned to the West after the sites in the Chalcidice were for the most part taken. There are two bits of evidence which support this early dating. One is the confused tradition which places the founding of Torone both before and after the Trojan War.<sup>123</sup> In fact, the very lack of any traditional dates for the northern colonies points to their having been founded early; the Chalcidice is the only area for which we have no such dates.<sup>124</sup> The other bit of evidence is the fact that the Thracian colonies sent aid to Chalcis during the Lelantine War.<sup>125</sup> If that war took place in the first half of the seventh century, as I have argued elsewhere,<sup>126</sup> this sending of aid would push the foundation of these colonies back into the eighth century. For there must have been a rather long interval during which these cities could have become well established and strong enough to dispatch help. By itself, this evidence is not compelling, but it is all we have, and, along with the general probabilities, it indicates that the Chalcidian colonization in Thrace took place at some indefinite time early in the eighth century. More exact knowledge must await the excavation of Torone, or some similar site.

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<sup>123</sup> See Steph. Byz., s. v. Τορώνη· πόλις Θράκης, ἀπὸ Τορώνης, τῆς Πρωτέως ἡ Ποσειδῶνος καὶ Φοινίκης. ἔστι καὶ ἄλλη Τορώνη μετὰ Τρολαν κτισθεῖσα. But there was only one Torone, to which both of these traditions must belong.

<sup>124</sup> For the traditional dates of colonies in all regions, see Cook, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-8, especially the table on p. 77. It seems to me that the statement made above is stronger than the usual argument from silence because of the fact that we have dates from all other regions except the Chalcidice.

<sup>125</sup> Aristotle, frag. 98, from Plutarch, *Amatorius*, 17.

<sup>126</sup> T.A.P.A., LXXVIII (1947), pp. 230-4.

## 'ΑΛΛΑ' IN LYSIAS AND PLATO'S *PHAEDRUS*.

There is no doubt that Lysias can be read with pleasure and profit without our having from first to last any more definite notion about the Greek word *ἀλλά* than that it means something like the English "but." However, some pleasant remarks of E. M. Forster's on "but" may suggest the interest of further inquiry into *ἀλλά*.<sup>1</sup>

To refer to my own work again, I have certainly benefited by being advised not to use the word "but" so often. I have had a university education, you see, and it disposes one to overwork that particular conjunction. It is the strength of the academic mind to be fair and see both sides of a question. It is its weakness to be timid and to suffer from that fear-of-giving-oneself-away disease of which Samuel Butler speaks. Both its strength and its weakness incline it to the immoderate use of "but." A good many "buts" have occurred in this paper, but not as many as if I hadn't been warned. The writer of the opposed type, the extrovert, the man who knows what he knows and likes what he likes, and doesn't care who knows it—he should doubtless be subject to the opposite discipline; he should be criticized because he never uses "but"; he should be tempted to employ the qualifying clause. The man who has a legal mind should probably go easy on his "if's." Fiddling little matters. Yes, I know. The sort of trifling help which criticism can give the artist. She cannot help him in great matters.

Clearly, one may count on Forster to be saying, among other things, that some matters of style may be spoken of quantitatively,—that is, counted, without respect for the unique instance.

Does Lysias use *ἀλλά* too often? We can accuse him of neither timidity, nor a university education, nor fair-mindedness. But he uses *ἀλλά* more than twice as often as Thucydides does, and Thucydides, though his literary courage is seldom questioned,

<sup>1</sup> E. M. Forster, "On Criticism in the Arts, Especially Music," *Harper's Magazine*, July, 1947.

is often thought of as fair-minded. The explanation is, of course, what some schoolboys know: that ἀλλά implies "on the contrary" much more often than it implies simply "but." There is nothing timid about this most frequent use of ἀλλά; in some cases it cannot even be translated "but." Here is an example from Lysias' *Against Eratosthenes*: "as though he were the cause of much good, and not of great evil"—*ῶσπερ πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰτίου, ἀλλ' οὐ μεγάλων κακῶν γεγενημένου* (XII, 64). On the other hand, ἀλλά in Isocrates occurs 25% more often than in Lysias. The three authors compare as follows: Thucydides, 27 instances per 1000 lines; Lysias, 67 per 1000; and Isocrates, 84 per 1000.<sup>2</sup> The frequency of ἀλλά in Lysias, then, is at least not extreme.

The figures given above for the three authors are of a rough and ready nature, and are not strictly comparable; however, the error involved would tend to bring them together rather than to separate them. The figure for Thucydides is higher than it should be because it is derived from von Essens's index, which is unclassified; thus the figure includes all instances of the spellings ἀλλά and ἀλλ'. The figures for Lysias and Isocrates, on the other hand, are in the first case my own collection and in the second from Preuss' classified index, so that here I have included only instances of simple connective ἀλλά. This means that the following have not been counted for Isocrates and Lysias: ἀλλ' ἢ "except" or "except that"; "combinations"<sup>3</sup> like ἀλλὰ γάρ and ἀλλ' οὖν; apodotic ἀλλά (five cases in Isocrates, none in Lysias), and adverbial ἀλλά (one case in Lysias, none in Isocrates). In any event the inclusion of these instances would not change the relative frequencies appreciably.

I have already given an example of what I have claimed is the most frequent use of ἀλλά—"good, not evil" was the gist of it. Much more often the negative comes before the ἀλλά, as "Don't lie; tell the whole story"—ψεύσῃ δὲ μηδέν, ἀλλὰ πάντα τάληθῇ λέγε

<sup>2</sup> Thucydides, 481 instances in 17,744 lines (estimated) in the Oxford Classical Text. Lysias, 454 instances in 6748 lines (actual count) in the OCT. Isocrates, 1185 instances in 16,249 Teubner lines (estimated), roughly equivalent to 14,100 OCT lines. Figures for Lysias include neither XI (epitome of X) nor the fragments.

<sup>3</sup> See J. D. Denniston, *The Greek Particles*, Introd., pp. li-lv.

(I, 18). In these cases an idea is contrasted with its logical opposite. Even where the negative idea is not the necessary opposite of the positive idea, it is quite useful to the orator to make it seem so, as "so that you might vote not the city's advantage, but the tyrants' wishes"—*ἴνα . . . ὑμεῖς . . . μὴ τὰ τῇ πόλει συμφέροντα ἔλοισθε, ἀλλὰ τάκείνοις δοκοῦντα ψηφίσαισθε* (XII, 72). Thus, when in Lysis IV, 19 we find "I at least have done nothing of this sort (harming anyone)—ἀλλά—I run the most unreasonable risk—ἀλογώτατον πάντων κινδυνεύω—of incurring far greater calamity thanks to these persons," our feeling for English would lead us to translate "and yet," a balancing adversative:<sup>4</sup> "I have harmed no one, and yet, fantastically enough, I am likely to suffer far worse than the injury I am charged with." But I do not think that this is what the Greek says: since ἀλλά habitually rules out one idea with the help of a negative and substitutes another for it, I think the feeling of the Greek sentence under discussion is rather this: "I have done no harm; on the contrary, it is utterly fantastic that I should run this risk." One observes that we can do the same thing in English: doing harm is not always "the contrary" of running an unreasonable, i. e. undeserved, risk, but it can be made so in this case. Let me quote the Greek sentence in full: *οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔμοιγέ ἐστι τοιοῦτον πεπραγμένον, ἀλλ' ἀλογώτατον πάντων κινδυνεύω πολὺ μείζω συμφορὰν ἔμαυτῷ διὰ τούτους ἐπαγαγέσθαι.* I think one must agree that the second interpretation makes a stronger appeal to the jury than the first.

Sometimes the problem is not to discover whether one idea is or is not meant to eliminate the other, but rather to discover how much of the sentence is ruled out by the negative combined with ἀλλά, as in the following sentence from Lysis' *Against Andocides*: *ἄξιοī δὲ οὐχ ὡς ἡδικηκὼς ἡσυχίαν ἔχων πολιτεύεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ἔξευρὼν τὸν τὴν πόλιν ἀδικήσαντας, οὗτος διανοεῖται, καὶ παρασκευάζεται ὅπως ἐτέρων μεῖζον δυνήσεται, . . .* (VI, 34). Here is the Loeb version of this: "He claims a quiet enjoyment of his citizenship, as though he were no wrong-doer, nay, with the air of having himself discovered the injurers of the city; and he plans to have more power than other men," etc. The

<sup>4</sup> This is the sense of the Loeb translation.

Budé translators treat the passage similarly. Isn't the meaning rather that he does *not* claim quiet citizenship, as a wrong-doer might, but on the contrary thinks of himself as a benefactor of the state and seeks to be a power in it? The main point, however, is that *ἀλλά* tends to substitute what is true for what is not, even in cases where we would see a more balanced opposition. Even in the two cases in Lysias where *ἀλλά* is preceded by a *μέν*<sup>5</sup> in the same sentence, the first idea is negative, and substitution and balance both seem to be present; for example, "I am not greatly surprised at what (*ὅσα μὲν*) they say about the dead, but rather at what lies (*ἀλλ' ὅσα*) they try to tell about the living" (XIX, 49). What they say about the dead balances what they say about the living while surprise substitutes for the lack of it. Incidentally, this rather rare locution, occurring, as it does, twice in the space of a page, may act as a characteristic, as a bit of ethos, for the speaker of the 19th speech.

'*Αλλά* then tends to substitute what is true for what is not. This is not a new idea; indeed it is the basis of Denniston's treatment of this particle. What I would emphasize is the extreme frequency of this "eliminative" use. If we may assume, and I think we may, that the effect of substitution is present in all cases where connective *ἀλλά* is associated with a negative in the same sentence, then 80% of the instances of *ἀλλά* in Lysias, and 95% in Isocrates, are of this type. In Book I of Thucydides, examined as a supplementary check, 90% of all instances of *ἀλλά* are associated with negatives in the same sentence, and substitute the true for the false.<sup>6</sup> Denniston implies that this holds true for Greek as a whole, saying that *ἀλλά* is "usually strong (eliminative or objecting): less frequently, the particle is employed as a weaker (balancing) adversative."<sup>7</sup> What may this mean about the Greek language? In the first place, the use seems uneconomical. Why say the same thing twice, as it were, once negatively and once positively?

As a matter of fact, there is reason to believe that this use

<sup>5</sup> XIX, 47, 49.

<sup>6</sup> Lysias: 369 of 454 instances; Thuc. I: 88 of 97 instances; Isocrates: 1121 of 1185 instances.

<sup>7</sup> *The Greek Particles*, p. 1.

is less favored in ordinary narrative. The following table compares its frequency per 1000 lines in the narrative portions of the Lysianic speeches and Thucydides, Book I, on the one hand, with its frequency in the speeches of Thucydides I and the proems, arguments, and epilogues of Lysias on the other. The figures for Lysias II, the funeral speech, are given separately. The narrative portion of this speech, 410 of its 500 lines, is written in an artificial style very different from Lysias' ordinary narratives, for its purpose is epideictic rather than informative, and its use of *ἀλλά* reflects this, at least, if not alien authorship also.

TABLE \*

	NARRATIVE	NON-NARRATIVE
Lysias (omitting II)	45	58
Lysias II	51	33
Thucydides I	22	58

According to statistical theory, the difference shown in the first line of the table would have only a moderate degree of significance,<sup>9</sup> but its agreement with the undoubtedly significant difference in the frequencies for Thucydides implies that in Lysias also the variation is not due to chance. Of course, little importance should be attached to the frequency for the non-narrative part of Lysias II: the sample is too small. At all events we may conclude (1) that while "narrative" may, on occasion, make considerable use of eliminative *ἀλλά*, as it does in Lysias II, it will not do so ordinarily, and (2) that there is an affinity between this use of *ἀλλά* and speech-making (cf. Isocrates, Lysias, and Thucydides' speeches on the one hand, and Thucydides' narrative on the other).

\* The frequencies in this table are based on the following figures:

	NARRATIVE	NON-NARRATIVE
Lysias (om. II)	65 instances 1442 lines	280 instances 4806 lines
Lysias II	21 instances 410 lines	3 instances 90 lines
Thucydides	40 instances 1854 lines	48 instances 826 lines

<sup>9</sup> From a chi-square analysis it appears that the odds are between 1 to 10 and 1 to 5 that the variation is due to chance.

If the negative-positive use of *ἀλλά* lacks straightforwardness, which is perhaps obvious even without the indications just mentioned, it must have some compensating advantages if it is to be used at all.<sup>10</sup> Its usefulness for constructing antitheses seems clear. But Greek after all had several other ways of marking an antithesis. Why did this particular, uneconomical type develop along with the others? At first it seemed to me a queer way of thinking. English, surely, does not employ a "not this, but that" locution every page or two. On the other hand, though I am sure it is not my conversational habit, I find that in writing this paper I have used constructions similar to the Greek one, sometimes with "but" and sometimes without, perhaps more often than Lysias—probably too often. I, too, am making a speech, as it were; I am trying to be emphatic as well as informative. The emphasis obtainable by this method I think may be described as follows: a simple statement defines an action or idea as though it were a point. Every action or idea has a negative and a positive extreme, with a continuous line of possible gradations connecting the two<sup>10</sup>—value (good and bad), for instance. When Lysias, in my first example, says "good, not bad," he refers to the whole spectrum of activity, against which the badness of Eratosthenes can be seen in its true light. This is much better than simply saying he is bad.

This locution is, of course, often used as a frame for more elaborate antithetical constructions. We have had examples of this already. Alfred Croiset, who in discussing the style of an author likes to mention the use of a particle or two as characteristic, refers to the importance of *οὐ* followed by *ἀλλά* for constructing sentences in both Thucydides and Isocrates.<sup>11</sup> This seems to me a good method, though perhaps if Croiset had had actual figures available he would have been less impressed in the case of Thucydides, and would have mentioned *ἀλλά* in connection with Lysias. As it stands, his observation would apply primarily to the speeches of Thucydides. Since Croiset, Wolf Aly and Finley have pointed out in general terms the differences between the style of the speeches and the rest of

<sup>10</sup> Cf. "He's not much of a man."

<sup>11</sup> *Hist. de la Litt. Grecque*, IV<sup>a</sup>, pp. 163, 503.

Thucydides.<sup>12</sup> My investigation of Thucydides is very incomplete, but it seems to me I have come upon something of a problem. If Thucydides is the exemplar of the antithetical style *par excellence*, as Finley so well describes him, and as we are all convinced he is, why, apart from the exigencies of narrative, does he not make considerably greater use of *οὐκ . . . ἀλλά?* Cleon in his Mytilene speech seems to avoid it, and Alcibiades at Sparta will say *πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον* where he can in its stead. Did it sound common in Thucydides' ear at Athens in 403, or too rhetorical, or both? We shall see reason to believe that to Plato, at least, it sounded like the rhetoric of that date.

But first we have one or two small matters to clear up. Almost always in the eliminative use of *ἀλλά* only one of the ideas joined is formally negative.<sup>13</sup> We do find, however (XXI, 11), "I ask not to receive a gift . . . but not to be stripped of what is mine"—*δέομαι οὐ δωρεὰν . . . λαβεῖν, ἀλλὰ μὴ στερηθῆναι τῶν ἔμπνοι*. . . . The effect of the second idea is positive, even though it is formally negative: "What I ask is not this, but this." Again, the negative idea usually precedes the positive.<sup>14</sup> In cases of *ὡς* or *ὡσπερ . . . ἀλλ' οὐ* (cf. our first example—"as though he were the cause of good, not of evil") it is the second idea which the speaker wants taken as true, though he expresses it ironically as false; thus what really is, comes second, as usual. There are six cases like this with *ὡς* or *ὡσπερ* in Lysias.<sup>15</sup> All the following are similar in that the truth really comes second:

VII, 32—"If I had done it without enthusiasm rather than with it" (contrary to fact).

X, 10—"If you really are going to fight with words and not pay attention to the facts" (the speaker intends to make sure that the facts will be attended to).

XII, 50—"He should have done thus, not thus" (he really did the second).

<sup>12</sup> Aly in *Philologus*, Suppl. XXI (1929), no. III, p. 50, and Finley in his *Thucydides*, pp. 256-7.

<sup>13</sup> 364 of 369 instances in Lysias; 1115 of 1121 instances in Isocrates.

<sup>14</sup> 349 instances in Lysias; 1058 instances in Isocrates.

<sup>15</sup> XII, 64; XIV, 16; XXIV, 15; XXVI, 1; XXVII, 11, 16. There are 7 instances of *ἀλλ' οὐ* with *ὡσπερ* in Isocrates, and 6 without.

XIX, 23—"Who do you think would do this, not this" (nobody).

XXIV, 11—"If I were rich, I would ride a mule of my own, not other people's horses" (the second is what I really do).

The nine remaining cases have the true negative second. An example of this last type, which I rather like, occurs in the case of the man engaged in codifying the sacred laws, who, when people complained that he was making the sacrifices altogether too expensive, replied that he was codifying hieronomy, not economy—*ώς ἐνσέβειαν ἀλλ' οὐκ εὐτέλειαν ἀνέγραψε* (XXX, 21).

There is one further important subspecies of eliminative *ἀλλά* which I cannot let pass without remark, especially since, if I do, I may be accused of cheating in maintaining that the use of *ἀλλά* with negatives does have so preponderantly the effect which I ascribe to it. I refer to "not only . . . but also," or "not merely . . . but even": *οὐ μόνον . . . ἀλλὰ καὶ*. "Neighbors, who do not merely know the things about each other which are matters of common knowledge, but even find out the things we try to conceal from everybody"—*τοὺς γείτονας, οὐ οὐ μόνον ἀλλήλων ταῦτ' ἵστων ἢ πᾶσιν ὅραν ἔξεστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ ὧν ἀποκρυπτόμεθα μηδένα εἰδέναι, καὶ περὶ ἐκείνων πυνθάνονται* (VII, 18). It may be objected that here the effect of the first idea is not negative, but positive—the second idea merely going farther than the first, with a feeling of climax, instead of replacing it: the neighbors just mentioned do know all the ordinary stuff, and more besides. If this view is accepted, the "habitual" use I have been maintaining becomes less habitual by 61 cases out of 369 in Lysias. However, a change of emphasis in pronunciation can bring the expression back to the original pattern: The neighbors do NOT merely know the obvious facts; they know the *secrets* as well. There are certain indications that there is more of this last feeling in the Greek locution than we are at once aware of, and they are found in a use sometimes called "omission of *μόνον*." I shall deal with these indications later. In the meantime, the common sense view is correct in pointing to the effect of climax; also, in the example just cited, there is certainly at least a positive implication in the first idea (not merely

knowing the obvious facts). Thus we have the first and most common variety of what we may call the *οὐ μόνον . . . ἀλλὰ καὶ* type of expression: positive idea (the second one: "they know secrets as well") as climax to a positive implication. There are 53 instances of this in Lysias. Sometimes (5 in Lysias) you can leave out the *καὶ*. This is logical when the second idea includes the first—"not only you yourselves, but the whole city" (I, 2). Lysias is logical three times of the five,<sup>16</sup> in a fourth case he is not,<sup>17</sup> and the fifth occurs in 233E of the 35th speech, the *Eroticus* in Plato's *Phaedrus*. The omitted *καὶ* there makes a neat ambiguity which I shall discuss below. A case of the opposite type, where *ἀλλὰ καὶ* is used even though the second idea seems to include the first, may also be something of a skillful touch. In *Against Ergocles* (XXVIII, 10) we hear "not only Ergocles is on trial, but the whole city as well." It would not do to imply that the defendant was a real citizen of Athens. So much for the cases where a positive idea is climax to a positive implication.

One can also have a positive idea as climax to a purely negative idea—"not only did the government not hold a sale of their furniture, but the very doors were missing from their houses" (XIX, 31). (Kuehner's grammar takes the first clause here as positive, wrongly I think.)<sup>18</sup> Οὐχ ὅπως . . . ἀλλὰ καὶ is the phrase used, and there is another case of it in Lysias (XXX, 26), without *καὶ* for no very obvious reason—the climax is simply not stressed. Οὐ μόνον οὐ . . . ἀλλὰ καὶ would also seem to be a possibility, but Lysias does not use it.

A negative idea as climax to a negative idea is found as follows: "not only were we not permitted to attend (the councils), but not even to be in our own homes"—οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἡμῖν παρεῖναι οὐκ ἔξην, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ παρ' αὐτοῖς εἶναι (XII, 33). The frame of the construction is οὐ μόνον οὐ . . . ἀλλ' οὐδέ. Another case<sup>19</sup> shows μὴ ὅπι . . . ἀλλ' οὐδέ. These are the only two cases in this group.

To complete the picture we have something like a negative

<sup>16</sup> I, 2; XXVI, 16; XXXI, 1.

<sup>17</sup> XXI, 19.

<sup>18</sup> Kuehner-Gerth, *Ausf. Grammatik d. Gr. Sprache*, II<sup>o</sup>, 2, p. 258, n.

<sup>19</sup> XXIII, 12.

idea as climax to a positive implication. (This is not impossible: imagine a sentence like "he not only hated his mother but didn't even go to her funeral.") In Greek we would expect *οὐ μόνον . . . ἀλλ' οὐδέ*. We find it in the 8th speech, which is certainly spurious: "not only that, but he hadn't even spoken to him for a long time"—*οὐ ταῦτα μόνον, ἀλλ' οὐδέ διελέχθαι πολλοῦ χρόνου* (VIII, 15). The first clause, disregarding the *οὐ μόνον*, is positive in form but probably felt as negative, since the antecedent of *ταῦτα* is a negative statement. However, formally at any rate, "Lysias" has illustrated all the possible combinations involving negative and positive ideas in a climactic arrangement.

Such then are Lysias' variations on the *οὐ μόνον . . . ἀλλὰ καὶ* theme; by far the most usual type is, of course, "not only . . . but also." Now I must give my reasons for insisting on the negative aspect of the first idea.

"*Μόνον* is sometimes omitted," say Liddell and Scott.<sup>20</sup> Apparently this use has its origin in paradoxes, as L. and S. suggest, comparing Euripides' *Phoenissae*, 1480: *οὐκ εἰς ἀκοᾶς ἔτι δυστυχία δώματος ἥκει· πάρα γὰρ λεύσσειν πτώματα νεκρῶν τρισσῶν ἥδη τόδε . . .*, and *Hippolytus*, 359: *Κύπρις οὐν ἄρ' ἦν θεός, ἀλλ' εἴ τι μεῖζον ἄλλο γίγνεται θεοῦ. . . .* A weaker version of the same strategy occurs in Lysias, XXX, 35: *παρακαλοῦμεν <ἱμᾶς> μὴ πρὸ τῆς κρίσεως μισοπονηρεῖν* (reasonable as that would be), *ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ κρίσει τιμωρεῖσθαι. . . .* (There is the added element here, "what is needed is not this, but this.") Now the point of a paradox is that it forcibly brings to mind its contrary, and it is to this contrary that the *καὶ* in an *οὐκ . . . ἀλλὰ καὶ* construction may refer. Electra spells this out for us in grisly fashion (Sophocles' *Electra*, 1453), when, in reply to Aegisthus' question, "Have they indeed reported Orestes' death?" she says, *οὐκ, ἀλλὰ κάπεδειξαν, οὐ λόγῳ μόνον.*<sup>21</sup> *Ajax*, 1313 is similar: to Agamemnon Teucer points out that for him the part of valor is to die in service to Ajax, not to serve the Atreidae's woman. *Πρὸς ταῦθ',* he continues, *ὅρα μὴ τοῦμόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ σόν,* followed by "Try something on me, and you'll wish you had been more cowardly." *Kαὶ* here does refer to the positive aspect of the

<sup>20</sup> S. v. *μόνος*, B. II. 2.

<sup>21</sup> I owe my examples from Sophocles to Denniston, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

negative first clause, but in a somewhat more general way than in the previous example: "Don't worry about me, though; you're in this too." The first clause is paradoxical only in that Teucer has been basing his argument on "*τούμον*," and now dispenses with it, contemptuously.

In none of the passages so far adduced would it be tolerable to insert a *μόνον* and spoil the paradox. Nor do I think that in the following examples, where the paradox is weak or non-existent, we should speak of "omission of *μόνον*" in other than an approximate sense, for some special flavor is gained in each case. When the Boeotian in Thucydides, IV, 92 says of the Athenians, *οἱ καὶ μὴ τοὺς ἐγγύς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἀπωθεν πειρῶνται δουλοῦσθαι*, paradox is present (he has just laid it down that neighboring cities are naturally at odds), though the use of adverbial *καὶ*'s in corresponsion<sup>22</sup> weakens it: "they attack in addition not neighbors, but those who are far off as well."<sup>23</sup> (This would not be redundant in Greek; see Denniston, *loc. cit.*) Sometimes, I think, the first clause may be not paradoxical, but the very reverse. Lysias has (XXV, 13) *ἄ χρὴ πάντας ἐνθυμούμενος μὴ τούτων λόγοις πιστεύειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων σκοπεῖν ἄ ἕκαστῳ τυγχάνει πεπραγμένα*. In the paradoxical cases we found that *καὶ* may refer to the positive aspect of a negative first clause. I think it does so here as well: "Don't take my accusers' words on faith, but make an examination which has as its basis the deeds of each individual concerned, as well as the allegations of the accusers." Lysias eats his cake and has it too: first, he tells the judges not to believe the accusers; and then, with *καὶ*, he implies that the speaker is a fair-minded man after all.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Denniston, *op. cit.*, p. 325. The first *καὶ*, however, may be taken more generally, "actually"; though here, too, *καὶ*'s reference is ultimately to the positive idea that they do attack their neighbors.

<sup>23</sup> I owe the example to L. and S., *loc. cit.*

<sup>24</sup> Professor Poultney has kindly suggested that the situation in question may be the result of a "contamination" (E. H. Sturtevant, *An Introduction to Linguistic Science*, p. 112) between *μὴ τούτων λόγοις πιστεύειν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν ἔργων σκοπεῖν* and *μὴ τούτων λόγοις μόνον πιστεύειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων σκοπεῖν*. Now in cases of contamination we end up with a logical absurdity. Professor Poultney's example from Sturtevant is, "No event is too extraordinary to be impossible"

I make so much of this one case of eating one's cake and having it too—the only case I have found in what remains to us of Lysias' compositions—because it seems to me that Plato parodies it in the speech of "Lysias" on love which Socrates discovers beneath the cloak of his interlocutor in the *Phaedrus*. There is little doubt that this *Eroticus* is a parody: Alfred Croiset held this opinion, against Egger and Blass, and remarked on the frequent occurrence of *καὶ μὲν δῆ*.<sup>25</sup> Shorey has since shown that *καὶ μὲν δῆ* is more frequent in Lysias than in the other authors, and much more frequent in the *Eroticus* than in Lysias.<sup>26</sup> Thus *καὶ μὲν δῆ* is one of Lysias' most characteristic expressions, and Plato exaggerates his use of it.

'Αλλά also is parodied. For a choice example of eating one's cake and having it too, "Lysias" writes, "In my intercourse with you, I shall not regard present pleasure, but that which will be of future profit—too": Οὐ τὴν παροῦσαν ἡδονὴν θεραπεύων συνέσομαι σοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν μέλλουσαν ὁφελίαν ἔσεσθαι (233 B 8). The first clause is very ascetic and high-minded (no pleasure), while the second offers long-term benefits, plus a hint of present

(Huxley). On reexamination of Lysias' sentence from this point of view, a re-examination which led me to modify my translation in the text, I found no absurdity. The speaker is saying essentially, "Don't take on faith; examine." The first idea involves merely the accusers' words; the second, deeds *as well as* the accusers' words, as *καὶ* shows. There was never really any intention of suggesting an examination confined to deeds, though editors have thought so ever since Emperius deleted the *καὶ*. This consideration also works against the contamination theory, since one of the sentences involved in the contamination would confine the examination to deeds. In a strict syntactical analysis *καὶ* goes closely with *ἐκ τῶν ἔργων* and not with *σκοπεῖν*, and we are miles away from the usual notion of an *οὐ μόνον . . . ἀλλὰ καὶ* construction. The speaker wants the jury to do something different, not something additional. In a context of justice, *σκοπεῖν*, as the speaker defines it, is opposed to *πιστεύειν* just because it goes beyond it. But how does the sentence sound? The reactions of Emperius and his followers, not to mention Professor Poultney's reactions and my own, suggest that some cake-eating is going on somewhere. I leave Plato's reactions to the next paragraph.

<sup>25</sup> *Hist. de la Litt. Grecque*, IV<sup>a</sup>, p. 459.

<sup>26</sup> P. Shorey, "On the *Erotikos* of Lysias in Plato's *Phaedrus*," *C.P.*, XXVIII (1933), pp. 131-2. There are 5 instances of *καὶ μὲν δῆ* in the *Eroticus* and 21 in Lysias.

pleasure after all. Plato has taken the not-believing-the-accusers example, or one like it, and exposed a latent unfair advantage which the logograph would seem to gain by the use of a rather unexpected *kai*.

"Omission of *μόνον*" (an unfortunate term, as has been pointed out) rests on the essential ambiguity in an *οὐ μόνον . . . ἀλλὰ καὶ* expression as to whether the first clause is negative or positive. This ambiguity also arises when it is uncertain whether the *μόνον* goes with the whole first clause, or only with some particular element of it. Plato twists Lysias on this point too, making him say that the lovers to be indulged are "not the importunate, merely, but those who are worthy of your attention,"—*οὐ τοῖς προσαιτοῦσι μόνον, ἀλλὰ τοῖς τοῦ πράγματος ἀξίους* (233 E 9). Only the lack of a *kai* after *ἀλλά* keeps this from being completely scandalous. The postponement of *μόνον* does not remove the ambiguity.<sup>27</sup> It is perhaps not surprising that both this case and the one in the preceding paragraph involve the sensual-spiritual ambiguity which runs through the *Phaedrus*.

But this is by no means all there is to Plato's parody of Lysias' use of *ἀλλά*. One theme of the *Phaedrus* is certainly the contrast between stylistic elaboration on the one hand, and adequate treatment of a topic from the point of view of truth on the other (cf. 234 E 5-235 A 6). It would seem that Plato chose *οὐκ . . . ἀλλά* to typify one element of this stylistic elaboration. If Anaximenes' pre-Aristotelian handbook<sup>28</sup> shows any traces of the doctrines contained in the rhetorical works mentioned in *Phaedrus* 266 D, Plato may have been familiar with explicit teachings on this very point. In chapter 24 Anaximenes recommends construction in pairs—*eis δύο ἐρμηνεύειν*. I would construe this to be Polus' *διπλασιολογία* (a hapax, *Phaedrus* 267 C), though L. and S. give "repetition of words" as the meaning of the latter.<sup>29</sup> At any rate, in giving *σχήματα τοῦ eis*

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Lysias, I, 2: *καὶ ταῦτα οὐκ δν εἶη μόνον παρ' ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐγνωσμένα, ἀλλ' ἐν ἀπάσῃ τῇ Ἑλλάδι;* and VIII, 15: *οὐ ταῦτα μόνον, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ. . .*

<sup>28</sup> *Anaximenes Ars Rhetorica*, ed. L. Spengel (2nd ed., Leipzig, 1850).

<sup>29</sup> Taking seriously the scholiast *ad loc.*: *ὡς τὸ φεῦ, φεῦ*. For reasons which appear below, the ancient scholium on the words *μονσεῖα λόγων*, which are defined by *διπλασιολογίαν, κτλ.* seems more relevant: *μονσεῖα λόγων—τὰ πάρισα, κτλ.* (W. C. Greene, *Scholia Platonica*, p. 87). Her-

δύο ἐρμηνεύειν, Anaximenes says that when the speaker (*aὐτός*), or the man he favors (*οὗτος*), has two advantages (*δύναται καὶ τοῦτο καὶ ἔτερον*), οὐ μόνον . . . ἀλλὰ καί is to be used; in other cases, especially where the speaker or his friend are at a disadvantage, he would employ the more deprecating οὐτε . . . οὐτε or μὲν γάρ . . . δέ. It is true that Anaximenes does not recommend οὐκ . . . ἀλλά as such, but he does not pretend to give all the schemata possible, and it is easy to see how such a recommendation could have occurred in Polus' book or another's. On the other hand the content of the Anaximenes passage is enough in itself to give point to Plato's ridicule.

Exaggeration being the soul of caricature, the frequency of eliminative ἀλλά is extreme in the *Eroticus*—17 instances, or 13 per 100 lines, while the average for Lysias is  $5\frac{1}{2}$  per 100 lines. That this use is singled out as typical of this kind of stylistic elaboration seems clear when we consider that no other particles suitable for construction-in-pairs are particularly frequent. It is inevitable that the frequency of οὐκ . . . ἀλλά should strike the reader, for the climax of the speech (233 E 5-234 A 9), a sort of epanodos,<sup>29</sup> is phrased in six such pairs in a row. On the other hand Socrates, in his speech outdoing Lysias on the same topic, manages with only six eliminative ἀλλά's, though he continually affects to be embarrassed at the high potential his style is developing.

In fact, if we look through this first speech of Socrates in search of ἀλλά, we are presented with a little Socratic commentary on Lysias' use of it. First, at 237 C 4, we are struck by a neglected opportunity, a place where Lysias, we feel, would have used ἀλλά. Socrates uses δέ. Ironic modesty? Then comes an ἀλλά, at 237 C 6, joining wildly unbalanced members: Socrates affecting not to understand the point of *τὸ εἰς δύο ἐρμηνεύειν?* Diffidently, he neglects another opportunity (239 A 2: δέ again), but then at once (239 C 5-D 2) he goes into a varied negative-

meias' comment of the sixth century of our era interprets the situation as I do: ἐκεῖνος γάρ (sc. Polus) ἔξεῦρε τὰ πάρισα, διὸ καὶ μουσεῖα λόγων ἐκάλεσεν (sc. Plato) ἐπειδὴ ἐδόκει τῇ καλλιλεξίᾳ πάνυ [κατακόρως?] κοσμεῖν τὸν λόγον (ap. W. H. Thompson, *The Phaedrus of Plato* [London, 1868], p. 114).

<sup>29</sup> Cf. *Phaedrus*, 267 D.

positive series (four opportunities) using *ἀλλά* only once, a passage which compares with the climax of Lysias' *Eroticus*, much to the detriment of the latter. Having shown how to do it, he continues the lesson with a straight Lysianic instance (239 D 3), as if to emphasize what he is talking about, followed by a couple of non-eliminative, balancing *ἀλλά*'s (240 B 1 and 240 C 3),<sup>31</sup> a use much neglected (unjustly, he implies) by the rhetoricians. Isocrates and Lysias, so far as they have survived, avail themselves of it only three times apiece. Then to finish up, either because the lesson is over, or because dithyramb is now passing into epic, as Socrates says (241 E), he uses three ordinary eliminative *ἀλλά*'s, judiciously spaced (240 C 7, 241 B 8, 241 C 8). These are much more effective because not overdone, especially the last sentence of the speech (cf. "Lysias" last sentence!): *ταῦτα τε οὖν χρή, ὃ παῖ, συννοεῖν, καὶ εἰδέναι τὴν ἔραστοῦ φιλίαν ὅτι οὐ μετ' εὐνοίας γίγνεται, ἀλλὰ σιτίου τρόπον, χάριν πλησμονῆς, ὡς λύκοι ἄρνας ἀγαπῶσιν ὃς παῖδα φιλοῦσιν ἔρασται.*<sup>32</sup>

Even more suggestively, in criticizing the style of Lysias' speech, Socrates refers explicitly to the *οὐκ . . . ἀλλά* kind of thing: "saying the same things two or three times over" (235 A 4); "showing that in saying the same things now in one way, now in another, he can say them in both ways to perfection" (235 A 6-8). Then, in his own speech, after comfortably surpassing Lysias in amplitude,<sup>33</sup> as he has set out to do, Socrates stops, as Phaedrus thinks (241 D), in the middle: Socrates should now praise the non-lover as he has heretofore blamed the lover. No, says Socrates, "to put it briefly, the non-lover has the virtues corresponding to the vices we have criticized in the lover; and what need is there of a long speech about it?" (241 E). "Lysias," of course, spelled out these oppositions with *οὐκ . . . ἀλλά*.

In this whole connection we may recall the frequency of

<sup>31</sup> Following Burnet's punctuation. Balancing *ἀλλά* between clauses, not sentences, is the use referred to here.

<sup>32</sup> It is very likely more elegant to construe *ἀλλὰ—πλησμονῆς* not with *γίγνεται* but with *φιλοῦσιν*, as Stallbaum does. In that case the construction gains further point as being only apparently Lysianic.

<sup>33</sup> 144 OCT lines to 127, not counting Socrates' invocation to the muses or his fairy-story introduction.

eliminative  $\delta\lambda\lambda\acute{a}$  in Isocrates and the mention of him made at the end of the *Phaedrus*. Socrates' hopes for him were not realized even stylistically. Clearly Plato did not approve the overworking of the emphatic use of  $\delta\lambda\lambda\acute{a}$  which he saw in Lysias and Isocrates, and perhaps in the rhetoricians generally. Thucydides may have had much the same feeling.<sup>34</sup>

Fiddling little matters, these "buts," to echo Forster, but do they not show a habit of mind? Scholarly in English, "dithyrambic" in Greek,<sup>35</sup> to Forster and particularly to Plato they at once suggest larger issues. Of the particles generally Plato might have said with F. W. Ullrich, "tenerima illa, quae mentem scriptoris proderent, lineamenta."<sup>36</sup> There is no doubt that in Plato's opinion Lysias used "but" too often.

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<sup>34</sup> See p. 387 above.

<sup>35</sup> Aristotle considered  $\delta\pi\lambda\bar{\eta}\ \lambda\acute{e}\kappa\iota s$  particularly suited to dithyramb (*Rhet.*, III, 1406 b, a passage reminiscent of the *Phaedrus'* criticism of prose style), but by  $\delta\pi\lambda\bar{\eta}\ \lambda\acute{e}\kappa\iota s$  he understood compound words. How is it then that neither "Lysias" nor Socrates makes particular use of compound words in the *Phaedrus*, though Socrates insists he is becoming increasingly dithyrambic (238 D, 241 E)?

<sup>36</sup> F. W. Ullrich, *ap. von Essen, Index Thucydideus*, p. iii.

## THE MINIMUM SUBJECT TO THE VICESIMA *HEREDITATIUM.*

The *vicesima hereditatium*, as is well known, was one of the taxes introduced by Augustus in A. D. 6 to support the *aerarium militare*. References to it in authors and other sources are common, and there is considerable evidence for the method of its collection and administration.<sup>1</sup> About the tax itself, however, we are less well informed. It was, at least in some periods, a five per cent death duty on estates above a certain value, provided they were not inherited from close relatives.<sup>2</sup> Only Roman citizens were subject to it. Quite clearly, as Gibbon saw, the tax had a considerable importance, both fiscal and social.<sup>3</sup> But to understand its scope and character one obviously needs to know above what limit it was collected.

The evidence for this limit is regrettably vague. Dio Cassius writes merely that the tax was paid by all *πλὴν τῶν πάνυ συγγενῶν η καὶ πενήτων*.<sup>4</sup> The only other statements bearing directly on the point are found in Pliny's *Panegyric*. In praising some modifications of the tax made by Trajan, he states:

Ac ne remotioris quidem iamque deficiens adfinitatis gradus a qualibet quantitate vicesimam ut prius inferre cogentur. Statuit enim communis omnium parens summa, quae publicanum pati posset. Carebit onere vicesimae parva

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<sup>1</sup> See R. Cagnat, *Étude historique sur les impôts indirects chez les Romains* (Paris, 1882), pp. 175-226; M. Rostovtzeff, "Geschichte der Staatspacht in der römischen Kaiserzeit bis Diokletian," *Philologus, Supplementband IX* (1904), pp. 383-5; O. Hirschfeld, *Die kaiserlichen Verwaltungsbeamten bis auf Diocletian*<sup>2</sup> (Berlin, 1905), pp. 96-105; S. J. De Laet, *L'Antiquité Classique*, XVI (1947), pp. 29-36.

<sup>2</sup> It is uncertain what degree of relationship gave immunity; see Cagnat, *op. cit.*, pp. 184-6. The provision, however, is obviously in keeping with Augustan social legislation as a whole; see e.g. H. Last, *C. A. H.*, X, pp. 450-1. The tax was levied on the entire estate; hence, if the estate was taxable, a legacy however small was liable for its share of the *vicesima*.

<sup>3</sup> *Decline and Fall*, I, ch. 6 (ed. Bury, I, pp. 162-3). See also Cagnat, *op. cit.*, pp. 224-6.

<sup>4</sup> LV, 25, 5.

et exilis hereditas. . . . Cuicunque modica pecunia ex hereditate alicuius obvenerit, securus habeat quietusque possideat.<sup>5</sup>

Pliny is not writing to give precise information on technical matters, though he could have done so,<sup>6</sup> but one may draw two conclusions from his remarks with some confidence. First, at the time of Trajan's reform of the tax, no estate was exempt on grounds of its size; evidently the exemption allowed by Augustus had subsequently been removed. Secondly, even after the changes made by Trajan, only quite small estates were tax-free. The adjectives *parva*, *exilis*, and *modica* make this sufficiently clear, particularly as it was Pliny's purpose to extol and magnify Trajan's benevolence.

In view of the nature of the evidence, some scholars have shown understandable caution in estimating the size of estates free from the *vicesima*, either leaving the question entirely open<sup>7</sup> or quoting the conjectures of others with proper reservations.<sup>8</sup> Nevertheless, in the most authoritative handbooks one finds the exemption given as 100,000 sesterces, in some without explanation or qualification.<sup>9</sup> This figure, in fact, has become so widely accepted that the *vicesima* is very generally regarded as a tax on the rich. A recent writer, for example, dismisses Dio's ex-

<sup>5</sup> *Panegyr.*, 39, 5-40, 1.

<sup>6</sup> In addition to holding other financial offices, Pliny had been *praefectus aerarii militaris*, to which treasury the tax was paid. This fact may explain in part why the *vicesima hereditatum* occupies four chapters in the *Panegyric*: ch. 37-40.

<sup>7</sup> E.g., H. Dessau, *Geschichte der römischen Kaiserzeit*, I (Berlin, 1924), p. 173: "ein gewisses Mass." G. H. Stevenson, *C.A.H.*, X, p. 197, quite properly gives a paraphrase of Dio: "The death-duties were not levied on property inherited from very near relations or on very small estates."

<sup>8</sup> Cagnat, *op. cit.*, p. 185; but cf. p. 226, n. 4, where he accepts the figure of 100,000 sesterces as probable.

<sup>9</sup> J. N. Madvig, *Die Verfassung und Verwaltung des römischen Staates* (Leipzig, 1882), p. 435; J. Marquardt, *Römische Staatsverwaltung*,<sup>2</sup> II (Leipzig, 1884), p. 267; P. Willem, *Le droit public romain*<sup>3</sup> (Paris, 1884), p. 485, n. 8; W. T. Arnold, *The Roman System of Provincial Administration*<sup>4</sup> (Oxford, 1914), p. 207; E. De Ruggiero, *Dizionario Epigrafico*, III, p. 728, s. v. "Hereditas"; M. Cary, *A History of Rome* (London, 1938), p. 512.

planation of the *Constitutio Antoniniana* (that Caracalla sought to increase the number of those subject to the *vicesima*) with the statement, ". . . by the time of Caracallus the majority of the great fortunes of the empire were already within the fold."<sup>10</sup>

The wide acceptance of an exemption of 100,000 sesterces is not surprising, since for it one may cite the authority of two great scholars, Bachofen and Mommsen. Bachofen held that the figure was taken over from the *lex Voconia* (169 B. C.), in which it determined who were to be subject to the restrictions of that law.<sup>11</sup> He pointed out, further, that in the *lex Papia Poppaea* the same figure defines the *locupletiores liberti*,<sup>12</sup> and that it is found a number of times in other legal texts in various connections.<sup>13</sup> In another passage, as some who cite him do not observe, Bachofen concludes on the basis of Pliny that the limit set by Augustus had been removed by his successors and was reintroduced by Trajan.<sup>14</sup>

Mommsen rejected the connection with the *lex Voconia*, but accepted the limit of 100,000 sesterces.<sup>15</sup> In particular, he placed emphasis on the figure in the *lex Papia Poppaea* and cited a statement concerning it from Theophilus:<sup>16</sup> *πλούσιον δὲ ὡρίσατο τὸν ἔχοντα ἐκατὸν χιλιάδων σεστερτίων περιουσίαν*. This definition of such *πλούσιοι* he felt served to identify Dio's *πέντε*.

<sup>10</sup> A. N. Sherwin-White, *The Roman Citizenship* (Oxford, 1939), pp. 221-2; cf. Dio Cassius, LXVIII, 9, 4-5.

<sup>11</sup> J. J. Bachofen, *Ausgewählte Lehren des römischen Civilrechts* (Bonn, 1848), p. 340 (in his study "Die Erbschaftssteuer, ihre Geschichte, ihr Einfluss auf das Privatrecht," pp. 322-95). He had argued for the connection with the *lex Voconia* in his earlier book, *Die Lex Voconia* (Basel, 1843), which I have not seen; cf., however, Marquardt, *Staatsverwaltung*,<sup>2</sup> II, p. 267, n. 2 and the note of Mommsen cited below in n. 15. The figure in the *lex Voconia* was 100,000 asses.

<sup>12</sup> Gaius, III, 42; *Inst.*, III, 7, 2.

<sup>13</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 340, nn. 95-97. These involve penalties and limits of various kinds. It would appear, however, that *Fr. de iure fisci*, 8 and 9 should not have been cited (n. 96), since the figure in both is 50,000 sesterces.

<sup>14</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 388.

<sup>15</sup> Th. Mommsen, *Die römischen Tribus in administrativer Beziehung* (Altona, 1844), p. 120, n. 106c. He cites Bachofen, *Die Lex Voconia*, p. 121 (see above, n. 11).

<sup>16</sup> The quotation is from Theophilus' paraphrase of *Inst.*, III, 7 (ed. Ferrini, p. 296).

Though the views of Bachofen and Mommsen have been the most influential, there are two others to be noticed. In one of his very stimulating books, J. Carcopino came to the rather surprising conclusion that Trajan lowered the immunity from 100,000 to 20,000 sesterces.<sup>17</sup> The first figure of course is a familiar one;<sup>18</sup> that of 20,000 sesterces is drawn from a section of the *Gnomon* of the *Idios Logos*.<sup>19</sup> This section, however, concerns penalties on unmarried women having property of that value, and there seems little reason to connect the figure with the *vicesima*. In any event, there is nothing in the *Panegyric*, which he was discussing, to support the assumption of a reduction in exemptions; in fact, Pliny's statements plainly point to their increase.<sup>20</sup>

Finally, it should be noted that the well-known Romanist, V. Arangio-Ruiz, has raised the question whether the limit might not have been 200,000 sesterces.<sup>21</sup> For this suggestion there are substantial grounds. *P. Oxy.*, 1114, a *professio hereditatis* ends: *eamque hereditatem esse ducentariam et innuminem a vicensima* (A. D. 237), and as Arangio-Ruiz observes, another declaration includes the statement that the estate has the value of 200,000 sesterces.<sup>22</sup> It should be observed, however, that in the first papyrus the beneficiaries are the daughters of the deceased woman and the immunity of the estate may be explained by this relationship, as the original editor, A. S. Hunt, suggested.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>17</sup> J. Carcopino, *Points de vue sur l'impérialisme romain* (Paris, 1934), p. 76.

<sup>18</sup> Carcopino cites Willems, *Droit Public*,<sup>2</sup> p. 481 (see above, n. 9).

<sup>19</sup> Sec. 28. For the *Gnomon* see especially the edition of W. Graf von Uxkull-Gyllenband, *B. G. U.*, V, 2. Carcopino refers to his own discussion of this section in *Revue des études anciennes*, XXIV (1922), pp. 213-14, which does not appear to explain why it need be connected with the *vicesima hereditatum*.

<sup>20</sup> As M. Durry remarks in his excellent *Pline le Jeune: Panégyrique de Trajan* (Paris, 1938), p. 146. Durry, however, does accept Carcopino's figure of 20,000 sesterces for the later period.

<sup>21</sup> In the preface of his edition of *P. Oxy.*, 1114 in *Fontes Iuris Romani Antejustiniiani*, III (Florence, 1943), no. 63, p. 187. Arangio-Ruiz discusses the same papyrus again in *Parerga* (Naples, 1945), pp. 7-8.

<sup>22</sup> *P. Oxy.*, 1274.

<sup>23</sup> The relationship gave immunity; see Pliny, *Panegyr.*, 37, 6 and Cagnat, *op. cit.*, p. 186 and n. 4. Hunt's explanation is repeated in A. S.

Moreover, in the second papyrus no claim to immunity is made on the basis of the estate's being *ducenaria*, and a declaration of value would have been in order in any event.<sup>24</sup>

There are, to sum up, two general objections to be made against the figures which have been proposed as the limit of the *vicesima*. First, none of them, except that cited by Arangio-Ruiz, is in any way connected in our sources with the tax. It is reasonable of course to attempt to supply the deficiency in our evidence by comparing similar limits, especially those in contemporary laws such as the *lex Papia Poppaea*. But it should be remembered that there was great variation in such limits. Without making a search, one may cite three different figures of this kind in almost consecutive sections of the *Gnomon*: 20,000, 50,000, and 100,000 sesterces;<sup>25</sup> 200,000 sesterces, the qualification for those to be listed in a census of A. D. 4;<sup>26</sup> and 400,000 sesterces, the estate required of *equites*. One could probably find some parallel for almost any round figure.

Further, it is difficult to reconcile such sums as 100,000 or 200,000 sesterces with the language of Dio and especially of Pliny, when one recalls that the minimum census of a knight was 400,000 sesterces.<sup>27</sup> The possessors of estates approaching those limits could hardly be described as poor, and whatever

Hunt and C. C. Edgar, *Select Papyri*, II (London, 1934), no. 326, p. 367, where the text is republished (Loeb Classical Library). See also H. Kreller, *Erbrechtliche Untersuchungen auf Grund der graeco-aegyptischen Papyrusurkunden* (Leipzig/Berlin, 1919), p. 106.

<sup>24</sup> On these *professiones* and on the procedure required of heirs, see Kreller, *op. cit.*, pp. 104-26, 395-406; also *P. Oxford*, 7 (A.D. 256-257), a recently published request for registration of an inheritance, and the notes of the editor, E. P. Wegener. The sums involved are often well below 200,000 sesterces; e.g., *P. Amherst*, 72 = *F. I. R. A.*, III, no. 62 (A.D. 246): three talents. In *P. Rylands*, 109 (A.D. 235) the estate amounted to ten talents.

<sup>25</sup> Secs. 29, 30, 32. For the great range of fixed penalties, see W. Hellebrand, *R.-E.*, Supplementband VI, cols. 542-55, especially 549, 551, *s. v.* "Multa."

<sup>26</sup> Dio Cassius, LV, 13, 4. This census preceded the inauguration of the tax by only two years.

<sup>27</sup> It should be noted, however, that the minimum equestrian census was set rather low; see A. Stein, *Der römische Ritterstand* (Munich, 1927), p. 439.

one's conception of imperial social policy in taxation may be, it seems doubtful that the Roman government, badly in need as it was of additional revenue, would have given them immunity.

A Latin papyrus from Egypt recently published by H. A. Sanders, *P. Mich.*, 435 + 440, appears to contain new evidence for the limit, if only of a negative character.<sup>28</sup> The papyrus is very difficult to read and is so poorly preserved that no line is complete. However, it clearly contains records of inheritances and payments of the *vicesima*, and one may suppose that it resembles the *commentarii* or *diaria stationis hereditatium* mentioned in inscriptions.<sup>29</sup> It is a military text, and presumably comes from the camp at Nicopolis or from some central bureau since men from several units are found in it.<sup>30</sup> The fact that the two legions *III Cyrenaica* and *II Traiana* are both mentioned provides an approximate date of *ca. A. D. 109-119*.<sup>31</sup> It dates therefore after the reforms made by Trajan.

In no. 435 there are parts of six entries, but only three are well enough preserved to furnish much information. All three, as well as the first in no. 440, have the date *IV Nonas Iulias*.

The first entry in no. 435 seems to have the same form as the

<sup>28</sup> *Michigan Papyri*, VII (Ann Arbor, 1947). The character of these texts is discussed briefly in my review of this volume in *A. J. P.*, LXXI (1950), pp. 433, 435, where I suggest that they are parts of the same document. V. Arangio-Ruiz has some remarks on no. 440 in his valuable "Chirographi di Soldati," *Studi in onore di Siro Solazzi* (Naples, 1949), pp. 257-9. He did not, however, connect it with no. 435, and consequently he treats its form in general terms.

S. L. Wallace, *Taxation in Egypt from Augustus to Diocletian* (Princeton, 1938), p. 324 notes an instance of "the *vicesima* paid by a Roman soldier," citing Mitteis, *Chrest.*, 372, iv, 7. But for the meaning of the passage cited see Arangio-Ruiz, *F. I. R. A.*, III, p. 51, n. 3.

<sup>29</sup> For these *commentarii* see e.g. *C. I. L.*, X, 3878; Dessau, *I. L. S.*, 1556; *Ann. épigr.*, 1948, no. 176: *diaria stationi(s) hereditat(ium)*; and A. von Premerstein, *R.-E.*, IV, col. 765, s. v. "A commentariis."

<sup>30</sup> The two legions in Egypt shared the camp at Nicopolis in A.D. 119; *B. G. U.*, 140. By far the greater part of Roman citizens in military service would at this time have been legionaries. Besides the names of the two legions, Sanders reads and restores (entry 3, line 1): *coh. I C(ilicum) e(quitata)*.

<sup>31</sup> J. Lesquier, *L'armée romaine d'Égypte d'Auguste à Dioclétien* (Cairo, 1918), pp. 63-4; Sanders, introduction to no. 435, p. 28.

others, and the report was made to the *optio* of the same century as in entry 2. But there is too little preserved to be sure of much more. However, in line 3 one finds *drachmas centum* and in line 4 *dr nonagen[ta]*.<sup>32</sup> The drachmas, it may be noted, are equivalent in value to sesteres.

Entry 2 is better preserved and will serve to illustrate the form. The width of the lacuna which appears in the middle of each line is not determined since the text is preserved on two unconnected fragments, but perhaps the lines averaged around 40 to 45 letters in width. Some of the readings given are not certain, but these are of little consequence here.<sup>33</sup>

L. II[1] Cūr o L Egrilius Optuſ Iuli[o cognomen optio]nī (centuriae) Claudi Romani  
 salutem. Fateſ[or] m[e accepisse] i]nstar.....  
 a Pulio Maximo (centuria) Ter[ tur] ex quibus deduci:  
 tur licensim[a] ]... drachma.  
 5 ... [.]ginta qui[nque] ]Aug IV Nonas  
 Iulias.

At the end of line 2 one finds the value of the total estate,<sup>34</sup> which Sanders reads as *MDC drachmarum*, with *dr P[t]ol Aug* inserted above the last word. One cannot verify this on the photograph, and it must be regarded as rather doubtful. The tax itself seems to be found at the beginning of line 5. Quite possibly Sanders' *non[a]ginta qui[nque]* is right; at any rate the ending *-ginta* shows that the figure was below 100.

Entry 3 follows a similar form, but since it concerns a legacy, it is less important for our present purpose.<sup>35</sup> In lines 2-3 one

<sup>32</sup> The first figure, which begins a line, may have been preceded by a sum in talents.

<sup>33</sup> Suggestions made in the review cited above in n. 28 are incorporated in the text as reconstructed here. The reading and expansion *o(bitus)* or *o(biit)* in line 1 seems doubtful. It is also difficult to confirm the reading of the name of the man making the declaration in line 1 and the *nomen* in line 3. Sanders reconciles the figure that he reads at the end of line 2, 1,600, with the tax, 95, by suggesting a service charge of 15 drachmas; *op. cit.*, p. 32.

<sup>34</sup> The sum received would appear to be a *hereditas* and not a *legatum* (as in the next entry), though because of the lacunas one cannot be quite sure.

<sup>35</sup> For the significance of the fact that it is a legacy see above, n. 2.

finds *Fateor me] accepisse legato Petroni Bland[.* The figure for the legacy is lost. The *vicensima*, however, in line 5 ends *]. quinque*, and the residue is *] quinque millia LXXXXV.* If the last figure is complete, as it would appear to be, the legacy may have been *ca.* 5,360 drachmas and the tax *ca.* 265.<sup>36</sup>

In the two entries in no. 440, no figures survive at all, though in the first (line 3) *vicesima* appears, and the form and date seem to be the same as in no. 435.<sup>37</sup>

It is unfortunate that these entries are so poorly preserved, and they leave several points in doubt. Nevertheless, in some respects their evidence seems quite decisive. The figures involved are comparatively small and can hardly be reconciled with the limits that have been suggested for the *vicesima*. All appear to be calculated in drachmas and not in talents, and two seem to be reasonably certain: 5,095, the residue of the legacy in entry 3; and 95, the tax paid in entry 2.

Moreover, quite aside from the figures in individual entries, we have in this document either five or seven soldiers all apparently paying the *vicesima* on the same day.<sup>38</sup> This fact in itself indicates that the estates can hardly have been very large, for surely no one would suggest that so many soldiers left estates of 100,000 sesterces, for example, on the same day or within a brief period.<sup>39</sup> The conclusion that the tax must have been collected from much smaller estates seems unavoidable.

<sup>36</sup> Sanders, *op. cit.*, p. 32, assumes a total of 5,800, from which a tax of 290 plus 15 drachmas (a service charge) was deducted. Since *drac[humae]* is read earlier in the line, the amount of the residue was evidently below one talent; hence 5,095 is the complete figure.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. n. 28.

<sup>38</sup> If no. 440 preceded no. 435 in the roll, at least five entries are to be dated *IV Nonas Iulias*; if it followed no. 435, at least seven must be so dated. The date can be read in the first three entries of no. 435 and in the first of no. 440. Sanders suggested the Jewish revolt of A.D. 115 and 116 as an explanation of this number of reports. One may also conjecture that such declarations were assembled and forwarded by the units at intervals. The date in any event is probably that of the report, not of the deceased's death.

<sup>39</sup> For the modest size of soldiers' estates in Egypt, see Arangio-Ruiz, *Studi in onore di Siro Solazzi*, pp. 251-2; for their pay, P. A. Brunt, *Papers of the British School at Rome*, XVIII (1950), pp. 50-71.

The evidence as a whole may be summarized as follows. Though the *πένητες* of Dio is too vague a term to be decisive, the phrases used by Pliny seem clearly to indicate a low limit for the exemption. The Michigan papyrus supports this impression and shows that estates even of *ca.* 1,900 drachmas might be taxed.<sup>40</sup> In any event, the *vicesima* was not simply a tax on the rich, even in those periods when exemptions were not curtailed or altogether removed.

This conclusion furnishes some support for Dio's explanation of the extension of citizenship in 212. Very possibly Dio was unjust, and one need not deny that Caracalla may have had other motives. But in itself Dio's statement is plausible, and its plausibility is strengthened by the fact that Caracalla raised the tax to 10 per cent:<sup>41</sup> he was clearly interested in increasing the revenues to be derived from it.

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<sup>40</sup> The approximate figure suggested by the probable tax in entry two: 95 drachmas.

<sup>41</sup> Dio Cassius, LXXVIII, 9, 4. It seems hardly necessary to note that Dio's explanation has often been accepted or to cite any of the bibliographies on the *Constitutio Antoniniana*, which has become so enormous since the publication of P. GAGLIARDI, *etc.* Who refers to other taxes in this passage, but only identifies one: the *decimaria libertatis*.

## ON THE EXEGETES AND THE MANTIC OR MANIC CHRESMOLOGIANS.

In a review<sup>1</sup> of my book *The Athenian Expounders*, C. Bradford Welles criticizes the section in which I treat the manner of appointment of that exegete distinguished as “the one appointed (*καθεσταμένος*) by the Demos,” or in late inscriptions as “the one elected (*χειροτονητός*) by the Demos.” Welles finds that I do not know the meaning of the word *χειροτονητός*. He writes: “The adjective *χειροτονητός* does much more than ‘suggest election rather than appointment’ (p. 45). It means ‘elected,’ by show of hands, literally, and it is hard to see what would mean being ‘appointed’ by the Demos.” To me the non-committal ancient and more common formula “*appointed* by the Demos” means “elected either by show of hands or by secret ballot,” because, of course, the Athenians had two ways of voting. But has the reviewer given a fair report of my argument? What I said on p. 45 was this: “The phrase ‘appointed by the Demos’ certainly suggests election rather than allotment. From inscriptions of the Roman Period (I 25, 32, and 42) it appears that the exegete was appointed, at least at that time, by election and not by lot, nor is there any reason to believe that he had ever been appointed by lot.”

Furthermore, Welles asserts that the novelty of my treatment of the Athenian expounders “lies in the epigraphical material.” If he had compared my work with that of my predecessors or had confronted my work with F. Jacoby’s *Attis*, which came out at the same time, Welles might have found considerable difference in my treatment of the crucial passage in Plato’s *Laws*, both in what I used and in what I refrained from using. And he would have found that Jacoby and my predecessors recognized a reference to an official expoundership in Eupolis, fr. 297, “Lampon the exegete,” which I interpreted as a sneering comparison of the Thuriomantis with Apollo. As if no one would ever dream of referring the noun here to an official expounder-

<sup>1</sup> *Traditio*, VII (1949-1951), pp. 471-3.

ship, Welles comments: "Obviously a man like Lampon . . . was a person of consequence, worthy to be called *exegetes*, 'ex-pounder' (for I cannot agree with Oliver that the word has anything to do with 'leading out' a colony . . .)." And is he right? Welles may think that Eupolis was paying tribute to Lampon's worth, but I do not. He might have cited a still greater tribute from Cratinus, fr. 57, Λάμπων τὸν οὐ βροτῶν.

We know that an official exegete had come into existence sometime before 363 B. C. Could one or two exegetes have been created in the great reform of Athenian institutions which occurred between 403 and 399 B. C.? Yes indeed, and I thought there was some evidence that the institution went back to "399 B. C. or shortly afterwards" because in an early dialogue Plato speaks of a consultation as occurring in the year 399 B. C. in a famous case. On pp. 30 and 31 I reminded the reader of Plato's anachronisms, but concluded that in the absence of evidence to the contrary we ought to assume that the famous case of Euthyphro's father really did occur sometime not far from the last days of Socrates. With a generalization which sounds well but is not really applicable, my critic comments, "I do not believe that we can safely argue from the dramatic date of Plato's dialogues to the introduction of constitutional changes," and for all his reader knows I may have used no caution whatsoever. I do not believe that we can safely ignore imperfect evidence. And is the evidence really so bad?

The true problem, however, is not whether I am justified in carrying the institution back to 400 B. C. but whether the institution came down from some prehistoric period or was first established around 400 B. C. My predecessors thought of the institution as a heritage from prehistoric times, and even Jacoby attributes its establishment to Solon. Jacoby reached this conclusion because he believed that official exegetes were attested by *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 77 where I can find none,<sup>2</sup> and because, like any serious student of the institution who thinks of it historically, he

<sup>2</sup> A careful study of the inscription by M. Ostwald, "The Prytaneion Decree Re-examined," *A.J.P.*, LXXII (1951), pp. 24-46, agrees with mine in the most important point, namely that no official exegetes are attested by this document.

had to invent an explanation for the curious electoral procedure prescribed by Plato in the *Laws*. Welles does not tell the reader this.

When for reasons which Welles does not mention and which I need not repeat I came to the conclusion that the expoundership was not a survival from prehistoric times but a creation of about 400 B. C., this conclusion imposed upon me the obligation of seeking an historical explanation.

I found an answer in the semi-official position achieved by men like Lampon and Hierocles and in the vociferous opposition which their authority called forth from the comic poets, who reflect the attitude of Lampon's political enemies. I analyzed their authority as that of political leaders who had convinced the Demos of their extraordinary *expertise* in religious matters. Here it was not just a question of a gift for ordinary divination or an ability to recognize signs. They had unusual knowledge of the most suitable sacrifices and proper rites, whenever a crisis or special situation arose. They had prestige. Eupatrid origin would have counted for much and may have been absolutely indispensable, but these popular authorities seemed to have something in addition, namely familiarity with unfamiliar sources of religious truth and knowledge. They had access to teachings which other people did not know by heart. Their opportunity came when the Areopagus ceased to consist of eupatridae and to be a true repository of ancestral wisdom.

Therefore, the establishment of official, eupatrid, but non-political expounders, distinct from official manteis who did not need to be eupatridae but who were likewise politically neutralized, appears to me to have been a solution for a problem posed by the abuse of an authority based on a successful claim to extraordinary religious knowledge by politicians. And it seems to me that the struggle in which they had been engaged was largely a struggle as to what, outside the *πάτρια*, were the authentic sources of religious truth and knowledge. In addition to the Delphic Oracle and to those of Dodona and the Ammonion, there were the inspired teachers. The great teachers were Homer, Hesiod, Orpheus, and Musaeus, but men like Lampon and Hierocles insisted that others too, whose ancient or modern verses they happened to know, had left productions of a divine

inspiration which Athens could not afford to overlook. Welles is amused that I should mention Homer and Musaeus in the same breath. He writes: "Musaeus was used for divination, Homer for moral and intellectual guidance—and I do insist <as if anyone would deny it!>, for pleasure also. I do not remember that people sat rapt while singers recited Musaeus." I, on the other hand, deny that Musaeus was always used merely for divination and Homer never, and I submit that from a certain standpoint they did belong together. The reader will remember the words with which Plato, *Apology*, 41A, makes Socrates look forward to meeting the great teachers, Ὁρφεῖς συγγενέσθαι καὶ Μουσαῖς καὶ Ἡσιόδῳ καὶ Ὀμήρῳ. Was it merely for his predictions that Socrates wished to be with Musaeus?

There is evidence that the text of the great teachers was established at Athens in the sixth century as a public undertaking. As an anticipation of Alexandrian philology the Pisistratean recension would be an absurdity, but a public effort to collect and preserve literature which was thought to be of a divine inspiration is not absurd. Welles, however, comments as follows: "Solon and Pisistratus did then cause, not merely the preservation, but the constitution (the author suggests 'disposition,' that is arrangement) of the Iliad and the Odyssey. This is a return to the 'lay-theory' with a vengeance," etc. I have always considered each of these poems to be a literary unit, and in my book I spoke of "the establishment of the complete Homeric text in writing," and of collecting the text "with the help of recitations by rhapsodists," and of "the division of the two entire epics into books" (pp. 3-4), but I do not find the word "constitution." Nor did I use the word "disposition." For rhetorical purposes Welles has substituted another word for mine and then denounced an implication that would never have entered my head.

Looking at the rest of the Greek world Eduard Meyer<sup>3</sup> was

<sup>3</sup> *Geschichte des Altertums*, II (Stuttgart, 1893), p. 746 (= 2nd ed., III [1937], p. 691): "Daher entstehen in den orphischen Kreisen auch zahlreiche Orakelsammlungen, theils unter den Namen des Orpheus und Musaeos selbst, theils unter dem alter Propheten wie Bakis, Epimenides, des Skythen Abaris. Ihre Sprüche werden von herumziehenden Propheten (*χρησμολόγοι*) verkündet und gedeutet, die ihre

probably right in calling the chresmologoi wandering folk, but this hardly applies to Athenian chresmologoi except when *driven* from home. Lampon, for example, though called a chresmologos, in no way really resembled a wandering gypsy from Acarnania. Now my book dealt with no chresmologoi but the so-called chresmologoi of Athens. I did not make this clear enough, and not only Welles but a most careful reviewer<sup>4</sup> misunderstood me. In taking up the Athenian chresmologoi and in following the Athenian chresmologoi and the panel of great teachers as far back as I could at Athens, my starting point was the necessity of explaining the establishment of the exegetes as late as about 400 B. C. My starting point was not a false etymology of the word *chresmologos* or a failure to detect a difference between the original use of the word *χρησμολόγος* and the original use of the word *μάντεις*. I found in Lampon, Hierocles, and such people a single group of controversial politicians called sometimes chresmologoi and sometimes manteis<sup>5</sup> and sometimes *χρησμολόγοι καὶ μάντεις*. Surely the two designations express different aspects

eigene Weissagungen daran anschliessen." Similarly K. J. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*, 2nd ed., I, 1, p. 320: "Es gab Leute (*χρησμολόγοι*), die ein Geschäft daraus machten, solche Sprüche auswendig zu lernen und von Stadt zu Stadt ziehend ihre Weisheit gegen geringe Bezahlung den Gläubigen zur Verfügung zu stellen." Lampon's voyage to Thurii as oecist of the Panhellenic colony is not comparable. At the head of the list of Athenians who swore to the Peace of Nicias, the name of Lampon was not that of a soothsaying beggar just back from a tour. What my critics who do not make this distinction have to say is beside the point.

<sup>4</sup> M. P. Nilsson, *A.J.P.*, LXXI (1950), pp. 420-5. Wherever I now disagree, I feel that through my own fault the revered master of Lund has misunderstood me. For example, I argue that those politically powerful *chresmologoi-kai-manteis* could hardly have risen to such prestige if they had not had the religious and social prestige of eupatrid origin to help them; an ordinary reciter of oracles would have found himself too often ineligible for religious duties. I never meant to suggest that "eupatrid descent was the basis for reciting oracles." I do not deny—indeed the point is made in my Ch. II—that the genē were the forerunners of the exegetes, but I think that men like Lampon and Hierocles created a kind of challenge and uneasiness which produced a demand for reform.

<sup>5</sup> The curious plural "manties," which Welles attributes to me as an English rendering, I cannot find anywhere in my book.

or impressions. I, however, was pointing out that we were not dealing with two groups of individuals but with *bina vocabula*<sup>6</sup> descriptive of one group.

We must now return once again to Plato, *Laws*, VI, 759D-E.

A little over two years after the publication of my book, N. G. L. Hammond published an article, "The Exegetai in Plato's *Laws*," *C. Q.*, XLVI (1952), pp. 4-12, which had been written, unfortunately, without knowledge of my book but at least with consideration of Jacoby's interpretations. Hammond, who clears away the difficulties which Jacoby introduced into the passage, has relieved me of any obligation to discuss this rather weak section of Jacoby's learned and stimulating book. Instead, I shall rather ungratefully turn upon Hammond himself. With angular brackets to represent a word implicit in the Greek and parentheses to represent words supplied for clarity in English, he translates, "As regards the exegetai three (in number), let <each member of> four tribes (of the twelve) nominate four <persons>, each <person drawn> from their own personnel, and let the State scrutinize whichever three gain most votes (that is, nominations counted as votes) and (so) send nine to Delphi to appoint one from each group of three."

<sup>6</sup>The term *χρησμολόγος καὶ μάντις* was used in the singular and was parodied by Cratinus (fr. 62 Kock) as *ἀγύρτης καὶ κυβηλιστής*. There was an ancient and continuous tendency to use *bina vocabula* in such cases. Philolaus (Diels, *Vorsokratiker*, I<sup>6</sup>, B 14 = Kern, *Orphicorum Fragmenta*, 8) says *θεολόγοι τε καὶ μάντες*. The *chresmologos-kai-mantis* reappears in Italy as the *sacrificulus et vates* (Livy, XXXIX, 8, 3) whom Livy describes as a *sacrorum antistes* and as a *Graecus ignobilis*. *Sacrificuli vatesque* are mentioned elsewhere by Livy, I, 25, 3; XXV, 1, 8; XXXV, 48, 13; XXXIX, 16, 8. It is recommended that the reader consult the last passage, because it is particularly interesting but too long to quote. With Ernst Bickel's convincing emendation *εναγεῖς* for the extant *οὐάτεις* (*Rh. Mus.*, XCIV [1951], p. 313), Strabo, IV, 4, 4 (p. 197) lists the three groups of Gallic singers: *παρὰ πᾶσι δὲ ὡς ἐπίπαν τρία φῦλα τῶν τιμωμένων διαφερόντως ἔστι, βάρδοι τε καὶ εναγεῖς καὶ δρυΐδαι· βάρδοι μὲν ὑμηταὶ καὶ ποιηταὶ, εναγεῖς δὲ ἱεροποιοὶ καὶ φυσιολόγοι, δρυΐδαι δὲ πρὸς τὴν φυσιολογίαν καὶ τὴν ἡθικὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἀσκοῦσι.* Philo, *Moses*, II, 40, says that men who knew the original Bible and the Septuagint called those who produced the latter not translators but *ἱεροφάντες καὶ προφήτες*. Themistius affects the phrase *ἕγγητῆς καὶ προφήτης* (II, 26c and XIII, 166c = pp. 31 and 204 Dindorf). In the article about him in the Suda, Philochorus is called *μάντις καὶ ἱεροσκόπος*.

It seems to me that the words φερέτωσαν μὲν αἱ τέτταρες φυλαὶ τέτταρας ἔκαστον ἐξ αὐτῶν cannot mean, "Let each member of four tribes nominate four persons, each from their own personnel." It must mean, "Let each local assembly of four neighboring tribes nominate four candidates from its own membership." The election does not take place in the local assembly but in the City Assembly where three out of each panel of four are selected as candidates for Apollo's choice. The election in the City Assembly, having no peculiar features, needs no description.

On p. 12 Hammond concludes that the procedure by which the expositors were to be appointed in Plato's second-best city "can be explained only by reference to those he enjoins for other elections in the *Laws*." Partly, yes, but the local assemblies and the oracle of Apollo make the procedure unique. I submit that the complicated procedure with nominations in three local assemblies is most intelligible as an effort by Plato to adhere as closely as possible to acceptable elements in the Athenian institution. I cannot believe that anything so complicated would appear an obvious improvement in need of no justification. I cannot believe that an Athenian looking back on the early history of Attica would think that a division into three big regions with a revival of sectional loyalties would appear as an obvious improvement over existing conditions, if it were not vestigially there already. Why does Plato call for three local assemblies in no other case, if it seemed an advantageous change?

I suggested in my book that the phratries and trittyes, which made up the four Old Attic (pre-Cleisthenean) tribes and still to a large extent carried the religious life of Athens, had always met in three big local assemblies for nominations and certain other business. There is some support for the theory and there is no evidence to the contrary. I showed on pp. 65-72 that there were elements in Athenian institutions and moments in Athenian history which could, or in regard to the factions had to, be explained on the theory of a division into three big sections before Cleisthenes. Unfortunately, I handicapped my theory by introducing the Constitution of "Draco." I hereby retract that false argument, which recoiled upon me in Professor Nilsson's review.

One thing that can be seen by comparing the nomination of candidates for the Platonic expounderships and the nomination of candidates for other offices in the *Laws* is that each voter named only one person, not four mutual competitors, so that the thrice four candidates for the three expounderships corresponded to the three hundred (or even one hundred) candidates for the thirty-seven posts of the nomophylakes. The failure to understand this has fundamentally vitiated Hammond's reconstruction. The thirty-seven nomophylakes are elected from one hundred candidates selected from three hundred candidates. The three exegetes are chosen by Apollo from nine candidates selected by the city government from twelve candidates nominated by three local assemblies.

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## THE PRIEST TIMOKLES AND THE ARCHON EUANDROS.

The discovery that appointment to the public priesthood of Asklepios in Athens was by allotment in accordance with the theory of tribal cycles, as had already been proved in the case of the official secretaries, was made independently by Ferguson and Sundwall.<sup>1</sup> As a result, whenever a certain priest of Asklepios can be associated with a certain archon it becomes possible to relate the cycles of the priests with those of the secretaries, and this fact has been utilized in all subsequent attempts to reconstruct the archon lists of Athens after the fourth century.<sup>2</sup>

In several instances, however, the evidence has been confused by a failure to establish definitely that the priesthood in question was that of the Asklepieion in the Asty, the only sanctuary for which the use of tribal cycles is proved. Several priests have been removed from the tribal cycles by scholars who have recognized the distinction between the various cults of Asklepios, both public and private.<sup>3</sup> In none of these cases, however, has the determination of the cycles, or the relationship of the cycles to the chronology of the period been affected by the exclusion of these priests from the lists.

<sup>1</sup> W. S. Ferguson, *Priests of Asklepios* (2nd ed., *University of California Publications in Classical Philology*, I [1907]); J. Sundwall, "Beiträge," *Klio*, Beiheft IV, pp. 75-80.

<sup>2</sup> W. B. Dinsmoor, *The Archons of Athens in the Hellenistic Age* (Cambridge, 1931), pp. 146 ff., 452 ff.; *The Athenian Archon Lists in the Light of Recent Discoveries* (New York, 1939), pp. 92-108; Ferguson, *Athenian Tribal Cycles in the Hellenistic Age* (Cambridge, 1932); W. K. Pritchett and B. D. Meritt, *The Chronology of Hellenistic Athens* (Cambridge, 1940). Note the connection of the priest Phyleus with the archon Isaios in *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 1163, and the priest Eustratos with the archon Diokles in *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 1539.

<sup>3</sup> E.g. Phormio (*I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 4453) by Pritchett, *A.J.A.*, XLII (1941), pp. 358-60. In the case of Demon (*I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 4969) no agreement has been reached as to the cult to which he is to be ascribed, but in any case the tribal cycles cannot apply in his case since he was appointed by special decree at the instigation of the oracle. See R. Schlaifer, *H.S.C.P.*, LI (1940), pp. 241-3; *C.P.*, XXXVIII (1943), pp. 39-43; Pritchett, *A.J.P.*, LXII (1941), pp. 359-60.

The case of the priest Timokles, son of Sokrates, of Halai, however, has not been examined until now, although it is very important for questions of chronology since the inscription in which the priest is recorded, *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 4441, is dated by the archon Euandros.<sup>4</sup> The only editor to publish a full commentary on the text, Meliades, apparently assumed that the priesthood in question was that of Amphiaraos.<sup>5</sup> In spite of this the scholars who have worked on the chronology of Hellenistic Athens have all assumed that Timokles is a priest of Asklepios, though nowhere are the grounds for this ascription argued.<sup>6</sup> It is apparently based on the suggestion of Kirchner in the commentary to *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 4441 to restore Ἀσκληπιῶν above line one. This restoration finds its support by analogy from the inscription on the reverse side of the stone, which dates from a re-use of the stone in imperial times, where Asklepios and Amphiaraos are both included in the dedication, though Hygeia is omitted.<sup>7</sup>

Even if we grant, however, that the little altar on which these two inscriptions were carved was dedicated on both occasions to Asklepios and Amphiaraos, it does not follow that Timokles is a priest of Asklepios. No inscription which is known to have come from the vicinity of the Asklepieion contains any reference to Amphiaraos.<sup>8</sup> In the case of our present inscription, though

<sup>4</sup> G. Meliades, *Arch. Delt.*, VIII (1923), pp. 52-8. This is the first full publication of this inscription, although, unknown to Meliades, it had already been published in *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, iv, p. 17, note, by Kirchner. Meliades assumes that this Euandros is the Euandros of 382/1 B.C., but the letter forms suggest the third or second century. Most scholars (see *infra*, note 6) put this Euandros at the end of the third century.

<sup>5</sup> Meliades, *loc. cit.*

<sup>6</sup> Dinsmoor, *Archons*, p. 214; *Athenian Archon Lists*, pp. 102-4; Ferguson, *Tribal Cycles*, pp. 99, 102; Pritchett and Meritt, *Chronology*, p. 104.

<sup>7</sup> "Firmos, son of Firmos, of Garghettos, set it up to Asklepios (and) Amphiaraos."

<sup>8</sup> Unfortunately, two of the inscriptions from the Attic Corpus which mention Amphiaraos, *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 4530, 4394, come from the Amphiareion at Oropos and do not strictly belong in the Attic Corpus. The latter inscription, whose provenance is not given in the Corpus, is published by B. Leonardos, *Arch. Eph.*, 1910, pp. 118-21. The only other inscription which mentions Amphiaraos comes from the vicinity of the so-called Theseion, *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 171.

an argument from provenance is in itself inconclusive, since the altar is quite small and could easily have been carried a great distance, it is important to note that the stone was found in a modern bath near the tower of Andronikos in the Roman Agora, on the opposite side of the Acropolis from the Asklepieion.<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, in all of the inscriptions from the Asklepieion, Asklepios is never coupled with any other healing divinity except Hygeia, who regularly accompanies all the healing heroes.<sup>10</sup> In one case, it is true, a dedication to Sleep is added to the usual ones to Asklepios and Hygeia (*I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 4467). It is not necessary to imagine here a clear personification of Hypnos, however, since this is more likely a reference to the famous "incubation" which was such an important part of the medical treatment of the sanctuary.<sup>11</sup>

On the other hand, in cases of other sanctuaries than the Asklepieion, Asklepios is often included with other healing divinities on the dedications. This is very evident in the case of the Amyneion. Many of the inscriptions from this sanctuary contain dedications to Asklepios and Amynas, and one is dedicated to Asklepios alone.<sup>12</sup> Thus it is clear that while Asklepios resisted the encroachment of other healing cults on the Asklepieion, he himself successfully invaded sanctuaries which were not his own.

Thus it is evident that even if the proposed restoration of Ασκληπιῶι were to be retained there would be no justification for the assumption that Timokles was a priest of Asklepios. This leads us to the question as to whether the restoration is justified on epigraphical grounds.

The stone is at present in the Epigraphical Museum in Athens, where, through the kind co-operation of Mr. M. Mitsos, the curator, I was able to examine it and to take a squeeze. It was possible to confirm the readings as reported by Meliades and

<sup>9</sup> Meliades, *loc. cit.*, p. 53.

<sup>10</sup> See F. Kutsch, *Attische Heilgötter und Heilheroen* (Giessen, 1913), p. 41, Hygeia with Amphiaraos; pp. 13, 15, with Amynas; pp. 29, 31 with Asklepios.

<sup>11</sup> So Jolles believes in *R.-E.*, IX A (1914), cols. 325-6, s.v. *Hypnos*.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Kutsch, *op. cit.*, Inscriptions, 14, 15, 8, 20. *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 4422, though found in the Amyneion, is dedicated to Asklepios alone.

Kirchner, and, as is clear even in the photograph in the publication of Meliades, enough traces are extant in line one to make the restoration of 'Αμφιαράωι and 'Υγιείαι certain. Any restoration above this line, however, is very improbable. The text is well centered on the stone without it, since it is apparent that the word 'Αμφιαράωι begins at the edge of the stone. Moreover, the space between the first extant line and the top of the stone, which seems to offer sufficient room for the restoration of another line, cannot have been inscribed. This is evident from a fact which was pointed out to me by Mr. Eugene Vanderpool, who kindly checked the stone at my request. Although the surface is broken away immediately above the first extant line so that it is impossible to determine whether or not the surface was inscribed, at the right hand side of this space the stone projects enough above the surface of the inscribed part of the stone to make it certain that there was a moulding across the top of this face which began immediately above the first extant line of text. This moulding would be in line with the extant moulding on the other three faces of the stone and would correspond with the moulding around the base of the altar. Another altar of approximately the same size, at present in the basement of the National Museum (Γλυπτά 3566), conserves the moulding on all four faces.<sup>13</sup> Unless it is assumed that the moulding is inscribed, which is very doubtful, there is no room for a line of text above the first extant line.

With the rejection of any restoration above line one the only reason for assigning Timokles to the priesthood of Asklepios disappears. As a consequence, the date of the archon Euandros must be disassociated from the tribal cycles of the priests of Asklepios, and must be left to be determined by other means.

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<sup>13</sup> This inscription is of little help in determining the location of any sanctuary to Amphiaraos. These altars are small enough to have been used as household altars such as are known at Olynthos, but the presence of the dating by an archon makes it unlikely that this is a domestic altar. Because of the provenance of *I. G.*, II<sup>a</sup>, 171, the sanctuary of Amphiaraos has been thought to be near the so-called Theseion.

## REVIEWS.

ARTHUR STEIN. Die Präfekten von Ägypten in der römischen Kaiserzeit. Bern, A. Francke Ag. Verlag, 1950. Pp. 248.  
(*Dissertationes Bernenses*, Series I, Fasc. 1.)

Just a half century before the publication of the work under review, Arthur Stein contributed a short article to the *Beiblatt* of *Jahreshefte des österreichischen archäologischen Institutes in Wien* (III [1900], pp. 210-11) entitled "Nachlese der Präfekten von Ägypten," in which he added new names and also corrected several inaccuracies of dating and of name in the short list of prefects which P. Meyer had appended to his book *Das Heerwesen der Ptolemäer und Römer in Ägypten* which had appeared that year. In this last work of his long and fruitful scholarly career, Professor Stein has returned to the subject which he treated in his first published article. He died on the 15th of November, 1950 in his eightieth year, leaving behind a legacy of many distinguished works of scholarship. In his passing classical studies have suffered a great loss, especially grievous in the field of Latin prosopography which he had made peculiarly his own. Without in any sense minimizing the worth of his other contributions, the *Prosopographia Imperii Romani*, on the first three volumes of which Professor E. Groag worked jointly with him, and the numerous prosopographical articles in Pauly-Wissowa, may be considered his greatest work.

In the book before us we should then expect to find a competent marshalling of the evidence in order to give us an accurate and complete list of the prefects of Egypt from the time of Augustus to the reorganization of Egypt under Diocletian, their dates of holding office, together with all information about their lives and careers, so far as that is possible from the presently available literary, inscriptional, and papyrological sources. That is precisely what we find in this monograph. It is a good omen for the *Dissertationes Bernenses* under the editorship of Professor A. Alföldi, that Series I is inaugurated by this excellent work from the hands of the scholar who was the dean of Roman prosopography.

The plan of the work may be briefly described as an expanded prosopographical catalogue. In the margin opposite each prefect's name is given the earliest and latest attested dates (day and month, when known) of his term of office. The body of the text presents in narrative form, a discussion, first, of the certain references (citations conveniently given in the text) to the given prefect which establish his name, dates of office, and activity in Egypt; second, all other references which give any information about him,—his family, social class, geographical origin, earlier and later career, and relationship to individuals already known in other connections; and third, references which may apply to him, but do not specifically name him.

In his "Zusammenfassung," pp. 167-90, Stein summarizes under ten heads what we know about the men who were numbered among the highest administrative officials of the Roman Empire. I. The Nature of the Sources. Some prefects are known only from literary sources, others only from inscriptions, the largest number from papyri, while the names of some of this last group occur also in literary sources, and finally a considerable group mentioned in all three kinds of sources. The importance of the prefects is shown by the considerable extent of our knowledge of their careers outside of Egypt. II. The Vice-Prefects. Stein thinks that they functioned only when the prefect was summarily dismissed or died in office. III. Assistants of the Prefect. Only the officials attached to the immediate staff of the prefect are treated, for, of course, all officials in Egypt, administrative and military, were under his command. IV. Geographical Origins. Although the origin of the prefects can be ascertained with certainty only in a limited number of cases, it can be said, in general, that Italy and the Romanized provinces of the West furnished the largest number of prefects in the first century, while the number of prefects from the Greek East slowly increased in the second and third centuries. V. Social Position. All were of the equestrian order with the exception of the freedman Hiberus, who was acting prefect for a short time, many were the sons of procurators and from families which had furnished equestrian career-men for several generations, and, in several instances, father and sons may have held office as prefect of Egypt, as Stein has plausibly demonstrated. VI. Titles of Rank and of Office. In general *κράτος* (*vir egregius*) is found in the first century with sporadic instances as late as 250, then *λαμπρότατος* (*vir clarissimus*)—but only in flattery and unofficially, for *vir clarissimus* is not applied to the prefect in Latin documents—in the second and third centuries, and, finally *διασημότατος* (*vir perfectissimus*) in the third and fourth centuries. "*Ἐπαρχος Αἰγύπτου*" (*praefectus Aegypti*) is the official title, but the less official title *ἡγεμών*, and verbal forms of the same root, are most commonly found. Stein also collects the designations of the prefect and of his position which are employed in the literary sources. VII. Official Career. The normal sequence was the advance from the *praefectura annonae*, less commonly from the *praefectura vigilum*, to the office of prefect. Stein discusses the relative ranking of the offices which they held before and after their post in Egypt. VIII. Length of Term of Office. Since the prefect held office at the pleasure of the emperor, the terms varied greatly. Stein accepts the statement of Seneca, *ad Helv.*, XIX, 6 that C. Galerius held office for 16 years, which is the longest term known, although he is otherwise attested to have held office only in 22/23. Two terms of seven, one of six, another of five are known. IX. Later Careers. They usually advanced to become *praefecti praetorio*, except in the earliest period of the Empire when the prefecture of Egypt was the higher rank. A considerable number of them were advanced to the rank of senator, some received the *ornamenta consularia* and even held the office of consul, one aspired to the imperial purple (L. Mussius Aemilianus) and one refused it.

(Celerinus). X. In this section, the author briefly refers to the literary activity of the men who were prefects of Egypt and adds the names of those whom we meet in the history of early Christianity.

In the table under *Chronologische Rückschau* are listed the names of the prefects, with the earliest and latest dates at which Stein concludes they held office. I am not clear why certain men, whom he apparently considers to have been prefect, so far as can be judged from the discussion in the body of the text, are not included here. I can only guess that it is because their term of office can be dated only within relatively wide limits.

The Notes for the body of the text and for the Résumé are separately numbered, and are accurate, complete, and pertinent. The Index is divided into 1. Things and Words, 2. Persons, with a separate Appendix for Emperors and their Families, and 3. Places and Peoples, which greatly facilitates the use of what is primarily a work of reference.

The roster of the prefects of Egypt (most recently published in the compilation which I appended to "The Prefect of Egypt from Augustus to Diocletian," *Klio*, Beiheft XXXIV [1935], but without critical study) receives a considerable number of additions, and some subtractions of names, changes in names and in datings,—in part corrections of my errors, and in part the result of new texts and studies appearing since 1935, along with full prosopographical data on each prefect and claimant for that office, in this most welcome and needed work of Stein's.

First the subtractions. Along with the two prefects under Commodus, Polliaenus Flavianus and Appius Sabinus, who, as Stein had previously (*Aeg.*, XIX [1939], pp. 215-66) shown, deserve no place in the list of Egyptian prefects, Ponticus (?), 66, and Aurelius Lycaon, before 229/30 (?)—the latter included by my careless reading of the text in which his name occurs—must certainly be dropped. A revised reading of *P. Thead.* 18 establishes the identity of Pomponius Anubianus with Pomponius Januarianus (instead of Januarius as my list has the name), and his term of office may now be extended back to 2 Nov. 283. It is an arbitrary matter to include in a list of officials, as Stein does, the name of a man like Claudius Firmus, who in his established capacity of ἐπανορθωτής carried out at least one of the tasks normally performed by the prefect, but who was never appointed prefect for the second time (Stein has established in *Aeg.*, XVIII [1938], pp. 234-43, the identity of the ἐπανορθωτής of 274 with the prefect, Claudius Firmus, of 264/5), and not to include the names of Naevius Sertorius Macro and Epagathus, who were both actually named prefect, but who, for well-known reasons, did not assume office. The fact that we do not have positive evidence that there was a prefect in office at the time when a decision ἐξ κελεύσεω τοῦ λαμπροτάτου ἡμῶν ἐπανορθωτοῦ Κλαυδίου Φίρμου (*P. Mert.* 26, shortly to appear) was adduced in the proceedings for the appointment of a guardian, 8 Febr. 274, is not sufficient proof that there was not, especially since Stein has shown that Claudius Theodorus was ἐπανορθωτής in Egypt in 258, a year in which L. Mussius Aemilianus was carrying out the func-

tions of prefect. Perhaps Stein does not include, in his Chronological Résumé, Petronius Quadratus, whom I gave as a prefect in the early second century, because of the vagueness of the possible dating. But in addition to omitting him there, he introduces the discussion of his name in the body of the text with "wenn er wirklich Präfekt von Ägypten gewesen war." There is no reason to doubt that the man who issued the *πρόσταγμα* concerning the punishment of disturbers of the peace, of which *P. Arch.* V, 383, no. 75 is a copy, was the prefect of Egypt, although the title does not accompany the name. Stein's doubt about Quadratus is all the more noticeable because he accepts as prefect the new name of L. Pedueaeus Colum(ella) both in the Chron. Rés. and in the body of the text without any demur, on the basis of a petition sent to a man of this name (also without title) by a legionary soldier. But it must be added that the context in the unpublished *P. Oxy.* may, as C. H. Roberts has assured Stein, leave no doubt that the individual in question was prefect.

The following names constitute the harvest of prefects of Egypt from the texts appearing after my list was published in 1935. All new names will be italicized. *Q. Ostorius Scapula*, between 3 and 11, on the basis of an inscription with a dedication to Augustus, [ἐπὶ] Σκάπλου [ἥγε]ιονος, G. de Sanctis, *Riv. Fil.*, 1937, p. 337—*S. B.*, V, 8083. *C. Liternius Fronto*, 69-70, ἐπὶ Γαιού Διτερίου Φ[ρό]ντωνος ἐπάρχοντος Αἰγύπτου, on a bronze vase from Alexandria, L. Robert, *Collection Froehner*, I (1936), 119, 75—*Ann. Epigr.*, 1937, 236. *L. Peducaeus Colum(ella)*, 69/70, unpublished *P. Oxy.* (see paragraph above). *M. Aurelius Verianus*, 189, Segre, *Bull. Soc. Alex.*, XXXII (1938), p. 139—*Ann. Epigr.*, 1938, 60 and *P. S. I.*, XII, 1227. *Alfenus Apollinaris*, 199/200, *P. Mich.*, VI, 426. *P. Mich.* is a petition in which the petitioner mentions a previous request sent τῷ κρατοῦστοι ἡγεμόνι ήμ[ε]ν, a copy of which he appends. Of this only the name of the addressee remains: Ἀλφῆνος Απολυγάριος. *Tiberius Claudius Herennianus*, acting prefect, 12 Jan. 225. His name appears in *P. Harr.* with the date given. It is again a petition, this time to the strategus, in which the writer includes the request which he has sent earlier to the acting prefect, Κλαυδίῳ Ἐρεννιανῷ τῷ κρατίστῳ [τῷ] [δικαιοδότῃ δι.] ἔποντι καὶ [τὰ κατὰ] τὴν ἡγεμονίαν.

Additional names follow which Stein discusses in the body of the text and also accepts as prefects in his Chron. Rés., but which do not appear in my list. *Pedo*, 10/11 or 11/12, whose name I overlooked in *P. S. I.*, X, 1149, 5, ἡγεμονευσάντων Πέδωνος καὶ Μαξίμου, was unquestionably prefect. *Dinarchus*, known only from the account of Malalas, XI, 280, where he is referred to as Αὐγονοστάλιον Δείναρχον, I rejected because of the unreliability of the report there given. Stein keeps him and places him "Under Pius." (*Tenagino*) *Probus*, 269/70, should certainly be included among the prefects. The inscription from Cyrene, which came into my hands too late to utilize, reads: Αὐτοκρ. Καῖσ. Μ. Αὐρ. Κλαυδίος Σεβ. ὅπλοις ἀναστ(ε)ίλας τὴν πολυχρόνιον Μαρμαριτῶν θρασυτητα Κλαυδίοπολιν ἐπώνυμον ἑαυτοῦ ἐκ νέας ἰδρύσατο ἡγουμένο(ν) [τὸν πόλεμον καὶ κτίζοντος

*Πρόβον τοῦ διασημοτ. ἐπάρ. Αἰγυπτ., Oliverio, Docum. ant. dell'Afr. Ital., II, 1 (1933), 102, 68—Ann. Epigr., 1934, 257—S. E. G., IX, 9.* So, too, should (*Statilius?*) *Ammianus* (between 267 and 269 or in the year 270/1) whom I took to be Annianus (between 236 and 240), in the only text mentioning his name, *P. S. I.*, X, 1102, 'Αμμιανῷ τ[ῷ] δ[ιασ]ημο[τάτῳ] ω [ε]πάρχῳ Αἰγύπτου, suspecting a misreading of the name. But Stein informs us that Vitelli had insisted that *μη* is "absolutely certain." *Aemilius Rectus*, under Tiberius, *ca.* 14, should perhaps be considered distinct from *L. Aemilius Rectus*, 41-42, and, according to Stein, was very likely the father of the latter. The absence of any supporting evidence for the attachment of the name of *Aemilius Rectus*, who "ruled Egypt," to the well-known anecdote about Tiberius' insistence on a fair but not confiscatory collection of taxes by this governor in Dio, LVII, 10, 5, an anecdote capable of wide applicability, justifies at least a question mark after the name of *Aemilius Rectus*.

In the body of the text, Stein discusses and makes mention of new names, which he does not include in his Chron. Rés. In two cases, he clearly indicates that he does not consider them prefects,—*Murrentius Mauricius*, p. 143, "keinesfalls authentisch" and included "nur der Vollständigkeit wegen"; *Marius Secundus*, p. 123, whose activity in Egypt in some administrative capacity, although a senator, is attested for the same period in which Julius Basilianus was prefect, 217 to June 218, and about whom Stein (rather unnecessarily) remarks, "Den Titel Präfekt . . . führt er hier (*P. S. I.*, III, 249) nicht und wird ihn wohl auch nicht geführt haben."

In the case of other new names only doubt is expressed. There is, however, no reason for considering the name of *Titianus Clodianus*, 143, as prefect of Egypt even under the protection of "ja es ist nicht einmal sicher, dass er Präfekt von Ägypten war." In the solitary text which mentions him, his name is doubtfully read, there is no mention of rank or title, the context gives no certain indication to make it likely that he was prefect. The pertinent passage in a petition addressed to the prefect *L. Mussius Aemilianus*, *P. Oxy.*, XII, 1468, 27-28 reads: (my mother) τ[ῆ]ς κ[α]κουργίας ταύτης μῆ σωτηρία μ[η]σάση τ[.] ετ[ο?] παρὰ Τίττανῷ Κλωδίᾳνῳ. *Aurelius Mercurius* is introduced, p. 154, by the statement, "An dieser Stelle sei eingereiht A. M. obwohl wir weder wissen ob er Präfekt war, noch den Zeitpunkt seiner Tätigkeit in Ägypten sicher bestimmen können." A final decision about his name must await the appearance of *P. Oxy.*, XIX in which his name is found, but without title. C. H. Roberts is quoted to the effect that "there is little doubt" that the author of the official correspondence in this papyrus, which is directed to several strategi about the *annona militaris*, and which contains a reference to orders, issued by the author of the correspondence, to the *procurator usiacus*, is the prefect. Stein thinks, p. 160, that the papyrus in which *Hilario* is named, Υἱαρεῖων(ος) ἡγεμόνος, *Papyrus der Sammlung Rainer, Stud. Pal.*, XXIII (—Wessely, *Catal. ser. Gr.*, II), 92, must be placed in the period before Constantine, because of its dating in the 2nd

year of an unknown emperor. The chronological difficulties, however, on the one hand, of placing him in this period, and on the other hand, the very late date which the very name Hilario and the whole composition of the text would seem to indicate, make him question whether Hilario is to be considered one of the prefects of the third century.

The roster in the body of the text concludes with a consideration of the names of prefects from the time before the third century, whose time of office cannot be determined with any degree of accuracy. Of the new names which Stein discusses here, the mutilated name of the man whose *cursus* is given in *C.I.L.*, XIV, 5341, beginning, . . . *Bla . . . praef. Aeg.*, must indubitably be added to the list of prefects. Stein dates the inscription, from the lettering, as certainly not later than the middle of the second century and probably from the reign of Trajan. He gives the restoration, *Bla(esus?)* which Groag suggested in Ritterling, *Fasti*, 116. I followed the conjecture of the editors of *P. Oxy.*, X, 1313, that the name in the second last line of this two line scrap, . . . Ἡρακλῆον δὲ τοῦ ἐπάρχου τῆς Αιγύπτου was a mistake for Heraclitus, and a reference to Septimius Heraclitus, prefect in 215. Stein is perhaps right in holding that the identification is unlikely, especially since we meet the similar name Heracleo in Dio, *exc. LXXX*, 4, 2 and Heraclius in an inscription from Leptis magna, *Ann. Épigr.*, 1929, 2, as Stein points out. *Heracleus* would then be perfect of Egypt at some unknown time, perhaps in the third century, in which the editors placed *P. Oxy.*, X, 1313. I fully concur in the doubt which Stein expresses about the name of *Agenor* as prefect of Egypt, *P. Oxy.*, I, 122. The discussion of the prefects concludes with citations of passages which mention the prefect, but which do not give specific names or dates.

The many refinements in dating the terms of office resulting from the critical re-examination and evaluation of the texts, old and new, which constitute one of the most valuable features of Stein's work, cannot be examined in detail. In general, it may be said that the determination of the fact that one known prefect immediately succeeded another known prefect in office, has shown that there are comparatively few gaps in the series. The author graphically shows sequence in the Chron. Rés. by arrows in the margin between the names of the prefects concerned. Three points affecting chronology may be mentioned.

*Q. Marcius Turbo T. Flavius Priscus Gallonius Fronto Publicius Severus* is now confirmed actually to have held office as prefect (not "titular prefect" as I gave him) for at least part of the year 117, and the names *T. Flavius Priscus Gallonius* have been added to his already unwieldy name by Leschi's revised reading of an inscription from Caesarea in Mauretania, *Compt. Rend.*, 1945, 144-62—*Ann. Épigr.*, 1946, 113.

*Ti. Julius Lupus* is placed in the year 71/72 principally on the basis of Josephus, *B.J.*, VII, 433, following Niese's dating of the events narrated at this point, rather than Schürer's, who places them in 73 (*Gesch. d. jüdisch. Volkes*,<sup>3</sup> I, pp. 639 f.).

The statement of Philo that Magius Maximus was prefect for the second time still remains unsupported by documentary evidence. Stein, however, gives a possible period for placing his first term, between 3 and 10. There is nothing intrinsically suspect in a second term of office for a prefect of Egypt, although the case of M. Magius Maximus is still unique in this respect. Stein has shown that Claudius Firmus, prefect of Egypt in 264/5 returned to administrative work in Egypt ten years later, albeit as *ἐπανορθωτής* and not as prefect, as has already been mentioned. It is not clear to me, however, why Stein connects the dedication of the people of Tarraco, *M. Magio M. f. Maximo, praef. Aegypti* in *C. I. L.*, IX, 1125—Dessau, 1335, with the period 3-10, as he does by the statement: "Das kann sich aber sicher wohl nur auf die zum erstenmal erfolgte Ernennung zum Präfekten beziehen." Other than Philo, there does not seem to me to be any support for placing Maximus in Egypt as prefect at any other time than 11/12. Of the three undated references to his prefecture in Egypt, *P. S. I.*, X, 1149 shows by the sequential naming of the prefects, Octavius, 2/1 B. C. to 3 A. D., Aquila, 10/11, Pedo, 10/11, and Maximus, that Maximus must be placed subsequent to 10/11. Concerning the second of these references, Dittenberger, *O. G. I. S.*, 665, 27, I think that I have presented cogent evidence in *T. A. P. A.*, LXV (1934), pp. 248-59 (Stein does not mention this) to make it very likely, at the least, that Maximus issued the administrative orders which are mentioned in the edict of Cn. Vergilius Capito, in the year 12. That leaves the vague reference of Plin., *N. H.*, XXXVI, 69, which tells us nothing more than that *Maximus quidam praefectus Aegypti* transported an obelisk to Rome.

It is worthwhile to give here the changes on the names of the prefects, corrections, additions, and conjectures, which Stein's new list presents to us. (*M. Antonius* ?) *Hiberus*, instead of *Hiberus*. *A. Avilius Flaccus*, correcting the typographical error of my *Avilius*. (*M. Mettius*) prefixed to *Modestus'* name should, perhaps, be followed by a question mark, since these names rest upon a very likely, but not definitely established, relationship which Stein's acumen has detected, pp. 32-3. *Quinctius* (?) *Paulinus*, rather than *Q.* (?) *Paulinus*. *C. Tettius Africanus Priscus*, the name *Cassianus* added. *C.* (A. in my list) *Avidius Heliodorus*. *Minicius Sanctus*, instead of *Ateius* (?) *Sanctus*. The first name is based upon the revised reading of a Berlin papyrus at Stein's suggestion by H. Zilliacus and published in 1941. In this papyrus, the name . . . *νικτος Σάνκτος* is prefixed without title to a circular letter addressed to the strategi of the Thebaid and Heptanomia. The reading in *P. Oxy.*, III, 635, where the title of prefect accompanies the name is . . . *ω Σάνκτω ἐπάρχου Αἰγύπτου*. *Pomponius Faustinianus*, not *Faustinianus*. Add *L.* to *Mantennius Sabinus*, *Aurelius* to *Septimius Heracitus*. More accurately . . . *alerius*, for my Galerius in 223/4, since other names are possible. Add *M.* to *Aurelius Zeno Januarius*. *C.* (not *Claudius*) *Valerius Firmus*. *Lissenius Proculus*, for *Lis-sinius Proculus*. *Cussonius I* . . . for *Cussonius*. *Juvenis Genialis*, not *Iuvenius*. *G. Sallustius Hadrianus* for the *Hadrianus Sallustius*.

of the texts. *Pomponius Januarianus*, not *Pomponius Januarius*. [*F*] [*Ia*] [*vius*] (?) *Valerius Pompeianus*, for *Flavius V. P.*

Whether L. Mussius Aemilianus, 257-259, was prefect from the beginning of his activity, as Stein insists, or first acting prefect and then prefect, as he is entered in my list of prefects, depends, in the first instance, on the interpretation of the phrase διέπων τὴν ἡγεμονίαν applied to Aemilianus, and, to lesser degree, on the conception one has of the office of Vice-Prefect in Egypt. To take up the second point first. Stein comments, p. 170, on the anomaly involved in an office of vice-prefect of the vice-regent of the Roman emperor, i. e. of the prefect, but the anomaly is demonstrably a legalistic one which did not bar the appointment of men to that office in practice. He proceeds to point out quite rightly that such an official was usually named to act as prefect only upon the unexpected termination of the prefect's term of office by his death or peremptory dismissal, and that he retired from office when a regular prefect was appointed and arrived in Alexandria. This was doubtless the normal procedure, but it does not preclude the possibility a) that an acting prefect could be appointed in the normal change in the high command of Egypt, or b) that once named acting prefect, the same man could be advanced to the office of prefect.

It would not be of so much importance, perhaps, to show the likelihood that possibility b) was apparently what took place in the case of Aemilianus, if the meaning of the phrase διέπων τὴν ἡγεμονίαν were not directly involved. In three places Aemilianus is mentioned as διέπων τὴν ἡγεμονίαν,—Eusebius, *H.E.*, VII, 11, which tells of the trial of Bishop Dionysius before Aemilianus during the persecution of the Christians under Valerian and Gallienus, which Stein dates in 257; *P. Oxy.*, IX, 1201, with the appellative λαμπρότατος dated 24 Sept. 258; *P. Oxy.*, XII, 1468, with the appellative διασημότατος and without date. In two papyri, the references to him read: τοῦ λαμπροτάτου Μουσσίου Αἰμιλ . . . , *P. Oxy.*, XIV, 1637, with no date, and τοῦ διασημοτάτου [ἡγεμόνος] ου Μουσσίου Αἰμιλιανοῦ, *P. Ryl.*, II, 110, dated Sept.-Oct. 259. From the use of the phrase, διέπων τὴν ἡγεμονίαν in the two passages of earlier date, I had concluded that Aemilianus was acting prefect for some time prior to 24 Sept. 258 (now by Stein's dating of the trial before Aemilianus, I should say as early as 257) and had been promoted to the office of prefect some time before Sept.-Oct., 259, as is shown by the Rylands' papyrus, and had thus entered him in the list, but without discussion. Διέπω used in connection with an office, normally bears this meaning, and it is the only meaning Preisigke gives it in this connection in his *Wörterbuch*, s. v. διέπω 2) "ein Amt vertretungsweise führen, vertreten" with citations from the second and third centuries of our era, and in *Fachwörter*, he equates διέπω = διαδεχόμενος = "Vertreter," διαδεχόμενος being the usual word employed in describing the acting prefect, especially when the δικαιοδότης succeeded to the office of prefect. (But notice the expression, Stein, p. 129, ὁ κράτιστος δικαιοδότης διέπων καὶ τὰ κατὰ ἡγεμονίαν, in connection with the acting prefect Herennianus.)

The application to the acting prefect of the appellatives *λαμπρότατος* and *διαισημότατος* although not otherwise attested—the usual appellative of rank seems to have been *κράτιστος*, the rank which many of them had as *δικαιοδότης*—cannot be a strong weight in the argument either way in view of the interchange of *κράτιστος*, *λαμπρότατος*, and *διαισημότατος* as appellatives of rank for the prefect, and particularly in this very period. Cf. Stein, pp. 162 and 178.

But Stein argues that *διέπων τὴν ἡγεμονίαν* is here shown to mean “einwandfrei . . . nicht wie öfter geglaubt worden ist ein Stellvertreter des Präfekten . . . sondern der Präfekt selbst” (p. 220 and note 454; the same position is reiterated p. 180 and *passim*) by the Latin text which precedes the Greek in *P. Oxy.*, IX, 1201: *Mussio Aemiliano v. p. praef. Aeg.* The Greek petition is given under the caption, line 12, *ἔρμενεία τῶν Θωμαϊκῶν* and addressed *Μουσίῳ Αἰμιλιανῷ τῷ λαμπροτάτῳ διέποντι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν* but it is obvious that the cumbersome Greek phrase *διέποντι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν* is no translation, but at best a periphrasis for the Latin *praef. Aeg.* and furthermore that *v(ir) p(erfectissimus)* is wrongly translated. In a similar bilingual petition (on separate papyri, but the same document), the Latin address reads: [*Au*] *relatio Appio Sabino v. p. praef. Aegypti* in *P. Giss. Univ. Bibl., Inv. 40—S.B.*, I, 1010, and the (correct) Greek translation, but without a translation of the appellative of rank [*Avp*] *ηλίῳ Ἀππίῳ [Σ]αβείνῳ ἐπάρχῳ Αἰγύπτῳ* in *P. Jand.*, *Inv.* no. 253—Kalbfleisch, *Sav. Z.*, LXIV (1944), pp. 417 f. But the reference to Aemilianus as prefect in the Latin version, and as acting prefect in the Greek version of *P. Oxy.*, IX, 1201 of the year 258, may simply reflect the confusion of the writers, because of the recent advancement of the acting prefect to the office of prefect. It may be of significance in this connection that it was in this very year 258 that Claudius Theodorus was active as *ἐπανορθωτής* in Egypt alongside Aemilianus, as Stein has demonstrated in *Aeg.*, XVIII (1938), pp. 240-1, and that the same Aemilianus not much later sought to make himself emperor.

In any case, no passage is known to me from the papyri in which *διέπω* is used in connection with an office in the meaning “manage, conduct the affairs of,” in which meaning it is found commonly enough in other connections. It, therefore, seems inadmissible to cite the usages in Josephus, *B. J.*, IV, 616 ὁ *διέπων τὴν Αἴγυπτον καὶ Ἀλεξανδρείαν* and V, 45 *τὴν Αἴγυπτον διέπων*, and then conclude, p. 180: “Diese Ausdrucksweise eignet gelegentlich auch den urkundlichen Texten, wo damit keineswegs immer die Stellvertretung gemeint ist, wie man bisweilen geglaubt hat (s. o. S. 144 und Anm. 454). L. Mussius Aemilianus wird sowohl bei Eusebios, hist. eccl. VII 11 wie in den Papyri *P. Oxy* IX 1201. XII 1468 als *διέπων τὴν ἡγεμονίαν* bezeichnet.”

In a book presenting material which consists largely of citations of sources, quotation of texts, frequently mutilated, dates, cross-references to publications of the same text in different places,—all the heterogeneous minutiae which almost invite to slips in writing, proofreading, and setting up in type, it reflects the conscientious and painstaking scholarship so characteristic of its distinguished author

in larger matters as well, to say that I have found only a very few slips of any kind, and that these are self-explanatory. It is only to satisfy the demands of custom that I list them: p. 10 Reinhardt, for my name; p. 59, margin, Jänner, for Januar; p. 99, in margin, "1" has dropped out in 180; p. 168, line 16, the spacing of *ode raus*; p. 193, Geminius Chrestus is dated 217-222, but on p. 124, margin, 219-221; p. 197, note 45 occurs twice; p. 203, "1" has dropped out of note 149; p. 220, note 451, *praefectus praetorso*, for *praetorio*; p. 225, note 29, *vila* for *vita*.

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MASON HAMMOND. City-State and World State in Greek and Roman Political Theory until Augustus. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1951. Pp. x + 217.

This book, whose author, as most readers of this Journal will know, is Pope Professor of the Latin Language and Literature at Harvard University, is not primarily intended for classicists or specialists in ancient history and ancient political philosophy, but for students of political theory and political science in general. Its aim is not merely to present a section or an aspect of ancient political thought but also to draw a lesson from it for our own time and for the future.

Books of this kind, if written by an author who is thoroughly competent in his field, are very much to be welcomed. For the political problems of classical antiquity have a greater similarity to the political problems of today than those of the Middle Ages or even of the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries; and since in dealing with antiquity we are able to overlook the whole chain of events from the beginning to the end, and so to discern the causes of success and failure, an analysis of this period is especially instructive. Disregarding a few exceptions, however, which one can count on the fingers of one hand, an adequate knowledge of the classical languages and of ancient history has in this country become almost exclusively restricted to specialists in the classics, with the consequence that even in some of the most widely used and most generally acknowledged works on ancient political theory one can discover egregious errors and gross misunderstandings of the ancient texts the like of which no translator with an adequate knowledge of either the ancient languages or of ancient political institutions could have committed. It has therefore become an urgent task of classical scholars to correct the faulty picture of ancient theory and practice presented in these works, and to do so in books which are likely to be read not only by specialists in their own field. This is what the author has tried to do in regard to one very interesting problem.

It is the main thesis of the book under review that one of the

major causes, if not the most decisive cause, of the centuries-long agony of the Roman Empire and of the breakdown of ancient civilization was the failure of ancient political thinkers to adapt the theory of the best state which had been developed on the basis of the experiences of the Greek city states of the sixth, fifth, and fourth centuries to larger political units like the Hellenistic kingdoms and the Roman Empire, which comprised the whole Mediterranean world. The author begins with a distinction made by Sir Ernest Barker between political theory and political thought. Political theory, according to Barker, is the result of the conscious speculation of individual thinkers, while political thought "is the complex of ideas which is entertained—but not, as a rule, apprehended—by those who are concerned with affairs of state at a given period of time." It follows that political theory cannot become historically and practically effective without first, at least to some extent, having become converted into political thought. It is also clear that political theory can remain, either permanently or for a long time, unproductive in the field of political practice. But there are also striking examples of political theories which have had an enormous influence in shaping actual political history, as for instance the theories of Montesquieu on the creation of the American constitution, the theories of Rousseau in the French Revolution, and the theories of Marx in recent history. If, therefore, there can be no doubt that political thought with its enormous influence on actual history has largely, though certainly not exclusively, been shaped by political theory, it does not appear unreasonable to assume that the lack or absence of an adequate political theory may also have had a negative and destructive influence in history.

Starting from these general considerations the author traces first the history of Greek political theory from its early beginnings through Plato and Aristotle to Polybius. He shows how the political experience of the city states with their constant change from oligarchy to tyranny to democracy and vice versa led with a certain inevitability to the theory of the mixed constitution. But the ideal of the philosophers who gradually elaborated this theory remained that of a small state, and Plato and Aristotle considered it as one of the most important prerequisites of a sound political community that it remain within very narrow limits both in regard to its territory and to its population. At the same time the actual historical development took the very opposite direction. But when Polybius applied the theory of the mixed constitution to Rome which, at the time when he wrote his work, had extended its rule over the greater part of the world then known, he made no attempt to adapt the theory to these new conditions. He pointed out, to be sure, that the Roman state had been better suited for large-scale military enterprises and the conquest of foreign countries than Sparta. But almost the only concrete observations that he made in this context concern problems of finance and supply in warfare that has to be conducted far away from the home base. He did not even touch upon the problem of the position of the conquered populations within the political community as a whole, beyond the very superficial obser-

vation that they were better off under the "beneficent" rule of the Romans than under Macedonian domination. This failure to see the most burning problems of his own time and of the future is, as the author correctly observes, all the more remarkable because problems of a similar nature had existed in the Greek world, ever since the Athenian Sea Confederation had, in the course of the fifth century, been converted into an *arche* and because the so-called Achaean League, in which Polybius had grown up and held important political positions, had offered in a way at least an approximation to the solution of such problems.

The author believes that this deficiency in the development of ancient political theory had very far reaching consequences. The large territory of the Roman Empire remained an object of exploitation for the Roman aristocracy to the end of the republic, and even the complicated system of federations which the Romans had created in Italy before the Punic wars was not further developed and adapted to new circumstances, until the so-called Social War of the early first century forced an extension of Roman citizenship to all Italians below the Rubico. When in the last years of the Republic Cicero in his political writings tried to find a way out of the hopeless political situation of his time he added some new ideas to the political theory of Polybius by whom he was very strongly influenced, but still continued to think essentially in terms of the city state, though, the author believes, his concept of a single *princeps* or several *principes* acting in harmony, made a certain adaptation of the mixed constitution to imperial government possible.

In the last chapters of his work the author tries to show the positive and negative influences of Cicero's theory on imperial Rome. In contrast to the rest of the work, which is very lucid, these last chapters are not quite easy to understand. I shall, therefore, quote a few of the most significant passages literally and then say what seems to me the intention of the author. "If he (Cicero) failed to recognize the new possibilities in Rome's imperial mission he nevertheless pointed the way for Augustus to realize these possibilities by compromise rather than by revolution" (p. 140). "Augustus failed to bridge the gulf between government and governed in the Roman Empire. Neither Caesar's monarchy nor Cicero's *de Republica* offered any guidance toward solving this problem. But in the end Cicero's *de Republica*, not Caesar's monarchy, set the theoretical pattern for the Augustan principate. In this sense Augustus fulfilled Greek political theory and Roman political experience as wedded in the political theory of Cicero. . . . The greatest contribution which Augustus made to the culture of Western Europe was not the actual government under which the Roman Empire flourished but the perpetuation of the ideals of Cicero" (p. 164). "The fault in the Augustan compromise did not lie . . . in the fact that it afforded an opportunity for monarchy to develop at the expense of the republic. . . . The government of the Roman Empire achieved its most effective balance during the second century of our era. By then the emperor was frankly recognized as

the head of the state. The senate no longer consisted of a narrow group of hereditary nobles but represented the best elements drawn from all the empire. The privileges of citizenship were rapidly being extended to all persons capable of political self-realization in a local city state under the general oversight of the central government. To condemn Augustus because his Roman principate became in fact an ecumenical monarchy under the Antonines would be as unfair as to condemn the creators of the United States because . . . the constitution which they established to protect States' rights against an undue growth of the federal government has become the vehicle of just that sort of centralization which they distrusted" (pp. 163-4).

If I understand this alternate praise and blame of the Augustan principate and its aftermath correctly it is the opinion of the author that it was the greatest merit of the Augustan principate that it continued to realize, even though in a much diluted form, the ideals of Cicero and the principle of the mixed constitution, but that, partly at least because of the absence of an adequately developed theory, the adaptation of this principate and of the monarchy which succeeded it to the conditions of a gigantic empire continued to be very imperfect. I am not so sure whether I understand the author's evaluation of the monarchization of the empire between Augustus and the Antonines: whether, as some of his sentences seem to indicate, he agrees with Gibbon's praise of the period of the Antonines as a kind of golden age, or whether he believes that the development toward an absolute monarchy was an evil mitigated only by the personal character of some outstanding monarchs, and then again whether he considers this development as inevitable or as something that could have been avoided. The latter interpretation agrees perhaps best with the general tendency of the work and also with the fact that the two devices of the representative system and of federalism have, in modern times, delayed and mitigated, even though not completely prevented, similar developments in some modern political bodies of similar size, especially the United States. But the views of the author in this respect are not quite unmistakably expressed.

At the very end of his work the author points out again that "stagnation is inevitable when orthodox political theory fails to progress in response to changed political conditions," adding that "today national sovereignty dominates political thought as firmly as did the orthodox theory of the city state with its mixed constitution in the classical world." This is obviously a challenge to modern political theorists to do what their ancient predecessors failed to do and to work out a solution of our new problems before it is too late and before we suffer the fate of ancient civilization. The author does not try to offer such a solution himself and he is wise in not doing so. For this is not the task of the historian and the classicist. Yet one may ask whether the historian cannot go considerably beyond what has been done in the work under review.

A work like this presents to its author a difficult problem of selection and composition. Where an attempt is made to deal with

problems of general political theory on the basis of factual history, it is wise to base the analysis as far as humanly possible on well established facts and to avoid controversial issues since their inclusion will naturally tend to make the results uncertain. The author was therefore right in following in general this principle. His thorough and accurate knowledge both of well established facts and of controversial historical issues which he makes no attempt to solve stands out on every page. But many pages in the book contain nothing but facts that are very familiar to any well-trained classicist. Since the work was not primarily written for classicists this is perhaps no fault. Yet there remains a certain dilemma. It is doubtful whether a reader who, before reading the book, was ignorant of all the facts that it communicates is sufficiently prepared to understand its very important points. The student of political science on the other hand, who is somewhat better acquainted with ancient history, may occasionally be tempted to skip a page that does not add anything to his knowledge. But having started doing so, he may then also skip pages that would be very rewarding.

Nobody can overcome this difficulty completely at a time when a work like this has to reckon with enormous differences in the educational background of its prospective readers. But it would perhaps be less apparent if an attempt had been made to increase the share of political analysis and to interconnect it as thoroughly as possible with the background facts, while in the work as it is analysis and background facts appear perhaps too often separately.

In order to illustrate in what way in my opinion the share of political analysis might have been increased, I may perhaps briefly touch upon two points. On p. 76 the author quotes with approval McIlwain's criticism of Polybius for having failed to distinguish between a mixed constitution and a purely functional system of checks and balances. McIlwain's criticism is of course perfectly correct. In fact, it is one of the greatest faults of Polybius' analysis that he characterizes Rome as a state with a mixed constitution, but analyzes this constitution almost exclusively from a functional point of view. But this criticism is not enough. It is necessary to show in what ways, strangely enough not pointed out by Polybius, Rome shows also essential characteristics of what was originally meant by a mixed constitution, or rather mixed politico-social structure, and then not only to distinguish between "mixed constitution" and "system of checks and balances," but also to point out what they have actually in common with one another and why they could be confused. Such an analysis would make it much clearer why a city state, a large empire, and a world state necessarily present the problem in very different forms and yet the same problem.

The second point leads back to the problem of the principate of Augustus. On p. 150 the author rejects Mommsen's theory of the Dyarchy of the *Princeps* and the *Senate*, pointing out that "Sovereignty rested ultimately with the 'Senate and Roman People,'" and that "Augustus himself was simply an agent assigned specific powers to fulfil certain assigned functions." This was unquestionably the official theory. But many historians have contended not without

justification that the scale was heavily weighted on the other side and this by no means, as the author seems to think, because of the personal incapability and lack of initiative on the part of the senators. The Senate had been given its powers by a man who, according to his own claim, *consensu universorum rerum potitus [erat] omnium*, and one may very well ask whether under such conditions the actual power of the Senate could have possibly amounted to very much, however excellent the senators might have been. The same thing had happened somewhat more than fifty years earlier under Sulla, and though Sulla abdicated after having made a constitution putting the Senate legally in control of the state, the power of the Senate vanished rapidly in the following decades while it had been supreme some hundred years earlier when it had had very flimsy legal foundations. At this point one comes to the fundamental question of the relation between legal and actual powers in a political community, a question which is also basic for a solution of the problem of the adaptation of the principles of the mixed constitution and of the system of checks and balances to changing conditions.

There are a good many other problems of this kind which cannot all be mentioned in a review. The system of checks and balances of the Weimar constitution, for instance, was not destroyed by expansion, which happened only after its destruction, and not, or certainly not exclusively or mainly, by the monarchic traditions and inclinations of the German people, but by factors which were also present and of very great importance in the late Roman Republic.

But it would be very unjust to blame an author for what he did not do instead of praising him for what he has actually accomplished, especially if this is so much as in the present book. Both by what it gives and by what it does not give, it presents a challenge not only to the political theorist but also to the historian and to the classical scholar to continue and enlarge the work which the author has so brilliantly started.

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CARLO DEL GRANDE. *Hybris. Colpa e castigo nell'espressione poetica e letteraria degli scrittori della Grecia antica da Omero a Cleante.* Napoli, Riccardo Ricciardi, 1947. Pp. 560. 1000 lire.

Professor Del Grande's book bears the sub-title "Crime and Punishment in the Literature of Ancient Greece, from Homer to Cleanthes." The present volume is an historical outline and philological study; it assembles and evaluates the evidence for the law of Hybris-Nemesis. A second part will discuss "the probable origin of this law in the cult of the chthonic deities and in the cult of Apollo, its widespread survival as a consequence of ingrained belief and religious scruple, and its Christian renewal which gives it a new esoteric meaning" (p. 3).

In the first part, here reviewed, Del Grande's method entails a general survey of Greek literature. He proceeds by categories of literary form, dealing separately with the epic, the lyric poets, the tragedians, the historians, the comic poets, the orators, and the philosophers. Any defect of perspective which arises from an analysis under these categories without particular reference to relationships of place or time will, in the intention of the author, be remedied by the synthesis of the second part, which will "order in chronological panorama the partial deductions already reached for individual writers" (p. 3).

Let me say at the outset that I find the method adopted by Del Grande—a wide survey of Greek literature under a particular aspect—both interesting and rewarding. New and unusual prospects compensate for the inevitable distortions of perspective. There are of course fields in which the material is meagre. Homer provides little evidence for the idea of hybris, and our interpretation of the evidence must depend on our view of religion in Homeric times. And Hesiod, though he is regarded as "having first affirmed the necessity of struggling against Hybris and following Justice" (p. 30) is not regarded as an innovator in that concept. It is when we reach the field of tragedy that the method proves most fruitful. Not only the extant but also the lost plays are studied, on the basis of didascalia and fragments, for their treatment of the hybris-nemesis theme. They are studied discursively, and the discussion is prefaced by a chronological résumé of the views hitherto advanced by scholars. The author's comment is both acute and illuminating. There are no footnotes to the pages, but 68 pages of notes are printed after the appendices. These notes constitute a bibliography briefly and usefully commented.

In any such vast study the reader will somewhere disagree with the author as to emphasis and detail; but the value of the study is determined by the validity of its method, the general soundness of its scholarship and the new perspective it creates. As to perspective, it is likely to reflect contemporary emphasis. Every book of any vitality is in a measure an essay on its own times. Jaeger's *Paideia* owes some of its character to the fact that it was written in the heyday of the national-socialist regime. So in Del Grande's *Hybris* one is conscious of the spectre of Mussolini, hanging by his heels at a Milan garage. And I am perhaps guilty of a contemporary judgment when I say that to me his theme is too tenuous for the superstructure—that I feel he should have been discussing not hybris but justice. Years ago a compatriot of his, Adolfo Levi, studied Crime and Punishment in Greek Thought under their juridical aspects. That, it seems to me, is how they should be studied. Once you leave the purely juridical field, cognate terms intrude. Only perhaps in the tragedians can we dissociate the idea of hybris from the other words it suggests—dike, moira, ate, Erinyes, later sophrosyne. All these words derive from a past of religious-philosophical speculation as—for all its defects—Cornford's early study *From Religion to Philosophy* sufficiently shows. They are a part of the struggle of the Greek spirit toward a concept of justice. Hybris without a con-

cept of justice had no meaning. The Thrasymachus of the *Republic*, by redefining justice, made of successful hybris a virtue.

It may, however, be premature to suggest that a study of the idea of justice is a necessary premise for the study of hybris. In his second volume Del Grande may (and indeed probably must) give us the study of the concept of justice for which he has laid such admirable foundations in the present volume. A second volume would probably also correct the impression left with me by this first,—that the concept of hybris was both uniform and unchanging. Some of the author's evidence explicitly contradicts any such thesis; but the effect of piling up evidence—even if some of it is negative and some tenuous—is to create the impression of a monolithic hybris, present from primeval times. Whereas we are interested in hybris not as a name for a crime of insolent violence but as a name of evolving connotations for a crime against a divine, tribal, social idea of justice. When in the nineteenth book of the *Iliad* Agamemnon blames his act of hybris on Ate, he may or may not have believed in compulsive behaviour but he was certainly alleging a cause intelligible to Homer's audience and a theory very different from that of Aeschylus.

There can be little doubt that the concept of hybris developed in time. It may be open to question whether concepts differed in place, between Ionia and the mainland. But the view of hybris and of justice that we find in the epic (including the *Nekuia*) differs from that of Hesiod. The evidence for an idea of hybris in Archilochus, Alcaeus, Sappho is scanty. In Tyrtaeus, Solon, Theognis we find the vigorous concept. The philosophers of the Ionian School are passed over by the author (though they use the terminology of justice to illustrate theories of nature) but he regards Parmenides and the Eleatics as having conserved something of the old idea of hybris. (The Presocratics by and large are regarded as rationalizers and only pp. 313-19 are devoted to this important period.) On Del Grande's own evidence it is tempting to see a divergent development in Ionia and on the mainland, perhaps due to differences in social and economic structure, perhaps to influences of religion.

A difference of development in place, however, must remain much more questionable than the obvious evolution in time. Hybris in the *Iliad* is ineluctable. Achilles, when about to draw his sword against Agamemnon, is saved only by the intervention of Athene. In the *Odyssey* the often-repeated charge of hybris against the suitors amounts to little more than offence against privilege and rights of property among a ruling class (p. 16). In Hesiod the idea of justice begins to appear under a very different aspect (p. 30). "Hesiod was the first to affirm the necessity of struggling against Hybris and pursuing Dike." Justice, like the virtue of Erga (289-92), must be attained by conscious effort. Del Grande concedes these points singly without drawing conclusions of evolution. Nor does he draw any such conclusion when discussing the tragedians. Yet after discussing Aeschylus, the great exponent of the hybris-nemesis theme, he turns to Sophocles and finds that where he uses that theme it is transformed.

The spiritual movement which began to manifest itself at the middle of the fifth century insensibly abandons the clear principles of the Delphic religion without formally denying them. In the choruses of the Antigone the substance of the thought is traditional, but the drama itself in its development leaves that tradition far behind (p. 136).

After long discussion of the more complex problem of Euripides he reaches the interesting conclusion (p. 210) that in the largest group of his tragedies Euripides followed the hybris-nemesis pattern of Aeschylus. At the same time he concedes that the plays preserved to us by the syllogies are those that conformed to "the spiritual climate which was in process of formation." These hints of development rather than persistence are so frequent that the synthesis of the second volume will no doubt correct any impression of static concept derived from the first.

The touchstone for Del Grande's thesis, however, is the fourth century. We naturally turn to that time to see whether, in a world of changing ethical attitudes, the idea of hybris keeps its vitality without changing its content. The mere survival of the word in current usage will mean very little, as the history of our own similar term of "sin" well shows. When we say "it is a sin to stay home on this fine day," our statement is no evidence for the continuing vitality of the doctrine of original sin. In discussing Socrates and Plato the author concedes that hybris is a Platonic synonym of "injustice," its opposing virtue being sophrosyne. The word hybris, however, has for Plato many connotations, as he himself says in the *Phaedrus* (238A), "when Desire, which is devoid of reason, rules in us and drags us to pleasure, that power of misrule is called hybris. Now hybris has many names." (Of the 53 instances of its use in Plato quoted in Ast's *Lexicon*, in 37 it means "insolent" or "impudent.") In some cases the word is used playfully; and when a word that once had profounder meanings begins to be used in this fashion it is usually a sign that the vitality of the original concept is on the wane.

In the fourth century lip service may continue to be paid to the simpler idea of crime and punishment; but Del Grande himself notes in passing the appearance of a new idea—tyche. Gorgias used it to exculpate Helen (p. 298). Plato gives it a cautious place (p. 338). That Tyche in Plato had much greater importance than our author would concede is well shown by G. Pasquali, *Le Lettere di Platone*, pp. 148-54). Our author examines the possibility of a dominating idea of tyche in Euripides only to dismiss it (p. 208). He concedes, however, its major importance in Menander (p. 280) and in Demosthenes (p. 307). This idea of tyche would seem to be one among many signs of the times. If you admit in human affairs chance and irresponsible evil, the foundations of Aeschylean teleology are shaken. Nemesis may not inevitably follow on hybris. And indeed it is conceded in a discussion of the Stoics, after an interesting though hypothetical reconstruction of the *Republic* of Zeno, that "the problem of hybris-nemesis has lost all meaning."

How then are we to see the original concept of *hybris* as a continuing element in Christian concepts of crime or sin?

In conclusion, it seems to me that we will have to await Del Grande's second volume for the further development of his thesis that

Alongside of an essentially Spartan *paideia*, based on continuation of the *Arete* of heroic times, we find another differing *paideia*, expression of wider strata of society, which—without repudiating *Arete*—corrects it and subjects it to the principle of recognizing and defending equal rights for all which cannot be infringed without offending the gods (p. 1).

The idea of *hybris* first appears in Homer, as an offence of violence against the gods or a ruler. It develops into the idea of violent offence against a rule of justice. Emphasis next shifts from the offence to the positive civic virtue of moderation. Then, in the religious and intellectual crisis of the Athenian republic, doubts arise as to the confident theology of earlier times. Through all this development the *paideia*, it seems to me, was not in the idea of *hybris* but in that of justice in the body politic—the *paideia* of the *Republic*.

Del Grande has been badly served by his publisher. Typographical errors abound, and in his graceful apology (p. 539) he concedes that many remain uncorrected for reasons beyond his control. His style is the "scientific" style that is prevalent nowadays. There are, however, in Italy still classical scholars with great literary gifts. From the University of Naples, where the tradition of Labriola is still alive, one does not expect phrases such as "the lyric wave that runs through the veins of tragedy" (p. 446) or Hesoid "gripping with his teeth his meagre paternal legacy" (p. 30). In most places the author fully acknowledges his debt to other scholars. In his treatment of myth, where he follows Frutiger's in *Les Mythes de Platon*, the extent of his indebtedness seems to me not sufficiently stated. English and American literature is more fully quoted and discussed than is usual in continental studies. It would be invidious to cite omissions, none of which are of major importance.

The five appendices are all of interest, particularly that on the meaning of "agnos" and the long discussion on the authenticity of the *Prometheus Vinctus* in which, after a survey of preceding discussion, the author analyzes the tragedy and compares it with others of Aeschylus (pp. 435-457). Even though German and Italian doubts as to authenticity may find little echo here, Del Grande's treatment of the problem throws light on the play itself. This appendix, as also the long discussion of *hybris* in tragedy in the body of the book, is both valuable and illuminating.

One may have critical reservations as to method and matter of the present volume. Nevertheless one follows the treatment of its theme with growing interest and cannot but look forward to the promised second volume. The author has assembled impressive evidence for what should be a substantial and scholarly structure.

FRITZ PRINGSHEIM. *The Greek Law of Sale.* Weimar, Hermann Böhlau Nachfolger, 1950. Pp. XIX + 580.

In the preface Pringsheim writes, "My main task consisted in the interpretation of texts." This is an accurate description of the book, for it is largely devoted to an analysis of the 44 double column pages of texts—literary, epigraphical, and papyrological—which are listed at the end of the volume. The result is a very scholarly work, but one which will lend itself primarily to reference purposes.

The title of the book raises a question. What is meant by Greek law? For the Hellenistic period Pringsheim quotes with approval the words of Rostovtzeff, *Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World*, p. 1047,—“a legal Hellenistic *κοινή* in course of development”—, a statement with which most people will probably agree. For the fourth and earlier centuries, however, the term Greek law is misleading. I do not see how the Gortynian Code and the Attic authors, for example, can be used as evidence for any states except Gortyn and Athens respectively. Since there was no Greek nation, I doubt if there was a Greek law.

Ptolemaic law, Pringsheim points out, was much more influenced by Greek law than by Egyptian. Concerning the influence of Athenian law he says dogmatically (p. 8): “Obviously Ptolemaic law is not strongly influenced by Athenian law.” This judgment seems questionable when one remembers that Theophrastus’ pupil, Demetrius of Phalerum, the *τρίτος νομοθέτης Ἀθηνησιν* (*Synecellus*, 521, Dindorf), spent many years with the first Ptolemy under whom *νομοθεσίας ἡρές* (Aelian, *V.H.*, III, 17).

The subject matter of this book is the Greek law of sale, but, since “sale is a contract as well as a transfer of property,” Pringsheim devotes most of Part I—Introduction—to an analysis of the Greek law of contract. He objects (pp. 14-15) to the common doctrine that “the history (of contract) begins with consensual contracts and proceeds to formal ones. This course of evolution is in itself improbable, since the early history of legal transactions is always dominated by formalism; independence of form is a later gradual growth.” Scholars who adopt this view forget “that an oral agreement may be something else than a mere consensual contract.” After examining the evidence from Homer to the Ptolemaic papyri, Pringsheim concludes that the witnessing of contracts—which implies a certain amount of formalism—was essential if the contracts were to produce liability. “The mistrust of the mere oral declaration explains why the Romans, who trusted it, spoke contemptuously of ‘Graeca fides’” (p. 29). He summarizes his views in the following sentences (pp. 43-6): “The Greeks had been a writing people since the 9th century. Nevertheless for a long time they preferred witnessed oral transactions to documents . . . On the other hand, documents, because the statements made in them are not subject to uncertainty and change, provided safer evidence than witnesses whose depositions were liable to be unreliable. Thus it became more and more advisable and usual, especially as commercial life developed, to combine both, the legally indispensable

witnesses and the expedient documentation . . . Yet during a long transitional period documents did not replace attestation, but only helped to prove it . . . In Greece for a long period written instruments produced liability only if they were witnessed . . . Witnessing was the source of liability, documents were merely evidence, though good evidence. Even in Egypt with her very different political and economic conditions the form of document first used (in the Ptolemaic period), namely the six-witness document, was creative of liability only because it was witnessed." In the course of time "the publicity of witnessing was more and more replaced by the publicity of documentation . . . In general a survey of the Greek evidence gives the impression that as a rule witnessed writing remained necessary. Only in Egypt can we observe the replacement of the witnessed by the written transaction, of the six-witness document by the written ὁμολογία."

Although Pringsheim's arguments are impressive that a purely consensual contract was not binding for the Greeks, the conclusion which he draws, that the Greeks did not have general actions—e. g., a συνθηκῶν (*συμβολαίων*) παραβάσεως δίκη—in addition to special actions, is highly questionable. It is true that the only specific reference to this suit seems to be Pollux, VIII, 31. Pringsheim (pp. 50-1) suggests that Pollux, or his predecessor, may have derived the notion of the action from the general language of Plato, *Crito*, 52D; 54C. There is evidence, however, that the Athenians did not always have recourse to a special action. In Isaeus, III, 9; 78, in regard to a dowry which should have been returned after the dissolution of the marriage, the speaker asks: ὅποιαν δίκην σίτου ἡ τῆς προικὸς αὐτῆς . . . δικάσασθαι ἡξίωσεν. The translation certainly must be—what sort of suit for maintenance or for the dowry itself did he deem it right to bring—rather than a specific—what δίκη σίτου or what δίκη προικός. The implication is clear that a person seeking restitution of a dowry had various actions at his disposal. Similarly Demosthenes, XLI (wrongly numbered 42 by Pringsheim, p. 49, n. 1), was probably not a δίκη προικός. That suit was included among the ἔμμηνοι δίκαι (Aristotle, *Ath. Const.*, 52, 2) and hence, presumably, was not first referred to arbitrators (Lipsius, *Attische Recht*, pp. 228; 497). The litigation at issue in Demosthenes, XLI, however, had previously been brought before arbitrators (sections 12 and 28), and also other claims were being levelled against Spoudias besides the balance of the dowry due (sections 8-11). The evidence from these two speeches, therefore, seems to prove that the Athenians did not always have to make use of a special action, but could have recourse to a more general one, which may very well have been Pollux's συμβολαίων, συνθηκῶν παραβάσεως.

Part II is entitled: The Greek Law of Sale. History and Theory. In this section Pringsheim takes the theory of Josef Partsch on the nature of the Greek law of sale, develops it, and propounds a thesis (pp. 90-2). The gist of the first part of this thesis is as follows (the remaining parts will be mentioned below in the résumé of Part III): "Greek law never abandoned the principle of cash sale . . . Sale is for the Greeks identical with the exchange of money

against goods . . . Since consensual contracts do not exist in Greece the mere informal agreement to sell and to buy is not a contract which binds both parties. Therefore there are no actions arising out of sale." Originally both payment and transfer of possession were necessary for transfer of ownership. Subsequently this *traditio*, *παράδοσις*, was not required, and the transfer of ownership depended on payment alone (cf. p. 219).

This thesis is discussed at length in Part II on the basis not only of the legal documents but also of the writings and attitudes of Plato, Aristotle, and Theophrastus. In this review there is space for only a few comments. Pringsheim believes that in contracts of sale the "strongest and oldest Greek form" was expressed as: B from A bought. This is the type found in the register of Tenos, *I. G.*, XII, 5, no. 872. Sale is a two-sided transaction, *ώνη—πρᾶσις* (*emptio-venditio*), but, since in Greek thought the acquisition of ownership was the predominant factor, it is only natural that *ώνη* was the usual term for the contract. Consequently, he suggests that the heading of the Tenos register should be restored as [Αἰδε *ώναι* ἐνέ] *νοτο* *χωρίων* *καὶ* *οἰκῶν* rather than [Αἰδε *πράσεις*—]. This is sound reasoning, but, when he advocates (pp. 117-19) that the term *ώνη* *ἐπὶ λύσει* should be used rather than *πρᾶσις* *ἐπὶ λύσει*, he goes too far, I believe. It is true that neither expression as such exists in the sources and that in two orations of Demosthenes (XXXIII; XXXVII) the creditors speak of purchasing the security. This is only natural, since the creditors (purchasers) are the speakers. If the pleas of the debtors had been preserved, then, of course, the talk would have been of the selling of real estate as security. Since over one hundred Attic mortgage stones with a formula similar to *ὅρος χωρίου πεπραμένου ἐπὶ λύσει* have been preserved, it seems certain that among the debtor (vendor) class a mortgage transaction called *πρᾶσις* *ἐπὶ λύσει* was only too familiar.

In Part III, The Greek Law of Sale. Practice, Pringsheim continues the elucidation of his thesis and shows how the Greeks, while retaining the conception of sale for ready money, managed to shape the rules of sale so as to meet new economic conditions. He first discusses Sale on Credit. Since transfer of ownership was dependent on payment of the full price, the vendor remained owner when he delivered goods not yet paid for. Recovery of the goods, however, was sometimes impossible. Consequently, since there was no action arising from the law of sale, the vendor often had recourse to the law of loan. The price which the purchaser had promised to pay was considered as a loan to him; thus protection was offered to the vendor, since the contract of loan was actionable. Similarly in Contracts for Cash Payment with Deferred Delivery, Pringsheim maintains that the purchaser sought protection by recourse to the law of loan. In *P. Hibeḥ*, 84a, for example, the vendor states that he has sold some wheat and received the price. Then, in what Pringsheim calls the loan part of the contract, the purchaser is secured by a penalty and an execution clause in case the vendor shall not deliver the goods by the stipulated time. Subsequently

another form was developed—*όμολογος*—*ἔχειν τιμὴν*—*ἀρταβῶν*—*καὶ ἀποδώσω*. This “new contract brought into existence a duty to deliver goods which could be enforced by an execution clause and guaranteed by a surety.” Another method which provided protection to the purchaser in cases of Sale with Deferred Delivery was to have the notary insert a clause in the contract granting him a right of seizure. Thus, although the concept of sale for ready money remained, the purchaser was enabled to force the fulfilment of the agreement by recourse to the old Greek principle of self-help. By means such as those just outlined “the requirements of a continuous development of economic intercourse were satisfied by an ingenious adaptation of Greek and Hellenistic forms and rules which could be found outside the province of the law of sale” (p. 333).

Pringsheim discusses at length the institutions of the arra (*ἀρταβῶν*—the earnest) and of warranty (*βεβαιώσις*). In origin the arra was probably similar to a pledge—the so-called ring arra. It was a one-sided liability on the part of the buyer, for, if the price was not paid, the ring was forfeited. If the price was paid, the vendor had to return the ring. In the course of time the arra became a part payment of the price and created a mutual liability. If the buyer did not pay the balance by a stipulated time, he forfeited the arra. On the other hand, the vendor, if he refused to accept the remainder of the price, was ordinarily liable to double the arra. The payment of arra did not grant ownership of the goods to the purchaser. Transfer of ownership resulted from payment of the full price. Defense of the purchaser's ownership was an important duty which fell upon the vendor. Hence warranty against eviction was the earliest obligation in sale; the rules concerning publicity in sales, of course, were designed to prevent sales by non-owners. If the vendor failed to warrant the buyer's ownership, he could be sued under the *δίκη βεβαιώσεως* and be compelled to pay either the simple price or double that amount. The position of the purchaser was stronger if a *βεβαιωτήρος*, *προαποδότης*, or *πρατήρος* was present at the actual sale. These titles apparently designated the person from whom the vendor himself had bought; such a person obviously was best qualified to guarantee the title of the vendor and consequently of the most recent purchaser. By the first century B.C. these guarantors had disappeared and the vendor alone is *βεβαιωτής*. Besides warranty against eviction there was also warranty against secret defects. It was the duty of market officials to protect purchasers against latent defects in all sorts of commodities, but in the case of slaves, and possibly cattle, special provision was made by law. Pringsheim discusses in some detail the term *ἐπαφή* which is found exclusively in connection with the sale of slaves. The use of such phrases as *ἐκτὸς ἵερᾶς νόσου καὶ ἐπαφῆς* seems to prove conclusively that the word is a medical term (i. e., leprosy) rather than a legal one (*manus injectio*).

In the Conclusion Pringsheim makes certain observations which deserve to be quoted or paraphrased. “It is neither possible nor necessary to summarize the results of this monograph. Most of them are more or less hypothetical . . . But two features will probably

stand firm: the lasting simple concept of Greek sale as a sale for ready money, and the adroit versatility with which Greek and Hellenistic practitioners managed to satisfy the requirements of a highly civilized world." The Greek law of sale has been misunderstood, for "it seemed impossible that Greek law should not at least have begun to develop the idea of a consensual contract . . . But not even a tendency towards a binding contract of sale is in fact discernible." The necessary economic results were obtained by means lying outside the field of sale proper. Pringsheim, then, after making some general remarks on Greek private law as a whole and the difference in spirit between Greek and Roman law, adds the interesting comment: "Aversion to oversharpe distinctions, preservation of old and still useful concepts, dislike of rigid rules are common to Greek and English law."

It is very difficult to give a fair verdict on this book. The amount of material collected and examined is tremendous, although, strangely enough, there is no discussion of the origin of the sale of immovables. May not the *πράσις ἐπὶ λύσει*, in Attica at least, have been one of the first stages in the history of the sale of real property? Only specialists in the Greek law of sale will be competent to pass judgment on much of this work, for it is definitely a book for the specialist. The mass of detail, the all too frequent obscurity of expression, and the inadequate summaries and conclusions, which are so scattered throughout the pages that it is often difficult to know to what period they refer, will not encourage the student of other aspects of the Graeco-Roman world to read this monograph. Legal scholars, I firmly believe, do the study of antiquity a great disservice when they write in such esoteric fashion that only the coterie of jurists can profit from their researches. Some knowledge of the law of a people is so essential to a proper understanding of their civilization that it is unforgivable for legal experts by their unnecessarily involved language to discourage the acquisition of that knowledge. Law is a difficult and complex subject, but it is possible to write lucidly on it. Beauchet, whom Pringsheim frequently criticizes severely, is a shining example of such clarity of expression. His *Histoire du Droit Privé de la République Athénienne* may contain many mistakes and misconceptions—considering the scope of the work and its date (1897) one might wonder that they were not more numerous—but on no page in the whole four volumes is his meaning in doubt. I regret that I cannot pay a similar tribute to Pringsheim's learned work.

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Marci Tulli Ciceronis Epistularum ad Familiares Libri Sedecim, edidit HUMBERTUS MORICCA. Turin, G. B. Paravia & Co., 1950. Pars Prior (Libri I-VIII), pp. lxxii+314, Lire 1200; Pars Altera (Libri IX-XVI), pp. 315-717, Lire 1300. (*Corpus Scriptorum Latinorum Paravianum.*)

*Omnis . . . Ciceronis epistulas legendas censeo.* This ancient judgment is one with which the great majority of those who are acquainted with Cicero's letters agree; the latter-day Mommsens are few and hardly vocal now. No panegyric is then needed to convince readers of the worth of these documents, but just because his material is so widely known and highly regarded any editor of these letters must face two crucial questions. These are whether a new edition is needed, and whether the proposed edition meets the need if one exists. What follows will explain briefly why Professor Moricca has little cause to fear either question.

A new edition of all the letters of Cicero is badly needed. Any selection, however excellently managed, is by nature incomplete. Modern editions of all the letters are few. The most important is of course the monumental work of Tyrrell and Purser; this remains valuable, but is expensive, bulky, and not always available even to those who can afford it. More pertinent is the fact that since its publication there has been a considerable advance in Ciceronian scholarship. The Teubner edition, as revised by Sjögren, is useful but neither complete nor fully reliable in its critical apparatus. The Budé edition by L.-A. Constans is a very commendable undertaking; so far, however, only three volumes, covering those letters written in 51 B. C. and earlier, have appeared, and in any case the nature of the series makes any extensive critical apparatus impracticable. We need then an edition of all the letters which will make it possible for students and readers to enjoy the fruits of modern research: whether the present work meets that need is the next question.

Before any detailed consideration of the contents of these two volumes is attempted, however, it seems appropriate to mention a dilemma which must confront any editor of these letters: should they be presented in their traditional division by books, or instead arranged as nearly as may be in their chronological order? Neither method will satisfy everyone. Those whose chief concern with the letters is to check references made to them by scholars will doubtless be best served by an edition which preserves the traditional order. Those who wish to read the letters for their wealth of playful, melancholy, serious, or ephemeral comments on the kaleidoscopic scenes of the end of the republic, or for their revelation of the character and moods of their mercurially sensitive author, will rightly wish to read them in their chronological order. It is notorious that frequently a letter to Atticus, for example, will cast such a flood of light on the nuances of a letter to some Roman dignitary that to read the latter by itself is dangerous and misleading. The quotation at the head of this review emphasizes the need for a study of all the letters, and the only way in which this

can be done both conveniently and with understanding is in an edition in which they appear in order. In the Budé edition Constans wisely followed Tyrrell and Purser and others in adopting such a chronological order, and the only serious fault that the reviewer finds with the present volumes is that their editor, who proposes to give us all the letters, has chosen to preserve the old scheme of *Epistulae ad Familiares, ad Atticum*, and so forth.

There are some seventy pages of introductory matter in the first of these two volumes, and each page is valuable. In his preface the editor gives a full account of the manuscripts concerned, and traces their history and affiliations. Here Moricca's conclusions differ little from those of Constans in the first volume of his *Correspondance*, pp. 14-26; the chief change is that the later editor does not agree with, or at least does not mention, the view that D is definitely superior to, though certainly later than, the other MSS of the Y class. Moricca, however, has not been content merely to follow in the footsteps of others; he has himself collated M, D, and V, and notes particularly, p. xx, n. 1, that his labors on the first two of these were *non sine fructu*. In establishing the text he is generally conservative, but space is found in the apparatus for the more important emendations and conjectures.

The preface is followed by eight pages of *testimonia*, dating from Seneca to Politian, after which are listed the principal editions of Cicero. English readers certainly, and perhaps others, will wish to add to the three German works comprising the list of *Epistulae Selectae* the famous edition by W. W. How, and will be somewhat surprised at the citation under *Epistulae Omnes* of the useful little volume of A. L. Irvine. Having chosen to print the letters out of chronological order, the editor goes far towards correcting this error by printing in twenty-five pages an annotated list of their order, so far as modern scholarship has been able to determine it. The scope of this account may be well illustrated by quoting from p. lii the note on one letter, XVI, 23:

De tempore non satis constat. RUETE (*Correspondenz*, p. 25) circ. a. d. X Kal. Quint., SCHMIDT (*Tab. chron. apud Mendelsohnum*, p. 457, n. 330, et *N. Jahrb. f. Klass. Philol.*, 1884, p. 337 sq.) hanc ep. V Kal. Iun. a. 710/44 datam censem (cf. TYRRELL-PURSER *Correspondence*, V<sup>2</sup>, p. 351). *Exeunte mense Iunio*, scripsit SJÖGREN, quem ego sequutus sum. Sed de hac re non idem sentit LIBBERTZ (*Phil. Wochenschr.*, p. 703 sq.), qui epistulam ante Caesarem necatum scriptam opinatur, neque tamen certos temporis fines terminosque constituit.

It may be supposed that such a list of chronological information alone would justify the purchase of this volume. A bibliography of the chief works used by the editor, and a list of Greek words with their Latin equivalents, complete the introductory matter. To find a Latin synonym for a Greek word is not always easy; one may question, however, the suggestion on p. lxx of *pignora* for *ἱποθήκας* in XIII, 56, 2, since apart from the difference in law between *pignus* and *hypotheca* we find that in the next line Cicero himself uses the transliterated form as a Latin word.

While there is much of interest in the introductory pages, it is perhaps in the extensive critical apparatus that Moricca's work appears to best advantage. To comment on all the matter in this apparatus would be neither practicable nor desirable, but three chief points may be noted. We find here the fullest account of the manuscript readings, as may be seen by comparing almost any page of this edition with the appropriate section of Tyrrell and Purser or Sjögren: the importance of such an account needs no elaboration. In this apparatus we also find a storehouse of references to the works of other scholars who have been concerned with the text. Finally, Moricca shows that his textual studies have indeed been not without result: on numerous occasions he indicates that the readings of Mendelssohn, often followed by later editors, are not found in the manuscripts as stated. These points may be illustrated by placing the apparatus for XII, 2, 2 furnished by Sjögren next to that in the present edition: both versions are given in complete form:

12 *sq. de asynd. cf. 4, 2, 1; 10, 15, 4* (*Plancus*); *Sj. 5 p. 137*  
13 *sint D sunt MH*      17 *dirumpitur HD, vulg. cf. 7, 1, 4*

Compare with this Moricca's apparatus:

23 *tris VD*      24 *qui quia Ω; qui, quia <quae> Cratander, Baiter, Wesenberg senserint libere Ω: senserint <quaeque senserint> libere Lehmann (Quaest. Tull., p. 54), coll. *Ad fam.*, IV, 14, 1 si dignitas . . . quod sentias; V, 14, 2; *Tusc. disp.*, I, 3, 6; libereque coniecit Mueller, sed ego lectionem traditam haud sollicitandam puto; hic habes enim asyndeton bimembre, cuius exempla apud Ciceronem non infrequenter occurrunt (cf. *Ad Att.*, VII, 4, 2; *Ad fam.*, IV, 2, 1; X, 15, 4; alia plurima, quae collegit Lehmann, Quaest. Tull., p. 26) sint vulg.: sunt VMHD (non sint D, ut Mendelssohn et Sjögren perperam adnotaverunt)  
28 *dirrumpiter M: dirumpiter VHD, vulg., cf. Ad fam., VII, 1, 4 dirrupi*      29 *delenitus M: delinitus VHD tollerabilia VHD: tolerabilia M<sup>2</sup> tolebilis M**

All the apparatus, of course, is not as full as this, but certainly Moricca seldom errs on the side of too great brevity.

There are, as one might expect in a work so detailed, a few misprints and inconsistencies, but each reader will note these for himself and there is little to be gained by listing them here. They are not so numerous as to detract from the value of these volumes, which everyone who is concerned with Cicero's letters will wish to consult and perhaps place on his shelves.

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PIERRE AMANDRY. La mantique Apollinienne à Delphes: Essai sur le fonctionnement de l'oracle. Paris, E. de Boccard, 1950. Pp. 290; 6 plates. (*Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome*, fascicule 170.)

Amandry has made a thorough study of all the evidence that bears upon the operations of the Delphic oracle, and in consequence has produced the soundest book that has as yet appeared upon this subject. As he says in conclusion, the results of his inquiry are in large part negative. He has nevertheless advanced the study of this subject by ridding it of several false ideas that have long been held as certain.

For over half a century it has been known that there is not nor ever has been at Delphi a chasm or fissure from which issued mephitic vapors that brought a trance or delirium to the Pythia, though the divine operations are so described in some ancient writers. But, though the chasm has, so to speak, disappeared, the Pythia's ecstasy has remained a fixed point in the scholarly discussion of the Delphic oracle. Now Amandry has disposed of that: there is simply no good evidence that the Pythia entered into an ecstatic or hysterical or delirious or trancelike state before she spoke oracles. The author finds the source of this view in Christian and other late misunderstandings of *Phaedrus* 244AB, and shows convincingly that this passage is based upon Plato's contrast between reason and intuition, between the man who is σώφρων, ἔμφρων, and him who is ἐκφρων or ἐνθεος. The Pythia was ἐνθεος, but her inspiration was manifest only in the state of grace that followed upon due performance of the preliminary rites: the chewing of laurel leaves and drinking of the waters of Castalia were meant to purify the Pythia and had nothing to do with mantic powers. The vapors had their origin in the *pneuma* of philosophical speculations, as seen in Plutarch's dialogues. Along with the Pythia's ecstasy vanishes the theory that the cult of Dionysus had a great influence upon the Pythia's role.

There is no evidence for the view that the priests interpreted and reduced to intelligible form the incoherent and unintelligible words that the Pythia spoke during her inspiration. Rather, the evidence tends to show that it was the Pythia who was the shrine's *porte-parole*; for in the numerous records of consultations it is either Apollo or the Pythia, but never the priest-prophet, who is said to speak the response directly to the consultant.

About many problems, including the central question of his inquiry, the mantic process at Delphi, Amandry is necessarily inconclusive. There is too little evidence upon which to base sound and convincing conclusions. Most ancients who wrote about the Delphic oracle did not themselves know what was done. Those who did, e.g. Plutarch, tell us little; they probably could not reveal the innermost secrets of the shrine.

So persistent, however, was the tradition of divination by lots at Delphi, that Amandry is inclined to think that lots were in fact

used at Delphi throughout the oracle's history, not only to determine the order of consultation and the like, but also to determine the god's will. He believes that the responses had a twofold expression; or, to put it another way, he distinguishes between the divinatory rite, in which lots were used and in which the god's will was revealed, and the prophetic rite, in which the Pythia communicated the god's will in words to the consultant.

In this fashion he explains the contrast between the clarity of the responses that we find in inscriptions and the obscurity or ambiguity of those found in historians and philosophers. In the inscriptions, he points out, we usually find a simple response formula in answer to an alternative put before the oracle. Vastly different are the verse responses that we encounter in the pages of Herodotus or Pausanias.

He has done well to emphasize this difference, which has been neglected by most writers on Delphi. But, no doubt unintentionally, he leads the reader to suppose that this difference corresponds closely to the nature of the document, that it is a difference between epigraphic and literary sources. That is actually not the case. It is really a difference between contemporary records and later sources. The oracles reported by Thucydides or Xenophon as delivered in his own lifetime are simply expressed, apparently in prose, and are little if any different from the oracles found in inscriptions. With one or two dubious exceptions, all contemporary records report a simple response which either approves a course of action or legislation or which designates the gods that should be worshipped, if the consultant is to prosper or the enterprise is to be successful. These responses are usually uninteresting in both form and content. The famous verse oracles, such as those given to Croesus or to the colonisers, ambiguous or unclear in expression, are in every instance reported by an author who lived at least a generation after the supposed date of the response. The writer, of course, received the report from someone else; but whether or not from a contemporary source, we can never be sure. In any case, such responses do not occur in any contemporary document that has come down to us.

These ambiguous verse oracles, supposedly historical, while differing markedly in form and manner of expression from the certainly genuine responses, are exactly like the legendary oracles in these respects. The ancients themselves often mentioned the Croesus oracles in the same breath with the Laius-Oedipus oracles, seldom doubting that both were genuine. Amandry apparently accepts as genuine many quasi-historical responses of this sort (though apparently not the Croesus oracles). But the genuineness of all such oracles must be questioned.

None the less Amandry's theory deserves careful study. There are extant some certainly genuine verse oracles, which, though expressed in poetic periphrases, are transparent in meaning. It may well be that such verses were composed for the Pythia and were spoken by her after the divinatory rite, consultation of the lots. But we must observe in respect to the oracles quoted by Thucydides and Xenophon that neither the historian nor any later author even hints at a verse

form. Also, if lots were used to determine Apollo's answer to an alternative question of which the second member was often "or not," we should expect some negatives among the genuine responses; or, more precisely, some answers contrary to the wishes of the consultants. If such answers were given, not one appears among approximately seventy certainly genuine responses. Always the response appears to favor the apparent wish of the consultant. In fact, the response, as Amandry notices, is often no more than a sanction of a decision already made by the consultant.

The oracle said no to the Athenians' question on the working of the Eleusinian *orgas* about 350 B. C. Not only may that answer have suited the wishes of the Eleusinian priesthood, but we also know from *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 204 that the question was presented in a very unusual way: the Pythia was asked simply to indicate the sealed urn which contained the right answer. In this consultation, it seems, the Athenians were in real doubt about the best course to take.

The documents, therefore, tend to show that the answer was not left to the chance indication of lots. But the evidence is far from conclusive. And the scenes of consultation on vase-paintings seem to confirm the use of lots in divination at Delphi.

Amandry opposes the ancient tradition, accepted by many modern scholars, that the Apolline oracle succeeded a chthonian oracle over which Ge and Themis ruled. He thinks that the legend, as found in the prologue of Aeschylus' *Eumenides*, was made to fit the history of the Delphic oracle into the Hesiodic *Theogony*, so that a high antiquity, antedating the birth of Apollo himself, might be claimed for the oracular shrine. But there is in reality no trace of a cult or oracle of Ge at Delphi in Mycenaean times. The earliest cult of the place occupied the terrace of Athena Pronaea in Mycenaean times, whatever deity was the object of worship then. There is no evidence that this was an oracular cult. The sanctuary of Apollo was established on its historical site in the eighth century. There was apparently no cult foundation there before that time. Earlier cults were nearer to the Castalian spring.

It was the Castalian spring and its recess, according to Amandry, that gave rise to the tradition of a chasm or opening in the earth, the source of the Pythia's inspiration, and once guarded by the serpent Python. I think, rather, that the Corycian Cave, higher up the mountain, is the reality behind the Delphic chasm and Python's cave. That, I believe, was the original scene of the Apollo-Python combat; notice that Zeus' fight with Typhon was connected with the Corycian Cave of Cilicia, which was also guarded by a she-serpent named Delphyne. For not only is Typhon very like Python, but the Delphic serpent is sometimes female and named Delphyne. And Strabo (IX, 3, 3, p. 418) tells us that the Delphians had formerly inhabited Lycorea, which was situated on the Parnassian plateau just below the Corycian Cave. There, perhaps, was the original Delphic oracle, which was transferred to Pytho when the Delphians moved thither from Lycorea. This will be the subject of an article which I plan to write soon.

Though some of Amandry's suggestions and conclusions may be

questioned, his judgments are always sensible and his conclusions always possible. He shows himself clearheaded, sceptical of traditional assumptions, to which he prefers the evidence presented by the sources and by archaeology, and discriminating in his use of the sources. In general his conclusions complement my own; he has proceeded along the same lines as I have followed in my Delphic studies.

A pre-introductory section contains a useful and critical bibliography of books and articles that directly concern the subject of the Delphic oracle's operations. The book is divided into three parts: I, Méthodes de Divination; II, La Consultation de l'Oracle; III, Histoire et Légende. Space prevents my discussing his treatment of such interesting subjects as frequency of consultation, preliminary sacrifices, and fees. In an appendix he lists and quotes the principal sources, referring to them by number in his text and notes.

I have only minor criticisms to make apart from the questions I have raised above. He frequently cites "Eudocia" as a reliable and independent source; and in his appendix (p. 259) accepts the *Violarium* as a genuine work of the eleventh-century Eudocia. He does not seem to be aware that the *Violarium* has been shown to be a sixteenth-century hodgepodge (see *R.-E.*, s. v. Eudokia, 3). It contains nothing that cannot be found in other extant works, whence, in fact, the compiler Palaiokappas made his extracts. On page 29 Amandry stresses the agreement of Nonnus the commentator, Suidas, and "Eudocia" concerning the lots at Delphi. But there is nothing remarkable about this agreement. Of the two passages cited from the *Violarium* one was taken from Nonnus, the other from Suidas.

On page 231 Amandry refers to Apollo as (*le*) *dieu solaire*. But certainly there is nothing in the evidence to prove that Apollo was considered a sun-god at Delphi. Surely the Helius of *Homeric Hymn* 3, 371-4 cannot be identified with Apollo. Also *Hymn* 3, 440-5 can hardly be understood to identify Apollo with the sun. And there is little else that one can use to prove a solar Apollo at Delphi.

But who can entirely avoid error? Amandry's book is a landmark in the study of the Delphic oracle.

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FRITZ TAEGER. *Das Altertum: Geschichte und Gestalt der Mittelmeerländer.*<sup>1</sup> Vierte Auflage. Stuttgart, W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1950. Pp. XVI + 980; 48 plates, 6 sketch maps. 19. 80 DM.

In ancient history as in other fields successful popularizers have been few. This handsomely printed and illustrated book represents

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<sup>1</sup> Thus on the title page of the book; "der Mittelmeerwelt" on the dust jacket, "des Mittelmeerraums" in the publisher's mimeographed prospectus.

Professor Taeger's ambitious bid to join that small company. The book has apparently enjoyed considerable popularity in Germany, to judge from the appearance of three editions in three years (1939-42), followed now by a fourth edition. The earlier editions, published during World War II, were not reviewed in this country. In this latest edition there is a certain amount of re-writing and new writing, and many of the illustrations have been changed; but the book and its point of view remain essentially the same.

In the *Einleitung* to the first edition (repeated in the second and third) Taeger announced as the aim of this work "das bunte Geschehen der Alten Geschichte in einer umfassenden Sicht zu schildern und deuten." The next year he proclaimed in the *Vorwort* to the second edition "die Gewissheit . . . dass ich mein Ziel erreicht habe." Then came reviews in several German periodicals. These were generally favorable, superficial, and political. The reviewers in *Klio* (XXXIII [1940], pp. 245-6) and *Philologische Wochenschrift* (LXI [1941], pp. 453-5), for example, liked the book in the main but found the racist point of view inadequately developed. As the latter put it, "Wie bei T. nicht anders zu erwarten, räumt er auch der rassenkundlichen Betrachtungsweise eine möglichst grundlegende Bedeutung ein. Selbständig gefördert hat er die Rassengeschichte des Altertums allerdings nicht, sondern nur den bereits vorhandenen Arbeiten entnommen, was er an Tauglichem zu finden glaubte."

Very different was the review by U. Kahrstedt in *Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen* (1940, pp. 148-58); this was a detailed, searching analysis, altogether free from nazistic aberration—and altogether devastating. Kahrstedt pointed out, *inter al.*, that the book did not trace the historical development of the ancient world but consisted really of a series of disconnected, static pictures of a few glorified *Blüteperioden*; that even in these the allotment of space was indefensible, with the Hellenistic and Roman imperial periods receiving particularly short shrift (even the favorable reviews commented on this obvious imbalance); that, except for early periods where the evidence was wholly or preponderantly archaeological, the author worked with literary sources almost exclusively—"genau wie zu Curtius' Zeiten"; that the emphasis throughout was so completely on *Denken* and *Geist* (characterized by the author himself at one point as "einer intellektuellen Oberschicht") that—to take two examples—the fifth-century *polis* appeared as an ideological abstraction, with the economic causes of the Peloponnesian War practically unmentioned, and the section on Augustus contained three pages on his personality but nothing on the economics of his times; and that the whole book was harder reading than it needed to be because of the effusive, high-flown language in which it was couched. Kahrstedt concluded with the remark that the lay reader would get an utterly false picture of the studies that have occupied historians of antiquity in the twentieth century from a book so thoroughly nineteenth-century in "Stoffauswahl und Methode. . . . Wenn kein Papyrus, keine Inschrift, kein Grabfund in den letzten 50 Jahren aus der Erde gekommen wäre, würde in diesem Buch, wenigstens in den Zeiten von den Tyrannen bis Diokletian, kaum

eine Zeile anders aussehen." Taeger replied in a *Vorwort* to the third edition with a testy dismissal of "positivist critics" who were not interested in understanding his self-styled "pioneering work," and an apologetic assurance to the other side that his thinking and writing really did repose on an ethnic and racial foundation.

We come thus to the current fourth edition, and what do we find? Gone, in the first place, is the now embarrassing racism from *Vorwort* and *Einleitung*, and the previous haughty attitude toward criticism is replaced by a more defensive attempt to justify the make-up and emphases of the book. In the book itself the author has yielded to criticism so far as to add half again as much text in the sections on the third and fourth centuries; he has, moreover, added a new paragraph or two here and there along the way; and he has arranged the Roman part in many more divisions and subdivisions than before—a distinct help. Beyond that we have the same unbalanced book, in which the details of the battles and marches of Alexander the Great occupy almost as many pages as the entire history of Augustus, and the period 133-44 B. C. (which Taeger knows intimately and handles best) receives a treatment equal in length to that accorded the period 44 B. C.-193 A. D. "Wer auch jetzt noch an der Kürze der hellenistischen und kaiserzeitlichen Abschnitte Anstoss nimmt, vergesse nicht," we are told (p. VIII), "dass es für mich sehr viel leichter gewesen wäre, sie ebenso breit zu schildern wie die Perioden, in denen die Antike gipfelt." In other words, the last century of the Republic represents for Taeger the high point of Roman antiquity. Most of us, I think, will continue to find a closer approach to the "Gestalt der Mittelmeerländer" in the history of the cosmopolitan Empire than in the death rattle, however grand, of a small ruling élite. Most of us will continue, too, Taeger (*ibid.*) to the contrary notwithstanding, to consider the more mundane matters of economy and society as important a part of history as politics and ideas.

In sum, the informed reader can find in this book a number of apt restatements of familiar material, but I doubt if he will consider these a sufficient reward for plowing through so many turgid pages. Least well served will be the lay reader who turns to this book for the promise of its title and subtitle. For, where the *Geschichte* is so partial and out of balance, the *Gestalt* is perforce distorted.

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REINHOLD STRÖMBERG. Greek Prefix Studies on the Use of Adjective Particles. Göteborg, Wettergren & Kerbers Förlag, 1946. Pp. 204. 20 Kr. (*Acta Universitatis Gotoburgensis*, LII [1946], no. 3.)

The title of Strömberg's study is a little deceptive, as he himself admits. Although beginning with some strictures upon the general

inadequacy of research into the Greek prefixes, he very soon limits the enquiry (p. 14) to cases of adjective compounds only. Subsequently, he delimits the field of investigation still further by proposing (p. 19) to deal exclusively with adjectives compounded with the prefixes *áπο-*, *ἐκ-*, *ἐπί-*, and *ἐν-*, which lend themselves to his purpose because of their originally concrete (i. e. local) meaning. Even within these bounds, the field is so enormous that Strömberg adds still another restriction: he proposes (p. 20) to discuss chiefly those compounds of which (a) the second member is a verbal stem, or (b) the second member is itself an adjective.

This is a valuable collection of materials which includes a surprising number of sample compounds for analysis. Perhaps two general comments may be made before passing to matters of detail. In the first place, Strömberg has brought to bear his expert knowledge of Greek medical and zoological terminology. This is particularly welcome here because such compounds occur with notable frequency in the various technical writings (p. 133). In a number of cases, Strömberg is able to correct the lexica on the meaning of a rare technical term. Thus he proves convincingly (pp. 66-7) that *ἐκλευκός* as a medical term does not mean 'very white,' 'intensely white,' as sometimes translated in lexica, but is rather used in contexts which indicate the turning of a natural color to a dull, dirty white (even approaching the meaning of *ώχρός* 'pale' or 'yellowish'). Similarly, *ἐξέρυθρος* is originally used in the medical writings to denote a dirty red color (pp. 67-8). Or again, *ἐπίξηρος*, defined by Liddell-Scott-Jones as meaning 'very dry' is subjected to an interesting analysis; Strömberg establishes (pp. 97-8) that the word is rather more common than attested in lexica, and that its primary meaning is 'dry on the surface' (as used to describe the tongue of a feverish patient).

A second general remark might be that Strömberg has treated deverbal compounds with insufficient attention to verbal aspects. His otherwise excellent account (pp. 26-7) of the semantic development of *ἀπο-* posits distinctions in meaning to cover what in some cases may be no more than the difference between indeterminate and determinate aspect. Thus, apropos of *ἀποτίνειν*, it is not sufficient to lump this word with compounds meaning that something is 'harmed, weakened, destroyed, or annihilated.' Actually, the IE root \**p̥i-*, \**p̥ō-* is originally determinate in aspect and forms root aorists in Vedic Sanskrit and in Greek; from the Greek standpoint, the nasal infix of *πίνω*, like the reduplication of Lat. *bibō*, also marks a determinate aspect (see Ernout-Meillet, s. v. *bibō* and *pōtus*). One suspects that as the determinate force faded from *πίνω*, so that this verb could also be used to describe repeated or habitual acts of drinking, it was felt necessary to emphasize the determinate aspect once again by the use of a prefix (with *ἀποτίνειν* one may compare German *austrinken*). The author does indeed point out (p. 63) the inchoative-ingressive force of the prefix *ἐκ-* in such words as *ἐκβάνειν* 'sing aloud'; this is a phenomenon entirely comparable with the Russian use of *из* in such forms as *закричал* 'cried out.' He also correctly notes the ingressive force of *ἐπι-* in certain compounds (p. 162).

One of the most curious results of Strömberg's collections is to show that prefixes sometimes can be productive in two contradictory senses. He cites for example (p. 28) *ἀπομελανεῖθαι* 'turn black' beside *ἀπομέλανως* 'whitening'; or again (p. 58) *ἔξουεῖν* in the contrasted meanings, 'be intoxicated' and 'become sober'! The medical term *ἐπίτοκος* can mean (p. 83) either 'before birth' or 'after birth.' Needless to say, such opposition of meanings can in all cases be deduced from the multifold semantic development of the prefix in question. It is interesting to speculate on the degree of tolerance which Greek seems to show toward such irreconcilable elements.

Strömberg has a useful discursus (pp. 50-2) on Greek adverbial expressions for the idea of 'suddenly,' 'at once,' 'quickly,' which he brings under a number of categories with citations of parallel semantic development from other languages. He is also illuminating (pp. 86-9) on the disputed development of *ἐπιόρκος* 'perjuring oneself' (according to him, formed from *ἐπιορκεῖν*, a "prefix-noun-derivative" itself formed directly from *ἐπι-* and *ὄρκος*, in which *ἐπι-* acquires analogically the sense of 'against,' as in *ἐπιβουλεύειν*).

A few matters of detail may be mentioned in passing. Strömberg's explanation (pp. 33-4) of *ἀπηνής* 'unfriendly,' so far as it relies on etymological considerations (i. e. from a stem \**āno-* 'face' presumed on the basis of Sk. *ānanam* 'face') is probably unsatisfactory. Walde-Pokorny notes expressly, with reference to *ἀπηνής* and its contrary *προσηνής* 'friendly,' that these words are not to be connected with Sk. *ānanam* in the sense "mit zu- oder abgewendetem Antlitz" since the Sanskrit word is an innovation within Sanskrit. The Greek words probably reflect an element \*-avən̪s also seen in Goth. *ansts* 'favor,' etc. At all events, it is better not to include *πρωνής* Att. *πρᾶνής* 'bent forward,' 'prone' in this same group, as Strömberg does; the parallelism with Lat. *prōnus* is much more attractive (see J. B. Hofmann, *Etym. Wörterbuch des Griechischen* [Munich, 1950], s. v.).

The OPers. *apanyaka* 'great-great-grandfather' adduced by Strömberg (p. 76) appears to be a scribal error for *apaniyāka* in an inscription of Artaxerxes II. See Roland G. Kent, *Old Persian* (Am. Oriental Society, 1950), para. 22.

That *ἐπητής* 'courteous' contains *ἡτορ* 'heart' in its second member, as Strömberg suggests (p. 83) is fairly unlikely on phonological grounds. It is true that no etymology of this word is entirely satisfactory though it has been traditionally linked with *ἐπος*. Passow's old definition, neatly framed to consort with this etymology, was "einer der mit sich sprechen lässt, der vernünftiges Zureden annimmt."

In conclusion, one incidental and perhaps unavoidable drawback in Strömberg's work must be regretfully touched upon: though we are grateful to him for writing in English, his text is thoroughly unidiomatic and at times even incorrect. Nevertheless, the matter is here more important than the manner, and the unfortunate style does not detract from the solid worth of the book.

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